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[1993] FCA 545
Federal Court of Australia
1993-11-15
Mr P, Keely J
Original judgment source is linked above.
MOK GEK BOUY v. THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ETHNIC
Immigration - refusal to grant refugee status - whether "policy to reject" Cambodian boat-people - reasonable apprehension of bias - no waiver - principle of necessity not applicable - error of law in acting on DFAT report without obtaining an "update" - meaning of "well-founded" fear - whether established if real chance of persecution in reasonably foreseeable future - breach of natural justice in not informing applicant of Fordham report - relevant time for assessment of whether fear of persecution was well-founded - whether delegate erred in being influenced and guided in his decision by the recommendation, reasons and "attributes and experience" of members of the Refugee Status Review Committee
Chan Yee Kin v. The Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379
Livesey v. New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288
Laws v. Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1990] HCA 31; (1990) 170 CLR 70
Richmond River Broadcasters Pty Ltd v. Australian Broadcasting Tribunal and Ors (1992) 106 ALR 671
Singh v. The Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 15 FCR 4
R. v. Secretary of State for Home Department (1977) 3 All ER 452
MELBOURNE, 2-4, 15-17 February, 24-26, 29-31 March 1993, 1, 8, 21, 22 April 1993, 10 May 1993, 9-11, 15-17 June 1993, 20-23, 27-30 July 1993, 6, 9-11 and 19 August 1993
Counsel for the applicant: Mr P. N. Rose with Mr G. Moloney
Counsel for the respondents: Mr R. R. Tracey QC with Mr A. L. Cavanough
Solicitor for the respondents: Australian Government Solicitor
1. The decision of the delegate made on 3 November 1992 be set aside.
2. The applicant's application for refugee status be referred to the respondent Minister to be determined according to law by him or by a delegate other than Mr Paterson.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
2. Ms Mok Gek Bouy ("the applicant"), a Cambodian, has applied under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act for a review of the following alleged decisions and/or conduct of the Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs ("the respondent Minister") and his delegate, Mr Malcolm Paterson ("the delegate"):
(1) The decision of the delegate on 3 November 1992, that
the applicant not be granted refugee status ("the
decision");
(2) The decision of the respondent Minister made on or about
6 November 1992 to refuse to set aside the decision;
(3) Alternatively to (2) above, the failure of the
respondent Minister to make a decision to set aside the
decision and further the failure of the respondent
Minister and his delegates to decide to grant the
applicant a Domestic Protection (Temporary) Entry Permit
or visa.
It will not be necessary in these reasons to refer again to paragraphs (2) and (3) because the applicant's counsel on the last day of the hearing stated that there was no evidence to support the challenge under paragraphs 2 and 3.
2. The application to this court was filed on 24 November 1992, as was a similar application (in Matter No. VG 451/92) by Ms Ly Muy Heng (with Ly Sok Pheng as a dependant). It should perhaps be mentioned that another application to this court (by Ms Ung Bun Nat in Matter No. VG 452/1992) was also filed on the same day; however no decision is required in that matter because, on 13 August 1993, by consent, that application was struck out with no order as to costs, Ms Ung having left Australia for Austria. Each of those applicants was represented by Ms Eve Lester, solicitor, Refugee Advice and Casework Service (Vic.) Inc. ("RACS").
3. The history of certain events which occurred between the arrival of the applicant in Australia, on or about 31 March 1990, and May 1992 is not in dispute. It is conveniently set out in Chu Kheng Lim and others v. The Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs and the Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 176 CLR 1 - although the agreed facts there referred to were only agreed in that case. In that case the plaintiffs (the applicant not being one) brought an action in the High Court claiming, amongst other relief, a declaration that ss. 54L, 54N and 54R of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") were beyond the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament. Those sections were part of a new Division (Division 4B), which was inserted in the Act by the Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth). On 26 June 1992 Mason CJ stated a case under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for the consideration of a Full Court. The reasons for judgment of Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ contained the following passages:
(p 15-16) "The facts, in the context of which those
questions fall to be answered, were agreed by the parties for
the purposes of the stated case. In the following summary of
them, the quotations are from the stated case.
The plaintiffs are all Cambodian nationals. They fall
into two groups. The first group ("the firstnamed
plaintiffs") arrived in Australian territorial waters by boat
on or about 27 November 1989. All but one of the second group
("the secondnamed plaintiffs") arrived in Australian
territorial waters by boat on or about 31 March 1990. . . .
None of the plaintiffs "entered Australia holding a
valid entry permit". They have all "been detained in custody
since their arrival". On or about 8 December 1989, the
firstnamed plaintiffs applied to the Minister . . . for
refugee status within the meaning of the international
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
("the Refugee Convention and Protocol"). On or about 9 and 10
May 1990, the secondnamed plaintiffs made similar
applications. The applications by the firstnamed plaintiffs
for refugee status were all rejected by delegates of the
Minister on or about 3 and 4 April 1992. Those of the
secondnamed plaintiffs were all rejected by delegates of the
Minister on or about 5 and 6 April 1992.
Proceedings seeking an order of review in respect of the
decision to reject the applications for refugee status were
instituted by the plaintiffs in the Federal Court of
Australia. Between 6 and 14 April 1992, a judge of that Court
made orders preventing the removal of the plaintiffs from
Australia. On 15 April 1992, pursuant to s. 16(1)(a) and (b)
of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977
(Cth), the Federal Court set aside each of the decisions
rejecting the plaintiffs' applications for refugee status and
ordered that the matters to which those decisions related be
referred back to a delegate of the Minister for determination.
The Federal Court also ordered that outstanding applications,
which the plaintiffs had made in the proceedings, for orders
that they be released from custody be adjourned for hearing
commencing on 7 May 1992.
On 5 May 1992, that is to say two days before the
hearing of the plaintiffs' applications for orders for release
from custody was due to commence in the Federal Court, the
Parliament of the Commonwealth passed the Migration Amendment
Act 1992 (Cth) ("the Amending Act") which inserted a new
Division - Div. 4B - after Div. 4A of Pt 2 of the Act. The
Amending Act received the Royal assent on 6 May 1992.
Division 4B became operative from that date. As will be seen,
it provides, inter alia, for the compulsory detention in
custody of certain non-citizens who come within the definition
of a "designated person" for the purposes of Div. 4B. The
stated case expressly states that the "plaintiffs fall within"
that definition. . . . "
Their Honours then dealt with the provisions of Division 4B of the Act, saying that they "constitute a single legislative scheme in relation to the compulsory detention in custody of persons who come within the Division's definition of "designated person". " Sections 54J and 54U were as follows:
"54J. This Division is enacted because the Parliament
considers that it is in the national interest that each
non-citizen who is a designated person should be kept in custody
until he or she:
(a) leaves Australia; or
(b) is given an entry permit.
. . .
54U. A statement by an officer, on oath or affirmation,
that the Department has given a particular person a
designation described in paragraph (e) of the definition of
'designated person' in section 54K is conclusive evidence that
the Department has given that person that designation."
Having regard to matters dealt with later in these reasons, it is convenient to set out here the following passages from their Honours' reasons for judgment:
(p 21) "The plaintiffs had, at the time of the commencement of
Div. 4B (6 May 1992), been held in custody for . . . a little
over two years in the case of the secondnamed plaintiffs. . .
. (T)he view was apparently taken by the Minister's
Department that, in a case where a vessel can never leave
because it has been destroyed, temporary custody under s.
88(1) and (2) can continue indefinitely. As has been seen,
however, that approach to the construction of the section was
mistaken.
(p 22) The result is that the continued detention of each
plaintiff in custody after the destruction of the boat . . .
was unlawful. Thereafter, and continuing to the time of the
commencement of Div. 4B, each of the plaintiffs was entitled
to approach this Court, or any other court of competent
jurisdiction, to obtain an order for his or her release.
. . .
(p 24) Finally, and most significantly, s. 54N authorizes the
arrest and detention in custody of a designated person . . .
"even" if he or she had been released from custody pursuant to
an order "by a court" (s. 54N(2)). Indeed, in the context of
the pending proceedings in the Federal Court, it appears that
one of the objects of the Act was to clothe with legislative
authority the custody in which the "boat people" were being
kept, a custody that might have been brought to an abrupt end
once a court ascertained that that custody was unlawful.
(p 25) Accordingly, the questions reserved by the stated case
must be approached on the basis that: (i) none of the
plaintiffs is an "illegal entrant"; (ii) none of the
plaintiffs has committed any offence against the Act or any
other law; (iii) each of the plaintiffs was unlawfully held in
custody at the commencement of Div. 4B; and (iv) if the
provisions of Div. 4B are completely valid, they authorize the
Department, by administrative "designation", effectively to
direct and enforce the compulsory detention in custody (ss.
54L, 54M, 54N) of any person in the situation of the
plaintiffs, under a regime where no court can, while such a
person remains "a designated person", "order (his or her)
release from custody" (s. 54R).
. . .
(p 35-36) Section 54R provides that a court "is not to order
the release from custody of a designated person" . . . The
section must, however, be read with s. 54U which provides that
a statement by a Departmental officer that the Department has
given a person "a designation described in paragraph (e) of
the definition (of designated person)" is "conclusive
evidence" of that fact . . . if a person does satisfy all
those elements and is a "designated person" for the purposes
of the Division, s. 54R purports to direct the courts,
including this Court, not to order his or her release from
custody regardless of the circumstances. . . . In fact, of
course, it is manifest that circumstances could exist in which
a "designated person" was unlawfully held in custody by a
person purportedly acting in pursuance of Div. 4B. . . . it
necessarily follows that the provision of s.54R is invalid . . .
. . .
(p 36) A law of the Parliament which purports to direct, in
unqualified terms, that no court, including this Court, shall
order the release from custody of a person whom the Executive
of the Commonwealth has imprisoned purports to derogate from
that direct vesting of judicial power and to remove ultra
vires acts of the Executive from the control of this Court.
Such a law manifestly exceeds the legislative powers of the
Commonwealth and is invalid. Moreover, even to the extent
that s. 54R is concerned with the exercise of jurisdiction
other than this Court's directly vested constitutional
jurisdiction, it is inconsistent with Ch. III. In terms, s.
54R is a direction by the Parliament to the courts as to the
manner in which they are to exercise their jurisdiction. It
is one thing for the Parliament, within the limits of the
legislative power conferred upon it by the Constitution, to
grant or withhold jurisdiction. It is a quite different thing
for the Parliament to purport to direct the courts as to the
manner and outcome of the exercise of their jurisdiction. The
former falls within the legislative power which the
Constitution, including Ch. III itself, entrusts to the
Parliament. The latter constitutes an impermissible intrusion
into the judicial power which Ch. III vests exclusively in the
courts which it designates.
. . .
No separate argument was addressed to the validity of
s.54U. Obviously, it is strongly arguable that the
considerations which lead to the conclusion that s. 54R is
invalid are equally applicable to a section which purports to
provide that a Commonwealth officer may pre-empt inquiry by
the courts about whether a person who satisfies the first five
elements of the definition of "designated person" has been
designated - or purportedly designated - by the Executive as
being subject to compulsory detention provisions. . . . we
refrain from expressing any concluded view about whether it is
invalid by reason of its own content."
4. Ms Mok and Ms Ly have been in the custody of the respondent Minister's Department ("the Department") since their arrival in Australia, on or about 30 March 1990, on a boat which the Department code-named "the Beagle". At a directions hearing on 2 December 1992 the court dealt with applications by Ms Mok and Ms Ly, who were represented by the same counsel. He tendered as an exhibit a copy of a certificate, dated that day, by Dr R. W. Haber, a consultant physician in Macquarie Street, Sydney. It stated that both Ms Mok and Ms Ly had been on a hunger strike for the previous seven weeks, that their condition was steadily deteriorating and was likely to be very critical in the very near future and that they "are determined to die rather than be repatriated." The respondents' senior counsel informed the court that he had "instructions that none of these ladies will be removed when the medical advice remains as it is, namely, that they are not fit to be moved" (transcript 17-18).
5. An affidavit filed that day exhibited a submission from the applicant's solicitor to the respondent Minister, dated 2 November 1992, the day before the delegate's decision, which stated:
". . . Ms Mok and Ms Ly have each made serious attempts to
commit suicide.
. . .
In a conversation with Keith Owen, Director of Immigration in
Sydney this afternoon, I was advised that the condition of all
three women was considered serious as there had been
complications with Ms Mok's and Ms Ly's drips and they too
were taking small amounts of liquid not considered to be
adequate even to sustain their present condition. The
condition of each is extremely fragile.
. . .
It is my understanding that . . . Ms Mok and Ms Ly cannot be
force fed because of the risk of infection."
On that day orders were made in each case restraining the respondent Minister from removing the applicant from Australia pending the hearing and determination of the application or further order. The applicant's counsel later informed the court that Ms Mok and Ms Ly "gave up the hunger strike because this case was going to be processed". Evidence was given to the court later by Mr Conybeare, the Secretary of the Department, elicited by the respondents' counsel, that at about the time of the hunger strikes in the latter part of 1992, "there was a mood of great tension and nervousness in the (detention) centres . . . There had been only a little while earlier in that year the spectacle of people jumping off the roof of one of the two-storey buildings in Port Hedland and causing themselves serious injury" and "incidents . . . in some centres such as people seeking to ingest poisonous substances and make themselves sick" (transcript 1845-1846). The Department took steps to provide counselling for the Cambodian 'boat people' "to avert disastrous outcomes of that character".
6. At the directions hearing counsel for the respondents requested that the court fix "the earliest possible trial date" and said that the parties were confident that the hearing of the matters would finish in less than one week, an estimate which the applicant's counsel thought was correct. The hearing was fixed for 2, 3, 4 and 5 February 1993 and it was ordered that the two matters be listed for hearing before the same judge to enable them to be heard consecutively, subject to any direction by the trial judge. Later the court reserved an additional three days (February 15, 16 and 17) in an endeavour to ensure that there would be sufficient time to complete the two hearings.
7. At the commencement of the hearing on 2 February 1993 Messrs Rose and Moloney, of counsel, who appeared for the applicant and for Ms Ly, stated that the two applications raised the same legal points and were in identical terms. It was decided that Ms Mok's application would be heard first, to be followed by Ms Ly's application, it being anticipated by the applicants' counsel that in Ms Ly's case it would be possible to rely almost solely on the evidence and arguments advanced for Ms Mok.
8. On 3 February 1993 the evidence of Mr M. Phillips referred to the existence of country files, including files on Cambodia ("the country files"). Mr Rose referred to the existence of other files within the Department described as "the Cambodian general files" and submitted that those files were of relevance to issues in the proceedings. The inability of the Department to find and disclose to the applicant departmental files and other documents was the subject of comment on a number of occasions during the course of the hearing and led to lengthy adjournments to enable the files to be examined by the applicant's legal representatives. Mr Rose said later that the applicant had not had access to the country files until 14 February 1993. He stated on a number of occasions that the applicant had not obtained complete access to relevant files (see, for example, transcript 874-877). It appeared that the fact that many of the same files were required for the use of the parties in similar proceedings, listed for hearing in this court in other States, was one of the matters which had played some part in the respondents' difficulties in giving access to various files to the applicant's legal representatives.
9. On 4 February 1993 Mr Rose informed the court that it had become apparent that the case would not finish in the days allotted, including the additional three days February 15, 16 and 17 and on the following day counsel for all parties requested the allocation of five further hearing days. The hearing continued on 24 March to 1 April 1993, two more days having been reserved lest the estimates again proved optimistic. The dates allocated were the earliest dates available, having regard to other matters which had been fixed for hearing at a time when the parties' estimates were that the present hearing would be completed in less than a week.
10. On 16 February 1993, Mr Rose described the task of examining the "country files" as "daunting". Considerable discussion ensued as to difficulties in examining material, referred to as "50 very voluminous files" (transcript 584), made available after the service upon the respondent Minister and the delegate of a subpoena dated 8 February 1993. Later Mr Rose said that the applicant had been given access to 52 files by 17 February, had been notified of the existence of 15 more files on about 4 March and of a further 21 files on 8 March and been given access to those 15 and 21 files on 11 March (the 52 and 15 and 21 files were referred to at the hearing as "the 88 files"). Much later Mr Rose said that the respondents' verified list of documents (as distinct from the actual documents) occupied "5 large binders". Mr Rose referred at various times to 800 files, to about 7000 documents (not pages) "from files not previously disclosed", which files were listed in the verified list and at one stage to about "18,000 pages" of documents.
11. On 17 February 1993 the court acceded to a joint request for the allocation of five more days (15 - 22 April) in addition to the days allocated from 24 March to 1 April 1993. On 1 April 1993 the parties jointly asked the court to adjourn the hearing to 15 April 1993, because the applicant, as a result of receiving some material from the respondents, had requested "some searches to be carried out (by the Department)". Later, at the joint request of the parties, the matter was listed for hearing on 8 April 1993, on which date Mr Rose asked the court "to vacate the existing dates in April and leaving the June dates intact and, . . . adding a further 10 days. . . . a search was made (by the Department) of a number of Department of Immigration sections for files. That has revealed . . . at least 91 files that have not been made available or disclosed." The ground advanced by Mr Rose for the requested adjournment was that having "seen the material in the representative sample, . . . we are not in a position to proceed . . . (my) clients are still in custody and we are very concerned at this turn of events". The court asked whether Ms Mok had been consulted as to the proposed adjournment and it appeared that that had not happened. The court was later informed that during the luncheon adjournment Ms Mok had spoken to her solicitor through an interpreter and that her instructions were that "although she was unhappy about the delay, she was prepared to allow it to enable her case to be fully put to the court".
12. Mr Tracey, of Queen's Counsel, who appeared with Mr A. Cavanough, of counsel, for the respondents, said "we support the application. We have, like our friends, only at this stage seen a sample of this additional material and from what we have seen, . . . we accept that until such time as the material has been properly disclosed to them and that they have had the opportunity of inspecting it, that it would really be impossible for the matter to proceed." Mr Rose read to the court the following press release from the Department, dated 2 April 1993:-
"The following is a statement from the secretary of the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Mr C. Conybeare.
Allegations have been received regarding interference with
evidence relevant to court proceedings involving boat people.
I have therefore taken the following action: (1) Secured all
documents relating to the boat people cases and commenced an
audit of all files. (2) Asked the Australian Federal Police
to investigate the allegations. (3) In consequence; placed a
departmental officer on other duties pending the outcome of
the investigation."
Mr Tracey suggested that two of the days in April could be usefully employed by interposing Ms Lloyd and Mr Vassallo, two of the respondents' witnesses, notwithstanding that the applicant's case had not been closed, a suggestion which was adopted by consent.
13. The hearing resumed on 21 April 1993 and Mr Rose again referred to the matter of recently discovered departmental files, saying that "in addition to the 91 files seized . . . (there) were something originally estimated to be around 200 cartons of files containing roughly 20 files each . . . Now it is not to be said that all of those are necessarily relevant to the matters before your Honour. . . . an audit is going on as are the Federal Police inquiries." In his submissions, Mr Tracey, on behalf of the respondents, said "it ought not to be assumed that any one of the documents that have been referred to by our learned friends is (a) within their notice to produce in this matter, (b) within the subpoena they have served in this matter, and (c) relevant to this matter. . . . about the police inquiry, it includes an inquiry into suggestions that documents that may or may not have been relevant to proceedings either here or in Sydney were withheld or disposed of, and those inquiries are currently being undertaken, . . . by the Australian Federal Police."
14. On 22 April 1993 the court made an order, which was not opposed, that the respondents give discovery, in accordance with Order 15 rule 6 of the Federal Court Rules, by filing and serving on the applicant a list of documents relating to any matter in question between the respondents and the applicant, with an affidavit verifying the list. The verified list was filed on 14 May 1993. Thousands of pages of exhibits were tendered during the hearing which, together with the short hearing in Ms Ly's case, occupied 39 days (3,500 pages of transcript) and was also the subject of written submissions, the last which was received on 23 August 1993.
15. Leave to file an amended application, and further amended applications, was granted to the applicant on four occasions - on 15 February 1993, 10 May 1993, 30 July 1993 (each by consent) and on 13 August 1993. It is convenient to refer in these reasons to the application in its final amended form as "the amended application". Although the grounds and the particulars in the amended application are very lengthy, are inter-related and overlap, it seems desirable that they be set out in these reasons. They are as follows:
"A. The decisions or conduct for the purpose of making
the decisions were taken in breach of the rules of
natural justice in connection with the making of
the decision.
Particulars
(a) There was reasonable apprehension that the
First Respondent and his delegates including
the Second Respondent were biased since no
cogent reason was given for preferring the
advice of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (DFAT) over the reports prepared
by Dr. Dennis Shoesmith.
(b) There is no evidence that the First
Respondent or his delegates including the
Second Respondent have considered all the
information put before them by or on behalf
of the Applicant or available to them from
other sources.
(c) The Second Respondent having been apprised
of the expert views of Dr Shoesmith ought
not to have made the decisions he did
without giving the Applicant or her advisers
any proper opportunity to comment on
material adverse to or at odds with that of
Dr Shoesmith;
(ca) The Second Respondent had before him and/or
relied upon material adverse to the
Applicant namely, the "Mission Report
Voluntary Repatriation Port Hedland" (the
"Fordham Report") referred to in the reasons
for decision of the Second Respondent dated
12 November, 1992 without giving the
Applicant any or any adequate notice of the
Fordham Report or any adequate opportunity
to put material before or make submissions
to the Second Respondent on the issues
addressed in that Report.
(d) The First and Second Respondents applied a
policy to reject the Applicant for refugee
status irrespective of the merits of her
claim.
(da) Each of the First Respondent and the
officers of the Department of Immigration,
Local Government and Ethnic Affairs ("the
Department") involved in the assessment
and/or determination of the Applicant's
application for refugee status including the
Second Respondent was biased and/or
unlawfully prejudged or pre-determined the
outcome of that assessment or that
application without regard to the merits of
the application by reason of a rejection
mentality or an institutional bias
prevailing and taking effect in or
throughout the Department or there was or is
a reasonable apprehension of such bias,
unlawful prejudgment or pre-determination.
(e) The First and Second Respondent by the use
of and adoption of standard paragraphs
engaged in conduct which deprived the
Applicant of procedural fairness in the
consideration, assessment and determination
of her claim for refugee status.
(f) The decisions of the First and Second
Respondents were illogical and were based on
inferences and findings which were
unsupported by probative material.
(g) The Second Respondent relied upon earlier
decisions and the reasons therefor of
Gregory Mills and/or the Refugee Status
Review Committee (the RSRC) in coming to his
decision to reject the Applicant's
application for refugee status without
himself having any or any proper regard to
the material supporting the Applicant's
claim.
B. Procedures that were required by law to be
observed in connection with the making of the
decision or conduct for the purpose of making the
decision have not been observed.
Particulars
(a) A policy decision was taken to reject the
Applicant and others rather than consider
their applications for Refugee Status
according to the relevant law and procedures
applying to refugee applications.
(b) A procedure involving the consideration of
selective material unfavourable to the
Applicant's case was adopted by the First
Respondent and/or his delegates including
the Second Respondent rather than a
procedure which allowed for a proper
consideration to be undertaken.
(c) The First Respondent and the officers of the
Department including the Second Respondent
commenced the process of assessing or
determining the Applicant's application for
refugee status with a presumption, or
predisposition to find, that the Applicant
together with the other Cambodian boat
people were not refugees within the meaning
of the Migration Act 1958 and the Convention
and Protocol.
(d) The Second Respondent, unlawfully and/or
improperly-
(i) was influenced by;
(ii) had regard to;
(iii) was guided to -
(ww) the recommendations of the members
of the RSRC; and/or
(xx) their reasons or the summing-up of
their meeting or meetings; and/or
(yy) the experience and attributes of
the members of the RSRC; and/or
(zz) his opinion that the RSRC was an
independent body and/or that it
provided an independent assessment
of the Applicant's case which gave
him guidance in making the
decision.
C. The making of the decisions was an improper
exercise of power conferred by the Migration Act
1958 in that irrelevant considerations were taken
into account.
Particulars
(a) The First Respondent and/or his delegates
including the Second Respondent acted in
accordance with a rule or policy of the
government that recognising Cambodian asylum
seekers as refugees would send a signal to
the rest of Asia to come to Australia.
(b) The First Respondent and/or his delegates
including the Second Respondent acted in
accordance with a rule or policy of the
government that recognising Cambodian asylum
seekers as refugees would undermine the
Cambodian Peace Process and Australia's role
in that process.
(c) The First Respondent and/or his delegates
including the Second Respondent relied on a
generalised interpretation of the current
situation without proper regard to the
Applicant's personal circumstances.
(d) The First Respondent and/or his delegates
including the Second Respondent acted on
advice regarding voluntary repatriation to
Cambodia, including the Fordham Report in
making the decision as to the Applicant's
status as a refugee.
(e) The First Respondent and/or his delegates
including the Second Respondent by using and
applying standard paragraphs sought to and
did apply a policy of rejection of the
Applicant's claim without regard to its
merits.
(f) The Second Respondent relied upon earlier
decisions and the reasons therefor of
Gregory Mills and/or the RSRC in coming to
his decision to reject the Applicant's
application for refugee status without
himself having any or any proper regard to
the material supporting the Applicant's
claim.
(g) The Second Respondent, unlawfully and/or
improperly-
(i) was influenced by;
(ii) had regard to;
(iii) was guided by -
(ww) the recommendations of the members
of the RSRC; and/or
(xx) their reasons or the summing-up of
their meeting or meetings; and/or
(yy) the experience and attributes of
the members of the RSRC; and/or
(zz) his opinion that the RSRC was an
independent body and/or that it
provided an independent assessment
of the Applicant's case which gave
him guidance in making the
decision.
D. The making of the decision was an improper
exercise of power in that relevant considerations
were not taken into account.
Particulars
(a) Material on the Country Files for or
relating to the State of Cambodia which
supported in whole or in part the
Applicant's claim for refugee status.
(b) All material referred to or supplied by or
on behalf of the Applicant and other
Cambodian Refugee claimants in support of
her or their claims for refugee status.
(c) The contents of newspaper clippings and
other documentary evidence provided to the
Respondent and/or his delegates.
(d) The Applicant's fear as evidenced by her
preference to die rather than return to
Cambodia.
(e) An accurate assessment of the current and
past conduct of the Khmer Rouge, including:
(i) the fact that the Khmer Rouge have
refused to disarm and have, at all
material times operated as a military
force;
(ii) the Khmer Rouge have a share in
governmental power and can operate
freely in the capital city Phnom Penh
and elsewhere in Cambodia;
(iii) the Khmer Rouge military forces
are fighting with Hun Sen
government forces in and around
Phnom Penh;
(iv) the Khmer Rouge have a military
presence, capacity and intention which
extends beyond areas currently
considered to be under its control;
(v) the terrorist techniques of the Khmer
Rouge in the infiltration of villages
in Cambodia.
(f) The fact that the United Nations has been
unable to verify total withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.
(g) The inability of the Cambodian government
and legal system to protect Cambodian
nationals from persecution.
(h) The interim nature of the Supreme National
Council's governing role in Cambodia.
(i) An accurate assessment of the instability
and violence affecting ordinary civilians in
Cambodia.
(j) The Applicant's claims based on her Chinese
ethnic background;
(k) That the perception of the authorities will
be different towards involuntary returnees.
(l) The Applicant's claims based on her
religious beliefs.
(m) The reports of Dr Dennis Shoesmith.
(n) The suffering of the Applicant and of her
family at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.
(o) The date of the Applicant's departure from
Cambodia.
E. The making of the decision and conduct for the purposes
of making the decision involved an error of law.
Particulars
(a) The First Respondent and/or his delegates
including the Second Respondent misunderstood the
term "well-founded" in respect of a fear of
persecution by requiring that there be a much
stricter test than that there be real chance of
persecution.
(b) The First Respondent and/or his delegates
including the Second Respondent erred in finding
that discrimination because of the Applicant's
Chinese ethnic background could not amount to
persecution within the 1951 United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
related Protocol of 1967.
(c) The First Respondent and/or his delegates
including the Second Respondent erred in finding
that the cumulative effect of the Applicant's
experiences and the likelihood that she would face
similar experiences should she return to Cambodia
did not justify a well-founded fear of
persecution.
(d) The First Respondent and/or his delegates
including the Second Respondent failed properly to
consider whether the Applicant had a well-founded
fear of persecution at the time of her departure
from Cambodia and/or at the time of her
application, and further whether there had been
substantial change so as to remove such a claim.
(e) The First Respondent and/or his delegates
including the Second Respondent wrongly considered
that the Applicant's experiences of sexual assault
were not Convention related;
(f) The First Respondent and/or his delegates
including the Second Respondent failed to consider
the Application for Refugee Status properly or at
all having determined as a policy that the
application would be refused prior to purporting
to consider same.
(g) The First Respondent and/or his delegates
including the Second Respondent erred in deciding
that a political profile can only be established
if there is evidence as to actual political
opinion.
(h) The First Respondent and the officers of the
Department including the Second Respondent erred
by commencing the process of assessing or
determining the Applicant's application for
refugee status with a presumption, or
predisposition to find, that the Applicant
together with the other Cambodian boat people were
not refugees within the meaning of the Migration
Act 1958 and the Convention and Protocol.
(i) The Second Respondent, unlawfully and/or
improperly-
(i) was influenced by;
(ii) had regard to;
(iii) was guided by -
(ww) the recommendations of the members of
the RSRC; and/or
(xx) their reasons or the summing-up of
their meeting or meetings; and/or
(yy) the experience and attributes of the
members of the RSRC; and/or
(zz) his opinion that the RSRC was an
independent body and/or that it
provided an independent assessment of
the Applicant's case which gave him
guidance in making the decision.
F. There was no evidence or other material to justify the
findings made by the Second Respondent as to the
following facts:
Particulars
(a) That involuntary returnees will not be subject to
adverse treatment.
(b) That there are areas sufficiently safe and stable
to which the Applicant could return.
(c) That the Applicant's testimony lacks credibility.
G. The decisions were so unreasonable that no reasonable
person could have so decided.
Particulars
(a) The First and Second Respondents have given
excessive weight to irrelevant, unsubstantiated
matters and little if any weight to relevant
matters.
(b) It was unreasonable to rely on the reports of DFAT
in preference to other material on the alleged
basis that the DFAT material "is more recent and
collected by impartial and professional officers
based in Cambodia".
(c) It was unreasonable to rely on the reports of the
DFAT on the basis that the reports were more
current than the article of Dr Shoesmith dated 17
February 1992 and at the same time maintain that
the situation in Cambodia is sufficiently stable
to conclude that there is no real chance of the
Applicant being persecuted.
(d) It was unreasonable to make a decision based on
policy rather than on the facts as they pertained
to the Applicant.
(e) It was unreasonable not to have regard to all
material of the Cambodian Country Files.
(f) It was unreasonable not to have regard to the
Shoesmith report of August 1992.
(g) It was unreasonable to use and adopt standard
paragraphs in the reasons for decision of the
Second Respondent.
(h) It was unreasonable to pay more regard to and/or
to have regard solely to reports and
communications from DFAT rather than considering
all available material properly or at all.
(i) It was unreasonable that the Second Respondent
relied upon earlier decisions and the reasons
therefor of Gregory Mills and/or the RSRC in
coming to his decision to reject the Applicant's
application for refugee status without himself
having any or any proper regard to the material
supporting the Applicant's claim.
H. The decision or conduct for the purposes of making the
decision constituted an exercise of a discretionary
power in accordance with a rule or policy and without
regard to the merits of the particular case.
Particulars
(a) A policy that it is safe to return to Cambodia
without genuine regard to the Applicant's claims.
(b) A policy that rejecting Cambodian asylum seekers
would send a signal to the rest of Asia not to
come to Australia.
(c) A policy to reject Cambodian asylum seekers.
(d) A policy to adopt the use of standard paragraphs.
(e) A policy to prefer, without full consideration
material emanating from DFAT rather than other
relevant material.
I. The making of the decisions were an improper exercise of
power in that they involved an exercise of power at the
direction or behest of another person.
Particulars
The First Respondent and/or his delegates including the
Second Respondent have blindly followed reports of the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade without
question."
16. Part C of the applicant's written submissions (dated 28 July, 1993) was headed "Institutional bias, prejudgment, predetermination, policy to reject, rejection mentality, predisposition to reject". Each of those will be treated in these reasons for judgment as being included in the words "policy to reject". It was submitted by the applicant that:
"14. The evidence, viewed in its entirety, justifies the
drawing of a clear and reasonable inference that, at all
relevant times from early in 1990 until after the
decision of the (delegate) was made (3 November 1992)-
(i) there existed a firm view, assumption or
opinion by senior members of Government
including the then Prime Minister that the
Cambodian boat people as a class were not
refugees within the meaning of the Act:
(emphasis added)
(ii) that view, assumption or opinion was
shared by senior officers of the
Department of Immigration, Local
Government and Ethnic Affairs ("the
Department") and the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade ("DFAT") and
was informally disseminated by them
throughout the Department to areas
including the DORS Branch:
(iii) that the view was so widely disseminated
that there exists a reasonable apprehension
that decision-makers including the Second
Respondent and their case officers might be
influenced by those views, assumptions and
opinions.
15. On the basis of the evidence, the Second Respondent -
(a) did not bring; or
(b) there is a reasonable apprehension that he might
not have brought -
an impartial, unbiased, fair and independent mind to the
resolution of the question for his determination: . . ."
17. It was further submitted that Mr Paterson in his decision applied the alleged policy to reject, which it was contended "existed (a) at ministerial level within the Government; (b) within the senior management of the Department; (c) had permeated and infiltrated the Branches of the Department concerned with the determination of refugee status of which the (delegate) was a member; (d) was known to and acted on by members of the Branches of the Department concerned with the determination of refugee status of which the (delegate) was a member; (e) was given effect to by, or unlawfully influenced, the (delegate) in the process of making his decision of 3 November 1992 and providing the reasons therefor." Each of those contentions was denied by the respondents.
7. Statements by Prime Minister Hawke and Senator Evans
18. The submission by the applicant's counsel in paragraph 14(i) above, that "there existed a firm view, assumption or opinion by senior members of Government including the then Prime Minister that the Cambodian boat people as a class were not refugees within the meaning of the Act" was partly based on what Mr Hawke said on 6 June 1990, when interviewed on television by Ms Jana Wendt. The following cablegram from the respondent Minister's Department in Canberra to the Embassy at Bangkok includes (in paragraph 2) the text of that part of the interview which related to the Cambodian 'boat people':
" The following points were prepared for use in answering
any press enquiries about boat people from Cambodia and
Australian contacts with the Phnom Penh authorities on this:
. The problem of Cambodian boat people arriving in
Australia has been discussed in the course of contacts
with the authorities in Phnom Penh
- We confirm that the Phnom Penh authorities have
said that they will only receive back people who
return voluntarily and that such people would not
face persecution on their return
. The determination of refugee status (DORS) committee has
yet to determine whether the boat people from Cambodia
who have arrived in Australia are refugees
- The findings of the committee will be made
available to the Minister for Immigration, Local
Government and Ethnic Affairs.
2. Following for your information is text of Prime Minister's
comments on the boat people from Cambodia in TV interview with
Jana Wendt on 6 June.
Text begins
Wendt: We woke up this morning to read that we're asking
the Cambodian Government to take back some of the Cambodian
boat people who came to our shores. Why are we doing that?
PM: For the obvious reason. I mean, we have - - - a
compassionate humanitarian policy which will stand comparison
with any other country in the world. But we're not here with
an open door policy saying anyone who wants to come to
Australia can come. These people are not political refugees
(emphasis added).
Wendt: How can you be sure of that, Mr Hawke?
PM: Simply there is not a regime now in Cambodia which is
exercising terror, political terror, upon its population.
Wendt: What do you make then of these hundreds of people-
PM: What we make -
Wendt: - Who get on their tin boats and travel across - - -
PM: What we make of it is that there is obviously a
combination of economic refugeeism, if you like. People
saying they don't like a particular regime or they don't like
their economic circumstances, therefore they're going to up,
pull up stumps, get in a boat and lob in Australia. Well
that's not on (emphasis added).
Wendt: And risk their lives to do it?
PM: Their lives is not, I mean, we have an orderly migration
program. We're not going to allow people just to jump that
queue by saying we'll jump into a boat, here we are, bugger
the people who've been around the world. We have a ratio of
more than 10 to 1 of people who want to come to this country
compared to the numbers that we take in.
Wendt: And you personally have no qualms about that?
PM: Not only no qualms about it, but I will be forceful in
ensuring that that is what's followed (emphasis added)
Ends"
(The words emphasised by me in the last paragraph, and in the paragraph referring to "economic refugeeism", appear to have been also emphasised in the original document.) Copies of that cablegram were sent to a number of persons and places including "Foreign Minister Abroad" (Senator Evans) and "U N New York".
19. Mr Hand, who was the respondent Minister at the time when the application was filed, was called as a witness, on subpoena, by the applicant's counsel. Asked if he had ever seen anything from Mr Hawke "suggesting that some of these claimants were economic migrants rather than refugees", Mr Hand said that he had:
" . . . read a transcript of an interview that he had on the
Jana Wendt show which was quite a famous occasion. And I read
that with interest and thought his statements were ill
advised, improper and for someone that ought to have known
better, stupid . . . I spoke to the Prime Minister and he is
well aware of how I felt about what I considered to be an
improper statement." (transcript 1686-87)
20. Later, asked as to "economic refugees", Mr Hand said " . . . the term "economic refugees" is a nonsense term. It is a contradiction in terms . . . The Prime Minister was wrong. . . . dead wrong. So was (Senator) Evans. . . . Evans and Hawke were wrong, and I think they now appreciate that they were wrong . . . " (transcript 1705-1706).
21. No attempt to defend Mr Hawke's statements was made by counsel for Senator Bolkus, the respondent Minister since April 1993; nor by Mr Conybeare, the Secretary to the Department; nor by any other witness called at the hearing - although in his evidence Mr Simington, the Special Advisor, International Migration, attempted to play down the significance of Mr Hawke's statements. That attempt will be referred to later. The evidence before the court did not disclose any basis for Mr Hawke's statements. As has been seen, Mr Hand, the respondent Minister at the time, far from defending Mr Hawke's statements, said that both Mr Hawke and Senator Evans were "dead wrong". The evidence from the Minister's Department was that Mr Simington had "no idea how the Prime Minister arrived at a view that would have him using those words in that interview" (transcript 626). Almost three months later Mr Conybeare gave evidence that he did not know what was the information on which Mr Hawke based his statements (see, for example, transcript 1812).
22. About four hours after he said that he had "no idea how the Prime Minister arrived at a view that would have him using those words in that interview" (transcript 626), Mr Simington "volunteered" the following statement:
". . . the Prime Minister's statement and his reference may be
assuming an importance in perhaps your mind . . . that it
doesn't deserve . . . from the context it's fairly clear that
the Prime Minister's comments were pretty well a throw away
line . . . I've always had a sense and I'm speaking very
personally here that the reference to the Cambodians was very
much a throw away line. The conclusion I draw from that is
that within a (p 677) bureaucracy where we have had to live
with that statement it probably wasn't given the importance or
the prominence that perhaps the court might conclude. It was
one of many, many issues and of itself it probably wasn't seen
to be nearly as significant as perhaps questioning here this
morning might suggest or today might suggest . . . I . . .
emphasise that what may appear from outside the bureaucracy to
be a very important issue is sometimes not seen within
because, for instance, in immigration we knew that we had not
been called on to provide any briefing for the Prime Minister,
that the comments were presumably off the cuff and probably
not all that seriously meant". (transcript 676-677)
23. I reject completely the statements there by Mr Simington (not in answer to a question) that Mr Hawke's comments were "a throw away line" and that they were "probably not all that seriously meant". On the morning of the day when he gave that evidence (24 March 1993), Mr Simington had said (transcript 627-628 - emphasis added):
"You will see that the text of the interview was sent to a
number of posts overseas. That's a standard procedure in
those circumstances where a major statement, particularly that
might affect international affairs, is made in Australia. . . ."
It may be added that Mr Conybeare, far from suggesting that the comments were "a throw away line", said, in answer to the respondents' counsel, that in the Department Mr Hawke's statements "were seen as comments that . . . had the effect at the very least of complicating - significantly complicating life for the Department of Immigration."
24. A document in evidence before the court stated that in February 1992 Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia said to Mr Hand and Mr Simington that most of the Cambodian 'boat people' were economic migrants, Mr Simington said that that proposition was not denied, that the proposition "didn't need, in the context of that meeting, to be challenged" (transcript 638). Mr Simington also said of a confidential inward cablegram (exhibit CS3), dated 20 April 1990, addressed to Mr Simington (amongst other people), that "there was a great deal of this kind of reporting ("economic refugeeism") . . . this is a good illustration of it. Fairly authoritative . . . because . . . the sources . . . are people . . . for whom I have a great deal of personal respect." (transcript 636)
25. As has been seen, Mr Hand in his evidence described Mr Hawke's statements as being "improper". In my view it was quite improper for Mr Hawke, as Prime Minister, to express publicly any opinion on the question of whether the Cambodian 'boat people' were genuine refugees. It was however far worse for him to say "I will be forceful in ensuring that that is what's followed" (i.e. he would take forceful measures to make sure that his opinion would be acted upon by Departmental decision-makers). In my opinion it was grossly improper for him to state publicly, with all the authority, prestige and influence of the office of Prime Minister, that he would "be forceful in ensuring that" his opinions would be "followed". That statement was likely to initimidate the respondent Minister's delegates and prejudice them against the Cambodian 'boat people'; the obvious danger was that the merits of the cases of the Cambodian applicants for refugee status would not be fairly considered by the delegates and applicants would be wrongly denied refugee status. It should be inferred that Mr Hawke knew that applications by Cambodian 'boat people' for refugee status would be considered by "middle management" public servants. If he did not know, then he ought to have made enquiries before making those statements on national television in prime time; he should have borne in mind what Dr Flick called "a temptation on the part of the decision-maker not to needlessly offend potential future employers by controversial decisions" (Natural Justice, Second edition, 1984, p 162). The temptation not to offend a "forceful" Prime Minister would have been stronger.
26. In a passage quoted above (transcript 1705-1706) Mr Hand said that "Evans and Hawke were wrong" and referred on other occasions to Senator Evans. During questioning by the respondents' counsel Mr Hand said "no one in the Department would have been . . . unaware of my views on the unfortunate statements of the P.M. and Senator Evans" (transcript 1771 - emphasis added). A little later, in a very long answer to a question by the court, Mr Hand said:
"Now, once I got Hawke and Evans to accept, as I said the
other day, that my view was the correct view, and they were
wrong, I didn't feel the need to constantly, for the next
three years, and then there was - I didn't want to have a war
with them for three years, so once they accepted they were
wrong and subsequently never made the same mistake, in their
language, and were very careful, . . . ". (transcript 1777 -
emphasis added)
The first of those statements was given in evidence on 11 June and the second and third were given on 15 June so it is clear that the references to Senator Evans were made with deliberation. It must be inferred, from Mr Hand's evidence as a whole, that in about June 1990 Senator Evans had publicly stated that all or most of the Cambodian 'boat people' were "not political refugees".
(c) Whether they ever admitted publicly that they were wrong
27. In a written submission, dated 30 April 1993, concerning the relevance of evidence relating to "institutional bias" and "rejection mentality", the respondents' counsel wrote:
"Economic Refugees. It is suggested (by the applicant) that
some Australian policy makers had formed the view that all of
the Cambodian boat people were economic refugees. Principal
reliance for this proposition is placed upon the terms of an
interview between the former Prime Minister and Jana Wendt on
6 June, 1990 . . . the respondents foreshadow that, if
necessary, a good deal of evidence will be called to show that
the Prime Minister quickly qualified the remarks which he made
on the television programme in such a way as to make it plain
that he was not assuming that none of the Cambodian boat
people were refugees and that each case would be examined on
its merits." (emphasis added)
28. Although the hearing continued over a period of more than three months, no evidence at all was "called to show that the Prime Minister quickly qualified the remarks" in the way suggested - or in any other way. Nor was there any evidence that the remarks have been qualified by Mr Hawke at any time since they were made on 6 June 1990. The RACS submission to RSRC (12 August 1992) expressed their concern about Mr Hawke's statements and there is no evidence that there was any reply from the Department saying that that statement had been "qualified" by Mr Hawke at any time.
29. The respondents' counsel in final address suggested that "a spokesman from the Prime Minister (was) effectively withdrawing the suggestion by the Prime Minister" (transcript 3197.1). I am unable to accept that there was any such withdrawal. The suggestion by counsel was based upon a report (on the morning following Mr Hawke's statements) in the "Australian" newspaper, under a large 3-column headline which read "Hawke: why Chinese may stay, Cambodians must go" (exhibit CS54 - document 20). The report quoted from Mr Hawke's statements to Ms Wendt (including his statement that "These people are not political refugees") and then continued:
"Earlier in the day a spokesman for the Minister for
Immigration, Mr Hand emphasised that all Cambodian boat people
who applied for refugee status would have their cases
individually examined by the Government's Determination of
Refugee Status Committee.
Those determined to be political refugees would be given
protection.
A government spokesman last night confirmed that Mr
Hawke's comments did not contradict this and that the
Cambodians would receive the benefits of the full refugee
screening procedures Australia has in place."
30. The report did not contain a statement by "a spokesman from the Prime Minister" - it merely referred to an unidentified "government spokesman". What is of greater significance, however, is that the spokesman's reported statements did not state that Mr Hawke withdrew any of the following statements (to which emphasis has been added):
(1) "These people are not political refugees";
(2) "There is obviously a combination of economic
refugeeism, if you like. People saying they don't like
a particular regime . . . therefore they're going to . .
. get in a boat and lob in Australia. Well that's not
on.";
(3) "Not only no qualms about it, but I will be forceful in
ensuring that that is what's followed"
31. I accept Mr Hand's evidence (transcript 1777) that he "got Hawke and Evans to accept that (Mr Hand's) view was the correct view, and they were wrong . . . they accepted they were wrong and subsequently never made the same mistake, in their language, and were very careful . . .". Although that statement was made eight weeks before the end of the hearing, no evidence was called by the respondents that Mr Hawke or Senator Evans ever admitted publicly that they were wrong. On the evidence as a whole, I find that no such admission was ever made publicly by Mr Hawke or by Senator Evans.
32. Mr Hand apparently considered that the admissions made privately to him were sufficient (see transcript 1777). In my opinion it was the duty of Mr Hawke, as a matter of fairness to the Cambodian applicants for refugee status, at the very least to ensure that action was taken to inform the Minister's delegates that the statements made by him on television were wrong and must be disregarded. It would have been better - and might have helped to allay public concern as to the fairness of the Department's processes - if he had publicly admitted that he was wrong. Similarly, Senator Evans should have taken steps to ensure that the officers of his department were informed of his admission that he was wrong; he was the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, had played an important part in the Australian Peace Plan for Cambodia, and his department was frequently sending cables to and receiving cables from the respondent Minister or his officers relating to Cambodia.
33. As Mr Hawke had not withdrawn his television statements, and neither he nor Senator Evans had publicly admitted that they were wrong, in my opinion the respondent Minister, Mr Hand, was under a duty to ensure that the persons to whom he, as the Minister, had delegated his powers under the Act, to decide whether the Cambodian nationals were refugees, were told (i) that both Mr Hawke and Senator Evans were wrong, (ii) that they had admitted that they were wrong, and (iii) that their statements must be disregarded by the delegates when considering the applications by Cambodians for refugee status.
(e) Total inadequacy of steps to overcome danger from statements
34. Mr Hand and Mr Conybeare were asked questions as to what steps had been taken by Mr Hand or his Department to overcome the danger that Mr Hawke's improper statement, and the media publicity given to it, would result in the Minister's delegates being prejudiced against the Cambodian boat people. I accept Mr Hand's evidence that when he was the Minister it was his opinion that the Cambodian boat people should be given a fair hearing on the merits of their applications for refugee status, and that he told various people interested in the refugee question, including journalists, lawyers, representatives of churches and of the Northern Territory Government and some officers of his Department, that "we had a fair and proper process" and that each case of a person claiming to be a refugee "had to be considered properly on its merits" (transcript 1777-78). Mr Hand gave the following evidence:
" . . . did you ever say anything like that (i.e. publicly
contradicting Mr Hawke) at the time, lest there be a danger
that your departmental officers might be influenced by what
the Prime Minister said? --- I probably used much more
colourful language at the time . . . both at meetings with
people and in my discussions with them. But in terms of
actual press release drafted specifically for it, I don't
recall one specifically drafted about that, but I can check.
. . .
Yes. But leave aside press release; what about an official
communication from you, as Minister, to, say, everyone who sat
on and decided, either by recommendation or decision, any of
the Cambodians' cases? --- No, there would have been no memo
from me." (transcript 1778)
Mr Simington was asked by Mr Rose did he "take any steps" immediately after watching Mr Hawke's interview on a television set in his office. His answer was "I believe quite frankly I just went home at that stage" (transcript 627). A little later he said (transcript 631) that, on the next working day after Mr Hawke's statements on television, the "action (he) personally took about" the statements was to discuss it "with colleagues both senior and junior, with a view to minimising the implications of what the Prime Minister said". (emphasis added)
35. Mr Simington on 24 March 1993 (transcript 632) and Mr Hand on 15 June 1993 (transcript 1776-77) were each asked to supply any information in documentary form relevant to the steps taken but no such documentation was put before the court - although Mr Simington had said that he could "try to track this sort of thing down". On the final day of the hearing (transcript 3494-3495), the respondents' counsel accepted that "no (written) memorandum . . . went out to within the Immigration Department (to decision-makers) saying Mr Hawke has got it all wrong, do not take any notice of him."
At an earlier stage Mr Simington was asked by the court:
"was there ever anything directed specifically to saying to
case officers, delegates, RSRC members, etcetera, specifically
take no notice of what Prime Minister Hawke said in June 1990,
he got it all wrong. The minister does not agree with him.
Your job is to honestly assess each thing and put totally out
of your mind, the way you direct a jury in a criminal trial,
forget all this prejudicial stuff you heard. Anything like
that ever on a systemised, efficient way poured into the
people who were going to be making these very important
decisions about Cambodians?"
"Can I answer your question by saying that having in mind
sensitivities about comments about what a Prime Minister may
or may not have said, the message that you are suggesting was
delivered frequently and loudly and clearly." (transcript
The respondents' counsel, in a memorandum dated 23 August 1993, submitted that:
". . . Mr Simington should be taken as explaining that one
would not expect to see a document, such as a circular,
criticising the Prime Minister. However, he should be taken
as saying that there was in fact express oral criticism of
what the Prime Minister had said from the Minister and senior
ranks of the Department. This tends to be confirmed by Mr.
Simington's evidence at 646-647, especially at lines 7-12 on
647. This interpretation is further confirmed by the evidence
of Mr. Hand at 1686 (line 30) - 1687 (line 6), 1769 - 1771
(especially at 1770, line 36 - 1771, line 2: "And no one in
the Department would have been unaware of my views on the
unfortunate statements of the PM and Senator Evans"), and
1775-1778 (especially at 1775, lines 20-24)."
36. I have considered carefully that submission and the evidence to which it refers and reject the submission that Mr Simington "should be taken as saying that there was in fact oral criticism of what the Prime Minister had said". The transcript for the last day of the hearing contains the following passage:
"(HIS HONOUR:) Now my impression at the time and my
impression - I say quite frankly to you now - having read that
transcript some time during the last few days is that he was
confining his answer to the message that you have got to give
them a fair go, as distinct from a message: look, forget
about what the Prime Minister said, he got it wrong; he should
not have said that. That is the impression I have got, and I
thought I ought to tell you that.
MR TRACEY: Well, your Honour, I think that that is not, with
respect, an unreasonable impression to be derived from the
passage. The evidence was, I think, that there was no formal
document went out to decision-makers saying, well, the Prime
Minister said this, you do not take that into account when you
are making decisions. I do not think there is any doubt about
that, your Honour, but there is an abundance of evidence that
showed that there were directions to delegates, repeated
directions to them, over a long period of time after Mr Hawke
made that statement that they ought to approach their task on
a decision basis and on the merits of the case and on the
material before them and no more." (transcript 3495)
In my opinion Mr Simington's statement that "the message . . . was delivered frequently and loudly and clearly" referred only to that part of the question by the court which asked whether the delegates were told that it was their duty "to honestly assess each (case)". Having listened to Mr Simington giving evidence for nine days, I have no doubt that his answer was not referring to that part of the question which asked whether the officers were ever specifically told to take no notice of what Prime Minister Hawke had said or that Mr Hawke's statements were wrong. Mr Simington showed a tendency during his evidence to answer that part of the question which suited his purpose of defending the Department.
37. If, contrary to my opinion, Mr Simington's answer was intended by him to convey the meaning that officers, including delegates, were expressly told that Mr Hawke's statements were improper or wrong, then, on all the evidence relating to that subject, I would reject that answer as being untrue. (Reference is made later in these reasons to the manner in which Mr Simington responded to questions.)
38. As to the passages in Mr Hand's evidence, which are cited by the respondents' counsel in the memorandum dated 23 August 1993 (quoted above) as confirming Mr Simington's evidence, it should be noted that Mr Hand was told by the court (transcript 1775) that it wanted to "understand the full basis upon which" he had said that "no one in the department would have been . . . unaware of my views on the unfortunate statements of the PM and Senator Evans" (transcript 1770-1771). His answer was as follows:
"Well, on the numerous speeches that I made within the
department at places like FECA, at the BIR type conference, in
discussion with journalists, and I think a fairly well
canvassed view, my view, that is, that we had a fair and
proper process here. Each case had to be considered properly
on its merits. That everybody was entitled to have their case
heard, which in itself is a constant criticism, or
contradiction of what Hawke said, and if I said it once I must
have said it a million times, because that was constantly what
I was being asked about. . . . I didn't want to have a war
with them for three years, so once they accepted they were
wrong and subsequently never made the same mistake, in their
language, and were very careful, I was always insistent within
the department, and was supported, I think, by the department,
that we would endeavour to try as best as humanly possible to
have a fair system." (transcript 1777)
39. On the evidence, including Mr Hand's evidence (quoted above - transcript 1778) as to his "more colourful language", I find that Mr Hand, on a large number of occasions, told people that the Department "had a fair and proper process". However, he failed to tell his delegates (and failed to have them told) that Mr Hawke's statements were wrong and must be disregarded. On his evidence, he seemed to think that it was sufficient for him to express his views that the Cambodians should be given a fair hearing; he considered that those views were an implied contradiction of Mr Hawke's statements. However, in my opinion, that left the delegates, at best, in the position of having statements, that had been made by both the Prime Minister and by Senator Evans, impliedly contradicted by the respondent Minister. I have said "at best" but, in my view, Mr Hand's statement as to a fair hearing did not impliedly contradict what Mr Hawke had said.
40. On Mr Hand's evidence as a whole, I find that the only basis for his belief that "no one in the department . . . would have been unaware of (his) views on the unfortunate statements of the PM and Senator Evans" was that his statements that there should be a "fair and proper process" were inconsistent with Mr Hawke's statements. In that connection it may be noted that the respondents' counsel in final address said that "if there is going to be corrective action in relation to decision-makers, then one would have assumed that it would have been taken promptly and in relation to people holding the role of delegates at about that time . . . it was made clear to those who were then in decision-making positions within the department that the Minister had an entirely different view".
41. Mr Hand's attempt to overcome the danger created by Mr Hawke's statements was totally inadequate. I have formed that opinion having regard to (1) the words used by Mr Hawke, (2) the real danger that they would influence delegates into wrongly rejecting the claims of Cambodian applicants for refugee status, together with the facts that (3) Mr Hawke spoke with all the authority and influence of the office of Prime Minister (4) Mr Hawke had not only said what his opinion was but had added that he would "be forceful in ensuring that (his opinion) is what's followed" (5) his statements were made on national television (6) they were the subject of a large headline in a national newspaper the next day and (7) there had been a statement by Senator Evans, on the subject of the Cambodian 'boat people', which also was wrong. In my opinion, the circumstances required the respondent Minister to inform his delegates, as soon as possible after 6 June 1990, preferably in writing, that Mr Hawke's statements to Ms Wendt were wrong and must be disregarded and to take similar action in relation to Senator Evans' statement. Senator Evans' role in relation to Cambodia was such that there was a real danger that his statement would influence delegates into wrongly rejecting Cambodian claimants for refugee status - see the importance placed by Mr Paterson on the June 1992 DFAT report produced by Senator Evans' department.
42. I accept that Mr Hand believed that "no one in the Department would have been unaware of (his) views on the unfortunate statements of the PM and Senator Evans". But those "views" were that the Cambodian applicants should be given a fair hearing. On all the evidence, including other evidence by Mr Hand, I reject the submission by the respondents' counsel "that there was express oral criticism (of what the Prime Minister had said) from the Minister (Mr Hand) and senior ranks of the Department". I find that no such criticism was expressed to delegates (and not at any time to Mr Paterson) although there were statements by Mr Hand that they should give a fair hearing to the Cambodian applicants. In my opinion the situation created by the statements of Mr Hawke and Senator Evans required far more positive action. A specific, unequivocal contradiction of their statements was necessary and the delegates should have been told that fairness required that those statements be disregarded by them.
43. On all the evidence, I find that there was not at any time any oral or written statement, by Mr Hand or by his senior officers, to the delegates, including Mr Paterson, (a) which specifically contradicted Mr Hawke's statements on television and Senator Evans' statement or (b) which stated that those statements were wrong or (c) which stated that the delegates, in considering each Cambodian case, must, as a matter of fairness, disregard those statements. I reject as incorrect any evidence which suggests the contrary.
44. I find on the evidence that the steps taken by the Minister and the Department were directed towards allaying the understandable fears of persons and bodies as to the manner in which the Department was dealing with applications by the Cambodian 'boat people' for refugee status - fears which had arisen primarily because of Mr Hawke's statements on television and the publicity given to them. I accept that the steps taken were intended to persuade the various bodies and persons interested in the fate of the Cambodian 'boat people' that the Department's processes gave a fair hearing to persons claiming to be refugees. However, the steps taken should have been aimed at ensuring that the Cambodian claimants would in fact receive a fair hearing. The reality of fairness was far more important than the mere appearance of fairness or the giving of assurances that there would be a fair hearing.
45. Mr Paterson did not consider Ms Mok's case until late October 1992 almost two and one-half years after Mr Hawke's statement; at that earlier time he was not a delegate deciding whether Cambodians were refugees. The respondents' counsel submitted that "two and a half years is a pretty long time and one would have thought that to have paraded the comments again and then expressly directed delegates to ignore them would have the very reverse effect." I was impressed by that submission at the time when it was made but, on reflecting on it, have come to the conclusion that there was a much greater danger in failing to tell him, specifically and unequivocally, that Mr Hawke's statements were wrong and must, as a matter of fairness, be disregarded; in that connexion it may be added that Mr Paterson in 1990 (when he was not a delegate) never saw "any documentation to suggest that the Prime Minister had got it wrong" (transcript 2031).
46. Mr Simington's evidence occupied nine days, partly because of the content and the length of his answers. It must be said that he persistently tried to ensure that the applicant's counsel would get no benefit from his answers, which on a substantial number of occasions failed to answer the question. His answers were often evasive, argumentative and liberally sprinkled with qualifications likely to lead the applicant's counsel away from the point of his original question - and at times succeeding in doing so.
47. Because of the way in which he was framing his answers to questions, the court found it necessary to speak to him on several occasions - see, for example, transcript 718 where he was told that witnesses' "function in a case is to listen carefully to the question and to answer that question and preferably no other question - no other question that they think, perhaps wrongly, is implicit in it". Another example is at transcript 910-911, where the court said to him that it had read the transcript and listened to his evidence for three days and that it "would help us all and may well help the respondent's case if you could make a point of not in any sense fencing with the question(er). . . . I urge you to remember that . . . it is no part of your function to try to argue the case for the minister. If you confine yourself to answering questions, listen to them carefully. If you have to give an explanation, of course give it". He was then given an example of where (at transcript 820) his failure to answer a question by Mr Rose had resulted in two "follow up" questions. After those statements by the court, Mr Simington's responses to questions improved for a short time but unfortunately the improvement did not last. Despite the court's observations Mr Simington's approach to giving evidence in this case was (1) to "fence" with Mr Rose, (2) to give an "answer" that he knew did not answer the question and (3) to try to argue the case for the Minister. I am unable to accept his answers as being accurate except where they give some support to the applicant's case and that only occurred where (a) the facts were common ground or (b) the documentary material put to him compelled the answer or (c) he inadvertently gave an answer of some value to the applicant's counsel.
48. The following extracts are from those parts of the transcript of Mr Simington's evidence which are not confidential. They illustrate his method of giving evidence and also throw some light on other aspects of the case:
"(p 606) (MR ROSE) You walked into the witness box with a
folder, did you not? --- Yes.
What is that folder? --- Papers, our documents from the files,
the departmental files, that is.
(p 607) Well, is the position then, Mr Simington, that you
have gone to these departmental files that you have access to
and drawn out the papers that you believe can assist you in
your recollection of events? --- Certainly. I think it's very
important to be in a position to recollect accurately.
So the position is that when we go back to 1989 and ask for
your involvement giving advice are you able to then, through
using the file you have with you, tell us what your
involvement was? --- No, I'm sorry. I've already (sic) I
can't recall and the files aren't a great deal of help to me.
Not everything one does or says is recorded on a file. . . .
At the time you became aware that the people on the first
boat, the Pender Bay, were making a claim for refugee status,
which is one, two or three weeks after they arrive, did you
have any concern at that stage there may be a major outflow of
boat people from Cambodia? --- I wouldn't link, I wouldn't
think the question of whether or not these people had sought
refugee status or not is relevant. The issue that I think
you're trying to - - -
Well, perhaps you can answer my question rather than - - - ?
--- Well, I'm trying.
Did you have a major concern, yes or no? --- I would've had a
concern about a boat arriving in North West Australia from
Cambodia. I would have been concerned about the implications
of that.
What was your concern about the implications? --- What did it
mean?
Did you have a view as to what it meant? --- I think over that
period there would have been a view which I certainly would've
expressed.
Can you tell me what that view is? --- There was the
possibility that there could be a renewal of a boat exodus, if
you want, from Indo China as (p 608) much along the pattern
that had been occurring from Vietnam for the previous 10 or 11
years.
Had the department you worked in and the section you worked in
been hearing rumours that boats were going to sail from
Cambodia for Australia? --- Yes, I - I couldn't be precise as
to the time at which those rumours as you suggest, began to
circulate - within, that is, a few weeks.
. . .
HIS HONOUR: Mr Simington, you said a moment ago, there would
have been a view and that you would have expressed it, that
there could be an exodus from Cambodia. To whom did you
express that view? --- This would have been in formal
conversations about this. If your Honour - and I assume we
are talking about the first weeks as it were, after the
arrival of the boat at Pender Bay in November 89. At that
stage we were already receiving indications that there was a
great deal of interest.
A great deal of? --- A great deal of interest in organisers
putting people on boats and sending them, not so much
necessarily to Australia, but out of Cambodia. Our principal
source of information by my recollection at that (p 609) time,
would have been UNHCR, the United Nation, the Office of the
United Nations of the High Commission for Refugees.
Yes. I do not think you have answered my question. It is to
whom you expressed those views? --- In the absence of records
on paper it is very difficult to be precise, but had I been
asked by the minister that presumably is the advice I would
have given. The secretary of the department. We were after
all in receipt of - by that stage, a degree of information
from overseas, from overseas sources. As I've said,
principally from the United Nations, that this was a
possibility.
. . .
MR ROSE: . . . I asked you before whether or not there had
been rumours of boat sailing. Is that the position? --- Yes,
I think, as I have explained.
Yes. And that was causing you some concern, was it? ---
Concern because it was an issue that would - that was going to
confront the minister, going to confront the government. . . .
HIS HONOUR: Mr Simington, the question that you were asked is
whether you at that time had any view as to whether they were
genuine, not what their race or nationality was? --- Your
Honour in that sense the moment people in this situation
sought asylum as refugees the issue of what I thought I would
hope was of no longer any relevance.
MR ROSE: Well, can you answer the question though, did you
have a view? --- I would have had a personal view but I - - -
(p 610) Well what was that view? --- But I don't believe that
my personal views - - -
What was that view? --- My view I suppose was that there was a
very strong possibility that these people were as was being
suggested by reports we were receiving people who were wanting
to leave Cambodia or leave Cambodia having come from somewhere
else to migrate to Australia.
Was your view that these people were potentially economic
refugees? --- Potentially of course.
MR ROSE: And was that a view that others at a senior level
within the department to your knowledge held? --- I could not
talk about the views and particularly the private views of
other officers. . . .
(p 611) Now, are you able to say whether that report was
accurately addressing the fears that I have been raising with
you? --- I am sorry, I don't understand the - what you mean by
"fears". . . .
(MR ROSE:) Mr Simington, I have asked you about fears of an
outflow coming to Australia and also the concept that these
people are economic refugees. Does that cablegram address
those issues? --- I think it - yes, it addresses those issues,
yes. . . .
(p 612) MR TRACEY: This particular cablegram came from the
Australian Embassy in Bangkok. It came to Foreign Affairs
Department in Canberra and it bears the date of 18 January
1990. . . .
(p 617) And it supports the proposition I was putting to you
that there are rumours of Cambodian boat refugees set to sail
for Australia. Would you agree with that? --- Yes.
And would that be of some concern to the Department of
Immigration? --- If the rumours were true, yes.
And is there also a suggestion that these rumoured boats are
relatives of people who have already sailed for Australia? ---
Well, that is what the telegram says, yes.
And would that be of concern? --- It is a question of what you
mean by concern. It's an explanation of the situation being
reported.
Was there a concern that there was going to be a potential
flow or outflow from Cambodia? --- I think that is what this
text suggests, yes. . . .
(p 618) Would you have a look at the bottom paragraph,
paragraph 5 - in the third last line, where it says:
The decision of those who are already in Australia will
obviously be of significant influence to any potential
flow.
? --- Yes.
Can you tell me what you understood when you got this document
and what that meant? --- I read that and as I read it today as
coming in the context of the reported rumour that there was a
mass exodus or there was a potential exodus of boats from
Cambodia that the judgment being in the minds of UNHCR and
others that this was - this was a migration exodus. The fact
would be and the judgment would be that if people were able to
successfully reach Australia and stay as migrants then of
course many other people would come. That is the context not
the question of refugee or not. . . .
(p 620) (MR ROSE:) Now it is quite clear, is it not, that
the paragraph 5 sentence . . . is relating to a consideration
of whether or not they get refugee status? --- Well, yes, that
is a construction that you could put on it but I didn't draft
this telegram. (Exhibit CS1)
I am not suggesting you drafted it, that is the proper
construction of the telegram, is it not? --- I wonder if it
is, I wonder if it is. . . .
MR ROSE: Mr Simington, what do you understand or what did you
understand at the time you first came across this telegram to
mean? --- I find it difficult to repeat the exact words but I
will attempt to reconstruct my earlier answer your Honour. I
took the last sentence to turn on the issue of whether for
whatever motivation these people had come to Australia for was
to be successful. Now the presumption behind this report as I
read it (p 621) then and as I read it now is that these people
were seeking to migrate to Australia.
As refugees Mr Simington? --- I submit that that is not and
was not an issue and it was probably not in the mind of the
drafter of this report.
MR ROSE: Do you read it today, Mr Simington, as indicating
that if there is a favourable decision of allowing these
people to stay that that might influence an outflow from
Cambodia? --- I believe that is correct, yes.
And that from the very earliest days was a concern of the
Department of Immigration, was it not? --- A fairly natural
concern to a ministry that is responsible for the control of
Australia's borders, yes.
Yes. There was a concern, was there not, that Australia did
not want a problem of having to deal with a lot of people
trying to come in and remain in Australia? --- I think that's -
I'm not terribly sure of the construction you want to put on
that - basically, governments do tend to believe that this
kind of issue is one that needs to be considered as very
important, yes. . . .
(p 626) Mr Simington, by the middle of 1990 was there a
prevalent view within the government circles and within the
Department of Immigration that these Cambodian boat people,
who had been arriving and making claims for refugee status,
were simply not refugees? --- I don't believe I can honestly
answer that question because I just don't know the answer to
that. . . .
(p 632) Are you able to give any information as to what those
elaborate lengths were. Are we talking about written
communication, television interview, speech in parliament or
what are we talking about? --- A number of public statements . . .
Well as you have now got notice of it would it be possible for
you to search your files or whatever else is available to you
with a view to getting more information on it? --- Well the
odds are your Honour it is not on these files.
Some more information on it? --- The odds are it is not on
these files but certainly I can try to track this sort of
thing down.
MR ROSE: Mr Simington,you had a request to produce all the
files? --- Yes.
(p 633) That you had control over? --- Yes. . . .
Mr Simington, prior to coming to court today were you aware of
what generally this case was about? --- Generally, yes.
And generally what the cases in Sydney are about? --- Less
specifically. . . .
Mr Simington have you ever been in a situation where somebody
has expressed the view that all these Cambodians are economic
refugees to you? --- Oh yes.
And have you dispelled that view or adopted it? --- It is not
a question of dispelling, it is a question - it is a question
of professional judgment.
(p 634) And in the course of negotiations was it ever
suggested to you overseas that people were - that these people
were all economic refugees? --- Yes, it was.
And did you dispel that view? --- It wasn't and I didn't see
it as my job to dispel that view, to take on as it were and
contest a judgment by everyone I met.
HIS HONOUR: . . . what sort of people suggested that to you?
--- . . . Let me give you perhaps an illustrative list, your
Honour. UNHCR principally and UNHCR let me emphasise is the
United Nations agency responsible for the protection of
refugees. . . .
(p 639) Perhaps I will ask the question again. Was there
concern that by recognising these people as refugees that that
might have some ramifications for the peace process in
Cambodia? --- I would think that it could have been seen by
UNHCR as having implications for the conduct of the
repatriation of the 300,000-odd Cambodians on the
Thai/Cambodian border, yes.
Was there such a concern? --- If I can interpret your question
as to be asking me was there a view that a decision,
favourable decisions, on refugee status in Australia would be
seen to be against the interests of UNHCR and other countries
I think there is a presumption that that was probably true
from time to time.
9. Whether any policy to reject Cambodian 'boat people' as refugees
49. I accept the applicant's submission that the "rule or policy" in paragraphs 5(2)(f) and 6(2)(f) of the Judicial Review Act is not restricted to a rule or policy which is promulgated by the Minister and adopted by decision-makers or otherwise formulated in writing by decision-makers for the purpose of guiding their decisions, but may extend to informal rules or policies. Each of Messrs Simington, Hand and Conybeare attended court after a subpoena was taken out by the applicant's solicitors. Before calling Mr Simington, Mr Rose referred the court to Mooney v. James [1949] VicLawRp 6; 1949 VLR 22 at 25 - 28 and Gordon v. Carroll (1977) 27 FLR 129 at 135-136 (6 ALR 579 at 585). Without objection by counsel for the respondents, Mr Rose put a very large number of leading questions to Mr Simington and also put leading questions to Messrs Hand and Conybeare.
50. Much of the documentary and oral evidence relied on by the applicant, in support of her claim that there was a policy to reject, was admitted subject to objection by the respondents' counsel to its relevance. After the application was amended without objection the court, on 10 May 1993, considered written submissions as to the admissibility of that evidence, heard further oral argument and declined to rule that the material was inadmissible (transcript 1404). Mr Tracey then told the court that the respondents "would be objecting to the admission of such evidence and that it would be included amongst the material to which we would wish to address your Honour in final address". However, during his final address Mr Tracey said that it would not be necessary for the court to reconsider the admissibility of the evidence if the court found that the evidence fell short of establishing any conspiracy or rejection mentality.
51. The applicant's counsel placed before the court an extremely large quantity of documentary material as well as the oral evidence of witnesses, whose evidence gave some support to the applicant's claim that there was a policy to reject. Much of the documentary material put by the applicant before Wilcox J in Lek v. The Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (Matter No. NG 926 of 1992 - judgment delivered on 22 June 1993) was apparently the same as that tendered in the present case - although the latter material may have been more extensive and Ms Mok's counsel led oral evidence at great length. Counsel for the respondents in the present case, in their submissions in reply (transcript 3198), referred the court to his Honour's decision and submitted that pages 40-44 of his Honour's reasons provided "what we would respectfully adopt as a fair summation of what these documents disclose". The pages adopted by the respondents' counsel included the following statements (p 40-42) by Wilcox J (emphasis added):
"The policy, (the applicants) say, was to refuse applications
for refugee status by "boat people"; and this because of two
important objectives of the Australian government. The
objectives were, first, to discourage people from leaving
Cambodia in the hope of being accepted as refugees in
Australia and, secondly, to avoid undermining implementation
of the Paris peace agreements.
The evidence contains records of numerous conversations,
at a high level of government, concerning "boat people". Some
discussions were between people within the Australian
government; others were between representatives of the
Australian government and representatives of a foreign
government. The records were produced to counsel on a
confidential basis. They were tendered in evidence and
addressed in submissions. But people participated in the
discussions on the basis that they would be kept confidential.
I should not reveal their content unless this course is
essential. It is not. For present purposes it is enough to
say that the documents demonstrate concern within the
Australian government, at Ministerial level, about the
problems that would result from any significant increase in
the number of "refugees" attempting to reach Australia by
boat.
The documents reveal that many people failed to reach
Australia. At least one boat sank off the Cambodian coast,
with extensive loss of life. Some boats only got as far as
Malaysia, causing problems and expense for the Malaysian
government. Some boats reached Indonesia but were unfit to
proceed further. The Indonesian authorities took into custody
many "boat people", most of whom probably left Cambodia with
the intention of travelling to Australia. At one stage, it
seems, Indonesia held nearly 2,000 Cambodians in a camp at
Galang. The number of detainees strained accommodation at the
camp. The Australian government agreed to make a financial
contribution to its extension. This gesture was partly
humanitarian, but it also contained an element of self
interest. Australian officials calculated that, if conditions
at Galang became too bad, the Indonesian government might
become unwilling to take into custody "boat people" who came
to official notice; and that any such attitude would increase
the number who continued on to Australia and eventually became
a burden on the Australian government.
The documents also show concern about the cost of caring
for those who did reach Australia. During the period 1989-1991
the cost of providing facilities, and caring, for
detainees ran to several million dollars each year. There was
a strong and understandable wish, at a high level of
government, to abate the flow of arrivals.
In relation to the second motive for the alleged rule or
policy; there is no doubt that the Australian government has
always strongly supported the Paris agreements. I understand
that the agreements are based on principles first suggested by
Australia; although many others contributed to their final
terms. The Australian government has assisted to implement
the agreements, even to the point of sending Australian
personnel to join the United Nations peace keeping force.
There is no doubt whatever that the Australian government
would have been anxious to avoid undermining the Paris peace
agreements.
The argument that a policy of refusing refugee
applications stemmed from concern about the Paris agreements
was not well developed. The argument seems to be that
widespread approval of refugee applications would encourage
others to leave Cambodia, in the belief that they also would
be allowed to settle in Australia; continuing departures would
suggest that there were serious continuing problems in
Cambodia; and this would adversely affect the willingness of
the Cambodian factions, and their international supporters, to
implement the peace agreements.
Perhaps the first two steps in the argument may be
accepted. But it seems unrealistic to believe that the
Cambodian factions or their international supporters would be
influenced by the number of people putting to sea. These
parties must know the true position within the country. In
the light of that knowledge, they would make their own
assessment whether or not the implementation of the agreements
was in their interests. I cannot see why this assessment
would be influenced by the number of people leaving Cambodia.
Perhaps it does not matter whether or not there is a
logical link between the flow of "boat people"and the future
of the Paris peace agreements; there were other reasons for
the Australian government to discourage people from attempting
to reach Australia. But it is another question whether that
wish gave rise to a rule or policy of refusing refugee
applications."
52. His Honour then referred to the evidence - and absence of evidence - before him. In referring to the evidence, oral and documentary, before the court, I shall follow his Honour's course of not revealing the contents of the confidential documents; the applicant's solicitors and counsel had obtained access to those documents from the respondents after signing undertakings to preserve their confidentiality.
53. The applicant's counsel contended that the delegate applied an:
" inflexible policy based in general terms on factors
including the nine points developed in the Applicant's case,
namely -
(i) Outflow;
(ii) Economic Refugeeism;
(iii) Indonesian Position;
(iv) Deterrence/Signals;
(v) Comprehensive Plan of Action;
(vi) Inconsistency with the Cambodian Peace Plan;
(vii) Repatriation Payments and Return Counselling;
(viii) Voluntary and Involuntary Returns;
(ix) (Draft) Memorandum of Understanding."
54. A large number of the factual matters asserted by the applicant's counsel were not in any real dispute. Many of them were accepted by Mr Simington in his evidence. Other factual matters were supported by statements in the documents which had been produced to the applicant's legal advisers by the respondents and tendered to the court by the applicant as confidential exhibits. Other matters were substantially the same as those stated in of the June 1992 Report the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (the DFAT report of June 1992) - see Section 2, "Background" and Section 3 "The Peace Settlement". The delegate "preferred that report, as to its general outline of the situation in Cambodia, to other material" (transcript 2273). That report (at p 7) stated that the "Paris Accords" signed on 23 October 1991 "by representatives of the four Cambodian factions" (including the Khmer Rouge) represented "the first real opportunity the Cambodian people have had in twenty years (1971-1991) to break the cycle of violence and human rights abuses in Cambodia". The most convenient way in which to record those non-contentious matters is by quoting passages from the book entitled "Australian Foreign Relations" by Senator Evans and Mr Bruce Grant, published in August 1991. Senator Evans is and was at all material times, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. On the evidence, oral and documentary, before the court, I accept as factually accurate the facts set out in the following passages and accept that the opinions there set out were held at the time by the persons to whom they have been attributed:
(p 206) " THE TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIA
The horror of Cambodia's experience in the killing
fields of the Khmer Rouge has captured the attention, and
emotions, of the world more than almost any other contemporary
tragedy. Australia's efforts to help achieve a durable peace
for Cambodia have occupied more time and attention in our
diplomacy than any other single issue in recent years. . . .
the story of Australia's involvement in the Cambodian problem -
unfinished though it still is - is worth telling in some
detail.
The complex modern tragedy of Cambodia effectively began
with the deposition in 1970 of Prince Sihanouk . . .
culminated in the capture of Phnom Penh by the communist Khmer
Rouge in 1975.
There was then instituted, under the Democratic
Kampuchea (DK) government of the Khmer Rouge, and its leader
Pol Pot, a genocidal reign of terror exceeded probably only by
the Nazis. The country was cut off from the world, all
foreigners expelled, the cities and towns forcibly evacuated,
the whole population set to work in the fields, and the
systematic extermination ordered of professionals,
intellectuals, senior bureaucrats, 'Khmer bodies with
Vietnamese minds', and anyone else who might conceivably
challenge Khmer Rouge authority. News of the scale of the
horror was slow to filter out, but by 1979 it was becoming
clear that at least one (p 207) million people - perhaps
double that number: the truth will never finally be known -
had died. . . .
The Khmer Rouge's reign of terror came to an end, but an
endlessly protracted civil war recommenced. Recurring bloody
military engagements, guerrilla assaults and ambushes, the
displacement of large numbers of civilians, and the inability
of life generally to return to any kind of pre-1970 normality
all took their further toll of a people who have already
suffered more than most in the twentieth century. . . .
(p 208) . . . in February 1981 when, after two years of
growing domestic pressure, the Fraser Government broke ranks
with ASEAN and 'de-recognised' the ousted Khmer Rouge, or DK,
Government, whose cause ASEAN had been sponsoring in the
United Nations. This decision . . . reflected the very strong
domestic opinion in the Australian community that it was
immoral for Australia formally to recognise any claimant to
government associated with the odious Pol Pot regime. . . .
The Hawke Government's Indo-China policy thus focused
from the outset on exploring various options for a Cambodian
settlement. . . . Specific Australian initiatives designed to
help break the stalemate included the proposal for an
international war crimes tribunal to try Pol Pot and his
senior associates, . . . (p 209) The first significant
manifestation of the new approach was the Australian decision
in 1983 to withdraw from co-sponsorship, in favour merely of
support, of the annual ASEAN Cambodia resolution in the United
Nations General Assembly. That decision was taken on the
basis that, among other things, the resolution was too
one-sidedly critical of Vietnam, and did not sufficiently
acknowledge the enormity of the human rights desecration that
had occurred in Cambodia under Pol Pot. . . .
Something of a consensus was emerging at least on broad
principles - that there needed to be withdrawal of all
Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, matched by an effective
arrangement to prevent Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge forces from
returning to power in Cambodia; . . . (p 210) The Paris
International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) was accordingly
convened, with joint Indonesian chairmanship, in Paris in
July-August 1989. This brought together all four Cambodian
factions, the six ASEAN countries, the Permanent Five Members
of the UN Security Council, Vietnam, Laos, Australia, Canada
and India as well as Zimbabwe (representing the Non-Aligned
Movement) and a representative of the UN Secretary-General.
In the event the Paris Conference failed, but not
without coming close to succeeding. . . .
Australia's United Nations Peace Plan It was to break this
impasse that the Australian peace proposal, announced in
outline by Gareth Evans in the Senate on 24 November 1989, was
put forward. The central concept of the Australian proposal
to reinvigorate the peace process was very simple. So as to
sidestep the power-sharing issue which had bedevilled the
Paris Conference, and constrain the role of the Khmer Rouge in
the transitional arrangements, it was proposed that the United
Nations be directly (p 211) involved in the civil
administration of Cambodia during the transitional period. .
. . In advocating a very substantially enhanced UN role in
the settlement, the Australian Government recognised that it
was being ambitious . . . conditions within Cambodia -
including the potentially fragile character of any ceasefire,
the difficulty of monitoring guerrilla forces, and the lack of
developed transport and communications infrastructure - would
mean that the overall UN operation would be much more
difficult than had been experienced in most other situations.
. . .
(p 212) it was appreciated that a long, gruelling effort
would be required to translate the Australian proposal into
reality.
In preparing its plan, Australia had to take account of
the prospect that the Khmer Rouge would be able to exploit the
process politically, militarily, or both - particularly in the
proposed transitional period under United Nations
administration - and would not in any event accept any final
outcome which did not leave them in control of the country.
Why not simply take the position that their past record of
atrocities entitled them to no consideration at all, . . . But
the critical point was that the Khmer Rouge could not be
effectively isolated and marginalised, and its military
influence nullified, so long as it continued to be supplied,
especially by China, with arms, money and diplomatic support.
. . .
It was also possible that the protracted process
involved in the plan's negotiation and implementation would be
exploited by the Khmer Rouge to make major military gains and
extend their political influence. . . intelligence assessments
available to the Australian government . . . indicated that
the Khmer Rouge was making steady long-term progress with the
same sort of guerrilla strategy which brought it to power in
1975 (combined with a softer 'hearts and minds' political
strategy), but that there was no prospect of an early
takeover. . . .
(p 213) Certainly in these circumstances, given no evidence
that the Khmer Rouge's stated abandonment of their previous
ideology and methods was anything more than tactical, there
could be no guarantee that they would not resume fighting
after the transitional period with weapons which had been
hidden from the UN monitoring teams. . . .
The Diplomatic Marathon . . . most of the participants in
the Paris Conference had picked up the proposal for an
enhanced United Nations role as a viable way around the
power-sharing impasse and the problem of the Khmer Rouge, and given
it varying degrees of public as well as private endorsement. .
. . (in) the December 1989 - January 1990 period . . . the
Australian 'idea' became a fully fledged Australian
'initiative' or 'plan', as the Foreign Minister and the
officials working with him constantly refined and developed
the detailed elements of the proposal and responded to
suggestions or criticisms from our various interlocutors. . . .
(p 215)
. . . there was produced in time for distribution at the
Jakarta Meeting - IMC (Informal Meeting on Cambodia - February
- a 155-page series of Working Papers, incorporating the
technical mission's findings and covering in some detail all
the necessary elements of a comprehensive settlement.
The Papers were subsequently published as Cambodia: an
Australian Peace Proposal - the so-called (from the colour of
its binding) 'Red Book'. . . .
The Jakarta IMC came very close to reaching agreement on
a statement of principles . . . it just failed to do so,
consensus breaking down on the question of whether the agreed
record should make specific reference to 'the prevention of
recurrence of genocidal policies and practices'. . . .
Steady diplomatic progress was made throughout the rest
of 1990 in the refinement and development of the Australian
plan, with the Permanent Five and the Paris Conference
Co-Chairmen in close consultation with the (p 216) UN Secretariat
now playing the central role. .
Then, at a meeting in Jakarta on 9-10 September (1990),
hosted by Indonesia and France as Paris Conference
Co-Chairmen, the four Cambodian parties accepted this Permanent
Five framework in its entirety as a basis for settling the
Cambodian conflict, and agreed to establish a Supreme National
Council (SNC) - part of the original Australian proposal, and
called for in the framework - which would, among other things
occupy the Cambodian seat in the United Nations. . . .
(p 217)
Prince Sihanouk . . . convened a meeting of the SNC in
Pattaya, Thailand on 24-26 June (1991) (the first since its
notional formation the previous September); and at that
meeting brokered a series of agreements between the four
Cambodian parties which engendered a great deal of
international confidence that a final settlement might, after
all, be quite quickly attainable.
The key agreements were an immediate and unconditional
ceasefire of unlimited duration; acceptance that all Cambodian
parties would stop receiving external military assistance
forthwith; and - in relation to the SNC itself - that future
meetings would be chaired by Prince Sihanouk; . . . (p 218)
There remained many issues of detail - not least the question
of interim enforcement of the ceasefire and arms cessation
agreements, and resolution of the demobilisation question
which was continuing to worry the SOC. But there was general
agreement on a course of future meetings to address these
issue (sic) - involving, again, the Paris Conference
Co-Chairmen, the Permanent Five, and ultimately the reconvened
Paris Conference. At the time of writing (August 1991) it did
seem, at last, that the comprehensive settlement process had
moved to its decisive end-phase. Whatever the final outcome
proves to be - and there have been many false dawns before in
the Cambodian tragedy - Australia's contribution to the
settlement process has been major, and acknowledged as such by
the international community. . . . It represented not only a
sharp new turn in the implementation of Australia's Indo-China
policy but a major development in Australian diplomacy.
. . .
FROM BATTLEFIELD TO MARKETPLACE
(p 219)
The 'boat people' brought to the forefront two seemingly
different Australian national interests. One is the value of
Australia subscribing to an international system which ensures
that refugees are given asylum. This interest arises partly
from the axiom that everyone benefits from rules that apply to
everyone, but more particularly from the belief that Australia
benefits by practising what, as a liberal, democratic society,
it professes - such as the right of the individual to a
private life, protection of the weak against the strong, and
equality before the law. Refugees, who by definition are
victims of persecution, obviously offer a test of these
principles.
(p 220) The other Australian interest lies in restricting,
not encouraging, the flow of refugees. It is always likely
that Australia will be the target of refugee movements, as a
relatively prosperous society with a small population
occupying a large land mass. Our distance from the main
centres of refugee activity protected Australia in the past
from the involuntary flow of large numbers of refugees, who
normally move over the nearest border. It had been easier for
Australia to maintain the first kind of national interest when
we decided to bring large numbers of refugees from
war-stricken Europe, where they were carefully selected by trained
immigration officers thousands of miles from Australian
shores. The 'boat people' arrived without any such
preparation. Although controversy broke out over the question
of their status - whether they were actually refugees, in fear
of persecution, or merely seekers of good, or better, fortune -
many of them were indisputably refugees. That they had
undertaken a hazardous voyage, through seas subject to storms
and piracy, to some extent supported their claim. Whereas the
European refugees were brought to Australia as part of
deliberate immigration strategy, the Vietnamese were, from the
standpoint of Australian policy, less wanted. This applies
also to more recent 'boat people' from Cambodia.
The resolution of these two national interests is
achieved in principle by establishing that every country has
the right to determine who enters its territory. Through
experience of grappling with the Indo-China refugee issue at
first hand, Australia remains committed to its humanitarian
principles, but has realised that it must be more active in
managing the refugee problem. It has done this by
establishing an 'orderly departure program' with Vietnam;
persisting in a dialogue with other governments in South-East
Asia about restraining the flow of refugees southward to
Australia; impressing countries outside the region with the
need to resettle refugees at present held in camps of first
asylum; and, above all, by making an end to the conflict in
Cambodia - and the isolation of Vietnam - one of the top
priorities of Australian foreign policy. In that sense
Australia owed it not only to innocent victims of war and
conflict but also to ourselves to find a lasting solution to
the last remaining source of serious conflict in Indo-China. "
55. On all the evidence before the court, including the respondents' adoption (transcript 3198) of the summation by Wilcox J, I find that the Australian Government was "anxious to avoid undermining the Paris peace agreements" - per Wilcox J in Lek, in the passage adopted by the respondents in the present case (quoted earlier). I also find that Australian Ministers were concerned "about the problems that would result from any significant increase in the number of refugees attempting to reach Australia by boat"; they wished "to discourage people from attempting to reach Australia".
56. I have referred earlier to the statements made by Mr Hawke and Senator Evans, and to Mr Conybeare who denied that there was any structural bias but gave evidence that:
". . . there were aspects of the personal conduct of one or
two officers that like reflecting the fact that our staff
comprised of some significant extent a cross section of the
Australian community have attitudes or use language often
loosely that might give cause for some to misunderstand the
position of the person concerned, the use of sloppy language.
The unfortunate and inappropriate use in official environments
of casual or vulgar language. . . . But in those instances
where I did find that the language particularly in the
personal conduct of one or two of the folk concerned had
formed part of the substance of the allegations and that those
officers were appropriately counselled."
57. The applicant relied upon the use of "standard paragraphs" in support of her claims relating to a "policy to reject" (grounds 3 H (c) and (d)), irrelevant considerations (ground 3 C (e)) and her claims of a denial of natural justice (ground 3 A (e)) and of "unreasonableness" (ground 3 G (g)). I agree with the opinion expressed by Wilcox J in Lek (at p 48 of his reasons for judgment delivered 22 June 1993) that:
"the use by decision makers of reasons devised by others is a
matter that should excite concern about the possibility that
individual decisions were taken in accordance with an
overriding rule or policy or at the direction or behest of
others."
58. However, Mr Paterson was cross-examined at some length as to the use of standard paragraphs. Having considered his evidence and the evidence relied upon by the applicant on this matter, I am satisfied that Mr Paterson did not "use them unquestioningly without looking behind their substance to ascertain their validity and accuracy" as suggested in the applicant's written final address. On the evidence the applicant has failed to establish the allegations of fact which are necessary to support her submissions relating to the use of standard paragraphs. On the evidence I find that the use of standard paragraphs was not compulsory and that it could not be inferred from the mere existence of them that there was a "policy to reject". I accept that Mr Paterson did not consider that he was obliged to use the standard paragraphs.
59. In the light of all the material it is not surprising that the applicant should contend that from March 1990 until after the delegate's decision on 3 November 1992 there was a policy to reject. I find, that after Mr Hawke's statements on television in June 1990, the publicity given to them by the print media and the statement by Senator Evans, there were understandable fears that such a policy existed. However, the applicant's counsel have not succeeded in persuading me, on the requisite standard of proof (cf Briginshaw v. Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336), that a policy to reject existed. In declining to find that such a policy existed I have not given any weight to the evidence of Mr Simington in so far as it gave any support to the respondents' denials; my opinion of his evidence has been expressed earlier in these reasons.
10. Whether Mr Paterson was influenced by Mr Hawke's statements
60. Mr Paterson said that while he was regional director at Darwin (i.e. December 1989 until September 1991) Mr Hand had come to Darwin "quite a few times", that he had attended meetings there with Mr Hand and that he could not recall Mr Hand ever saying "disagree with the Prime Minister". He said that in 1990 he did not "ever see any documentation to suggest that the Prime Minister had got it wrong" (transcript 2031).
61. The respondents' counsel, in their memorandum dated 23 August 1993, accepted that they were unable to point to any evidence by Mr Paterson "to the effect that when he came to decide these cases in November 1992 Mr Hawke's statement had no influence on him at all". They sought to rely upon his evidence that "in my operations at that point in time (June 1990), Mr Hawke's statement that the Cambodians were economic refugees had no effect whatsoever", that it "was of no concern to me whatsoever"; and that "he had had no reaction to it" (transcript 2029-2030). They submitted that "If this evidence be accepted (whether or not one also takes judicial notice of the fact that Mr Hawke ceased to be Prime Minister in December 1991) the only available inference is that Mr Hawke's statement had no influence or effect whatsoever on Mr Paterson's decision-making in November 1992."
62. I am not prepared to accept that Mr Hawke's statement had "no influence or effect whatsoever on Mr Paterson's decision-making in November 1992". Mr Paterson's evidence that Mr Hawke's statement "had no effect on me" was expressly said by him to be "because I was more concerned about the Chinese issue . . . I was more concerned about that side of it at that point in time (June 1990)". He also said "Well, I wasn't involved in refugee processing so it had no effect on me at all" (emphasis added). Pressed by Mr Rose as to whether "you say it had no effect" Mr Paterson answered "In my operations at that point in time it had no effect whatsoever" (emphasis added). In context, his evidence that it "was of no concern to me whatsoever", meant that he was not concerned because he was not a delegate at that time (June 1990) and he "had a very serious issue regarding Chinese workers in the Northern Territory . . . the Cambodian issue was lost in the Chinese issue".
63. Even on that basis it was a surprising statement by Mr Paterson (that Mr Hawke's television interview "had no effect on me at all). One would have thought that, as a lawyer, he would have had a reaction to Mr Hawke's prejudging of claims that were to be determined by officers of the Department of which Mr Paterson was an officer; further, that he would have had a very sharp reaction to Mr Hawke's statement that he would "be forceful in ensuring that that is what's followed". No lawyer should listen with equanimity to a public statement by the Prime Minister, speaking of his proposed intimidation of delegates who were making important decisions under the Migration Act.
64. It will have been noted that the evidence relied upon by the respondents' counsel was given as to what happened in June 1990. The question under consideration at present is whether Mr Hawke's statements had any influence upon Mr Paterson when he came to decide the case in November 1992. It might be thought that, by 3 November 1992, Mr Paterson might have forgotten the detail of Mr Hawke's statements. However, Mr Paterson, in his evidence (June 1993), quickly corrected counsel as to what Mr Hawke said:
"(MR ROSE:) Well, when you were in Alice Springs and you
turned on the late news and you heard Mr Hawke say: Chinese
and Cambodians are economic refugees, did that have any
relevance to you? --- Well, with respect, I think Mr Hawke
said that the Cambodians were economic refugees, but he didn't
say the Chinese were economic refugees." (transcript 2029)
65. The memorandum by the respondents' counsel referred to "the fact that Mr Hawke ceased to be Prime Minister in December 1991", i.e. nearly a year before the decision. However, there was no evidence that even suggested that Mr Keating, who became Prime Minister at that time, or any Minister in the new Ministry (including Senator Evans and Mr Hand), had ever at any time, directly or indirectly, assured the delegates that they had nothing to fear from Mr Keating, or from any other Minister, for performing their duty with fairness and impartiality towards the Cambodians. Nor was there any evidence that Mr Keating, or any of those Ministers, even stated that Mr Hawke was wrong or that his statements must be disregarded by the decision-makers.
66. The respondents' counsel relied upon the following answers, given by Mr Paterson during his evidence in chief:
"In each case, do your published reasons genuinely express
your views of the matter? --- Yes, they do.
In each case do you - or rather did you take into account only
those matters to which you advert in your reasons? --- Yes,
that's correct.
And did you have resort only to the material that you
identified at the end of your reasons in each case, for the
purpose of coming to your decision? --- Yes." (transcript
I am not prepared to accept as accurate Mr Paterson's evidence as to what he took "into account" and as to those being the "only" matters that he considered. In the final address by the applicant's counsel his evidence was criticised partly for the extraordinarily large number of times when his answers in cross-examination were "I can't recall" or "I can't remember" or "I can't recollect". The frequency of the answers in those terms were such as to raise doubts as to his evidence. An example of those answers was as follows (transcript 2240-2241):
"(MR ROSE:) But you cannot say now that you specifically
remember them forming part of your reasons, can you? --- No.
We are very much back to "I would not have signed the document
if it had not been the reasons"? --- Yes, that's correct.
And that is the only basis that you can say these are your
reasons? --- Yes, that's correct.
You have no independent recollection of any of the thought
processing you went through? --- That's correct.
You have no independent recollection of speaking - of what you
spoke about to people in Refugee Law? --- That's correct.
Or as to what other people you spoke to? --- That's correct.
As to what instructions you gave your case officer? --- That's
correct.
As to what notes you made at the time? --- That's correct.
As to what matters exercised your mind in making the decision?
--- That's correct.
You have no recollection about that? --- That's right, Mr
Rose.
Even though you knew that this matter was going to come on to
court at an early stage after the decision was made? --- I
have no guarantee it's going to come on to court at an early
stage. It's now six, seven months later.
You knew proceedings had been issued, did not you, fairly soon
after the decision? --- I knew proceedings had been issued,
yes.
But you took no steps to ensure that you could remember the
things that may have been pressuring (? present to) your mind?
--- Well, as I said yesterday, Mr Rose, in normal proceedings
it's not normal for a delegate to be called to give evidence.
Normally the section 13 statement speaks for itself."
It should be noted that Ms Mok's application was filed on 24 November 1992 and Mr Paterson swore an affidavit on 29 January 1993, in which he dealt with his decision and referred (paragraph 16) to facts which he had considered in reaching a conclusion.
67. Another comment made by Mr Rose upon Mr Paterson's credibility related to the fact that his notes were destroyed. In my opinion the destruction of his notes - although Mr Paterson said he "normally" did (transcript 2112) - was surprising conduct by an officer giving written reasons for decisions that could well be the subject of review proceedings. The fact that he was working under pressure would have been an added reason for retaining his notes - lest he confuse one case with another. Mr Paterson said (transcript 2110-2115) that he had approximately 25 Cambodian cases "in November into December", that he had other issues still going on and was still running a section of 20-odd people; that section was still doing 130 cases in October/November.
68. However, although his evidence has many unsatisfactory features, I am not prepared to disbelieve Mr Paterson's evidence that he could not "remember a lot of what happened in these cases" (transcript 2133).
69. In my opinion, the probabilities are that Mr Paterson, in considering the case in late October 1992 and deciding it on 3 November 1992, was influenced by the statements by Mr Hawke. In forming that opinion I have taken into account his evidence as a whole, including (1) the absence of a denial that he was influenced by Mr Hawke's statements; (2) his ability to recollect (in June 1993) what Mr Hawke had said in June 1990; (3) his evidence that he had no reaction to Mr Hawke's statements; and (4) the fact that he could not recall any contradiction of Mr Hawke by Mr Hand.
70. I accept the written submission by the respondents' counsel that there was no evidence of actual bias on the part of Mr Paterson. However, I have found that he was influenced by Mr Hawke's statements and that, coupled with his lack of any reaction to those statements, suggests that he was unconsciously biased by Mr Hawke's statements.
12. Whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias
71. The applicant submitted that the evidence justified the drawing of an inference that, at all relevant times from early 1990 until after the decision, there existed a view, assumption or opinion, by senior members of the Government including Prime Minister Hawke and senior officers of the Department, that the Cambodian boat people as a class were not refugees; that that view was so widely disseminated that there existed a reasonable apprehension that decision-makers, including the Second Respondent, and their case officers might be influenced by those views, assumptions and opinions. Further that, on the evidence, there was a reasonable apprehension that the delegate might not have brought an impartial, unbiased, fair and independent mind to the resolution of the question for his determination. Counsel cited a number of authorities, including Livesey v. New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288.
72. In their written submissions the respondents' counsel submitted:
". . . that the test as propounded in Livesey is no longer the
test to be applied to courts and tribunals. . . . In Laws . .
. the High Court [1990] HCA 31; (170 CLR 70) applied a different test. In
their joint judgment Mason CJ and Brennan J said, at 87:
"However, we do not consider that the inference
drawn in the preceding paragraph, taken in
conjunction with the other circumstances which we
have described, would lead a fairminded observer
to conclude that the members of the Tribunal apart
from those who participated in the decision of 24
November would bring other than an unprejudiced
and impartial mind to the solution of the issues
which would probably arise in an inquiry to be
held under s.17C: see Livesey . . . " (Emphasis
by respondents' counsel)
"Even if four of those six members were parties to
the filing of the defences, the rules of natural
justice would only require their disqualification
if a reasonable bystander would entertain a
reasonable fear that they were incapable of
bringing fair and unprejudiced minds to the
inquiry: R. v. Watson; Ex parte Armstrong;
Livesey v. New South Wales Bar Association."
(emphasis by respondents' counsel)
The word "would" recurs throughout the three judgments: see
at (81, 87, 94, 98-99, 99 and 101-102). It would thus appear
that the High Court has recast the test, certainly as it is
applied to administrative tribunals. . . . "
74. Having considered that submission, and the passages quoted from Laws, I am not able to uphold the submission that "the High Court applied a different test" in Laws from that in Livesey. In that connection it is to be noted that Livesey is cited in the High Court reasons in Laws, without saying that there was henceforth to be "a different test" (as submitted by the respondents here); further, Livesey had been applied by the High Court in Vakauta [1989] HCA 44; (1989) 167 CLR 568 at 576 and in Grassby v. R [1989] HCA 45; (1989) 168 CLR 1 at 20 [1989] HCA 45; (87 ALR 618 at 631).
75. The respondents also sought to rely upon the decision of Wilcox J in Richmond River Broadcasters Pty Ltd v. Australian Broadcasting Tribunal and others (1992) 106 ALR 671. That case was conducted by counsel for both parties on the basis (p 673) that the test was whether "an objective bystander would reasonably apprehend that (the proposed decision-maker) had predetermined a critical issue in the case", i.e. the applicant's counsel did not argue that the test was whether the decision-maker "might" have such a reasonable apprehension (as distinct from "would") Wilcox J did not have to express an opinion on that question.
76. The submission by the respondents' counsel places undue emphasis upon the use of the word "would" in Laws. In my opinion the question is whether it would be reasonable for the general public or one of the parties to suspect the decision-maker of not bringing an unprejudiced and impartial mind to the solution of the issues before him.
77. In considering the question of whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to suspect Mr Paterson of not bringing an unprejudiced and impartial mind to the consideration of her application, it may be useful to contemplate the hypothetical case of an Australian woman, kept in detention in a foreign country for three years whilst waiting for an administrative official to make a decision as to whether she was a refugee. Assume for the purpose of the case (1) that the Australian woman watched on television, and/or read in a newspaper the next day, that the Prime Minister of that country had expressed views that the Australians who had recently arrived there were not refugees and should not be allowed to stay; (2) that that Prime Minister had stated that he would be forceful in ensuring that his views were followed by the administrative officials who were deciding cases which included her case; (3) that the administrative decision-maker was on a salary level which could be broadly called "middle-management"; and (4) that the view that those Australians were not refugees had also been publicly expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. In my opinion such an Australian citizen would be likely to suspect - and it would not be unreasonable for her to suspect - that the administrative official who was to decide her case would not bring an unprejudiced and impartial mind to the making of his decision.
78. It is to be noted that "The General Submission", dated 12 August 1992, by RACS, on behalf of their clients including Ms Mok, contained the following:
"CLASSIFICATION AS ECONOMIC REFUGEES
We are concerned by allegations made in the press by prominent
persons including the former Prime Minister, Bob Hawke that
the boat people are 'economic refugees'."
That document shows that at a time after the meeting held by the RSRC, but before its recommendation, the applicant, through her solicitor, was expressing her apprehension of bias. In my opinion her apprehension of bias was reasonable. Less than two months later, but before the delegate's decision, she commenced a hunger strike which lasted for approximately two months and led to a Macquarie Street specialist expressing the written opinion that she was "determined to die rather than be repatriated". Any apprehension of bias that the applicant felt as a result of the statements in June 1990 by Mr Hawke and Mr Evans may have been increased by the passage of the Migration Amendment Act 1992. That was at a time after Mr Keating became Prime Minister cf. the reference by the respondents' counsel to the fact that Mr Hawke ceased to be Prime Minister in December 1991. The Amendment Act became operative from 6 May 1992 - the day before the hearing of applications for orders for release from custody was due to commence in the Federal Court (see Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 15-16 - quoted earlier in section 2 of these reasons). The observations by the High Court on that Act (although made after the delegate's decision) may not be irrelevant to the question of whether it was reasonable for the applicant to suspect the delegate of not bringing an unprejudiced and impartial mind to his function of deciding whether she was a refugee.
79. If there be any doubt as to the reality of her apprehension, it should be noted that the Department's Director of Immigration in Sydney (Mr K. Owen) later advised her solicitor that Ms Mok's condition "was considered serious as there had been complications with Ms Mok's drips" and she was "taking small amounts of liquid not considered to be adequate even to sustain (her) present condition"; further, the respondents' counsel advised the court that his instructions were that she was "not fit to be moved" (see section 3).
80. I have considered the submissions by the respondents' counsel as to necessity and, on the material before the court, am not prepared to uphold it. It would have been open to Mr Hand, as the Minister, to have considered and decided the application himself; on his evidence, which I have accepted, he would have given the applicant a fair hearing and may well have granted her application. Further, it could have been open to the Minister to have arranged for the matter to be heard and determined by a member of the legal profession (not an officer of the Department), with the necessary delegation from the Minister. I also reject the submissions of the respondents on the question of waiver - see, for example, the RACS submission on Ms Mok's behalf, referring to Mr Hawke's statements.
81. On 3 November 1992 Mr Paterson by letter informed the applicant that he had determined that she was not a refugee and on 12 November 1992 he signed a statement of reasons (which the parties treated as a statement of reasons under the Act) and forwarded a copy to the applicant. It is convenient to set out most of that document, despite its length, because of the nature of the challenges to the decision:
" APPLICANT'S NAME: MOK, Gek Buoy (sic)
File Number: 90/36901
STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DECISION ON REFUGEE STATUS
FOLLOWING REVIEW BY THE REFUGEE STATUS REVIEW COMMITTEE
1. BACKGROUND
1.1 Personal particulars
1.2 Arrival details
1.3 Detention details
2. PROCESSING HISTORY
3. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS/SUBMISSIONS
4. ASSESSMENT
4.1 Definition
4.2 Race
4.3 Religion
4.4 Nationality
4.5 Social group
4.6 Political opinion
4.7 Cumulative grounds
5. DECISION
6. EVIDENCE
STATEMENT OF REASONS
I, MALCOLM GORDON PATERSON, at all material times a delegate
of the Minister of State for Immigration, Local Government and
Ethnic Affairs for the purpose of the determination of refugee
status make the following statement setting out my findings on
material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other
material on which those findings are based and giving the
reasons for my decision of 3 November 1992 that GEK BOUY MOK,
(the Applicant), does not have the status of refugee within
the meaning of the Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees that was done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, (the
Convention), or the Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees that was done at New York on 31 January 1967, (the
Protocol).
1. BACKGROUND
1.1 Personal particulars
Surname: MOK
Given names: Gek Buoy (sic)
Date of birth: 6 June 1959
Country of birth: Cambodia
Citizenship: Cambodian
Sex: Female
Marital status: Single
Composition/disposition of immediate family: Father
deceased. Mother, two brothers and two sisters in
Cambodia. One sister and one brother in Australia.
Country of former habitual residence: Cambodia
1.2 Arrival details
Date and place of arrival: 2 April 1990, Broome, WA
Documented/undocumented arrival: Undocumented
1.3 Detention details
In custody since 2 April 1990.
2. PROCESSING HISTORY
08/05/90 Application for refugee status received by
the Department (ff 3-36)
28/05/90 Applicant interviewed (f 63 - tapes)
26/02/92 Decision that Applicant was not a refugee
(ff 96-115)
24/03/92 Application for review of the decision
received by the Department (ff 116-118)
29/07/92 Consideration by Refugee Status Review
Committee (RSRC) (ff 148-151). Their
assessment was that she was not a refugee.
A copy of the RSRC assessment was sent to
the Applicant for comment.
24/09/92 Applicant's comments on RSRC assessment
received (ff 154-170)
3. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS/SUBMISSIONS
3.1 Following is a summary of claims raised in the primary
application:
(1) The Applicant and her family suffered hardship
during the Pol Pot period which included denial of
the right to practice her religion, separation of
family members, requirement to perform hard labour
while receiving insufficient food and the death of
her father due to exhaustion resulting from hard
labour. The Applicant was accused of being a CIA
informer when soldiers discovered her escaping her
mobile labour unit to visit her parents. As a
punishment for her attempted escape, she was sent
to an isolated farm where she was required to work
alone for six months.
(2) There is still fighting in Cambodia and the
Applicant fears a return of Pol Pot to power. The
Applicant's fears are not allayed by the
developments in Cambodia as there is still a
strong Khmer Rouge (KR) presence there.
(3) The Applicant and her family were faced with a
food shortage immediately after the Vietnamese
takeover. They stayed for a short time in a camp
on the Thai-Cambodian border before being forced
back into Cambodia at gun point along with
thousands of other refugees. In 1980, they went
to live in Phnom Penh where they found that most
of their relatives had died. During this time,
her brother continued to work as a dentist whilst
she took up sewing to earn an income.
(4) In 1985, the Applicant's family were classified as
'351' denoting Chinese ethnicity. As a result,
their belongings were confiscated by armed
soldiers. They were subjected to discrimination
which affected the Applicant's education, her job
prospects, her ability to openly practice her
religion and cultural practices. The Applicant
and her family were also discriminated against by
the general population. Commenting on the draft
primary assessment of the Applicant's claims, her
legal representative stated that liberalisations
referred to by the primary case officer are not
sufficiently substantial to negate the fears held
by the Applicant in this regard.
(5) Despite the prohibition of religious practices,
the Applicant and her family continued to practice
their religion secretly at home. On one occasion,
the police raided their home while they were
praying, destroyed their shrine and threatened
them with imprisonment and flogging if they were
caught again.
(6) The police and a section leader came to her family
home two or three times in 1989. Her sister spoke
with them while the Applicant ran away. Her
sister was very frightened by them. The Applicant
does not know what they wanted.
. . .
(9) Because of the Applicant's illegal departure, she
would be considered as a person who had betrayed
her country and she fears imprisonment on return
to Cambodia. Her relatives would also be
condemned. She had seen people depart Cambodia
but had never seen them return. She had heard
that punishment for attempted illegal departure is
imprisonment.
(10) Commenting on the draft primary assessment of the
Applicant's claims, her legal representative
stated that the case officer has given no
consideration to the objective situation at the
time the Applicant submitted her application. It
is argued that developments which have taken place
since that date and which have been taken into
account by the case officer do not represent a
change which is either stable or ongoing.
(11) The Applicant believes that the 57 Cambodians who
returned from Galang camp in Indonesia would not
have returned unless they had someone inside the
Government to depend on. The Applicant's legal
representative makes a distinction between the 57
voluntary returnees and the hundreds of thousands
of Cambodians who continue to be unable or
unwilling to return to Cambodia.
Additional claims in the review application can be
summarised as follows:
(12) The Applicant's legal representative re-iterates
that refugee status should be determined upon the
facts as they exist when the Applicant seeks
recognition as a refugee and that even a 10%
chance of persecution on return to the Applicant's
country of nationality would constitute a "real
chance" of persecution (Chan vs. Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs).
(13) Return of the KR does not mean a return by the KR
to complete and absolute power but it means a
situation where the KR are able to continue the
civil war in Cambodia through violence and
persecution. The Applicant's fear in this regard
is supported by objective evidence in relation to
the destructive force of the KR. As an equal
partner in the four member SNC, the KR would
secure its own position within Phnom Pehn, remain
armed and continue to receive endorsement by the
Chinese leadership.
(14) The Applicant's legal representative refers to
articles by Dr Dennis Shoesmith and Stephen Heder
and submits that the leadership and ideology of
the KR remain unchanged. Commenting on the
ceasefire violations by the KR, it is submitted
that they are a set back to the peace process.
. . .
(19) The disproportionate punishment that the Applicant
would be subjected to for her illegal departure,
would amount to persecution in Convention terms.
(20) In view of the volatile situation in Cambodia,
returnees to Cambodia are not yet safe from future
persecution. They will only remain unharmed while
the international spotlight is focussed on
Cambodia. When the numbers increase, it will not
be easy to monitor their safety.
(21) Dr Shoesmith has stated that the relaxation of
some discriminatory regulations in relation to
Chinese Cambodians does not mean that the Chinese
Cambodians are not at risk of persecution by local
party leaders and agitators in the lead up to
elections. Dr Shoesmith also points out that the
Chinese Cambodians outside the capital city still
face particular risks from the Khmer Rouge.
(22) The Applicant's legal representative refers to
Paragraph 201 of the UN Convention Handbook and
requests that the "cumulative effect" of the
Applicant's experiences be taken into account.
Additional material in the applicant's comments on the
RSRC recommendations can be summarised as follows:
(23) The UNHCR Handbook stipulates at Paragraph 37,
that the subjective element should be accorded
primacy and that the determination of refugee
status "primarily requires an evaluation of the
Applicant's statements rather than a judgement on
a situation prevailing in his country of origin".
The RSRC has paid insufficient attention to the
merits of the Applicant's individual claim and has
instead, been acting on a policy to reject the
current applicants.
. . .
(25) The fact that millions of Cambodians had
experiences similar to those of the Applicant
during the Pol Pot period, does not dilute the
experiences of the Applicant. Any fear of the
return of the KR is well-founded in view of its
past practices and in view of the power it now
wields in Cambodia.
(26) With regard to the Applicant's 351 classification,
the Committee has not given individual attention
to the specific matters mentioned by her in her
application. The Applicant's experiences in this
regard, when considered cumulatively, justify a
claim to a well-founded fear of persecution on
grounds of race, nationality and membership of a
particular social group.
(27) The RSRC has ignored Prime Minister Hun Sen's
comment in Sydney on 27 October 1991 that he did
not consider ethnic Chinese to be Cambodians.
Given Hun Sen's status in Cambodia and the
likelihood of Hun Sen returning to power after
elections, there is a real chance that his views
will be reflected in policy resulting in ethnic
Chinese being victims of discriminatory measures.
(28) It is inappropriate to rely solely on the
provisions of the 'SNC Resolution, April 1992' to
guarantee the safety of returnees given that there
is evidence to contradict it. A UN spokesman
admitted as recently as 17 April 1992, that
Cambodian refugees returning home under UN
protection were being questioned by the Government
police regarding their political affiliations.
(29) The Applicant's legal representative questions
UNHCR's capacity to monitor the fate of those who
have returned, given the high numbers. The RSRC
has not cited the source of its information that
'those who voluntarily returned from Australia to
Cambodia have settled well without experiencing
any major difficulty' and the Applicant's legal
representative also questions the strength of this
assertion and refuses to accept the conclusion
that it is safe for the Applicant to return to
Cambodia. It is further submitted that no part of
Cambodia can be judged as being safe or stable.
4. ASSESSMENT
4.1 Convention definition
4.1.1 As relevant to this case, a refugee is defined in the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) as
amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1967) as a person who
" . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country . . ."
4.1.2 I accepted that the Applicant does not wish to avail
herself of the protection of Cambodia. However, I had
to assess whether this is because the Applicant has, in
relation to a Convention reason, a well-founded fear of
persecution.
4.1.3 My assessment of the applicant's claims and submissions
against the Convention definition, taking each
"Convention reason" in turn, follows. Numbers in
brackets refer to the claims as summarised in Section 3
above.
4.2 Race
. Ethnic group
4.2.1 The Applicant's claims (4), (21), (26) and (27) relate
to discrimination suffered as a result of Chinese
ethnicity. I considered the description in the
Shoesmith Report (dated 17 February 1992) of the effect
of "351" ethnic Chinese classification and the unsourced
statements regarding "351" submitted by the Applicant's
representative. However, I gave greater weight to the
more recent evidence in the report, dated 22 June 1992
from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT),
which advises that although discrimination against the
Chinese did exist in the early years of Ordinance 351,
there is evidence that it is no longer being enforced
and also that there is tolerance of Chinese cultural
activities within the community. This is particularly
so in the commercial sector. I gave the DFAT material
greater weight as it is more recent and collected by
impartial and professional officers based in Cambodia.
4.2.2 In considering the Applicant's claims regarding
discrimination in employment and education I accepted
that in 1980 the Applicant had been able to establish
herself as a self employed seamstress to earn an income.
Even after the classification of the Applicant as "351"
in 1985 she was still able to attend a course in dress
making in 1987 and continue with her business up until
the time she left for Australia in 1990. I also
considered that the applicant has claimed that she did
not receive any schooling past 1975. This is consistent
with the coming to power of the KR and the cessation of
education for a great many Cambodians. By the time the
KR were removed from power the Applicant was past normal
school age and like many Cambodians was not able to
complete her education. There is no evidence to suggest
that she was denied education prior to 1973 for
Convention related reasons. Even if the limitations on
the Applicant's education were based on her ethnicity, I
found that this adverse treatment was insufficient to
amount to persecution as it did not result in her being
denied the right to employment.
4.2.3 I did not consider Dr Shoesmith's statement that Chinese
Cambodians living outside the capital city still face
particular risks from the KR (claim (21)), as relevant
to the Applicant. The Applicant would be able to return
to Phnom Penh, where the KR, although present, are not
active, and where she resided for 11 years prior to her
departure.
4.2.4 Fears expressed in claim (27) are based on the
speculation that Hun Sen would come to power after the
election and that he would adopt discriminatory policies
towards Chinese Cambodians as per his comment in Sydney
last year. I did not give weight to this claim or Prime
Minister Hun Sen's comment as it is based on speculation
that he will come to power after the election and that
he intends adopting discriminatory policies towards
Chinese Cambodians. There is evidence, see 4.3.2 below,
that the Hun Sen Government has, in fact, taken steps to
liberalise policies in relation to Chinese Cambodians
for example in relation to religion.
4.2.5 I considered the applicant's claim that due to her
Chinese ethnicity she suffered discrimination by the
general population. As the applicant does not provide
details regarding the nature of this discrimination, I
am unable to assess whether or not it amounts to
persecution.
. . .
4.3 Religion
4.3.1 The Applicant claimed she was forbidden to perform
certain Chinese religious practices such as the burning
of incense, maintaining a shrine in the family home and
worshipping ancestors. Claim (5) outlines the
difficulties experienced by the Applicant as a result of
practicing her religion at home. I did not consider
these claimed general restrictions to amount to a denial
of the Applicant's right to practice her religion but
rather a limitation of that right. While the incident
where the house was raided by the authorities was no
doubt distressing to the Applicant and her family, I
considered that as it was a one off incident, which was
apparently not followed up by the authorities, it does
not amount to persecution.
4.3.2 Advice from both DFAT and Dennis Shoesmith is that steps
have been taken by the Phnom Penh authorities to ease
long-standing restrictions on the practice of religion.
This includes the fact that Chinese temples and the
freedom to practice Chinese Buddhist activities,
including the Chinese New Year, are in evidence and are
not apparently being stopped by the authorities. In
view of these recent developments, I do not consider the
Applicant's fear in this regard to be objectively
well-founded.
4.4 Nationality
. Ethnic group
4.4.1 I have assessed the claimed discrimination owing to the
Applicant's Chinese ethnicity under the Convention
reason of Race in Section 4.2.
. . .
4.6 Political opinion
. experiences during the Pol Pot period and the fear of
return of the KR
4.6.1 The applicant's claims regarding adverse treatment of
herself and her family by the KR and her fear of return
of the KR (claims (1), (2), (13), (14) and (25)) are
based on incidents that occurred several years ago. I
accepted that the KR currently have a presence in Phnom
Penh, however I assessed that that presence was not an
active presence such as to give rise to Convention
concerns. There is no evidence to support a proposition
that the KR have persecuted anyone in Phnom Penh or that
they would persecute the applicant in Phnom Penh. DFAT
advise, (in advice of 22 June 1992), that Khmer Rouge
activity is limited to certain geographical areas, most
notably the northern and western areas of the country.
On 19 June 1992, DFAT advised that Daniel Conway (UNHCR
Representative in Thailand) made it clear while briefing
Australian officials, that nobody would be repatriated
to Khmer Rouge areas, even if they requested this, as
long as those areas were not open to UNHCR monitoring.
When the applicant is returned to Cambodia, she will be
sent to an area where there is no Khmer Rouge activity.
On that basis, her fear of persecution by the Khmer
Rouge is not well-founded.
. treatment by Vietnamese authorities after Pol Pot period
4.6.2 I accepted the difficulties that the Applicant and her
family experienced after the Vietnamese takeover in
1978, as outlined in claim (3). They are consistent
with experiences of thousands of other persons who
returned to Cambodia from camps after the Vietnamese
takeover. This situation did not continue as is evident
from the Applicant's submission that her family were
engaged in small trade in Phnom Penh since 1980, that
she was self employed as a dress maker and there is no
further mention of difficulties with the Vietnamese
authorities. Therefore, I did not consider the adverse
treatment suffered establishes a well founded fear of
persecution on return to Cambodia.
. consequences of illegal departure and safety of
returnees
4.6.3 The Applicant's claims (9) and (19) outline feared
adverse treatment on the basis of her illegal departure
while claims (11), (20), (28) and (29) outline the
Applicant's fears concerning the safety of returnees. I
accepted the possibility that the Cambodian authorities
may view an illegal departure as an expression of
political opinion and that there probably were instances
of persons being prosecuted and possibly persecuted for
illegal departure prior to the Paris Peace Agreement.
However, the only recent evidence relating to the
treatment of returnees that I had before me dealt with
voluntary returnees, including those from Australia who
had also left Cambodia illegally. These people are
being monitored by the Australian authorities in
Cambodia and there is no evidence that they have
suffered any persecution or discrimination since their
return.
4.6.4 Despite concerns expressed by the applicant, UNHCR
advises in a press release on 28 August 1992 that 100
000 Cambodians have been repatriated from border camps
and that there have been no reports of human rights
violations with respect to the returnees. In accordance
with Annex 4, Part II, Clause 4 of the Paris Agreement,
which provides for the rights and freedoms of Cambodian
refugees and displaced persons, the SNC Resolution,
April 1992, confirms that all Cambodian refugees and
displaced persons who return home under the arrangements
foreseen in the Paris Agreement "will not be subject to
persecution, prosecution, punitive or discriminative
measures on account of their departure from Cambodia, or
their status as refugees or displaced persons, or,
without prejudice to relevant provisions of
international law, their political affiliation or
activities subject to their departure".
4.6.5 It is a principle of the repatriation provisions of the
comprehensive settlement that nobody will be forced to
return to areas which are judged unsafe or unstable. I
agreed, subject to my findings in paragraph 4.6.1 above,
with the RSRC that by returning to Phnom Penh, which is
the Applicant's former area of residence, she will not
be returning to an unsafe or unstable area. On the
basis of the information before me, I find that the
applicant's fear of persecution upon return is not
well-founded.
. visit by police and a Section leader
4.6.6 The Applicant does not know the purpose of the visits
mentioned in claim (6). Although the Applicant may have
been frightened by the visits at the time, neither the
Applicant nor her sister, who spoke with the
authorities, experienced any further difficulties as a
result of these visits which occurred two or three times
in 1989. I do not accept that these visits contribute
to the Applicant's claimed fear of persecution for a
Convention based reason.
. . .
4.7 Cumulative grounds
4.7.1 I considered the Applicant's claims regarding race,
religion and political opinion cumulatively. I assess
that the discrimination and harassment suffered by the
Applicant do not constitute persecution in Convention
terms.
5 DECISION
I determined that the applicant is not a refugee.
6 EVIDENCE
In making my assessment, I had before me the following
material:
. Departmental file 90/36901, consisting of folios
1-172.
. DFAT report dated 22 June 1992 on the situation in
Cambodia.
. United States State Department Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices (1991) pp 798 - 808.
. Mission Report Voluntary Repatriation Port Hedland
- Fordham.
. Other submissions lodged on behalf of the
Applicant.
. Departmental files 92/52429 and 92/52587
containing submissions lodged on behalf of the
Applicant.
(signed)
Malcolm Paterson
Delegate of the Minister for Immigration
Local Government and Ethnic Affairs
12 November 1992"
14. The delegate's failure to seek an update of June 1992 DFAT report
82. The DFAT report of June 1992 contained the following passages, to which emphasis has been added:
"The following assessment by the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (DFAT) of the situation in Cambodia, updated to 20
June 1992, concentrates on the areas of political stability,
security and human rights, as being the areas most relevant to
evaluating the risks which would be faced by non-voluntary
Cambodian returnees from Australia at this time.
In summary, DFAT holds a cautious but basically
optimistic view on the prospects for stability and respect for
human rights in Cambodia, both in the coming 12-18 months
(during the period of the UN administration) and in the longer
term, following the democratic elections to be organised and
supervised by the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993. This view is based on the
comprehensive nature of the settlement itself, including its
complex system of safeguards, the continuing support of the
international community as a whole, the fact that none of the
parties involved in the conflict, despite some serious
strains, have abandoned the settlement, and on the progress
being made, notwithstanding a number of difficulties and
delays, in the implementation of its provisions.
It is important to note, however, that the situation in
Cambodia remains extremely fluid. Given the nature of
Cambodian politics, the number of players involved and the
unprecedented scale of the United Nations role, this must be
expected. The most recent difficulty has been the Khmer
Rouge's refusal to comply with requirements laid down by UNTAC
for the implementation of Phase II of peace-keeping operations
(see below, pp17ff). This problem is being discussed at a
Ministerial Conference on Cambodia in Tokyo on 22 June. At
the time of completion of this report, the results of this
potentially important meeting are not known. Should this
problem remain unresolved over the next few weeks, it would
clearly have serious implications for the settlement as a
whole; however, the Khmer Rouge are now participating in talks
in Tokyo on the impasse. . . . How easily the current
problem may be solved should become clearer following the
current talks in Tokyo. . . .
(p 17.9) On 9 May 1992 representatives of the four factional
armies had given an undertaking to the UNTAC Military
Commander (Sanderson) to comply with the preconditions for the
beginning of Phase II of UNTAC military operations. These
preconditions included total UNTAC access to the areas under
their control, formal ceasefire arrangements, cantonment
arrangements and marking of minefields. . . .
(p 18) Unfortunately the Khmer Rouge subsequently failed to
meet a number of requirements for all the factions laid down
by Mr Akashi on 26 May. The most important of these
requirements concerned allowing UNTAC full and unrestricted
movement in the areas under Khmer Rouge control.
Nevertheless, Phase II began on schedule on 13 June, albeit
without the cooperation of the Khmer Rouge, . . .
(p 19) b) The Position of the Khmer Rouge
By their signature of the Paris Accords, the Khmer Rouge
have committed themselves to cantonment, disarmament and
eventual demobilisation of their armed forces under UN
supervision. . . .
Throughout the implementation process, through their part in
the ceasefire violations, their slowness in complying with
military arrangements and in providing access to areas under
their control, the Khmer Rouge have demonstrated their
determination to deny any advantage to their main adversary,
the SOC. Their failure to meet UNTAC requirements and
commence Phase II with the other factions is of particular
concern. . . .
(p 20) While the Khmer Rouge have dragged their feet in the
initial implementation phase of the settlement, their pattern
of behaviour has been to push their point as far as possible
but to draw back before endangering the settlement as a whole.
The balance of informed opinion continues to support the view
that the present impasse is yet another example of such
behaviour, albeit more serious and potentially destabilising
than previous instances. It is noteworthy that the Khmer
Rouge leadership has continued to assert its support for the
settlement, and senior leaders are participating in
discussions in Tokyo with the Supreme National Council (SNC),
and other interlocutors there for the Ministerial Conference
on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (21-22
June). Khmer Rouge representatives continue to participate in
the work of the SNC and the Mixed Military Working Group. . .
. It should become clearer in the very near future whether or
not recent events are (sic) reflect a change in the Khmer
Rouge position. . . .
(p 22) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
which, under the terms of the Paris Accords, has the
responsibility to supervise the release of prisoners of war
and civilian detainees . . . is satisfied that the
non-communist factions are holding no prisoners. There have,
however, been continuing problems with access to Khmer
Rouge-held territories and it is not known how many, if any,
prisoners are being held there. On 9 May the Khmer Rouge
agreed, as part of the pre-conditions for the commencement of
the formal, (p 23) UNTAC supervised ceasefire, that it would
grant UNTAC complete access to the areas under their control.
However, to date this has not been forthcoming. "
834. As to the reference in the last paragraph to an agreement by the Khmer Rouge on 9 May 1992, an unclassified cable, dated 9 June 1992 (Document 10 in Exhibit CS55), from DFAT at Phnom Penh to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade and others quoted the SOC Foreign Minister as having referred, at a Press Conference given by him on 5 June 1992, to the DK's "intransigent position", their attacks on "Cambodian villages" and "concluded that he was very pessimistic that the DK would change their position". He said "that he expected the UN Security Council to make a resolution condemning the DK as the 'rebel' in the process".
84. The court was told that Exhibit CS55 (see last paragraph above) was a "bundle of agreed documents" (transcript 2529). Document 7 in that exhibit was obviously written after June 1992 and after the DFAT June 1992 report to which it refers. It was undated and unsigned but marked Vol 12 and bore a folio number 13. It was headed "Cambodia - Further information required from DFAT" and in its first line stated that the "situation has changed since June 1992". The full text of the document is as follows:
"CAMBODIA- FURTHER INFORMATION REQUIRED FROM DFAT
. Update information - situation has changed since June
1992. In particular, location and nature of KR and Hun
Sen activity - have they expanded their sphere of
operation?
. Repatriation of involuntary returnees:
- what is the law?
- what is the administrative practice?
- where is the evidence on specific known cases
outside of the UN Repatriation Programme?
- has there been any monitoring by UNHCR - where is
the evidence?
- claims made by applicants have not been pursued by
DORS/DFAT (ie need further investigation to
determine whether the claims have probative value)
- what is in the Fordham paper? has it been used?
if it is favourable, why not? has it been put to
the applicants for comment?
. Some applicants claim that they fear persecution by Hun
Sen but their activities - in terms of adverse treatment
of persons - have not been adequately documented.
. Adverse treatment on the basis of Chinese ethnicity.
Problems with existing information.
- limited sources (only one?);
- source (Association of Chinese Nationals in
Cambodia) appears to be an officially tolerated
group;
- source arguably has a vested interest in
representing Cambodia as not unsafe (ie a good
place to come and spend money).
. Some inferences by DFAT are open to question, eg:
- at p 24, DFAT says that "Chinese temples and
freedom of worship are in evidence" but that
evidence is only of temples in two cities;
- attached cable at para 4, DFAT says that the
Chinese face reverse discrimination in relation to
conscription, but the only evidence is that ACNC
replied with "mirth and a definite no" to the
suggestion of discrimination in this regard.
. We need DFAT to identify an expert witness:
- who has a detailed knowledge of both the general
situation and specific case examples;
- to give an authoritative report on which decisions
can be based;
- who would be willing, able and suitable to appear
for the Department in Court proceedings.
Was Eleanor Higgs asked to write a paper?"
85. Document 19 in exhibit CS55 was a restricted cable from Foreign Affairs, Phnom Penh, to Immigration Department, Canberra, and sent to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. Headed "Cambodia: Khmer Rouge frustrates Mixed Military Meeting" it said that the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) meeting on 12 October 1992 foundered when a NADK representative avoided discussion. It said:
"Chairman LtGen Sanderson . . . cited recent NADK ceasefire
violations - highlighting the 6 Oct attack on Kanipo Commune
25 km northwest of Siem Reap".
. . .
3. COMMENT. There is now no optimism in HQ UNTAC for NADK
compliance with Phase 2. This unsuccessful meeting was a blow
to the few remaining enthusiasts among senior military staff.
While the MMWG had previously been a very useful forum, it now
appears stalled. Indeed, although the next meeting had been
planned for 17 Oct such has been indefinitely deferred. While
the MMWG secretariat will maintain regular contact with all
factions, LtGen Sanderson has directed that another meeting
will not be held until the NADK advise that they are willing
to have a dialogue beyond rote repetition of their Phase Two
preconditions."
86. Document 20 in exhibit CS55 was from Phnom Penh to Immigration Department, Canberra and sent to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. It was dated 16 October 1992 and was a "restricted" cable. The summary read:
"An attack by NADK troops in Southern Kampong Thom Province on
the night of 13/14 Oct is assessed by UNTAC HQ as one of the
most serious ceasefire violations to date. With bridges blown
on both routes 6 and 21, Kompong Thom town has been
temporarily cut off from the South. Due to the seriousness of
this latest ceasefire violation, the UNTAC Force Commander has
called an emergency meeting of the Mixed Military Working
Group Level One for 15 Oct 92. This violation is a serious
setback to any prospects for phase two implementation."
"COMMENT
4. Such a coordinated attack suggests a serious upscaling
of NADK activity, south of Kompong Thom city, which had
previously been relatively free of incident. Route 6
Skoun-Kompong Thom city has been under repair by the Chinese
Engineer Battalion. Following NADK intransigence at the 12
Oct MMWG meeting (see REFTEL), this NADK attack is a major
setback to any hopes of phase two NADK compliance."
During his cross-examination, Mr Paterson, asked where did he "get the information that Phnom Penh was safe" said that it "was common knowledge" and, after further questions, said:
"Can I make a statement then, your Honour? There was no
evidence in existence at that time that stated that it was
unsafe to return to Phnom Penh.
MR ROSE: Did you seek any information about that issue? ---
No. I didn't need to.
Did you then go from the fact that there is no evidence to say
it was unsafe to a positive finding that therefore it was
safe? --- Yes."
(transcript 2256)
Mr Paterson's statement of reasons (paragraph 4.6.1) shows that the DFAT report of June 1992 was the basis for his decision that the applicant's fear of persecution by the Khmer Rouge (the existence of which fear he accepted) was "not well-founded".
87. On all of his evidence, including that quoted above, and the contents of the report, Mr Paterson knew that the DFAT report:
(1) was "evaluating the risks which would be faced by non-voluntary
Cambodian returnees from Australia at this time"
(2) expressed a cautious but basically optimistic view, which was in
part "based on . . . the fact that none of the parties . . . have
abandoned the settlement"
(3) said that it was "important to note, however, that the situation in
(4) expressly said that the most recent difficulty was the Khmer
Rouge's refusal to comply with requirements laid down by UNTAC
(5) said that that "difficulty . . . is being discussed at a
Ministerial Conference on Cambodia in Tokyo on 22 June . . . (a)
potentially important meeting" and said quite explicitly "Should
this problem remain unresolved over the next few weeks, it would
clearly have serious implications for the settlement as a whole;"
(6) said: "How easily the current problem may be solved should become
clearer following the current talks in Tokyo."
(7) said that: "On 9 May 1992 representatives of the four factional
armies had given an undertaking to the UNTAC Military Commander
(Sanderson) to comply with the preconditions for the beginning of
Phase II of UNTAC military operations. These preconditions
included total UNTAC access to the areas under their control,
formal ceasefire arrangements, cantonment arrangements and marking
of minefields."
(8) said "Unfortunately the Khmer Rouge subsequently failed to meet a
(9) said "It should become clearer in the very near future whether or
not recent events . . . reflect a change in the Khmer Rouge
position."
Mr Paterson's evidence made it clear that (a) he read and accepted the DFAT report "as to the general situation in Cambodia", (b) that he "preferred (it) . . . to other material", and (c) that he was "basically . . . making the assumption that that was the state of Cambodia and the position in Cambodia that (Ms) Mok would return to if sent back" (transcript 2272).
Mr Paterson's reluctant answers re events after 20 June 1992
88. Mr Paterson was reluctant to assent to various questions by the applicant's counsel on the subjects of whether the "Khmer Rouge (had) abandoned the settlement" and whether they "had ceased to be involved . . . in the peace process". His answers initially were "To a large extent" and "To some extent" but he finally said that he was "aware that the Khmer Rouge had ceased to involve itself in the peace process" (transcript 2279-2280).
89. Mr Paterson was also less than forthcoming in answers to the court as to his knowledge of what had happened at the Tokyo Conference on the question of whether the "peace process" had "stalled". The following evidence is illustrative:
"(HIS HONOUR:) Well, did you ascertain what happened at this
Tokyo conference on 22 June that counsel has referred to? ---
Not specifically as in approaching foreign affairs and trade,
no your Honour.
Well, did you find out from any source what had happened then?
--- Just what I would have seen in the press and the media
generally.
Do you remember what it was that you saw? --- Not
specifically, no.
Well, was the conference successful or unsuccessful from (the)
point of view of the peace process? --- Well, it did stall,
your Honour, so I guess you could say it was - - -
It stalled at the Tokyo meeting, did it? --- As I understand
it, yes, your Honour." (transcript 2281)
Another example of Mr Paterson's approach to answering the questions of the applicant's counsel was:
"MR ROSE: Given that very early on in the DFAT report there
is flagged a potential difficulty, that is, that there is a
problem and that if it is not resolved it could undermine the
settlement, or have implications for the settlement? --- Yes.
They are fairly serious considerations, are they not? --- Yes.
Because if the peace settlement did not go ahead that would
have had serious ramifications for Cambodia, would it not? ---
It could have, depending on the position the parties took.
But at the time you are considering these claims for Mrs/Ms
Mok, Nat and Ly, there is a cloud hanging over the peace
process? --- Yes.
You have the DFAT report saying, should the problem unresolved
in the next few weeks it would have serious implications? ---
Could have serious implications. Clearly have serious
implications for the settlement, yes.
(t.2284) It would clearly have. Not could, it would? ---
Yes, okay, yes.
In November - on November 3rd - the problem had not been
resolved, had it? --- No.
So we had gone past a few weeks, had we not? --- Yes.
So, does it not follow that on the information you are
operating on there are serious implications for the peace
settlement? --- Yes. . . .
But there is a difference between not co-operating fully and
abandoning the peace process, and they abandoned it? --- . . .
I don't know what difference it made to DFAT, I don't know
what DFAT's view was.
Why did you not find out? --- Well, it wasn't relevant. As
far as I was concerned the material I had before me I had
enough to make a decision." (transcript 2283 - 2284 -
emphasis added)
Later, when the court sought to obtain clarity as to what Mr Paterson was saying, the following evidence was given (emphasis added):
"(t.2285) HIS HONOUR: . . . the problem of the Khmer Rouge's
refusal to comply with requirements laid down by UNTAC for the
implementation of phase 2. Now, that problem I rather gather,
but correct me if I am wrong, continued from the date of this
report . . . at least until some time relevantly after your
decision on 3 November? --- Yes, your Honour. . . .
(t.2286) And the day . . . on which the report was dated a
conference at least partly called to consider that very
question of Khmer Rouge problem attitude that in fact was
resolved but resolved the wrong way, is that right? --- Yes,
your Honour, that is why I made the reference to the practical
reality of the situation. ...
(The DFAT report) says how (easily) the current problem may be
solved should become clearer following the current talks in
Tokyo. Well, would it be fair to say that the question of how
(easily) it could be solved became much clearer after the
talks in Tokyo and the answer was it was not going to be
solved? --- That is right, the problem continued.
The problem continued . . . (t.2287) roughly until the time of
your decision? --- Yes, your Honour.
Was that known to you? --- Yes, your Honour, as we have
discussed there were the problems with Khmer Rouge in various
parts of Cambodia.
But see do you say anywhere in your decision that you took
into account the fact that the position had markedly changed
for the worst in the sense of a non-resolution of what DFAT
called a problem, . . . and it was still continuing when you
decided the question whether this woman had objective reasons
for fearing return to Cambodia? --- No, your Honour, that is
what I was saying earlier about the practical reality of the
situation. The practical reality of the situation was the
peace process had stalled but the problem was still in
existence. The problem existed when the DFAT report was
written, it was still in existence in November so the peace
process was largely irrelevant for that particular purpose if
you understand the logic of that.
Well I do not quite follow why you say it is irrelevant, I am
not quite sure what you (are) saying about practical reality
if you explain that? --- Well, the practical reality was there
was a problem with the Khmer Rouge in - on 22 June, 1992, when
this report was written.
Yes? --- All that happened was that the peace process actually
stalled. The practical problem of the Khmer Rouge maintaining
control over parts of Cambodia and not disarming and cantoning
continued and that is the distinction I am drawing your
Honour.
Well, (DFAT said) "should this problem remain unresolved over
the next few weeks, it would clearly have serious implications
for the settlement as a whole". Did you take that into
account? --- Not that I can remember, your Honour. "
After Mr Paterson had answered "I can't remember" or "I can't recall" to a number of questions as to whether he was influenced by various passages in the DFAT report, Mr Rose asked:
"(t.2275) Mr Paterson, is the position that if I take you to
a specific paragraph, the reality is I am going to get an
answer, you do not remember, or do I need - - - ? --- Yes,
that's correct. I mean, I just do not recall which bits I
specifically relied on.
Did you ever seek to check the accuracy of any of this
material? --- No. ...
(t.2278) And did not the Khmer Rouge abandon the settlement?
--- Well, they - they were as we have already discussed, they
stalled on certain parts, yes.
. . . what influence or impact did that have on you, the Tokyo
meeting? --- None that I can remember.
But does not that change perhaps one of the major basis for
the DFAT report's optimism? --- Not in any great way, because
the whole peace, the whole - DFAT was not based wholly and
solely on the peace process. The peace process is only part
of the process. . . .
(t.2282) HIS HONOUR: . . . Take your time to look at it, Mr
Paterson, I want your evidence on it, do you understand? Do
you see the passage to which counsel has just referred, the
most - - - ? --- Well, I am reading the whole of the third
paragraph on that page, your Honour, yes.
Well, take your time and read it, yes? --- Yes, I've read the
paragraph.
What is the problem referred to in the last line which says,
"Should this problem remain unresolved"; what is that problem?
--- Well, to the best of my recollection, your Honour, what
was happening was there was - the process was stalling up
until that time, and at Tokyo - and I say, I am only reaching
back into memory here - the actual - there was a sort of a -
agreed stalling, if you understand the difference, at that
point in time. Till Tokyo there were problems and then there
was - it was - I think the Khmer Rouge at that meeting
actually said they would not participate. And that is my -
best of my recollection, but it is very vague.
What, in the peace process? --- In the peace - at that point
in time, yes.
Well then, it goes on, "If it remains unresolved" - now, I
take it it remained unresolved immediately after the Tokyo
conference on what you have just said? --- To the best of my
recollection, your Honour, and I am not a foreign affairs
expert, so - - -
Well, the report says, "If that remains unresolved in the next
few weeks it would clearly have serious implications for the
settlement of the whole"? --- Yes.
Did that sort of statement have any effect upon your approach
to the question of whether there was objectively a danger of
persecution of Ms Mok should she be returned? --- Did that
particular reference?
Yes? --- Not that I can remember, your Honour.
Well, that reference coupled with the information which you
say you got probably just through the press, that the Khmer
Rouge had in fact pulled out of the peace process; did that
have any effect upon your approach to the question of what was
likely to happen to her if she was returned to Cambodia? ---
Well, not that I can expressly remember now, your Honour, but
obviously it did because of the way the final decision came
out.
(t.2283) What have you got in mind there? --- Well, just the
way that - as I have said earlier - taking it down to a
personal level to this individual applicant it obviously
didn't have any effect on - sorry - I obviously assessed the
woman not to be a refugee on an individual fear of persecution
taking into account this material. Do you follow what I am
saying or have I made myself more confusing?
Well, it is just that you say in your statement of reasons
that you had regard to, and preferred, this report which we
are just looking at? --- Yes.
This report is written on 22 June and there happened to be a
meeting in Tokyo (later) that very day, and the report itself
talked about that as being a potentially important meeting? ---
Yes.
As I understand what you are saying is that you found out from
some source - you knew that the meeting had resulted in the
Khmer Rouge saying, well, we are out of this peace plan, or
words to that effect? --- There was some - yes, obvious, yes -
- - . . . implementation of phase 2 of the peace-keeping
operations; is that right? --- Yes, your Honour."
90. As to his failure to obtain from DFAT, in mid October 1992, a statement updating the views expressed in the DFAT report dated 22 June 1992 (to 20 June 1992), Mr Paterson suggested that he had been "vindicated" by a document from DFAT, dated 4 December 1992, i.e. after his decision on 3 November 1992 in the present case. In the light of that suggestion the relevant correspondence should be set out. By letter dated 3 December 1992, Ms J.J. Bedlington, First Assistant Secretary, Onshore Refugee Division of the Department, Belconnen Offices, A.C.T., wrote to Mr P. Grey, First Assistant Secretary, Asia Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Parkes, A.C.T. as follows:
"CAMBODIA: ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
You provided on 22 June 1992 an assessment by DFAT of the
situation in Cambodia current to that date. This assessment
is proving particularly useful in the consideration of refugee
applications from Cambodian boat people.
Processing of applications has reached an advanced stage and
is required to be completed within the next few weeks.
However, given the nature of the review process, lawyers
acting on behalf of applicants have lodged extensive
additional material. This material questions the currency of
the DFAT assessment, and includes Asia Watch and Amnesty
reports on Cambodia published in September and October 1992.
In order to make informed decisions on the Cambodian boat
people applications it is necessary to obtain your assurance
that certain elements of the 22 June assessment are still
current.
I would be grateful if you would confirm as a matter of
urgency that comments in the following sections are current:
(b) Position of Khmer Rouge (pp 19-21)
. specifically in relation to limitation of Khmer Rouge
activity to certain geographic areas (p 20)
(d) Situation of Ethnic Chinese Community (pp 23-24)
(e) Conscription (p 25 and attached unclassified cable para
. would you also confirm that the comments relating to
conscription relate also to compulsory labour ie. conscription
to forced labour, for instance for forest clearance work, has
ceased along with conscription to military service.
(g) Repatriation of Displaced Persons and Refugees (pp 25-27)
. specifically UNHCR advice that no-one will be repatriated
to Khmer Rouge areas while these are not open to UNHCR
monitoring (p 26).
I look forward to your early response.
Yours sincerely
SIGNED
J J Bedlington"
The reply from Mr P. Grey, dated 4 December 1992, was as follows:
"CAMBODIA: CURRENT ASSESSMENT
I refer to your letter, dated 3 December 1992, seeking
assurance that certain elements of the 22 June assessment are
still current. As noted in that assessment, the situation in
Cambodia is fluid, and there are a number of elements which
would need to be reflected if a revised overall assessment
were to be required. However, in regard to the specific
questions which you raise in your letter, our response is as
follows:
(b) Position of the Khmer Rouge (pp 19-21)
. specifically in relation to limitation of Khmer Rouge
activity to certain geographic areas (p20)
Comment: The same with the addition of some rural
areas in Kompong Cham Province.
(d) Situation of Ethnic Chinese Community (pp23-24)
Comment: The same.
(e) Conscription (p25 and attached unclassified cable para
. would you also confirm that the comments relating to
conscription relate also to compulsory labour ie.
conscription to forced labour, for instance for forest
clearance work, has ceased along with conscription to
military service.
Comment: The same. Our mission in Phnom Penh has
confirmed that there are no conscripted
labour camps in existence and no conscripted
labour in areas to which the UN has access
and to which returnees are repatriated.
(g) Repatriation of Displaced Persons and Refugees (pp 25-27)
. specifically UNHCR advice that no-one will be
repatriated to Khmer Rouge areas while these are not
open to UNHCR monitoring (p 26)
Comment: The same.
I hope this information is of assistance to you.
Yours sincerely
SIGNED
Peter Grey "
It will be noted that Ms Bedlington did not in terms seek information as to what had happened in Cambodia since 20 June 1992. Instead she said " . . . it is necessary to obtain your assurance that certain elements of the 22 June assessment are still current. I would be grateful if you would confirm as a matter of urgency . . ." (emphasis added). Mr Grey obviously read her letter carefully and replied carefully, noting that Ms Bedlington was seeking assurance that certain elements are still current. He answered "the specific questions which you raise in your letter" and expressed the hope that "this information is of assistance to you".
91. In my opinion that correspondence in early December 1992 does not in any sense "vindicate" Mr Paterson, who had failed to seek any information updating the views expressed in the DFAT report of June 1992. The court put to Mr Paterson that that correspondence did "not throw any light by way of vindication" on the question because Mr Grey's reply dated 4 December 1992, did not "relate to that question of what had happened at Tokyo or what had happened in the general attitude of the Khmer Rouge". Mr Paterson answered "Yes, I agree with that" (transcript 2453).
92. Having regard to the contents of the DFAT report, including the passages quoted above, and the evidence of Mr Paterson that the Tokyo conference on 22 June 1992 had failed to resolve the impasse and that the peace process had been abandoned by the Khmer Rouge, in my opinion the delegate erred in law in acting upon the June 1992 DFAT report without obtaining an update of it.
93. He relied on that report in considering whether Ms Mok's subjective fear of persecution by the Khmer Rouge was well-founded more than four months later (3 November 1992) - although that report had expressly referred to the "potentially important meeting" in Tokyo and had said that a failure to resolve the 'problem' "would clearly have serious implications for the (peace) settlement as a whole".
94. In cross-examination Mr Paterson agreed that that 'problem' "remained unresolved throughout July, August, September, October and (he had) not made any enquiries about it. His evidence continued:
"(MR ROSE:) Yet you were aware of the problem? --- Yes.
You were aware of the issues that were raised in the DFAT
material that highlighted or exacerbated the problem, such as
the refusal to disarm and all of that - - - ? --- Yes.
- - - by the Khmer Rouge. And yet you did not go and seek to
get any information as to whether the situation had either
deteriorated or improved? --- Correct.
And you would agree that that information was readily
available to you? --- If I'd sought information from DFAT, yes
I could have obtained information. . . .
(t.2298) (MR PATERSON:) Well, I guess, your Honour, what I
could have done would have been what was done some weeks later
where we wrote to Foreign Affairs and Trade and asked them for
an update of the situation.
. . .
(t.2299) (HIS HONOUR:) And you did read the DFAT report,
obviously? --- The June one, yes. . . .
And you did not seek an update of it before making the
decision about four months later? --- No. That's right, your
Honour, I didn't."
The respondents' counsel said in final address that "the Khmer Rouge had stayed outside the process . . . were not participating in stage 2 . . . in . . . being disarmed and so forth" (transcript 3497).
15. The delegate's misunderstanding of "well-founded"
95. Mr Paterson's evidence made it clear that in considering whether there was a real chance of persecution he was confining himself to possible persecution of the applicant on her return - not at some future date. Asked in cross-examination "what about two months hence" he specifically said that "it wasn't relevant to my decision when she was removed". The evidence was as follows:
"(MR ROSE:) If you apply the Chan test, do you not then, to
some extent, have to speculate as to what is going to occur in
the future? --- You have to assess the situation as you see
it.
But do not - - -? --- That's what the decision making process
involves.
But do not you have to assess the situation as you believe it
may pertain in the future? --- Well obviously because the
person may be returned tomorrow, which therefore is the
future.
When you came to you assessing task, did you look at what, in
terms of Ms Mok's complaint that the future position in
Cambodia would be. That is, if she was returned on 4
November, I appreciate you say well, that is the future from
the day you made your decision the third, but what about two
months hence, did you look to see what the position was? ---
Well, it wasn't relevant to my decision when she was removed.
But how can you consider whether there is a real chance that
somebody would be persecuted if you are not looking at the
position a bit further down the track. You are not looking
into the future as best you can? --- Well by the same question
I could be saying the person could be persecuted in 50 years
time. Where do you (draw) the line?
I just want to understand how you applied the Chan test. Was
it your understanding the Chan test required you to decide if
a person had a genuine fear founded on a real change that he
or she would be persecuted for a stipulated reason? --- Yes.
Would be persecuted means that you have to look into the
future, does it not? Not that they will definitely be
persecuted, it is would be? --- Would be, yes.
Is not that looking at the future? --- As I said, the future
can be the next day.
It could be the next month too, cannot it? --- It could be
fifty years hence.
(t.2294) All right. Now, it has got to be a well founded
fear and a real chance has it not? --- Yes.
The one thing we perhaps could not say is. look at what
Cambodia will be like in 50 years time, could we? --- That's
right.
You would say that is beyond the pale of reasonableness? ---
Yes.
But we could look on the known facts objectively as to the
possible scenarios that could have developed in Cambodia in
the period leading up to the May election and the period of a
government coming into power. They were things you could have
looked at were not they? --- I could have looked at them.
You could have gone, for example, to DFAT and said, well what
is your best scenario, could you not? --- I could have.
You could have gone to Mr Simington who had been going back
and forth to Cambodia and said, "What is your expectation"? --
- I could have.
But you did not do any of that, did you? --- No." (transcript
2293-2294 - emphasis added)
96. The delegate considered that a real chance of persecution of the applicant two months after her return to Cambodia "wasn't relevant". In my opinion, the question of whether there was a real chance of persecution necessarily required the delegate to look at the future in so far as it was reasonably foreseeable at the time when he was making his decision. On the one hand the delegate was not required to look at the possibility of something occurring in 50 years time - to take the example given by Mr Paterson to Mr Rose (transcript 2293). On the other hand a delegate errs in law, in my opinion, if he confines his attention to whether there is a real chance of persecution on the day after an applicant's return. In my opinion on the delegate's evidence of what he considered, he erred in law.
97. The delegate's evidence on the question of whether there was a real chance of persecution was such as to give further cause for concern as the following passage demonstrates:
"MR ROSE: And when you were looking at a real chance of
persecution . . . were you looking for a probability or were
you looking for just a possibility? --- Well, what is between
a possibility and a probability, I mean can you define in
percentage terms, I don't - probability and possibility are
interchangeable to a large extent.
HIS HONOUR: I am sorry, what was the last thing? --- Well,
your Honour possibility and probability are largely
interchangeable.
What do you understand that legal test of the balance of
probabilities to mean? --- In what respect?
Well, it is the standard civil test, civil law, you determine
facts on the balance of probabilities as you just said? --- In
that instance, sir, I would be say
talking about, you known, 50 per cent you Honour.
And do you think that is the same as saying that you determine
on the basis of possibilities? --- No possibilities are less.
Yes? --- That is why I was asking for a percentage sort of
breakdown, your Honour.
I would have thought there was plainly a difference between
possibilities and probabilities. At one stage I thought you
were saying that they were interchangeable? --- Well, they are
used interchangeably a lot in current (parlance), your Honour,
that is all. . . .
(t.2293) (MR ROSE:) Well what test were you using? --- Were
you using a possibility or a probability test? --- I was using
the best - using the Chan test - High Court test of a less
than remote possibility.
A less than remote? --- Less than remote, yes. Using McHugh J
- possibly even down to 10 per cent type level of
persecution." (transcript 2292-2293)
Despite the last two answers, the above evidence causes me to doubt whether the delegate applied the Chan test correctly.
98. In the light of the opinions expressed above as to reasonable apprehension of bias (section 12), the fact that the delegate acted upon the June 1992 DFAT report without seeking information bringing it up to date and the delegate's misunderstanding of the meaning of a well-founded fear" the delegate's decision must be set aside. In those circumstances it is not necessary to deal in great detail in these reasons with the other matters relied upon by the applicant.
16. The Fordham report: (a)relevance; and (b) natural justice
99. In essence the applicant submitted that (a) the Fordham report was irrelevant because it dealt with voluntary returnees to Cambodia and the applicant would not be a voluntary returnee (b) if it was relevant then the respondents were guilty of a breach of the rules of natural justice in not informing the applicant of the Report so as to permit submissions by her solicitors on that document. Mr Paterson gave the following evidence:
(t.2370) "(MR ROSE:) . . . I think you told us yesterday
that RSRC summing up of their deliberations . . . was enough
to alert (the applicant) to the issues raised in the Fordham
report? --- Yes.
And therefore you did not have to give them the Fordham
report? --- Yes.
(t.2371) --- It alerts them to the essence of the claim. It
doesn't alert them to who drafted it, but it alerts them to
the essence. . . .
They . . . (t.2372) go on to say that RSRC has not cited the
source of its information (and) it is noted in our general
submission we do not accept that reference to voluntary
returnees from Australia constitutes a reason for concluding
that it is safe for Ms Mok to return? --- Yes.
And they got (sic) along to be somewhat critical of the
assertion? --- Yes.
And its use by the RSRC? --- Yes.
Now . . . could you see any need at that stage to make
available the Fordham report? --- Not that I can remember, no.
Did you note the distinction that was being drawn (in the RACS
submission) in respect of voluntary returnees and Ms Mok? ---
Not that I can remember.
Well, did you ever turn your mind to that distinction? --- I
did in the decision, but I don't remember now.
Well, in the decision did you turn your mind to the
differences between voluntary and involuntary return? --- Yes.
We talked - I talked about the evidence before me dealt with
returnees; voluntary returnees from Australia.
Voluntary returnees? --- Yes.
But did you ever go and deal with the distinction that an
involuntary returnee might be in a different position? ---
Without the decision in front of me I don't remember what I
wrote, but as from memory, no, we didn't. Well, we had to
address the issue of what the evidence was about returnees and
there was no evidence about involuntary returnees. How it was
addressed in that draft decision - how it was addressed in the
final decision I don't recall now."
(In view of Mr Paterson's words "Without the decision in front of me I don't remember . . . ", it should be stated that all witnesses were encouraged to have in the witness box whatever documents they considered would assist them and were given sufficient time to read any document upon which they were being questioned - see, for example, transcript 610.)
"You see on page 15 at the top of the same submission that I
have just taken you to:
It is Ms Mok's belief that the situation in Cambodia is
extremely unstable.
? --- Yes.
And did you accept that proposition? --- I don't recall now,
but she'd - I had stated previously that I believed she had a
subjective fear.
(t.2375) HIS HONOUR: . . . Am I right in understanding it
(the UNHCR Report) was limited to voluntary returnees in the
full sense of that word? . . . --- As far as I am aware, your
Honour, yes.
At the time of your decision you did not have any reason to
think that it included involuntary returnees? --- That's
right, your Honour, yes.
Could I ask you while you are interrupted, looking at the RSRC
document which you have been asked about just a few minutes
ago, at the foot of page 3, the sentence, the middle sentence:
Those who voluntarily return from Australia - . . . to
Cambodia have settled well without experiencing any
major difficulty.
Can you tell me what is the basis for that statement, as you
understand it? . . . --- I would assume that they have based
that statement on the Fordham Report because that as far as I
know was the only material that was available at that point in
time given the fact that it is a month after the Fordham
Report was available.
(t.2376) Well, on that assumption, can you tell me where in
the Fordham Report that is said? --- As we said yesterday,
your Honour, it is not stated explicitly.
Well is it stated implicitly? --- I think it is, your Honour,
yes.
Well, would you point me to the passage which implicitly
conveys that - - -? --- Well, it is not a passage, your
Honour, it is the whole tenor and tone of the paper. "
100. Mr Paterson accepted that the RACS submission of August 1992 was critical of the RSRC assertion that returnees had settled well "and had pointed out that the RSRC had not given any source for that assertion" (transcript 2371-2372).
101. On 6 July 1992 Mr Paterson, as acting Branch Head, signed a cable to Ms Eleanor Higgs, the Principal Migration Officer at Phnom Penh. In it he said it would assist the RSRC in its consideration of applications by Cambodians to have a report:
". . . concerning the situation of Cambodian refugee
applicants who have returned there from Australia. This
report would complement the report prepared by Roger Fordham
after his recent trip there with other returnees. Whereas his
report dealt with one week only, your report would be more
on-going dealing with subsequent contact with returnees.
It is intended that the report would be general in
nature with specific instances of harassment or persecution
reported by the returnees specified. There is no need to deal
with each returnee individually, rather a general picture of
them will suffice.
While it is appreciated that there is cable traffic from
you, one consolidated paper, able to be released to the
applicants and their legal representatives, would be of
assistance in the RSRC consideration of the remaining
applications.
Also, do you have any comments on the Fordham paper?
Grateful of your advice on return from leave."
There was no reply to that cable. I uphold the applicant's alternative submission that the respondents were guilty of a breach of the rules of natural justice. It is not necessary to decide whether the report was irrelevant; however, given the difference between voluntary and non-voluntary returnees, and the significance attached to that difference in Cambodia, the Fordham report as to voluntary returnees did not support the delegate's finding (par. 4.6.5) that the fear of the applicant, as a non-voluntary returnee, was "not well-founded".
102. Ground E, particular (d) of the amended application was that the making of the delegate's decision on 3 November 1992 involved an error of law in that:
" The First Respondent and/or his delegates including the
Second Respondent failed properly to consider whether the
Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution at the time
of her departure from Cambodia and/or at the time of her
application, and further whether there had been substantial
change so as to remove such a claim;"
103. As to that particular, the applicant contended that the delegate in making the decision was under a legal duty "to assess (the application for refugee status) . . . in particular by reference to the circumstances of the applicant as they existed" at the time of her departure from Cambodia (March 1990) or at the time when her application for refugee status was lodged (May 1990). No distinction was drawn by the applicant between the time of her departure from Cambodia and the time when she lodged her application and accordingly no distinction will be drawn between them in these reasons, which will refer to them simply as "March/May 1990". The respondents contended that, in considering whether the application should be granted, the circumstances were to be determined upon the facts as they existed at the time at which the application was being decided by the delegate i.e. on or shortly before his decision on 3 November 1992. In my opinion the respondent's contention must be upheld - see the reasons for judgment of the High Court in Chan Yee Kin v. The Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR at 386-387 (per Mason CJ), 399 (per Dawson J), 405-406, 408 (per Toohey J), 414.6, 415 (per Gaudron J) and 432 (per McHugh J).
104. The applicant's alternative submission under ground E particular (d) was that the delegate's duty was to consider first whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution in March/May 1990 and then consider "whether there had been substantial change so as to remove such a claim". In support of that submission the applicant's counsel relied upon the following passages (emphasis added) from the reasons for judgment in Chan:
per Mason CJ [1989] HCA 62; (169 CLR 379 at 387):
" . . . in making such a determination under the Convention, a
logical starting point in the examination of an application
for refugee status would generally be the reasons which the
applicant gave for leaving his country of nationality. Those
reasons will necessarily relate to an earlier time, since when
circumstances may have changed. But that does not deny the
relevance of the facts as they existed at the time of
departure to the determination of the question whether an
applicant has a "fear of persecution" and whether that fear is
"well-founded". "
" The Full Court placed insufficient weight upon the
circumstances as they existed at the time of departure which
grounded Mr. Chan's fear of persecution. In the absence of
compelling evidence to the contrary the Full Court should not
have inferred that the grounds for such fear had dissipated.
While the question remains one for determination at the time
of the application for refugee status, in the absence of facts
indicating a material change in the state of affairs in the
country of nationality, an applicant should not be compelled
to provide justification for his continuing to possess a fear
which he has established was well-founded at the time when he
left the country of his nationality. This is especially the
case when the applicant cannot, any more than a court can, be
expected to be acquainted with all the changes in political
circumstances which may have occurred since his departure.
Those changes are a matter which, if they were to be relied
upon, needed to be established and stated by the delegate in
reasons. As I have said, the required justification was not
established . . . As I see it, his error was one of acting
upon impermissible reasons and then reaching unreasonable
conclusions."
" Of course, the circumstances in which an applicant for
recognition of refugee status fled his country of nationality
will ordinarily be the starting point in ascertaining his
present status and, if at that time he satisfied the test laid
down, the absence of any substantial change in circumstances
in the meantime will point to a continuation of his original
status. That must be so in the present case where the
delegate in his reasons did not seek to point to any
significant change in attitude towards the appellant on the
part of the authorities in the People's Republic of China."
" Of course, such an approach does not and cannot exclude
consideration of an applicant's circumstances at the time he
left the country of his nationality; these circumstances are a
necessary starting point of the inquiry. All that the
approach demands is that a determination whether a person has
a well-founded fear of being persecuted is a determination
whether that circumstance exists at the time refugee status is
sought. If circumstances have changed since the applicant
left the country of his nationality, that is a relevant
consideration. In an appropriate case the change (such as a
new government) may remove any basis for a well-founded fear
of persecution.
(at 408:) In my view the Full Court fell into error because
of the way it approached the current situation. While it is
true that the determination of the appellant's refugee status
was to be made in the light of the circumstances then
prevailing, there was no basis for concluding that the
political situation in China had changed relevantly since the
appellant left it. If, as it did, the available material
pointed to the appellant having a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of . . . political opinion" at the time
he left the country of his nationality, there was nothing to
indicate that the circumstances giving rise to that
well-founded fear had altered in any relevant respect at the time
refugee status was sought."
" It is one thing to say that an applicant must have a
well-founded fear of being persecuted at the time his
application is considered. It is quite another thing to say,
as was said by the Full Court of the Federal Court, that, in a
case involving changed circumstances, the question whether
such fear is well-founded is to be answered by reference to
the situation prevailing, when the application is considered.
Of course, and I do not understand this to be excluded by the
Federal Court's formulation, a political situation can only be
properly evaluated in the context of its supporting political
structures. Those structures are not necessarily revealed by
a consideration of current political activities and policies.
And where, as here, the claim is to an extent based on
political structures, something more is required than a mere
evaluation of current political activities and policies. But
even allowing for these considerations, I do not think it
correct to say that the question whether a fear is
well-founded is to be answered by reference to the situation at the
time of the determination and in isolation from the past
experiences of the applicant.
(at 415:) Although the definition requires that there be
"well-founded fear" at the time of determination it would be
to ignore the nature of fear and to ignore ordinary human
experience to evaluate a fear as well-founded or otherwise
without due regard being had to the applicant's own past
experiences.
If an applicant relies on his past experiences it is, in
my view, incumbent on a decision-maker to evaluate whether
those experiences produced a well-founded fear of being
persecuted. If they did, then a continuing fear ought to be
accepted as well founded unless it is at least possible to say
that the fear of a reasonable person in the position of the
claimant would be allayed by knowledge of subsequent changes
in the country of nationality. To require more of an
applicant for refugee status would, I think, be at odds with
the humanitarian purpose of the Convention and at odds with
generally accepted views as to its application to persons who
have suffered persecution:"
" In many cases, the same result will be reached whether
one begins by asking whether an applicant was a refugee when
he or she left his or her country of nationality and whether
the circumstances have since changed or whether one simply
examines the circumstances in the country of nationality at
the time a claim for recognition is made on the State party.
But in the present case the appellant claims that it is
important to distinguish between the two approaches because if
he was a refugee in 1974 there was no evidence that the
circumstances which gave rise to him being a refugee at that
time had ceased to exist. However, the delegate seems to have
approached the case on the basis that the conditions which
existed when the appellant left China have not changed . . .
"
"(i) In this case, the delegate was not obliged to make his
mind up as to whether Ms. Mok had been a refugee or had
had a "well-founded fear" (of being persecuted for a
Convention reason) when she left Cambodia in March 1990.
(emphasis by counsel)
(ii) At most, Mr Paterson was only required to consider
changes of circumstances in Cambodia insofar as they
bore on the question whether Ms. Mok was a refugee at
the time of the determination.
(iii) Mr. Paterson did in fact consider the changes of the
circumstances in Cambodia insofar as they bore on the
question whether Ms. Mok was a refugee at the time of
the determination.
(iv) In any event, even if Mr. Paterson was required by law
to make up his mind as to whether Ms. Mok had a
"well-founded fear" as at March 1990 and to consider the
effect thereon of any subsequent changes in Cambodia,
Mr. Paterson substantially and effectively complied with
these requirements.
(v) Alternatively, the failure, if any, to have regard to
these matters could not have materially affected the
decision: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v.
Peko-Wallsend Ltd. [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40; Commonwealth Bank
v. Percival [1988] FCA 240; (1988) 82 ALR 54 at 60; Barmuncol Pty. Ltd.
v. Maroochy Shire Council (1983) 2 QdR 639."
They also said that Mason CJ in Chan (at 387) had "expressly approved the view expressed by (Mason,) Deane and Dawson JJ in (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v.) Mayer [1985] HCA 70; (1985) 157 CLR 290 at 302:
'Plainly enough, the words "has the status of refugee" refer
to the possession of such status at the time when the grant of
an entry permit is under consideration. As the definition of
"refugee" for the purposes of the Convention and the Protocol
makes clear, a person can become or cease to be a "refugee"
according to his own circumstances or circumstances within
"the country of his nationality" at the time when his "status"
is being determined. That being so, the reference to a
determination that an applicant for an entry permit "has" the
status of refugee is a reference to a contemporaneous
determination rather than to some past determination that the
applicant had the "status of refugee" at the time when that
past determination was made.' "
In my opinion that statement does not support the respondents' submission and is consistent with the passages quoted from Chan, upon which the applicant's counsel relied. I accept the applicant's submissions that those passages support the contention that the delegate erred in law in failing to consider:
(1) whether the applicant's fear of persecution was well-founded in March/May 1990 i.e. at the dates of her departure from Cambodia and her application for refugee status; and
(2) whether there had been a change in the relevant circumstances of such a nature and extent that her subjective fear of persecution was not well-founded at the time when the application was being decided by the delegate on 3 November 1992.
105. In my opinion the following matters tend to support the conclusion that the delegate erred in law:
(a) the delegate had accepted that, at the time when he was considering her application before he made his decision on 3 November 1992, the applicant "had the subjective fear of persecution if she were to return to Cambodia" (transcript 2209) that "she had a subjective fear of (persecution by) the Khmer Rouge" (transcript 2300) and that his acceptance was "based on information dating back to March 1990 when she first set out to come here" (transcript 2301) and that that "subjective fear was for convention reasons" (transcript 2475); and
(b) there was no suggestion in the material that her subjective fear had ceased to exist by the time of the delegate's decision on 3 November 1992.
106. I find, on Mr Paterson's evidence, that he did not consider whether her fear was well-founded in March 1990. His evidence included the following passages (transcript 2299-2300):
"(MR ROSE:) Were you aware of provisions within the refugee
convention dealing with the cessation of reasons continuing to
exist which led to a person being a refugee in the first
place? --- Yes. Article 1C you are talking about? . . .
(transcript 2300)
Did you ever look at the question of whether . . . Mrs Mok may
have had reasons to be refugee but they had all ceased? Did
you ever consider that? --- I cannot recall now. I may have,
but I don't remember. . . .
You are saying you looked at her as at 3 November? --- Yes.
And you decided on 3 November that she had a subjective fear,
did you? --- Yes.
On that date? --- Yes.
And then you looked at the question of whether, in your view
as at that date, that was well founded, objectively? --- Yes.
Yes.
And it would not have mattered to you if the week before she
had had an objectively well-founded fear, as long as on 3
November you did not think she did? --- I had to assess it the
day on which I make the decision.
Well, how can you do that if your information is stale? ---
The information wasn't stale as far as I was concerned. . . .
But that was based on information dating back to March 1990
when she first set out to come here? --- And I think repeated
all through her other claims as well - other submissions as
well."
It may be added that the respondents' counsel in final address said that Mr Paterson "did not formally ask himself the question, pose the test as of May 1990 and answer it. There is not doubt about that . . . " (transcript 3179).
107. In my opinion the delegate was under a duty to consider whether the applicant's subjective fear was well founded in March/May 1990 and, if so, to accept that that fear was still well founded at the time of his decision on 3 November 1992 unless a substantial change in the circumstances since her departure had been established, in which case that substantial change should have been detailed by the delegate in his statement of reasons. That opinion is based upon the passages in Chan (to which emphasis has been added) which are set out earlier, namely, at 387, 391 (per Mason CJ), 399 (per Dawson J), 406, 408 (per Toohey J), 414-415 (per Gaudron J) and 432-433 (per McHugh J).
108. In my opinion the delegate erred in law in failing to consider first whether the applicant's fear was well-founded in March/May 1990 and then whether changes in the relevant circumstances were such that her subjective fear of persecution (which he accepted existed on 3 November 1992) was not well-founded at that time. In my view the delegate's decision that the applicant did not have a well founded fear of being persecuted was also unreasonable within s.5 of the Judicial Review Act, as claimed in ground G of the amended application (cf. McHugh J in Chan at 434).
109. Since the conclusion of the hearing the respondents' counsel have referred the court to the reasons for judgment of Wilcox J in Lek v. The Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (Matter No. NG 926 of 1992 - delivered in Sydney on 8 October 1993). Having read the relevant parts of his Honour's reasons, in my opinion they do not give any support to the respondents' submissions on this part of the case. His Honour said (at pp 13-15):
"The facts concerning an applicant's departure from his/her
country of nationality must certainly be considered. What I
am holding, contrary to the submission made on behalf of the
applicant, is that it is also necessary to consider events
that have occurred since the applicant departed the country of
nationality and, indeed, since the applicant lodged his/her
application for refugee status, and which bear upon the
question whether the fear is well-founded at the date of
determination.
Each of the delegates approached the application of Dr
Lek and the group members in this way. In each case they
looked at the claims made by the applicant for refugee status
concerning his/her experiences in Cambodia. In each case they
accepted that the applicant had a fear of persecution on one
or more Convention grounds. They then went on to consider
whether that fear was well-founded. In most cases the
delegates did not make a specific finding on the issue, as at
the date of the applicants' departure from Cambodia. Rather,
they approached the matter, in effect, by assuming that the
fear was well-founded at that time and posing the question
whether supervening events meant that the applicants'
continuing fear remained well-founded. They answered that
question by pointing to information (notably the report of the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ("DFAT") dated 22 June
- regarding changes within Cambodia since March 1990. It
seems to me that this course follows the prescription laid
down in Chan. It separates out two logically distinct
questions: whether the applicant had a continuing subjective
fear of persecution on a Convention ground at the date of
determination and whether that fear was objectively
well-founded. It addressed the second question by taking as the
starting point the position as at the date of departure and
asking whether the available evidence establishes that the
position has since changed, so that the fear is no longer
well-founded even though subjectively continuing. In regard
to the latter inquiry, and because of the practical problems
noted by the High Court, there is in substance an onus of
proof on those who assert that relevant changes have occurred.
In each of the subject cases, the delegates in effect
determined that this onus was discharged because of the
official material placed before them. I see no fault in the
delegates' methodology." (emphasis added)
18. Whether the delegate erred in being influenced by the RSRC's recommendation, its reasons and the "attributes and experience" of the RSRC members
110. Grounds B particular (d), C particular (g) and E particular (i) of the amended application each asserted that the:
"The Second Respondent, unlawfully and/or improperly -
(i) was influenced by;
(ii) had regard to;
(iii) was guided by -
(ww) the recommendations of the members of the RSRC;
and/or
(xx) their reasons or the summing-up of their meeting
or meetings; and/or
(yy) the experience and attributes of the members of
the RSRC; and/or
(zz) his opinion that the RSRC was an independent body
and/or that it provided an independent assessment
of the Applicant's case which gave him guidance in
making the decision."
111. The delegate's evidence was that he "took into account the RSRC recommendation". Asked what he meant by that answer he said (transcript 2066):-
". . . that is the base point . . . where you are starting
from. What you are doing is you are reviewing a case de novo
and part of that - part of the material you consider is the
RSRC recommendation, which comprises an independent assessment
of this person's case to give you further guidance.
To give you further guidance as to what? --- Well, as to what -
what your decision should be. Because it's a case of - I
look at it myself, but I have the benefit of having five other
people with a various range of attributes and experience
making a recommendation to me about this applicant's status.
Well, does that mean that in making up your mind what to do,
you were partly influenced by the view of the five persons, or
four or five persons on the RSRC committee having formed a
view to recommend that it be rejected? --- Well, that's the
purpose of the RSRC, to make a recommendation to the delegate.
Yes. But I am just asking you, it is - - -? --- Yes. The
answer to your question is yes, because that's their role."
(emphasis added)
112. The respondents' counsel submitted that there had been no error of law. They cited passages from authorities including the following from the reasons for judgment of Forster J in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 15 FCR 4 at 8 and 10.
p 8 "(iii) A letter from Amnesty International of 15 January
1987 to the Chairman of the DORS Committee was not considered
by the decision-maker invoking ss 5(1)(3) and 5(2)(b) of the
Act.
p 10 (iii) The letter of 15 January 1987 was directed to the
Chairman of the DORS Committee so that one would incline to
the view that the Committee received it and considered it in
the absence of any evidence to the contrary. In addition, the
evidence is that the question of the possible refugee status
of Heer and Mrs Heer was only reconsidered in February 1987
because of the receipt of the letters from Amnesty
International. The respondent Minister in his reasons dated 6
April 1987 for the decision of 3 March 1987 not to recognise
Heer as a refugee mentions the receipt by the DORS Committee
of the letter from Amnesty International but does not say that
the Minister himself read and considered that letter, rather
the reverse, but it is clear that the DORS Committee
considered it. I am prepared to find that the matters raised
in the letter were considered by the DORS Committee, there
being no evidence to the contrary and there being evidence in
the minutes of the meeting called to consider the letter and
that relating to Mrs Heer that the matters were considered.
The respondent Minister was, in my view, entitled to act on
the report of the DORS Committee, a Committee set up for the
very purpose of investigating questions of refugee status and
advising the Minister thereon. If the Minister were obliged
to study all the material before the Committee there would not
be much point in having a Committee. The Minister was
entitled to act upon the report of the Committee and adopt its
recommendations: see Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar
[1981] FCA 191; (1981) 38 ALR 363 at 370 per Deane J. The Minister in his
statement of reasons mentioned above specifically refers to
having had before him when making the decision as to refugee
status the minutes of the meeting of the DORS Committee. This
ground also fails." (emphasis added)
It will be seen that (a) his Honour was considering the decision of a Minister and (b) that he applied the following passage in Sean (at 370):
"The statutory requirement that there be a report from the
Committee before decision by the Minister, the inquisitorial
powers conferred upon the Committee, the nature of the
decision, the realities of the functioning of responsible
government and the limitation of human capacity combine to
make unavoidable the conclusion that, having received the
Committee's report, the Minister is entitled to decide to
adopt it and any recommendations which it may contain without
having examined and assessed for himself all the material
which was before the Committee."
113. In the present case there was no statutory requirement and the other matters referred to by Deane J, to which I have added emphasis, are not applicable e.g. the "statutory requirement" and "the limitation of human capacity" of a Minister functioning under responsible government.
114. The respondents also referred to the following passage from my decision in Perera v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (27 February 1992, at page 9 - unreported):
" Ground 3(b)(ii) was added, by leave, during the hearing.
It read as follows:-
"3. There was an improper exercise of the power
conferred on the Respondent in that: . . .
(b) the Respondent took into account irrelevant
considerations in the exercise of its power
namely - ...
(ii) the recommendation of the
Immigration Review Panel that,
having independently determined
that the circumstances of the
case are not such as to warrant
special treatment and that the
departmental decision be
maintained and explained." ...
Before the terms of the amendment were formulated, that
proposed new ground appeared to the court to be one of some
substance. However, having reflected on it and having read
the transcript of the address in support of it by Mr. Rose and
that of Mr. Huttner on behalf of the respondent, I have come
to the conclusion that the ground cannot succeed. I accept
the submission of Mr. Huttner that the recommendation by the
Immigration Review Panel was not an irrelevant consideration
and was a matter which the delegate could take into account."
That passage was referring only to whether the Immigration Review Panel recommendation was an irrelevant consideration. In the present case the contention is also raised under "procedures . . . required by law . . . not been observed" (ground B) and "error of law" (ground E). I accept that the recommendation of the RSRC was not an irrelevant consideration but on the evidence of Mr Paterson he was "guided" by it as to "what (his) decision should be" and in my opinion that constituted error of law. In addition, he was "influenced" in "making up (his) mind what to do" by the "attributes and experience" of the RSRC members. As to his knowledge of the process of appointing RSRC members (including the "community representative") to constitute the Committee for any particular case, and to select "replacements" if a member was ill or away, see transcript 3412-3416 (transcript in Ly's case but accepted as evidence in Ms Mok's case). It may be added that he had little knowledge of the members of the Committee and of how they were selected and did not know what information they acted upon.
115. In my opinion a delegate, who after considering all the material before him, is in some doubt as to whether the applicant's fear is, or is not, well-founded, is not entitled to resolve that doubt by deciding to accept the RSRC recommendation (that the applicant is not a refugee) because he considers that the RSRC recommendation is to give him guidance as to what his decision should be or because of his belief that its members have a range of attributes and experience.
116. There were many other cases cited by the respondents' counsel in their written submissions dated 9 August 1993 (6 pages) and 19 August 1993 (24 pages). In my respectful opinion those cases do not stand as authorities governing the present case - particularly in the light of the evidence of Mr Paterson. I have also considered counsel's memorandum dated 23 August 1993, citing R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Hosenball (1977) 3 All ER 452 at 461. One can admire the language of Lord Denning, in the passage quoted by counsel (presumably based upon evidence) without accepting as applicable to the present case his reference to successive Ministers having:
"set up advisory committees to help them, usually with a
chairman who has done everything he can to ensure that justice
is done. They have never interfered with the liberty or the
freedom of movement of any individual except where it is
absolutely necessary for the safety of the state. In this
case we are assured that the Home Secretary gave it his
personal consideration, and I have no reason whatever to doubt
the care with which he considered the whole matter. He is
answerable to Parliament as to the way in which he did it and
not to the courts here."
It will be noted that in that case (1) the decision was made by the Home Secretary (2) who was accepted as having given "it his personal consideration" (3) was assumed to have "considered the whole matter" with care (4) the decision to deport was "in the interests of national security" (see 457) and (5) the Minister was "answerable to Parliament as to the way in which he did it and not to the courts here".
117. There are various elements to be considered in examining the delegate's role and that of the RSRC in the present case:
1. The Minister had power to decide whether the applicant was a
2. The Minister delegated that power to Mr Paterson.
3. The definition in the Act adopts the meaning in Article 1 of the
Refugees Convention or in that Article as amended by the Refugees
Protocol. In order to be satisfied that Mok was a refugee within
the definition of 'refugee' in the Migration Act, s. 4, Mr Paterson
had to decide whether the applicant was a person who:
'owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country;. . ."
4. Mr Paterson accepted that she had that fear subjectively and had to
5. He had to decide whether there was a "real chance" of her being
6. That was essentially a question of fact (provided that he was clear
on the law as to the meaning of the words "well founded fear of
persecution . . .").
7. His decision that she was not a refugee was "partly influenced" by
the recommendation of the RSRC that she was not a refugee
(transcript 2066).
8. He was influenced by that recommendation "an independent assessment
of this person's case to give (me) further guidance as to what (my)
decision should be ...".
9. Mr Paterson said in evidence that he did not know what material was
10. He had no idea how long the RSRC meeting took (transcript 1991).
11. Nor did he know (transcript 1992) "to what extent members of the
committee did in fact settle" (as distinct from have an opportunity
to alter or suggest alterations to) that draft recommendation
12. Neither the "Summing up of the RSRC Deliberations", nor the letter
to Ms Mok enclosing it, was signed by the chairperson; the letter
was initialled F.P. - apparently by Mr F. Pappadoupolos (the case
officer), dated "31/8/92" but referred to a meeting on 29 July
13. The RSRC recommendation was drafted by a case officer who, on the
evidence as to the general practice, probably took the minutes at
the meeting of the RSRC.
118. In my opinion on the detailed facts in this case, the applicant has established that the delegate erred in law by being influenced and guided by the matters set out in the particulars to the ground, set out above.
19. Whether the delegate failed to consider religious persecution
119. Although I have some doubts in the matter, I am not prepared to uphold this contention.
20. The attack upon the delegate's statement of reasons
120. The applicant submitted that the reasons for decision, dated 12 November 1992, signed by Mr Paterson, were not his reasons and that they were reasons composed by his case officer, working primarily under the control of officers of the Refugee Legal Section of the Department; that alterations to those reasons, drafted by the case officer, were suggested by a legal officer. Mr Paterson gave evidence that they were in fact the reasons for his decision on 3 November 1992. Although that evidence was weakened by his inability to remember what he had taken into account in reaching his decision, and by his "relevant answers", referred to earlier I am not prepared to reject his sworn evidence that he "would not have signed the document if it had not been the reasons" (transcript 2239 - see also 2116 and 2137).
121. I rejected, as being without substance, submissions by the applicant's counsel that:
(a) the decision was vitiated by the fact that the delegate did not
(b) Mr Paterson's decision relied on the recommendation by Mr Branston
(c) the delegate erred in failing to seek further information e.g. Dr
(d) the decision was vitiated by the fact that the delegate did not
look at the material in the country files in considering the
applicant's case.
122. The decision will be set aside and Ms Mok's application for refugee status will be referred to the respondent Minister to be determined according to law by him or by a delegate other than Mr Paterson.
Mok Gek Bouy
the Minister of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs and Malcolm Paterson [1993] FCA 545;
(1987) 15 FCR 4
(1977) 27 FLR 129
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(1981) 38 ALR 363
(1989) 168 CLR 1
(1983) 151 CLR 288
(1988) 82 ALR 54
(1993) 47 FCR 1
(1989) 169 CLR 379
(1990) 170 CLR 70
(1992) 106 ALR 671
(1992) 176 CLR 1
(1989) 167 CLR 568
(1986) 162 CLR 24
(1983) 2 QdR 639
(1985) 157 CLR 290