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[2013] NSWADT 127
plaintiff. The respondents are to pay the applicant's costs from 6 June 2007 as agreed or assessed.
Keysar Trad won part of his racial vilification case against Alan Jones and 2GB over a 2005 broadcast that targeted Lebanese Muslims. The Tribunal agreed the comments incited serious contempt but only for one set of comments (Schedule A); the others (Schedule B) were about religion, not race. Trad offered early on to settle everything if Jones just apologised on air and in writing. Jones and the station ignored the offer. Years later, after a hearing, the Tribunal ordered an apology, $10,000 damages and a policy review. The Tribunal decided it was fair to make Jones and the station pay Trad's legal costs from the day after their offer expired because rejecting a fair early deal was unreasonable, especially given the serious human rights issues involved and their initial failure to respond to the complaint. The case shows that in anti-discrimination hearings, turning down a reasonable apology-only offer can cost you even if you partly succeed.
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Keysar Trad lodged a complaint on 29 April 2005 with the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board alleging racial vilification arising from broadcasts made by Alan Jones on Radio 2GB between 26 and 29 April 2005. The complaint was referred to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal on 22 March 2007. The broadcasts were divided into Schedule A (a single broadcast on 28 April 2005 from 9.20 am) and Schedule B (broadcasts over three days). The Schedule A transcript, reproduced in full at paragraph 6, referred repeatedly to "Lebanese males" and "Lebanese Muslims" in the context of events at Hickson Road, describing them as "mongrels", "vermin" and stating that "they simply rape, pillage and plunder a nation that's taken them in".
The Tribunal at first instance (in the earlier decision Trad v Jones & Anor [2008] NSWADT 272 and subsequent rulings) found the Schedule A broadcast breached s 20C(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 because it incited hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of Lebanese Muslims on the ground of their race (defined in s 4 to include ethno-religious origin). The Schedule B broadcasts were dismissed because they targeted Muslims as a religious group rather than on the ground of race. Orders were made for $10,000 damages, a critical review of policies and practices on racial vilification, staff training, and an apology. Both parties applied for costs.
Prior to the substantive hearing, on 22 May 2007 Trad's solicitors wrote to Jones (copying the Harbour Radio address) offering to settle the entire matter by way of an on-air apology at 9.20 am and a written apology on Harbour Radio letterhead, both in specified terms acknowledging that the remarks vilified Lebanese males and Lebanese Muslims and breached the racial vilification provisions. The offer was expressed to be without prejudice except as to costs, open for 14 days, and stated that acceptance would mean no costs would be sought. The offer expired on 6 June 2007 with no response. Mediation and further negotiations occurred later but did not resolve the matter. The respondents did not reply to the President's initial letter or attend the first case conference on 9 May 2007.
By the time of the costs hearing on 30 April 2013 before the reconstituted Tribunal (Magistrate N Hennessy, Deputy President), appeals and cross-appeals had been determined by the Appeal Panel (Trad v Jones (No 3) (EOD) [2013] NSWADTAP 13 and related decisions). The costs judgment (Trad v Jones (No 5) [2013] NSWADT 127) ordered the respondents to pay Trad's costs from 6 June 2007 as agreed or assessed. The Tribunal rejected the respondents' argument that the costs applications were barred by res judicata or issue estoppel.
The Tribunal began from the statutory starting point in s 88(1) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 that each party bears their own costs. Departure is permitted only if the Tribunal is satisfied it is fair to do so, having regard to the matters in s 88(1A), including under paragraph (e) "any other matter that the Tribunal considers relevant". The fairness test applied because, although the offer was made in 2007 when the prior "special circumstances" test governed, the proceedings were not finally determined before 1 January 2009 (ADT Act, Schedule 5, Part 11, Cl 43(2)(i)).
The decisive factor was the 22 May 2007 letter. The Tribunal found the offer was reasonable: it was made very early, before significant costs had been incurred, after the complaint had been on foot since 2005, and at a time when the respondents had failed to respond to the President's letter or attend the first case conference. It contained a significant element of compromise because it sought neither damages nor orders for policy review or training—remedies that were ultimately granted. The 14-day period for acceptance was reasonable in the circumstances.
The respondents' rejection was unreasonable. Their later argument that the offer required a "full admission of guilt" rather than a genuine apology was rejected because the Tribunal has power under s 108(2)(d) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 to order an apology that includes an acknowledgement of unlawfulness (citing its own earlier decisions such as Sunol v Collier (EOD) [2006] NSWADTAP 51). The fact the letter was addressed to Jones at Harbour Radio's premises, referred to both respondents, attached the President's Report naming both, and required the written apology on Harbour Radio letterhead satisfied the Tribunal that the offer was intended to settle the complaint against both parties. The absence of Points of Claim at the time of the offer was irrelevant; the scope of the complaint was clear from the President's Report.
The terms of the offer were more favourable to the respondents than the final orders. The Tribunal ultimately ordered an on-air apology (in terms broadly similar to those offered, with minor additional context about the Hickson Road incident), $10,000 damages, and a policy review. Although the final apology did not require a personal written apology to Trad personally (the Tribunal accepted Jones had not vilified him individually), this did not render the overall outcome more favourable to the respondents. The human rights context reinforced the conclusion: freedom from racial vilification is a fundamental right, high-profile broadcasters have access to legal advice, and the objects of the ADT Act favour informal and expeditious resolution. The respondents' initial non-engagement undermined those objects. Because the Calderbank-style ground succeeded, it was unnecessary to decide other costs arguments or the respondents' application for costs on the dismissed Schedule B portion.
The res judicata argument was rejected because the Appeal Panel had expressly stated it lacked power to award first-instance costs and considered it more appropriate for the original Tribunal to decide the matter, citing its lack of "feel" for the lengthy proceedings. That was not a final determination on the merits. A statement in Trad v Jones (No 4) [2012] NSWADT 265 that only the apology remained outstanding did not extinguish jurisdiction over a costs application that had already been filed and held over pending appeals.
Prior to 1 January 2009 the test for costs in the Tribunal required "special circumstances warranting an award of costs". The fairness test in s 88(1A) replaced it. Paragraph 34 expressly notes that although the 22 May 2007 offer was made under the old test, the new fairness test governs because the proceedings were commenced but not finally determined before the commencement date. The Tribunal drew on Court of Appeal authority (AT v Commissioner of Police, NSW [2010] NSWCA 131 at [33]) that there is a "relatively low hurdle" for an applicant and that fairness takes into account the compensatory purpose of costs orders, generally favouring the successful party, while also considering the Tribunal's objects and the nature of the jurisdiction.
In the equal opportunity jurisdiction the Tribunal had previously cautioned against a "chilling effect" from too readily awarding costs against unsuccessful applicants (Tu v University of Sydney (No 2) [2002] NSWADTAP 25 at [39]). The decision integrates Calderbank principles (Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 ALL ER 333 and subsequent cases) into the s 88(1A)(e) residual category, adapting them to the Tribunal context. It confirms that an offer need not mirror the final orders exactly; the question is whether the offer was reasonable at the time it was made and whether its terms were more favourable overall. Offers including an admission of unlawfulness in an apology were accepted as legitimate (referencing Supreme Court defamation practice in Assaf v Skalkos [2000] NSWSC 935).
After this decision the law remained that costs are exceptional but fairness is the touchstone. The judgment reinforces that early, reasonable offers in vilification cases carry significant forensic weight, particularly where respondents have not engaged with pre-hearing processes. It also confirms that reconstitution of the Tribunal under s 79 does not prevent determination of ancillary costs applications by a single member under s 24A.
Paragraph 2: "The normal rule is that each party pays their own costs. Costs may only be awarded if it is fair to do so. I have decided to order the respondents to pay the applicant's costs from 6 June 2007 because the applicant made a reasonable offer to settle the entire proceedings by way of an on-air and a written apology before any significant legal costs had been incurred. The respondents unreasonably rejected that offer which expired on 6 June 2007. The terms of the offer were more favourable to the respondents than the orders that the Tribunal ultimately made."
Plain English: The usual position is everyone pays their own lawyers. We only shift that if it's fair. Here it is fair to make Jones and the radio station pay Trad's costs from the day after they ignored his early apology offer. The offer was sensible, came before big legal bills, and gave them a better deal than what the Tribunal eventually ordered.
Paragraph 3: "It is a fundamental human right recognised by the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (AD Act) that every person should be able to live free from racial vilification. High profile public figures like Alan Jones have ready access to legal advice. If, either inadvertently or intentionally, Mr Jones vilifies a person or a group of people on the ground of race he should, at least, respond quickly and acknowledge and apologise for any wrongdoing. That did not happen in this case."
Plain English: The law says people have a basic right not to be racially vilified. Famous broadcasters with lawyers on speed-dial should apologise quickly if they cross the line. They didn't do that here, even though the allegations were serious.
Paragraph 35 (quoting AT v Commissioner of Police, NSW [2010] NSWCA 131): "Although an order varying the general rule may be made 'only if' the relevant criterion is satisfied in a particular way, there is a relatively low hurdle for an applicant seeking an order. The criterion of 'fairness' will take into account the compensatory purpose of an award of costs, which will generally favour the successful party."
Plain English: You still need a good reason to make someone pay costs, but the bar is not set very high. Fairness includes the idea that the winner should usually get their costs back.
Paragraph 71: "The unreasonable rejection of a Calderbank type offer will not necessarily make it fair to award costs, but it does in this case. The Equal Opportunity Division is a jurisdiction which, through the resolution of complaints under the Anti-Discrimination Act, seeks to protect and promote the observance of fundamental human rights. Freedom from racial vilification is one such right. Alan Jones knows that his comments are broadcast to a large audience and that racial vilification is unlawful. An object of the ADT Act is to enable proceedings to be determined informally and expeditiously. That cannot happen if Mr Jones and Harbour Radio Pty Ltd do not respond to a reasonable offer of settlement."
Plain English: Ignoring a fair settlement offer does not automatically trigger costs, but it does here because this is a human-rights jurisdiction. Jones broadcasts to thousands and knows the law. The Tribunal is supposed to be quick and informal; that only works if parties engage with reasonable offers.
This decision is triggered where a complainant in the Equal Opportunity Division makes an early, genuine settlement offer limited to an apology that acknowledges unlawfulness under s 20C, the offer is made before significant costs are incurred and before Points of Claim have crystallised, the scope of the complaint is apparent from the President's Report, the respondent has failed to engage with the Anti-Discrimination Board or the first case conference, the offer contains an element of compromise by not seeking damages or systemic orders, the respondent rejects the offer, and the Tribunal's final orders include an apology plus additional remedies such as damages under s 108 or policy review. It also applies where the respondent later argues the offer required an impermissible admission of liability or was defective because it was not sent to every named respondent separately, but the surrounding correspondence and attachments demonstrate the offer was intended to resolve the entire complaint against all respondents. The precedent further applies to costs applications that have been held over pending appeals where an Appeal Panel has declined to determine first-instance costs on jurisdictional or discretionary grounds.
The Schedule A/Schedule B distinction illustrates that partial success on race versus religion questions does not prevent a costs order running from an early offer date if the offer related only to the ultimately substantiated portion. The fact pattern does not require the offer to match the final apology wording exactly; minor differences (such as additional contextual sentences identifying the Hickson Road incident) do not render the final orders more favourable to the respondent.
The judgment itself treats earlier authorities as guiding the application of the fairness test. It applies the statement of issue estoppel from Dixon J in Blair v Curran [1939] HCA 23 at 531-2 to reject the res judicata submission. It follows the Court of Appeal's characterisation of the "relatively low hurdle" and compensatory purpose in AT v Commissioner of Police, NSW [2010] NSWCA 131 at [33]. The Tribunal cites and applies its own earlier Equal Opportunity Division costs decisions (Denmeade v Kempsey Shire Council & Ors (No.3) [2004] NSWADT 54, Lynch v Alan Hingston as trustee for the AP Family Trust trading as Grafton Sawmilling [2009] NSWADT 263, Jenkins v YMCA of Great Lakes Inc. t/as Great Lakes Aquatic & Leisure Centre [2008] NSWADT 335 and Hughes v Narrabri Bowling Motel Limited (No 2) [2012] NSWADT 260) as demonstrating that Calderbank-style offers are relevant under the fairness test even though not expressly listed in s 88(1A).
The Appeal Panel decisions in the same matter (Trad v Jones (No 3) (EOD) [2013] NSWADTAP 13 and Trad v Jones (No 3) (EOD) [2012] NSWADTAP 33) are treated as confirming that the Tribunal at first instance is best placed to determine costs because it has the "feel" for the lengthy proceedings. The judgment notes that Chand v Railcorp of NSW (No.2) [2011] NSWCA 80 is actually authority that the Appeal Panel does have power to determine first-instance costs, yet the Panel still declined to do so on appropriateness grounds. Subsequent references in the series (Trad v Jones (No 4) [2012] NSWADT 265) are distinguished on the basis that a statement about "only outstanding issues" made before the Appeal Panel's costs ruling cannot impliedly extinguish a filed but undetermined costs application. The Tribunal's own guideline on costs is cited at paragraph 25 as supporting the proposition that first-instance costs can be finalised despite appeals. Overall the decision consolidates the line of authority that early reasonable offers attract costs consequences in human-rights jurisdictions while preserving the "each party pays their own" starting point.
The judgment leaves open whether costs would have been awarded on other grounds advanced by Trad (relative strengths of claims, conduct prolonging proceedings) because the settlement-offer ground was dispositive. It does not decide the respondents' cross-application for costs on the dismissed Schedule B portion. The precise weight to be given to a respondent's failure to respond to the President's letter or attend the first case conference, standing alone, remains unquantified.
Questions remain about the outer limits of "more favourable" when comparing an offer to final orders: how many additional remedies (damages, policy review, training) can be ordered before an offer is no longer more favourable? The Tribunal did not set a bright-line rule. The interaction between s 88 and the specific costs power in s 110 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 is noted but not exhaustively analysed. Whether an offer addressed only to the individual broadcaster and not separately to the licensee would still bind the corporate respondent in every case is left for future decisions, although on these facts the Tribunal was satisfied the single letter sufficed. The decision does not address the quantum of costs in detail, instead ordering costs "as agreed or assessed" after the respondents complained they could not comment on the $180,946.17 estimate without a breakdown by date. Finally, the precise boundary between an apology that constitutes an admission of liability and one that is merely "genuine" for settlement purposes is acknowledged as fact-sensitive and guided by earlier cases but not exhaustively defined. These matters continue to require case-by-case assessment under the fairness criterion.
Introduction 1In December 2009, the Tribunal found that broadcaster Alan Jones and the licensee of radio station 2 GB, Harbour Radio Pty Limited, had breached the racial vilification provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. Comments made by Mr Jones on 28 April 2005 were found to have vilified Lebanese Muslims on the ground of their race (the Schedule A broadcast). Other comments made on 26, 27 and 28 April 2005 (the Schedule B broadcasts), were found not to constitute racial vilification because they were directed to Muslims and, in the context of the broadcast, Muslims were being characterised as a religious, not a racial group. The applicant, Mr Trad, has applied for the respondents to pay his costs of the whole proceedings. Alternatively, he applies for the costs relating to the Schedule A broadcast. Mr Jones and Harbour Radio have applied for their costs relating to the Schedule B broadcasts. 2The normal rule is that each party pays their own costs. Costs may only be awarded if it is fair to do so. I have decided to order the respondents to pay the applicant's costs from 6 June 2007 because the applicant made a reasonable offer to settle the entire proceedings by way of an on-air and a written apology before any significant legal costs had been incurred. The respondents unreasonably rejected that offer which expired on 6 June 2007. The terms of the offer were more favourable to the respondents than the orders that the Tribunal ultimately made. 3It is a fundamental human right recognised by the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (AD Act) that every person should be able to live free from racial vilification. High profile public figures like Alan Jones have ready access to legal advice. If, either inadvertently or intentionally, Mr Jones vilifies a person or a group of people on the ground of race he should, at least, respond quickly and acknowledge and apologise for any wrongdoing. That did not happen in this case. Despite the seriousness of the allegations neither respondent answered the President's letter enclosing the complaint or the Tribunal's letter requiring them to attend the first case conference. It was in that context that Mr Trad made a reasonable offer to settle the entire complaint by way of an on-air and a written apology in relation to the Schedule A broadcast only. Despite the efforts to settle the matter after 6 June 2007, it is fair for the respondents to pay the applicant's costs from that date.
Constitution of Tribunal 4The Judicial Member who presided at first instance is no longer a member of this Tribunal. The Tribunal was re-constituted to hear the costs application in accordance with s 79 of the ADT Act. Because the Tribunal is exercising an ancillary function, one judicial member now constitutes the Tribunal: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997, s 24A.
The complaint 5On 29 April 2005 Mr Trad lodged a complaint of racial vilification with the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board. The complaint was about various comments Mr Jones had made when presenting a programme on Radio 2 GB between 26 and 29 April 2005. 6The so-called Schedule A broadcast took place on 28 April 2005 from 9.20 am. Mr Jones referred to Lebanese males and Lebanese Muslims. Because it is relatively short, I will reproduce the Schedule A broadcast in full: ALAN JONES: Yes, it's 20 past nine. I've just received this letter, which has just been sent to me by a listener. "Frightening" he says: I watched in horror as Lebanese males -- this is in relation to the Channel 9 program last night -- openly taunted police who were sent there to try and shift these idiots from the area. The camera clearly showed Lebanese males swearing and challenging police to fight, openly humiliating them. Singing 'pig songs' and walking up to the window of the police car and hurling abuse at the police inside. What did the police do? Nothing? They drove off to the cat calls and abuse of a clearly out-of-control crowd. Remember, these people announced themselves as Lebanese Muslims. Were police reinforcements called to make arrests? No. He says: If ever there were clear examples of the offence 'intimidate police' that was captured on film. But the police involved just meekly drove away. It was sickening. But more was to come. A number of these mongrels then pretended to hold a minute's silence for Anzac Day. Obviously this film was - this segment was filmed on the 24th of April. They then bowed their heads and pretended to cry and began to laugh and make jokes about our fallen heroes. It was absolutely gut-wrenching to watch and listen to these mongrels desecrate our national memory. If ever there was a clear example that Lebanese males in their vast numbers not only hate our country and our heritage, this was it. They have no connection to us. They simply rape, pillage and plunder a nation that's taken them in. I can't believe what I'm seeing. What did we do as a nation to have this vermin infest our shores? What about the sacrifices that our war dead gave to this country to make it what it is today, and these mongrels laugh at them on national TV. Tell me we don't have a national security problem in the making. And that show last night would have shown Bob Carr for what he is - a liar. 'We have delivered safer streets for the community', he shouts. He continues to talk about how his government have made the New South Wales Police Force the number one force in the country. What we saw last night was a graphic example of the Carr Government deception, and the incredible failures of not only Ryan but now Moroney. We have a Police Force that allows itself to be humiliated and assaulted by mobs of rampaging youths at Redfern, Macquarie Fields and anywhere else in Sydney. This is the age of the academic trained police, who are taught to turn the other cheek and cop whatever comes their way. When police simply back down and absorb the insults and the humiliation that I saw last night then I know we've lost control of the streets. Well, we pay government to be able to address these issues and yet again they don't. And as I said before, if there's someone out there who can't do the job, turn over your badge and give it to someone who can. 7The so-called Schedule B broadcasts occurred over 3 days in April 2005. The transcript of those broadcasts is lengthy. The Tribunal described them as having the following themes: . . a speech by a Lebanese-Australian Muslim cleric called Sheik Faiz Mohammed; the allegedly inflammatory nature of that speech which Mr Jones interpreted as an excuse for or incitement of sexual assaults by Muslim men upon non-Muslim women and as blaming the victims for the crimes committed against them; the fact that the speech was given to a large audience of Muslim people in the Bankstown area; the alleged reaction or lack of reaction by the audience and, in particular, people identified by Mr Jones only as "the Muslim leadership"; the fear of non-Muslim women; In the last two days, after apparently receiving hundreds of emails from Muslim listeners, a theme also developed that many of the "Muslim rank-and-file" had disowned their "leadership" in favour of the type of leadership offered by Mr Jones. Trad v Jones & anor (No. 3) [2009] NSWADT 318 at [5].
Racial vilification unlawful 8Under s 20C(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act: It is unlawful for a person, by a public act, to incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of the race of the person or members of the group. 9Race is defined in s 4: Race includes colour, nationality, descent and ethnic, ethno-religious or national origin. 10A significant issue in relation to the Schedule B broadcasts was whether any incitement to hatred, serious contempt for or severe ridicule of a person or group was on the ground of the "ethno-religious" origin of that group. 11Various exceptions are set out in s 20(C(2): (2) Nothing in this section renders unlawful: (a) a fair report of a public act referred to in subsection (1), or (b) a communication or the distribution or dissemination of any matter on an occasion that would be subject to a defence of absolute privilege (whether under the Defamation Act 2005 or otherwise) in proceedings for defamation, or (c) a public act, done reasonably and in good faith, for academic, artistic, scientific or research purposes or for other purposes in the public interest, including discussion or debate about and expositions of any act or matter.
Brief procedural history 12Three days after receiving the complaint the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board advised the owners of Radio 2 GB of the complaint and issued a Notice under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth). The President required Radio 2 GB to keep a recording of the relevant broadcasts and to provide a copy to the Anti-Discrimination Board. The owners complied promptly providing CDs of selected items from the Alan Jones' programme from 26-29 April 2005. The President had the CDs transcribed and, in September 2005, asked Mr Trad to identify the comments that were of the most concern. Mr Trad replied on the same day. 13The President wrote to the owners of 2 GB again on 27 November 2006, more than a year later, asking for a response to the complaint itself. Although a response was requested within 28 days, no response was received in that time and, on 17 January 2007, Mr Trad asked the President to refer the complaint to the Tribunal. The President referred the complaint on 22 March 2007 together with the President's Report attaching all relevant correspondence. 14The Tribunal wrote to each of the parties enclosing a copy of the President's Report and advising that they should attend a case conference on 9 May 2007. Mr Trad attended the conference but neither of the respondents attended. The Tribunal directed that the matter be listed tentatively for mediation on 7 June 2007 and that a further case conference be held on 2 July 2007 if the matter did not settle. The Judicial Member requested that the Registrar write to each respondent advising that the applicant had consented to the matter proceeding to mediation. The letter set out alternative directions if the respondents did not consent to mediation. 15On 22 May 2007, two weeks after the first case conference, the applicant's solicitors wrote to Mr Jones offering to settle the complaint by way of an "on air" and a written apology. Neither Mr Jones, or any other person on his behalf, replied to that letter at the time. 16Mediation did not take place on 7 June 2007 but, by arrangement between the parties, it was held on 23 October 2007. It was adjourned to 7 November 2007. There was further correspondence between the parties after that date regarding settlement offers. Both parties made a significant effort to resolve the complaint, but it did not settle. A copy of the correspondence between the parties in relation to the settlement negotiations was Confidential Exhibit A 12 in the proceedings. That exhibit was also before me. 17By the time of a further case conference on 6 February 2008, the matter had not settled and it was set down for hearing on 29 and 30 July 2008. Prior to that hearing, the Tribunal heard an interlocutory application by the respondents to confine the scope of the complaint to certain specified comments and to strike out those parts of the Points of Claim which were said to allege religious, rather than racial vilification. The Tribunal rejected the applications and permitted the applicant to amend the Points of Claim in one respect: Trad v Jones & Anor [2008] NSWADT 272. 18The applicant filed Amended Points of Claim but there was disagreement as to whether that document reflected the Tribunal's decision. The parties then had discussion on the issue of whether further evidence was required to address the applicant's new point. On 11 May 2009, the first day of hearing, the applicant applied to further amend the Points of Claim to deal with the issue of whether Muslims constitute an ethno-religious group in the context of the Schedule B broadcasts. The Tribunal gave the applicant leave to further amend the Points of Claim and to file new evidence: Trad v Jones (No 2) [2009] NSWADT 206. The Tribunal noted at [27] that it was within the Tribunal's power to cure any unreasonable prejudice to the respondents by making a costs order in their favour. The matter was ultimately heard on 12 and 13 August 2009.
Tribunal's decision at first instance 19The Tribunal found the complaint of racial vilification in respect of the Schedule A broadcast substantiated. The complaint in so far as it related to the Schedule B broadcasts was dismissed. The Tribunal found that the group being referred to in the Schedule B broadcasts, was Muslims and that they are a religious group, not an ethno-religious group. Any incitement which may have occurred was not on the ground of race: at [166]. The Tribunal ordered the respondents to pay $10,000 in damages, to conduct a 'critical review of its policies and practices on racial vilification' and staff training and to apologise in terms to be agreed. The Tribunal also directed both parties to make any application for costs within 28 days. The precise orders were: 1. The complaint of racial vilification as against the first and second respondents in respect of Schedule A of the Points of Claim is substantiated. The balance of the complaint is dismissed 2. The respondents are to pay the applicant within 21 days, damages in the sum of $10,000, for which they are jointly and severally liable. 3. Within six months of the date of these orders the second respondent is to conduct review in accordance with [245] of these Reasons. 4. The parties are directed to confer about the time, form, extent and manner of publication of the apology to be issued in accordance with these Reasons. If the Tribunal is not notified within eight weeks of the date of these orders that agreement has been reached directions will be issued under s 108(2)(d) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 about the details of the apology. 5. Any application for costs in relation to these proceedings, together with supporting submissions, must be filed and served within 28 days of the date of these reasons. Within a further 28 days, the opposing party is to file and serve submissions in reply. 20Before the costs application was determined or the details of the apology agreed upon, the respondents appealed to the Appeal Panel and Mr Trad cross-appealed.
21The issues can be summarised as follows: 1)Are the costs applications barred because of the doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel? 2)If not, is it fair in all the circumstances to order the respondents to pay all the applicant's costs or, alternatively, the costs relating to the Schedule A broadcast? 3)Is it fair in all the circumstances to order the applicant to pay the respondents' costs relating to the Schedule B broadcasts?
Are the costs applications barred because of the doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel? 22The respondents applied for the applicant's costs application to be dismissed because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to entertain it. The respondent conceded that if this submission was accepted it would also mean that their costs application could not proceed. The submission was made on the basis that when the Appeal Panel was hearing the appeals against the Tribunal's decision, it decided that it had no jurisdiction to hear the application for costs in relation to the proceedings below. According to the respondents, that means that the application for costs at first instance has been finally determined. In my view, that submission is not supported by the facts. 23The doctrine of res judicata or cause of action estoppel is that "if a dispute is judged by a court of competent jurisdiction, the judgement of the court is final and conclusive as to the rights and duties of the parties involved": Butterworths, Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, 2nd edition, Butterworths, 1998. The aim is to ensure finality and non-duplication of litigation. A related principle is issue estoppel. The most authoritative statement of that principle is in Blair v Curran [1939] HCA 23; (1939) 62 CLR 464, per Dixon J, at 531-2: A judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or of law disposes once and for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised between the same parties... The estoppel covers only those matters which the prior judgment...necessarily established as the legal foundation or justification of its conclusion, . . . Nothing but what is legally indispensable to the conclusion is thus finally closed or precluded. 24When handing down its decision, the Tribunal directed the parties to make any application for costs within 28 days. Each party applied for costs and replied to the other party's application. On 12 February 2010, before the Tribunal had determined those applications, the Registrar wrote to the parties saying that the costs applications would not be determined at that time because an appeal and cross appeal had been lodged and the outcome of those appeals may have some bearing on the issue of costs at first instance. 25In the course of hearing the appeals, the Appeal Panel considered the applicant's submission that it could determine his application for costs in relation to the proceedings below. The respondents submitted that the Appeal Panel did not have the power to determine applications for costs at first instance. The Appeal Panel agreed. In any case, the Appeal Panel decided that it was more appropriate for the Tribunal below to hear the costs application: As to the proceedings at first instance, we apprehend that we have no power to order any such costs: Chand v Railcorp of NSW (No.2) [2011] NSWCA 80. In any case we think it inappropriate for us to entertain that dispute. We do not have the feel for those lengthy proceedings that those still members of the Tribunal who heard it would have, and if we were to decide the question, that might unfairly foreclose any possible appeal as to costs that might be better informed by a decision benefiting from the input of those members. See also the Tribunal's Costs Guideline at para 10, which suggests (with respect, for good reason) that the costs at first instance might have been finalised despite the appeals: Trad v Jones (No 3) (EOD) [2013] NSWADTAP 13 at [2]. . 26Incidentally, the applicant's lawyer pointed out that Chand v Railcorp of NSW (No.2) [2011] NSWCA 80 at [28] is actually authority for the proposition that the Appeal Panel does have power to determine an application for costs at first instance. Whether or not it has that power, the Appeal Panel decided that it was more appropriate for the Tribunal at first instance to determine any costs application. 27Contrary to the respondents' submission, the Appeal Panel did not finally dispose of the application for costs before the Tribunal below. The passage quoted above makes it clear that it decided that the Appeal Panel lacked jurisdiction, not that the Tribunal below lacked jurisdiction to determine the costs application. 28The respondents cannot gain any support for their submission from a statement the Tribunal made in proceedings relating to the form of the apology the respondents should make to the applicant. The background to that submission is that after deciding that the complaint was substantiated in relation to the Schedule A broadcasts, the Tribunal directed the parties to confer about the details of an apology. No agreement was reached and, as each party had lodged an appeal, no order was made about the form of an apology at that time. 29After the Appeal Panel handed down its substantive decisions, the matter was re-listed before a differently constituted Tribunal to finalise the apology order. In that decision the Tribunal stated that: The parties have been unable to come to an agreement and have been directed by the Tribunal to file and serve submissions about the time, form, extent and manner that the apology should take. Those are the only outstanding issues in these proceedings: (Trad v Jones (No 4) [2012] NSWADT 265 at [2] and [3]. 30The respondents submitted that because the applicant had not made it clear to the Tribunal that there was also an outstanding costs application, the costs issue must have been finally resolved and the doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel applies. 31Any failure of the applicant to 'correct' a misunderstanding on the Tribunal's part does not affect the Tribunal jurisdiction to determine the costs application. In any case, on 12 December 2012 when the decision was made about the form of the apology, the Appeal Panel had not handed down its decision in relation to the costs on appeal or at first instance. If the Appeal Panel had decided that it had jurisdiction to deal with the application for costs at first instance, the details of the apology would have been the only outstanding issue. 32The submission that the Tribunal at first instance does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the application for costs because of the operation of the doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel is not supported by the facts and is rejected.
33Section 110 of the Anti-Discrimination Act gives the Tribunal power to award costs under section 88 of the ADT Act. Section 88 states that: (1) Each party to proceedings before the Tribunal is to bear the party's own costs in the proceedings, except as provided by this section. (1A) Subject to the rules of the Tribunal and any other Act or law, the Tribunal may award costs in relation to proceedings before it, but only if it is satisfied that it is fair to do so having regard to the following: (a) whether a party has conducted the proceedings in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged another party to the proceedings by conduct such as: (i) failing to comply with an order or direction of the Tribunal without reasonable excuse, or (ii) failing to comply with this Act, the regulations, the rules of the Tribunal or any relevant provision of the enactment under which the Tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings, or (iii) asking for an adjournment as a result of a failure referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii), or (iv) causing an adjournment, or (v) attempting to deceive another party or the Tribunal, or (vi) vexatiously conducting the proceedings, (b) whether a party has been responsible for prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceedings, (c) the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties, including whether a party has made a claim that has no tenable basis in fact or law, (d) the nature and complexity of the proceedings, (e) any other matter that the Tribunal considers relevant. (2) The Tribunal may: (a) determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid, and (b) order costs to be assessed on a basis set out in Division 11 of Part 3.2 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 or on any other basis. (3) However, the Tribunal may not award costs in relation to proceedings for an original decision unless the enactment under which the Tribunal has jurisdiction to make the decision provides for the awarding of costs. (4) In this section, "costs" includes: (a) costs of or incidental to proceedings in the Tribunal, and (b) the costs of or incidental to the proceedings giving rise to the application, as well as the costs of or incidental to the application. 34The "fairness" test in s 88 came into effect on 1 January 2009. Before that, to depart from the general rule that each party pays their own costs, the Tribunal had to be satisfied that there were 'special circumstances warranting an award of costs'. Although that was the test in 2007 when the 22 May offer of settlement was made, the fairness test applies to this matter because it was commenced but not finally determined before 1 January 2009: ADT Act, Schedule 5, Part 11, Cl 43(2)(i). 35In a 2010 decision, after re-iterating the general rule that each party pays their own costs, the Court of Appeal made the following comments about the scope of s 88: . . .Although an order varying the general rule may be made "only if" the relevant criterion is satisfied in a particular way, there is a relatively low hurdle for an applicant seeking an order. The criterion of "fairness" will take into account the compensatory purpose of an award of costs, which will generally favour the successful party. The circumstances in which fairness may be identified are indicated by the specific attributes listed in subs (1A), but subject to the generality of para (e), read in its context. Other considerations will no doubt include the nature of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which is invoked and the objects identified in s 3(b)-(g) of the Tribunal Act: AT v Commissioner of Police, NSW [2010] NSWCA 131 at [33]. 36The nature of the jurisdiction is important. The Tribunal has noted the "chilling effect" of too readily awarding costs against unsuccessful applicants in a jurisdiction which seeks to protect and promote the observance of fundamental human rights: Tu v University of Sydney (No 2) [2002] NSWADTAP 25 at [39]. 37The objectives of the ADT Act are also relevant. They include: (b) to ensure that the Tribunal is accessible, its proceedings are efficient and effective and its decisions are fair, (c) to enable proceedings before the Tribunal to be determined in an informal and expeditious manner... 38As the Appeal Panel said, in Tu v University of Sydney (No 2) [2002] NSWADTAP 25 at [47]: The equal opportunity jurisdiction like most of the other jurisdictions of the Tribunal is intended to function as a low-cost, relatively informal, expeditious forum for the resolution of disputes that involve deeply sensitive issues. For those goals to be achieved there must be active co-operation with the case management discipline of the Tribunal.
Unreasonable refusal to accept an offer of settlement 39The applicant relied on all the grounds for an award of costs set out in his written submissions dated 18 January 2010 and 15 February 2010. I will deal first with the ground that the respondents have unreasonably refused to accept an offer of settlement made on 22 May 2007. 40The fact that an offer of settlement has been unreasonably refused and the ultimate decision is more favourable to the person who made the offer, is not a factor listed in s 88 as relevant when determining whether it is fair to award costs. But the Tribunal may take into account any matter that it considers relevant: ADT Act, s 88(1A)(e). In costs applications in the Retail Leases Division the Tribunal has taken into account the fact that: (a) a successful party in proceedings has made an offer of compromise of the dispute before the conclusion of the proceedings; (b) the unsuccessful party has unreasonably rejected the offer; and (c) the terms of the offer were more favourable to the unsuccessful party than the orders made by the Tribunal: De Luca & Anor v Scuccimarra & Anor (No 2) [2007] NSWADT 245 (10 October 2007). 41Although the decision in De Luca & Anor v Scuccimarra & Anor (No 2) [2007] NSWADT 245 was made when the test for an award of costs was "special circumstances", this principle has also been taken into account in relation to the existing test of fairness in various divisions of the Tribunal including in the Equal Opportunity Division: Denmeade v Kempsey Shire Council & Ors (No.3) [2004] NSWADT 54; Lynch v Alan Hingston as trustee for the AP Family Trust trading as Grafton Sawmilling [2009] NSWADT 263; Jenkins v YMCA of Great Lakes Inc. t/as Great Lakes Aquatic & Leisure Centre [2008] NSWADT 335 at [28]; Hughes v Narrabri Bowling Motel Limited (No 2) [2012] NSWADT 260. 42In the Supreme Court and the Federal Court there is provision for the payment of indemnity, rather than party/party, costs where a so-called "Calderbank" type offer has been made: Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 ALL ER 333; Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corp (1996) 138 ALR 425; Assaf v Skalkos [2000] NSWSC 935; Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 602. While the principles followed in these cases come from a different legal and factual context they provide some guidance as to how this Tribunal should approach its task. In particular: 1)when determining whether the offer is 'reasonable' all the surrounding circumstances must be examined including whether the offer is genuine and realistic when it was made and the time given to respond: Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 602 at [14] - [17]; 2)to be reasonable, an offer should contain an element of compromise: Assaf v Skalkos [2000] NSWSC 935 at [61]; and 3)an offer of settlement which includes an apology does not have to correspond exactly with the findings of the ultimate decision maker, the question is whether the terms of the apology were, at the relevant time, reasonable: Assaf v Skalkos [2000] NSWSC 935 at [66] - [71].
22 May 2007 offer 43By letter dated 22 May 2007 the applicant's solicitor wrote to Mr Jones offering to settle the proceedings in the Tribunal by way of an "on air" and a written apology. I have reproduced the letter in full: Mr Alan Jones Harbour Radio Proprietary Ltd Macquarie Radio Network Ltd Level I, Building C 33 - 35 Saunders Street PYRMONT NSW 2009 Without Prejudice except as to costs Dear Mr Jones RE: KEYSAR TRAD We act for Keysar Trad in respect of the proceedings in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal ("ADT") in respect of file number 071036. At the present time, Keysar Trad is the complainant, and yourself and Harbour Radio Pty Limited are the respondents. The matter was listed for its first case conference in the ADT before Deputy President Anne Britton on 9 May 2007. There was no appearance by or for Harbour Radio Pty Ltd or by or for yourself or for any other person who might be involved in the matter, apart from Mr Trad. We appeared for and with Mr Trad. During the course of the conference the following directions were made; 1. The matter is listed for another case conference at 9:30 am on 2 July 2007. 2. The matter is listed for mediation at 10 am on 7 June 2007. 3. In the event that further parties are to be joined, an application for joinder of any additional parties as applicants/complainants or respondents be made by 22 June 2007 (10 days prior to next case conference). 4. We have leave to uplift the recordings at the tribunal and listen to them. As you are aware from your previous involvement in proceedings of this nature in the Equal Opportunity Tribunal, such proceedings can be lengthy, costly and complex. With this in mind and the likely or possible course that the proceedings might take in the ADT, we have been instructed by Mr Trad to make the following offer of settlement in this matter to you: 1. You apologise to Mr Trad in writing in the exact form attached under cover of the letterhead of Harbour Radio Pty Ltd and yourself within 14 days of acceptance of this offer. The letter must be personally signed by you and must be submitted to us for approval beforehand; and 2. You are to broadcast the attached apology in the exact form attached to the people of New South Wales on your morning show at 9:20 am within 14 days of the acceptance of this offer. The offer is open for acceptance by you for 14 days from the date of this letter. Whilst this timeframe may appear short to you, the complaint was made and investigated by the Anti-Discrimination Board ("ADB") over a period of time commencing in May 2005. There has been correspondence about the complaint from the ADB to Harbour Radio/Macquarie Radio without response. The correspondence about the complaint generated a substantial file at the ADB. For your information we enclose a copy of the letter of the ADB to Mr Trad of 21 March 2007 together with attachments, including the President's Report, as sent to our client so that you can properly consider the matter and this offer. In the event that the offer contained in this letter is accepted, then we can notify the ADT prior to the mediation, which is to take place on 7 June 2007. The ADT can then make appropriate orders by consent which provide for the apologies to be made, sent and broadcast by you. It is implicit in this offer that the time limit for acceptance be complied with. If the offer is accepted, and the apologies made, our client will not be seeking any costs. If the offer is not accepted, our client's position will change in that regard, and he and any other parties will seek costs and other remedies from the ADT as are available under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. Yours faithfully TURNER FREEMAN Per: Terence Goldberg Partner Enc 44The proposed content of the written apology was as follows: Dear Mr Trad On 28 April 2005 at 9.20 am, on my morning program, I broadcast comments about the Lebanese community, the Lebanese male community, and the Lebanese Muslim community. During the course of that program I broadcast remarks which vilified Lebanese males and Lebanese Muslims and which were designed to incite hatred towards, and serious contempt for Lebanese males and Lebanese Muslims. I recognise that the remarks made by me were unlawful and in breach of the racial vilification provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). I apologise to you and to the Lebanese people of New South Wales for those remarks. (Underlining added) It is unlawful for any person, including myself, by a public act, to incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of a person or a group of persons on the ground of their race. Yours sincerely Alan Jones 45The proposed form of the on-air apology was in identical terms except that it did not include the underlined words. The requested apologies related only to the Schedule A broadcast on 28 April 2005. 46Mr Jones did not reply to this offer within the14 day period. In fact, there is no evidence that either respondent replied in writing to the offer until two years later on 23 April 2009. During the intervening period, settlement negotiations had occurred. 47The applicant set out the history of his attempts to settle the complaint in a letter of 3 April 2009. In particular, the applicant's lawyer stated that: We note that the applicant would have resolved the matter by way of an apology only in 2005 and in 2007 before he had expended significant costs, and the respondents would not apologise as requested and still will not. 48On 23 April 2009, in response to that letter, the respondents wrote: We note your reference to the request for an apology made in a letter of 22 May 2007. While that letter (which was expressed to be without prejudice) did seek an apology, it did not indicate that your client would settle the matter "by way of an apology and nothing more" as asserted in your letter of 3 April 2009. On the contrary, your letter of 22 May 2007 required Mr Jones to sign a letter (on the Harbour Radio's headed paper) and to make an on-air statement, both of which had to be in the express terms of the "apology" appended to that letter. That "apology" required Mr Jones to expressly admit that he had racially vilified Lebanese males and Lebanese Muslims . . . and to admit that the remarks broadcast during his programme were "designed to incite hatred towards, and serious contempt for Lebanese males and Lebanese Muslims. . . . In the circumstances, and given our client's position that no racial vilification had occurred, it is not surprising that Mr Jones was not prepared to make a statement that was tantamount to a full admission of guilt (as distinct from a genuine apology). Further we note that the letter of 22 May 2007 was only sent to Mr Jones and not to Harbour Radio. 49The applicant submitted that the respondents' rejection of the offer was unreasonable at the time and the terms of the offer were more favourable to the respondents than the orders ultimately made by the Tribunal.
Was rejection of the offer unreasonable at the time? 50The points about the unreasonableness of the offer made in the respondents' 23 April 2009 letter were supplemented by oral submissions. In summary, the respondents submitted that it was not unreasonable for them to have rejected the offer because: 1)the offer did not indicate that nothing more than an apology was required - the 'apology' was in fact a full admission of guilt rather than a genuine apology; 2)the offer was only directed to Mr Jones, not to the second respondent, Harbour Radio Pty Ltd; 3)the respondents cannot have unreasonably rejected a settlement offer prior to the filing of Points of Claim on 9 August 2007 because that is when the complaint 'crystallised'; 4)there were lengthy negotiations prior to the hearing and the respondents made genuine attempts to settle the matter; and 5)the Schedule A broadcast had nothing to do with Mr Trad. 51Firstly, the respondents disagreed with Mr Trad that what he proposed was an apology. It was said to be a full admission of guilt in circumstances where liability was denied. 52If the Tribunal finds a complaint substantiated, it may do various things including: order the respondent to publish an apology or a retraction (or both) in respect of the matter the subject of the complaint and, as part of the order, give directions concerning the time, form, extent and manner of publication of the apology or retraction (or both): AD Act, s 108(2)(d). 53Under this provision the Tribunal has ordered a respondent to apologise in terms which include an admission of liability: Sunol v Collier (EOD) [2006] NSWADTAP 51; Burns v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd & Ors (No2) [2005] NSWADT 24 (16 February 2005).) A similar order was ultimately made in these proceedings. In defamation proceedings in the Supreme Court, an order for indemnity costs was made where the defendants unreasonably refused an offer that they publish an apology which included an acknowledgement that the defendants had "seriously defamed" the plaintiff: Assaf v Skaldos [2000] NSWSC 935. 54The respondents' second point was that the offer was directed only to Mr Jones. There was no separate letter to the second respondent. The respondents submitted that even if Mr Jones had accepted the offer, the proceedings would not have concluded against Harbour Radio Pty Ltd. According to the respondents, there is nothing in the letter which indicates that the applicant would have withdrawn his complaint against both respondents. 55While it would have been prudent for Mr Trad's lawyer to write separately to the second respondent, I am satisfied that Mr Trad's intention was to make the offer to both respondents in the letter to Mr Jones and for its acceptance to mean that the entire complaint was at an end. Support for that finding comes from the following facts: (a)the complaint was addressed to Mr Jones at Harbour Radio's address in Pyrmont; (b)the letter acknowledges that the two respondents are Mr Jones and Harbour Radio Pty Limited; (c)attached to the letter is a copy of the President's Report naming both Mr Jones and Harbour Radio Pty Ltd as respondents; and (d)the written apology from Mr Jones was to be on Harbour Radio Pty Ltd's letterhead but otherwise there was no requirement for Harbour Radio Pty Ltd to take any action. 56Thirdly, the respondents submitted that they did not unreasonably reject the settlement offer at that time because the complaint did not crystallise until the filing of Points of Claim on 9 August 2007. 57The President of the Anti-Discrimination Board referred the complaint to the Tribunal on 29 April 2007. That referral is taken to be an application for an original decision within the meaning of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act: Anti-Discrimination Act, s 95(3). An applicant is only directed to file Points Claim where he or she is legally represented and/or the complaint is complex: Equal Opportunity Division Guideline at 5.7. The Points of Claim must be consistent with the complaint as referred by the President. The Respondent unsuccessfully applied to have the scope of the complaint confined to three incidents identified by Mr Trad in his written complaint to the ADB. The Tribunal found that the Points of Claim as filed did not extend the scope of the complaint as originally referred by the President: Trad v Jones & Anor [2008] NSWADT 272 at [29] and [30]. 58It was not reasonable for the respondents to impliedly reject the offer because Points of Claim had not been filed. The scope of the complaint was apparent from the President's Report. 59Fourthly, the respondents submitted that there were lengthy negotiations prior to the hearing and the respondents made genuine attempts to settle the matter. In fact, one of the respondents' grounds for seeking costs was that they had made a settlement offer on 30 April 2008 which the applicant unreasonably rejected. 60While I accept that the respondents genuinely attempted to resolve the complaint those negotiations are not relevant to the question of whether, at the time the offer was made in May 2007, it was reasonable for the respondents to reject it. 61Finally, the respondents submitted that Mr Trad was not one of the "car hoons" to whom Mr Jones was referring in the Schedule A broadcast and he did not have any personal involvement with this incident. I accept that Mr Trad was not one of the people involved in the Hickson Road incident referred to in Schedule A. One of the terms of settlement was that Mr Jones apologise in writing to him. While that is not a remedy that the Tribunal ultimately ordered, it was not so unreasonably as to justify the respondents rejecting the offer. Mr Trad was born in Lebanon and now lives in Sydney with his family. He has standing to make the complaint and the Tribunal could have made an order that the respondents apologise to him personally. 62There are several other matters not raised by the respondents which are relevant to the reasonableness of the rejection. 63Firstly, the offer contained a significant element of compromise because it did not include any terms relating to the payment of damages or the future conduct of the respondents. 64Secondly, the 14 day period given to respond was reasonable in the circumstances. The respondents had not responded within time to the President's letter seeking an answer to the complaint nor had they attended the first case conference before the Tribunal. 65Thirdly, in relation to the timing of the offer, it was made very early in the proceedings before the Tribunal but long after the complaint had been made. The offer was made prior to the parties incurring any significant costs.
Were the terms of the offer more favourable to the respondents than the orders ultimately made by the Tribunal? 66Not only did the Tribunal order an "on air" apology, it ordered the respondents to pay damages of $10,000 and to develop and implement a program or policy aimed at eliminating unlawful discrimination. Despite these additional remedies, the respondents submitted that the terms of the offer were less favourable than the orders made by the Tribunal. The basis for that submission was that: 1)the on-air apology ordered by the Tribunal was not in similar terms to that proposed by the applicant in 2007; 2)the Tribunal did not order that the respondents should apologise in writing to Mr Trad personally; and 3)the apology ordered by the Tribunal was confined to the "Hickson Road" incident. 67At the hearing in relation to the details of the apology, the applicant put forward a very similar version of the apology to that which was proposed in the 22 May 2007 offer of settlement. The terms of the order that the Tribunal ultimately made about the on-air apology were that: Mr Alan Jones read the following apology on air between 8.00 and 8.30 am on any day during the week commencing 17 December 2012: On 28 April 2005 on my breakfast program on Radio 2GB I broadcast comments about Lebanese males including Lebanese Muslims. The comments were made following a Channel Nine television current affairs show about the conduct of young Lebanese men in Hickson Road at the Rocks. The Administrative Decisions Tribunal has found that my comments incited serious contempt of Lebanese males including Lebanese Muslims. Those comments were in breach of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act. I apologise for making those comments which I recognise were unlawful. I also apologise on behalf of Radio 2 GB." 68This version contained the same elements as Mr Trad's version - some background information, an acknowledgement that the comments were unlawful and an apology. One insignificant difference between the apology offered by the applicant and that ordered by the Tribunal was that the latter included an extra sentence describing and further identifying the background to the events. That sentence mentioned the "Hickson Road" incident which was the scene of the conduct on which Mr Jones had commented. 69The Tribunal also ordered Mr Jones to apologise on behalf of Radio 2 GB. Unlike the May 2007 offer, the Tribunal did not order Mr Jones to apologise personally to Mr Trad. It accepted the respondents' submission that he was not vilified personally by the broadcast in Schedule A: Trad v Jones (No 4) [2012] NSWADT 265 at [5]. Despite that finding, the Tribunal had the power to order the respondents to apologise personally to Mr Trad. The absence of such an order does not make the Tribunal's orders as a whole less favourable than the offer. 70As with Mr Trad's 22 May offer, the apology related to the Schedule A broadcast only.
Is it fair to award costs? 71The unreasonable rejection of a Calderbank type offer will not necessarily make it fair to award costs, but it does in this case. The Equal Opportunity Division is a jurisdiction which, through the resolution of complaints under the Anti-Discrimination Act, seeks to protect and promote the observance of fundamental human rights. Freedom from racial vilification is one such right. Alan Jones knows that his comments are broadcast to a large audience and that racial vilification is unlawful. An object of the ADT Act is to enable proceedings to be determined informally and expeditiously. That cannot happen if Mr Jones and Harbour Radio Pty Ltd do not respond to a reasonable offer of settlement. 72It is fair for the respondents to pay the applicant's costs from 6 June 2007, the date the offer of settlement expired. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider any other basis on which the applicant or the respondent sought costs.
Amount of costs 73The Tribunal's Costs Guideline (re-issued on 30 April 2010) encourages parties to file and serve a precise statement of the amount of costs actually sought and its components. If that is done, further costs of assessing the costs can be avoided. The applicant filed such a document at the hearing. The costs were estimated to be $180,946.17. That estimate comprised disbursements and expenses, including counsel's fees, as well as solicitor's costs. The respondents submitted that it was difficult for them to comment on the estimate because they do not know when the costs were incurred. The respondents went on to say that if the Tribunal is minded to order costs, additional details of the applicant's costs should be provided to the Tribunal. 74Given those circumstances, and to avoid the costs of any further submissions, it is appropriate in this case to order that the respondents pay the applicant's costs as agreed or assessed.
Orders The respondents are to pay the applicant's costs from 6 June 2007 as agreed or assessed. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 05 June 2013
Trad
Jones
The respondents are to pay the applicant's costs from 6 June 2007 as agreed or assessed.