Torrens v NSW Aboriginal Consultative Group

Dutt v Central Coast Area Health Service [2002] NSWADT 133

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125

IW v The City of Perth [1997] HCA 30; (1997) 191 CLR 1

Keene v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2011] NSWADT 59

Langley v Niland [1981] 2 NSWLR 104 at 107

Margan v University of Technology, Sydney (EOD) [2003] NSWADTAP 65

McDonald v Central Coast Community Legal Centre [2008] NSWADT 96

Munt v Workers Compensation Independent Review Officer [2020] NSWCATAD 156

Nicholls and Nicholls v Director General, Department of Education and Training (No 2) [2009] NSWADTAP 20

Razaghi v Director-General, NSW Department of Health & Anor [2002] NSWADT 4

Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice v Tebb [2020] NSWCATAP 179

Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness [2000] NSWCA 29; (2000) 49 NSWLR 262

Seventh-Day Adventist Church (North NSW Conference) Limited v Seupule-Feau [2016] NSWCATAP 256

Spence v Roberts (No 2) [2006] NSWADT 361

Stanborough v Woolworths Ltd [2005] NSWADT 203

Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57; (1993) 177 CLR 598

Wecker v The Delegate (the decision maker) to the President of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board [2014] NSWCA 372

NSW Aboriginal Consultative Group (AECG) Inc (Respondent)

1. This is an application by the respondent, NSW Aboriginal Consultative Group (AECG) Inc, to summarily dismiss a discrimination complaint brought by the applicant, Ms Torrens.
2. Ms Torrens made a complaint to the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board (the President) alleging discrimination on the grounds of her race, sex and disability, in the provision of goods and services by the respondent (the complaint).
3. The complaint was referred to the Tribunal on 17 September 2025.
4. The respondent has made an application under s 102 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (the Act) that the complaint be dismissed on the grounds that:

(1) it is frivolous vexatious, misconceived and/or lacking in substance;

(2) the conduct alleged in the substantive proceedings, even if proven, would not disclose a contravention of a provision of the Act.

1. For the following reasons I have decided to dismiss the whole of the complaint under s 102 of the Act.

Statutory framework - Tribunal's power to dismiss a complaint

1. Section 102 of the Act provides that the Tribunal may, at any stage in proceedings relating to a complaint, dismiss the whole or any part of the complaint on a ground on which the President may decline the whole or any part of a complaint under section 92(1)(a)(i) or (ii) or (b). The relevant provisions of s 92 state:

(1) If at any stage of the President's investigation of a complaint -

(i) the complaint, or part of the complaint, is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance, or

(ii) the conduct alleged, or part of the conduct alleged, if proven, would not disclose the contravention of a provision of this Act or the regulations,

(b) the President is satisfied that for any other reason no further action should be taken in respect of the complaint, or part of the complaint,

the President may, by notice in writing addressed to the complainant, decline the complaint or part of the complaint.

1. The respondent must meet a high threshold in order for the proceedings to be summarily dismissed, rather than proceed to final hearing and be determined on the merits. The discretion to dismiss a claim prior to hearing its merits must be exercised with exceptional caution. In circumstances where there may be substance to an applicant's allegations which if accepted would ground a finding that discrimination has occurred, no strike out of the complaint should be contemplated: Seventh-Day Adventist Church (North NSW Conference) Limited v Seupule-Feau [2016] NSWCATAP 256 at [22] - [24]; Margan v University of Technology, Sydney (EOD) [2003] NSWADTAP 65 at [11]; Webster v Lampard [1993] HCA 57; (1993) 177 CLR 598 at [20].
2. A complaint or part of a complaint can be dismissed if it is 'so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed.' General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130, [10] per Barwick CJ.
3. The onus of proving that a complaint ought to be summarily dismissed lies on the person seeking such an order: Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice v Tebb [2020] NSWCATAP 179 at [53].
4. The term "misconceived" has been construed as including a misunderstanding of legal principle, and the term "lacking in substance" has been construed as encompassing an untenable proposition of fact or law: Keene v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2011] NSWADT 59 at [14], McDonald v Central Coast Community Legal Centre [2008] NSWADT 96 at [22]; Stanborough v Woolworths Ltd [2005] NSWADT 203 at [50].
5. A complaint can be lacking in substance if it can be demonstrated that there exists no factual basis for the allegations or that the complaint is not reasonably arguable: Langley v Niland [1981] 2 NSWLR 104 at 107; Chalker v Murrays Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCATAD 282 at [22].
6. In a dismissal application, the applicant's case is taken at its highest to enable the Tribunal to determine whether it reveals an arguable case to which the respondent should answer: Burns v Sunol [2015] NSWCATAD 178 at [8] citing Alchin v Rail Corporation NSW [2012] NSWADT 142 at [19]-[26]; and Razaghi v Director-General, NSW Department of Health & Anor [2002] NSWADT 4 at [38].

1. The President's delegate accepted the complaint for investigation pursuant to s 89B of the Act, for conduct and events alleged to have occurred from 18 June 2024 to 1 July 2025 (the complaint period).
2. The President declined any complaints in respect of the period prior to 18 June 2024.
3. The President also declined complaints against a former employee of the respondent (Mr Gordon) on the ground that his actions are "covered by" s 53 of the Act (which makes the respondent vicariously responsible for conduct of its agents and employees), and because the allegations occurred more than twelve months prior to the lodgement of the complaint.
4. The President's delegate formed the opinion that the nature of the complaint is such that it should be referred to the Tribunal pursuant of s 93C(c) of the Act. This was said to be in light of submissions made by the applicant about: the scope of the Act; the administration of the Act by the Anti-Discrimination Board; and the Board's obligations under UN treaties.
5. The complaint which is before the Tribunal is the complaint as referred by the President. I note that the Tribunal does not have power to review the initial decision made by the President to decline part of the complaint: s 89B(4) of the Act; Wecker v The Delegate (the decision maker) to the President of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board [2014] NSWCA 372.
6. Ms Torrens provided a number of documents to the President which, together with the completed complaint form and documents provided by the respondent, form part of the President's report to the Tribunal. Ms Torrens has also provided further documents to the Tribunal since the referral of the complaint. These include:

(1) written submissions in response to the application for summary dismissal;

(2) a statement of Ms Torrens dated 29 September 2025;

(3) a statement of Ms Torrens dated 17 September 2025;

(4) a statement of Ms Torrens' carer, Mr Kevin Gray, dated 17 September 2025;

(5) a letter from Ms Torrens' medical practitioner dated 10 November 2025;

(6) various other documents labelled "Exhibits A to W"; and

(7) a further bundle of documents comprising copies of many of the documents labelled Exhibits A to W.

1. Ms Torrens says the unlawful discrimination was on the ground of her race, sex and disability. There is no dispute that Ms Torrens' race is Aboriginal and that her sex is female. She says her disability is psychological and that she suffers from agoraphobia and other mental health issues.
2. Ms Torrens alleges in summary that the respondent discriminated against her in relation to Aboriginal language learning pathways, specifically at premises of the respondent known as the "Bandjalung Language and Culture Nest" in Northern New South Wales.
3. The relevant facts are as follows.
4. In February 2021 Ms Torrens attended the respondent's Bundjalung Language and Culture Nest with her carer, Mr Gray, to meet with an employee of the respondent, Mr Gordon. She asserts that Mr Gordon's conduct towards her during that meeting caused her to feel "humiliated and culturally unsafe, particularly given my disability and need for support". She subsequently made a complaint to the respondent about Mr Gordon's conduct. She also lodged complaints with other organisations including NSW Police and the NSW Ombudsman.
5. On 15 June 2021 the respondent's then president, Ms Trindall, responded to Ms Torrens about her complaint.
6. On 4 June 2024 Ms Torrens reached out again to the respondent. She sent an email to Ms Trindall thanking her for her efforts to resolve the complaint about Mr Gordon. The email went on to say "Unfortunately, due to [Mr Gordon's] treatment towards me, I have not been able to attend any language classes through the AECG. I have been deprived of learning language, which is part of my culture. This amounts to cultural genocide for me and my larger family." In that email Ms Torrens demanded a letter from Mr Gordon.
7. By that time neither Mr Gordon nor Ms Trindall were in the employ of the respondent. The respondent's new president, Mr Ingrey, responded to Ms Torrens on 18 June 2024 (the first day of the complaint period), noting that Mr Gordon and Ms Trindall no longer worked for the respondent and that the respondent had "no power to direct either of them to do anything". The email stated: "I am unsure what steps NSW AECG can undertake to resolve the matter that fulfils your expectations" and invited Ms Torrens to share her thoughts on "possible next steps". There followed an exchange of correspondence between Mr Ingrey and Ms Torrens and also between Ms Torrens and another employee of the respondent - Mr Walker. That correspondence centred on Ms Torrens' suggestions about how the respondent could assist her with her desire to learn her language.
8. For example, in an email sent dated 18 June 2024 Ms Torrens said "To answer your question with respect to my thoughts on what steps to take next, I ask that you support and help me to connect with and participate in the local cultural and language nest. If there is no longer any language nest in Lismore, then I would strongly suggest that a new one established [sic] which allows individuals such as myself, to attend during the day to access audio recordings that are related to my people's ... language within the Bundjalung Nation. I need a safe space to learn my languages ... Even if it is me going in every day to listen to audio recordings then I would be happy with that."
9. Ms Torrens also suggested in that email that the respondent "contact and approach a genuine Elder from Bundjalung, someone like Harry Walker ... a well respected Elder throughout Bundjalung Nation ... I would feel safe and know that I have a good teacher who leads with his heart and not with ego".
10. Mr Ingrey responded saying "I think that is something we can assist you with ... I think your suggestion of getting someone of the standing like Uncle Harry Walker would be beneficial to community and would like to explore that further". He indicated that another employee of the respondent - Mr Terry Walker - would be in touch with Ms Torrens.
11. In an email to Mr Ingrey on the same date Ms Torrens stated: "As I have no transport would Terry be open to conducting lessons via zoom or other similar platform".
12. On 19 June Mr Terry Walker wrote to the applicant indicating that he would give her a call the next day.
13. On 20 June 2024 Mr Ingrey wrote to Ms Torrens to inform her that "the office" has been closed for a number of weeks due to a tree falling on the building and that this had resulted in the electricity being turned off and phones not working. The email concluded that Mr Walker would remain in contact "to keep you informed of opportunities for learning Bundjalung".
14. On 20 June 2024 Ms Torrens wrote to Mr Ingrey to inform him that she had received a call from Mr Walker but that it had been cut short and "as a result I was not given any information on how to access language material".
15. On 25 June 2024 Ms Torrens wrote to Mr Ingrey again regarding her disappointment that Terry hadn't called her back, and asking Mr Ingrey to be "more proactive in connecting me to language classes". The email also stated "I understand that Bundjalung language nest was destroyed, however this shouldn't prevent individuals accessing language material via platform such as Zoom or Skpe. That's one of benefits of Technology and these platforms offers [sic] both educators and students alike, they allow us to engage in distant learning".
16. Mr Ingrey responded the next day saying that the respondent did not at that time offer online learning courses.
17. On 1 July 2025 Ms Torrens lodged her complaint with the President.
18. Ms Torrens' has not clearly articulated how the respondent unlawfully discriminated against her under the Act. She alleges:

(1) The respondent did not respond in a timely or appropriate way to her complaint about Mr Gordon;

(2) The respondent has not provided Ms Torrens with a "culturally safe pathway back into learning";

(3) The respondent failed to accommodate Ms Torrens' "disability/transport limits by implementing the proposed Zoom arrangement";

(4) The respondent caused "unreasonable delay and failure to provide services after acknowledging my requests".

(5) The respondent caused "ongoing cultural exclusion and detriment".

Is the complaint misconceived or lacking in substance?

1. In order to prove discrimination on the ground of race, sex or disability in the provision of goods or services, Ms Torrens would need to establish:

(1) that the respondent provides the relevant goods or services; and

(2) that the respondent discriminated against her on the ground of her sex, race or disability by refusing to provide her with those goods or services, or in the terms on which it provided her with those goods or services: ss 19, 33 and 49M.

1. In the context of alleged discrimination under the similarly worded s 66K(1) of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) Brennan CJ and McHugh J said in IW v The City of Perth [1997] HCA 30; (1997) 191 CLR 1 at 16-17:

"In determining whether a person has refused to provide a service within the meaning of the Act, it is necessary to identify with precision what service has allegedly been refused to that person and what service or services the alleged discriminator provides."

1. To establish unlawful discrimination, Ms Torrens would need to establish either of the following:

(1) That she was treated less favourably than others in the same or similar position (sometimes referred to as "differential treatment") and that at least one of the reasons she was treated less favourably was "on the grounds of" her race, sex or disability (sometimes referred to as "the causation question"). This is commonly referred to as "direct discrimination".

(2) That the respondent imposed a requirement or condition with which she was unable to comply, and with which a substantially higher proportion of persons not of Ms Torrens race or gender, or who don't have her disability, are able to comply, being a requirement which is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case. This is commonly referred to as "indirect discrimination".

1. The respondent is a not-for-profit organisation that is funded to create and provide services to students in public schools in New South Wales, one being Aboriginal language programs. It delivers Aboriginal language to students through the "Aboriginal Language and Culture Nests" program, including the Bandjalung Language and Culture Nest in the Lismore and Northern Rivers area.
2. The respondent says that it is not funded to provide Aboriginal language programs or services to adults, and that this is not a service it provides to any adult. It says that is the role of TAFE NSW which is funded to deliver certified Aboriginal language courses for school leavers and adults across New South Wales.
3. The respondent makes a number of submissions as to why the complaint should be struck out. It is not necessary to repeat them all here. It says that it responded to the complaint about Mr Gordon and that Ms Torrens has not identified how it discriminated against her in connection with the complaint. Its primary contention is that none of Ms Torrens' other allegations fall within any good or service that the respondent has, or has had, funding to provide, and that at all times during the complaint period the respondent itself did not offer enrolment and/or any other form of engagement in language classes at the Bundjalung Language Nest for adults.
4. Ms Torrens submits, in summary:

(1) Her complaint concerns specific events, involving identified individuals, relating to her exclusion from Aboriginal language and cultural programs There is no basis to characterise her complaint as frivolous or vexatious.

(2) She alleges conduct capable of constituting unlawful discrimination on the grounds of race, sex and disability, including a failure to make reasonable adjustments. If her evidence is accepted the conduct she describes falls plainly within the scope of the Act. The respondent has not shown that her complaint is incapable of establishing a breach of the Act.

(3) The respondent's application relies on explanations and assertions about why Ms Torrens was excluded and how access to its programs was managed. Ms Torrens does not agree with those explanations. Resolving those matters would require the Tribunal to make findings of fact and assess the evidence of both parties.

(4) Ms Torrens is in the process of seeking important information from the NSW Department of Education under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW). That information is directly relevant to matters relied upon by the respondent in support of its dismissal application and it would be unfair to dismiss the complaint before the applicant has had a reasonable opportunity to obtain and rely on that material.

(5) The respondent's contention that the Tribunal should consider only events occurring from 18 June 2024 onwards "improperly excludes earlier conduct involving race discrimination, sex discrimination and racial vilification that was accepted by the Anti-Discrimination Board and referred to the Tribunal". The earlier conduct "forms part of the same factual and legal context and is directly relevant to understanding the nature and continuation of the alleged discriminatory treatment." Whether the conduct constitutes "separate incidents or a continuing course of discrimination depends on evidence and factual findings and cannot be determined on a summary basis".

(6) She has provided medical evidence confirming disability and the need for adjustments.

(7) The respondent is a peak Aboriginal body with influence over access to cultural and language programs. The issues raised have broader implications for cultural access, treatment of Aboriginal women, and inclusion of people with disability within Aboriginal institutions. Dismissing the proceedings without a hearing would risk undermining confidence in the Tribunal's role in ensuring access to justice, particularly for self-represented applicants.

1. Ms Torrens says that the respondent did not respond to a complaint about its employee, Mr Gordon, in a timely or appropriate manner. Although not clearly expressed, as I understand this part of her complaint, Ms Torrens alleges that the respondent discriminated against her by refusing to provide a complaint handling service, or in the terms on which that service was provided.
2. For the purposes of this application for summary dismissal I will accept that the respondent provides a complaint handling service.
3. The materials demonstrate that the respondent responded to, and attempted to address, Ms Torrens' complaint about Mr Gordon. In this regard the respondent's former president, Ms Trindall, wrote to Ms Torrens on 15 June 2021, setting out the steps that the respondent had taken in relation to the complaint about Mr Gordon, and assuring Ms Torrens that her allegations have been "investigated and addressed with the person in question".
4. Ms Torrens subsequently wrote to Ms Trindall on 4 June 2024, stating "I am contacting you to first acknowledge your efforts made to resolve the complaint regarding Roy Gordon from the Language and Cultural Nest in Lismore". That email goes on to press for the respondent to direct Mr Gordon to provide her with a written apology and statement.
5. As discussed above, by that time neither Mr Gordon nor Ms Trindall were in the employ of the respondent. The respondent's new president, Mr Ingrey, responded to Ms Torrens on 18 June 2024 (the first day of the complaint period), noting that Mr Gordon and Ms Trindall no longer worked for the respondent and that the respondent had "no power to direct either of them to do anything". The email stated that Mr Ingrey was unsure as to what steps the respondent could undertake to resolve the matter and invited Ms Torrens to share her thoughts on "possible next steps". There followed an exchange of correspondence between Mr Ingrey and Ms Torrens and also between Ms Torrens and Mr Walker about next steps. As discussed above, that correspondence centred on Ms Torrens' desire to learn her language rather than on her complaint about Mr Gordon.
6. Ms Torrens is not satisfied about the way in which the respondent dealt with her complaint about Mr Gordon, including because it did not obtain an apology directly from Mr Gordon and because of the timing of the respondent's replies to her. However, the scope of ss 19, 33 and 49M is limited. Those provisions prohibit discrimination by refusing to provide the relevant good or service, or in the terms on which the good or service is provided. They do not allow a complaint of discrimination to be brought in relation to the manner in which goods or services are provided. "Terms" are the conditions on which the service is or will be performed; they are not part of the manner of actual performance: Spence v Roberts (No 2) [2006] NSWADT 361 at [58-60]; Munt v Workers Compensation Independent Review Officer [2020] NSWCATAD 156 at [28-30].
7. Ms Torrens' materials do not disclose a refusal by the respondent to provide a complaint handling service to Ms Torrens during the complaint period (or at all), nor do they disclose that the respondent discriminated against Ms Torrens in the terms on which that service was provided to her.
8. I would add that even if Ms Torrens could show differential treatment in the provision of the respondent's complaint handling service, there is simply no evidence that such treatment was "on the grounds of" Ms Torrens' race, sex or disability. The words "on the grounds of" have been paraphrased as "because of", "due to," "a real" reason, a "genuine" reason or "true reason" for the treatment alleged to have been discriminatory: Nicholls and Nicholls v Director General, Department of Education and Training (No 2) [2009] NSWADTAP 20 at [28]. In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination on the ground of race, sex or disability, a causal link between a relevant attribute of Ms Torrens and the alleged treatment would have to be established by inference from the available facts. Any such inference must be logical and reasonable and must show that a connection is probable: Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness [2000] NSWCA 29; (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; Dutt v Central Coast Area Health Service [2002] NSWADT 133 at [70].
9. Ms Torrens has not explained the basis on which such an inference could be made. Having considered all the materials, there does not appear to be any logical basis for making an inference that the respondent's handling of Ms Torrens' complaint about Mr Gordon was because of her gender or her Aboriginality, or because of a disability that Ms Torrens had or was thought to have. Any claim of direct discrimination would be speculative at best.
10. For these reasons, to the extent that Ms Torrens' complaint is one of direct discrimination in connection with the respondent's complaint handling service, it is lacking in substance.
11. Ms Torrens has not identified a requirement or condition that the respondent imposed on her in connection with its complaint handling service that a substantially higher proportion of persons not of her race or sex, or without her asserted disability, can comply with. Therefore, a complaint of indirect discrimination in connection with the respondent's complaint handling service also lacks substance.

1. To the extent that Ms Torrens' complaint is that the respondent discriminated against her by refusing to provide online educational services or transport services, or in the terms on which such services were provided, it is lacking in substance because there is no evidence that the respondent has ever provided such services to any person either during the complaint period, or at all.
2. Accordingly, neither a complaint of direct discrimination nor indirect discrimination on this basis could be substantiated.
3. As for other services which may be the subject of the complaint, as discussed, it is necessary to identify with precision what service or services the respondent provides, and what service or services have allegedly been refused to the complainant or provided on less favourable terms.
4. The onus is on Ms Torrens to identify such service or services. The problem for Ms Torrens is that she has not done so. Her evidence and submissions contain broad allegations about the respondent's alleged failure to help her access her desired educational pathways, and alleged shortcomings in the way in which the respondent handled her communications about those matters, but do not identify with any specificity any services which the respondent actually provides (or provided during the complaint period) and either refused to provide her, or provided to her on less favourable terms.
5. In the absence of any clearly identified service which the respondent provides, and which form the basis of her discrimination complaint, Ms Torrens' complaint cannot possibly succeed and is lacking in substance.
6. For completeness, I would add that even if Ms Torrens' complaint is understood as alleging that the relevant service provided by the respondent is adult language education services, and that the respondent discriminated against her by refusing to provide that service, or in the terms on which it was provided, her complaint is nonetheless lacking in substance. The respondent has provided evidence that it provides Aboriginal language services to children and that it is not funded to provide, and does not provide, language or cultural services to adults. Whilst I acknowledge that Ms Torrens and her witness Mr Gray say that they visited the respondent's Lismore premises in February 2021 and observed what they describe as a class attended by approximately four or five men, Ms Torrens' materials do not identify any adult language education service actually provided by the respondent to adults during the complaint period. For example, there is no evidence of the respondent having offered enrolment opportunities to adults, having advertised adult language services to the community, or having been engaged in the provision of language services to adults during the complaint period. Indeed, the correspondence between the respondent and Ms Torrens during the complaint period involved Ms Torrens attempting to engage with the respondent about her desired educational pathways, and about her suggestions for potential educational offerings, rather than about any language service actually being offered by the respondent to adults at that time.
7. If the respondent does not provide the service in question, an allegation of breach of ss 19, 33 and 49M cannot possibly be substantiated.
8. ​I also note that Ms Torrens says she was "unable" to attend the respondent's "Bundjalung Language Nest" premises due to Mr Gordon's treatment of her in 2021. She says this "created an unsafe and unstable cultural environment and denied me access to the Bundjalung Language Nest". Ms Torrens has not explained why Mr Gordon's treatment of her in 2021 prevented her from attending the respondent's premises during the complaint period, particularly as Mr Gordon was no longer an employee of the respondent at that time. More importantly, she has not explained how this alleged state of affairs amounted to a refusal by the respondent to provide any service to her, or involved less favourable treatment in the terms on which any service was provided to her.
9. As Ms Torrens has not identified any other service which was provided by the respondent and was refused to her or provided on less favourable terms, neither a claim of direct nor indirect discrimination can be substantiated.

1. Annexed to Ms Torrens' written submissions is a document entitled "Annexure A - Outstanding Investigation and Disclosure - Clarification". It explains that there are documents and materials which Ms Torrens says are relevant to her complaint but not yet in her possession: namely records held by the respondent which she has asked the respondent to produce to her, and records to which she has sought access under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) from the NSW Department of Education "relating to her discrimination complaint concerning the Lismore Language Nest". Ms Torrens submits in effect that it would be premature to dismiss the complaint as lacking in substance before she is in receipt of those materials.
2. I note in this regard that on 16 January 2026 the Tribunal refused a request by the applicant for an extension of time for the filing of evidence relating to the summary dismissal application. The Tribunal noted that no direction had been made for the exchange of evidence relating to the summary dismissal application and that "the applicant's case will be taken at its highest."
3. Although I accept that Ms Torrens is in the process of seeking records from the respondent and from the Department of Education, she has not explained, and it is not apparent, how the records she seeks might resolve any of the issues I have identified as to why Ms Torrens' claim, taken at its highest, is lacking in substance.
4. Accordingly, I do not agree that it would be premature to dismiss the proceedings at this time (noting that s 102 permits the Tribunal to dismiss a complaint "at any stage" in proceedings relating to the complaint).

1. For all of these reasons I have concluded that Ms Torrens' complaint is lacking in substance.
2. In such circumstances, allowing the complaint to proceed in the Tribunal would be futile. It would also be contrary to the Tribunal's guiding principle set out in s 36 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), which is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.
3. Accordingly, I am exercising my discretion to dismiss the complaint and am making the following order:

(1) The complaint is dismissed under s 102 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW).

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.