[2024] WASC 396
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of WA
2024-10-17
Strk J
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) the respondent be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care or treatment;
(b) alternatively, that the respondent be subject to conditions when not in custody,
on the basis that he was a serious danger to the community, in that there was an unacceptable risk that, if one of those orders were not made, the respondent would commit a serious sexual offence.[1] The respondent was then 21 years old.
(1) This section applies if an offender who is subject to a supervision order is before the Supreme Court and proceedings on an application made under section 53 in respect of the offender are pending (the pending proceedings).
(2) The court may at any time in the pending proceedings -
(a) if the offender is detained in custody, order the offender to be released, subject to subsection (3); or
(b) if the offender is not detained in custody, order the offender to be detained in custody.
(3) The court cannot order the offender to be released unless it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that -
(a) releasing the offender is justified by exceptional circumstances; and
(b) the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the supervision order, including any amendments to the standard conditions made under subsection (7)(b).
(4) The onus of proof as to the matter described in subsection (3)(b) is on the offender.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (3), in considering whether releasing the offender is justified by exceptional circumstances the court may, as it thinks fit, receive and take into account information put before it, whether or not that information would normally be admissible in a court of law.
(6) In making a decision under subsections (2) and (3), the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure adequate protection of the community.
(7) If the court releases the offender -
(a) the offender remains subject to the supervision order; and
(b) the court may, before the pending proceedings are determined, make an interim order amending the supervision order to include any requirements the court considers appropriate to ensure adequate protection of the community; and
(c) the court may order the offender to reappear before the court at any adjourned hearing of the pending proceedings; and
(d) if it is alleged that the offender has further breached the supervision order or breached an order made under paragraph (c), the court may issue a warrant to have the offender arrested and brought before the court.
Prima facie, in my view, 'detained in custody', within the meaning of s 56, means detained pursuant to the provisions of the Act. Section 56(2)(a) cannot be construed as providing this Court with a general dispensing power to release persons who are otherwise in custody, either as sentenced prisoners or on remand for other offences. In the context of pt 4 div 5 of the Act, in my view, the expression 'detained in custody' would ordinarily apply to a person who is in custody as a consequence of having been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued under s 51 of the Act in relation to a suspected or anticipated contravention of a supervision order. An order of the Court would be necessary to 'release' such a person from custody, and so s 56(2)(a) would apply - including the requirements of s 56(3).
Similarly, a person detained pursuant to an order of the Court made under s 53(2)(b) of the Act would be 'detained in custody' within the meaning of s 56(2)(a).
A supervision order in relation to an offender must require that the offender -
(a) report to a community corrections officer at the place, and within the time, stated in the order and advise the officer of the offender's current name and address; and
(b) report to, and receive visits from, a community corrections officer as directed by the court; and
(c) notify a community corrections officer of every change of the offender's name, place of residence or place of employment at least 2 days before the change happens; and
(d) be under the supervision of a community corrections officer and comply with any reasonable direction of the officer (including a direction for the purposes of section 31 or 32); and
(e) not leave, or stay out of, the State of Western Australia without the permission of a community corrections officer; and
(f) not commit a serious offence during the period of the order; and
(g) be subject to electronic monitoring under section 31.
[T]he real issue is that which applies generally to an interim detention order (under s 46(2)(c)) or an interim supervision order under (s 58(2)(c)); namely, whether the Court is satisfied that, to ensure adequate protection of the community, it is desirable to make either an interim detention order or an interim supervision order. That is, in effect, the test that applies to the making of an interim supervision order generally.
This points up an important aspect of any consideration of alleged contraventions of an interim supervision order. Compliance with an interim supervision order (and, indeed, any supervision order) is an important matter, and the importance of such compliance should not be understated. Nevertheless, it must be recognised, having regard to the text and structure of the Act as a whole, that an interim supervision order is not an end in, and of, itself. An interim supervision order is a means to an end: the end being the protection of the community against the risk of serious offences.
In that sense, a supervision order or an interim supervision order will have served its purpose if it protects the community from serious offences, even if compliance with the conditions of the order, in the particular case, has not been perfect. The Court must always keep in mind that the object of the Act to be achieved is the adequate protection of the community from the commission of serious offences.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[1] As defined in s 4A of the Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act.
[2] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Warmdean [2019] WASC 6 (Fiannaca J).
[3] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 2] [2020] WASC 454 (Curthoys J).
[4] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 3] [2021] WASC 438 [14] ‑ [19], [76] and [278] (Derrick J).
[5] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 3] [308] (Derrick J).
[6] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 3] [283] - [304] (Derrick J).
[8] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 4] [11] (Strk J).
[9] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 4] [12] (Strk J).
[10] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 4] [78], [99] (Strk J).
[11] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 4] [111] (Strk J).
[12] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 4] [110] - [120] (Strk J).
[13] Reproduced in The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 4] [109] (Strk J).
[14] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 4] [26] (Strk J).
[15] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 4] [129] - [133] (Strk J).
[16] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187; (2008) 38 WAR 307 [62], which concerned an application under the now repealed Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act.
[17] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 4] [151] (Strk J).
[18] The State of Western Australia v Warmdean [No 4] [173] - [197], [199], sch A (Strk J).
[19] Affidavit of FM Allen affirmed 16 October 2024, annexures 'E', 'H', 'K', 'M', 'P', 'S' 'V', 'Y' and 'AC'.
[21] The State of Western Australia v Slater [No 2] [2021] WASC 465 [17], cited with approval in The State of Western Australia v MAR [No 4] [2023] WASC 271 [14].
[22] The State of Western Australia v Slater [No 2] [18], cited with approval in The State of Western Australia v MAR [No 4] [15].
[23] The State of Western Australia v CA [No 4] [2024] WASC 28 [19].
[24] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Hart [2019] WASC 4 [52].
[25] The State of Western Australia v CA [No 4] [22].
[26] High Risk Serious Offenders Act, 56(4).
[28] Psychiatric report of Dr G Wojnarowska dated 19 March 2023, par 78.
[29] The standard conditions of the supervision order set out in s 30(2) of the High Risk Serious Offenders Act includes being subject to electronic monitoring under s 31.
[30] Affidavit of R Stockton affirmed 8 October 2024, page 17, par 16 - 18; affidavit of BGD Moulton affirmed 14 October 2024, pages 8 - 10.
(2008) 38 WAR 307