[2023] WASC 271
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of WA
2023-07-21
Strk J
Original judgment source is linked above.
(This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 21 July 2023 and has been edited from the transcript.)
(a) an offender who is brought before the Supreme Court under a warrant issued under section 51(3) or 56(7)(d); and
(b) an offender who is charged with an offence under section 80(1).
(2) In relation to the offender, the State may apply for -
(a) an order under section 55; and
(b) an order for the offender to be detained in custody while proceedings on the application for an order under section 55 are pending.
(3) The application must state what order is sought under section 55.
(1) This section applies if an offender who is subject to a supervision order is before the Supreme Court and proceedings on an application made under section 53 in respect of the offender are pending (the pending proceedings).
(2) The court may at any time in the pending proceedings -
(a) if the offender is detained in custody, order the offender to be released, subject to subsection (3); or
(b) if the offender is not detained in custody, order the offender to be detained in custody.
(3) The court cannot order the offender to be released unless it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that -
(a) releasing the offender is justified by exceptional circumstances; and
(b) the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the supervision order, including any amendments to the standard conditions made under subsection (7)(b).
(4) The onus of proof as to the matter described in subsection (3)(b) is on the offender.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (3), in considering whether releasing the offender is justified by exceptional circumstances the court may, as it thinks fit, receive and take into account information put before it, whether or not that information would normally be admissible in a court of law.
(6) In making a decision under subsections (2) and (3), the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure adequate protection of the community.
(7) If the court releases the offender -
(a) the offender remains subject to the supervision order; and
(b) the court may, before the pending proceedings are determined, make an interim order amending the supervision order to include any requirements the court considers appropriate to ensure adequate protection of the community; and
(c) the court may order the offender to reappear before the court at any adjourned hearing of the pending proceedings; and
(d) if it is alleged that the offender has further breached the supervision order or breached an order made under paragraph (c), the court may issue a warrant to have the offender arrested and brought before the court.
Prima facie, in my view, 'detained in custody', within the meaning of s 56, means detained pursuant to the provisions of the Act. Section 56(2)(a) cannot be construed as providing this Court with a general dispensing power to release persons who are otherwise in custody, either as sentenced prisoners or on remand for other offences. In the context of pt 4 div 5 of the Act, in my view, the expression 'detained in custody' would ordinarily apply to a person who is in custody as a consequence of having been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued under s 51 of the Act in relation to a suspected or anticipated contravention of a supervision order. An order of the Court would be necessary to 'release' such a person from custody, and so s 56(2)(a) would apply - including the requirements of s 56(3).
Similarly, a person detained pursuant to an order of the Court made under s 53(2)(b) of the Act would be 'detained in custody' within the meaning of s 56(2)(a).
Rather, the real issue is that which applies generally to an interim detention order (under s 46(2)(c)) or an interim supervision order under (s 58(2)(c)); namely, whether the Court is satisfied that, to ensure adequate protection of the community, it is desirable to make either an interim detention order or an interim supervision order. That is, in effect, the test that applies to the making of an interim supervision order generally.
This points up an important aspect of any consideration of alleged contraventions of an interim supervision order. Compliance with an interim supervision order (and, indeed, any supervision order) is an important matter, and the importance of such compliance should not be understated. Nevertheless, it must be recognised, having regard to the text and structure of the Act as a whole, that an interim supervision order is not an end in, and of, itself. An interim supervision order is a means to an end: the end being the protection of the community against the risk of serious offences.
In that sense, a supervision order or an interim supervision order will have served its purpose if it protects the community from serious offences, even if compliance with the conditions of the order, in the particular case, has not been perfect. The Court must always keep in mind that the object of the Act to be achieved is the adequate protection of the community from the commission of serious offences.
Charges 22 - 24 (PE 30128-30129/23 and PE 30190/23)
The respondent has an extensive history of chronic alcohol and cannabis use, which appears to have commenced when he was a teenager, and continued throughout his adult life. Although there is nothing in the materials to suggest that it prevented him from functioning satisfactorily in the work and service roles he has had, his substance abuse problem has been identified as a factor in his offending.
As Dr Wynn Owen had identified previously, any future serious offending by the respondent is likely to reflect his past offending. Accordingly, in his opinion, the most likely scenario for serious sexual offending is an opportunistic indecent assault upon a female family member or acquaintance who is present, and apparently asleep, at a place where the respondent happens to be, and at a time when the respondent has been drinking alcohol and is acutely intoxicated or within hours of ceasing alcohol consumption. In that scenario, the respondent would cease if the victim woke and told him to stop, or broke free. An escalation of sexual violence would entail attempted or actual vaginal penetration, with a degree of force used to compel compliance. Dr Wynn Owen concluded that an escalation and change would be the use of a degree of force resulting in physical injury, including the potential use of a weapon. [Footnotes omitted]
In Dr Wynn Owen's opinion, the most likely scenario for serious violent offending is violence towards a female partner in an intimate relationship. The context may include a return to substance use to manage feelings of jealousy or to manage fear of rejection and abandonment. Acute intoxication is likely to be a factor, as the disinhibition resulting from intoxication can impair self-control and consequential thinking, resulting in an increase of the level of violence used. [Footnotes omitted]
Sch A - Supervision order made on 27 October 2022 (redacted)
_________________________________________________________________________
Pursuant to section 48(1)(b) of the High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020, having found that the Respondent is a high risk serious offender within the meaning of section 7(1) of the High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (HRSO Act), the Court makes a supervision order in relation to the Respondent (this Order), for a period of 5 years from 2 November 2022, on the following conditions:
('Contact' under this condition and the following two conditions means any form of interaction or communication whether by word, gesture, expression or touch and whether in person, in writing, by telephonic or electronic means, but does not include the bare minimum of interaction or communication necessary between an adult and child to promptly and civilly terminate any inadvertent or uninvited interaction or communication)
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[1] The State of Western Australia v Slater [No 2] [2021] WASC 465 [17].
[2] The State of Western Australia v Slater [No 2] [18].
[3] The State of Western Australia v Slater [No 2] [24].
[4] Affidavit of D S McDonnell pars 12, 40.
[7] Affidavit of D S McDonnell, annexure 'AA'.
[10] Affidavit of D S McDonnell par 53(ii).
[11] The State of Western Australia v MAR [No 2] [26]; The State of Western Australia v MAR [No 3] [54].
[12] The State of Western Australia v MAR [No 3] [191]; affidavit of D S McDonnell, annexure 'AA', pars 57 ‑ 59.
[13] The State of Western Australia v MAR [No 3] [196] - [227]; affidavit of D S McDonnell, annexure 'AA', pars 65 ‑ 95.
1. On 14 April 2021, having found the respondent to be a high risk serious offender within the meaning of s 7(1) of the High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA), the court made a continuous detention order in relation to the respondent: The State of Western Australia
MAR [No 2]