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[2024] WASC 403
Supreme Court of WA
2024-10-31
Seaward J
Original judgment source is linked above.
(1) did Mr Thomas suffer from a mental impairment at the time he killed Edward Thomas?
(2) if Mr Thomas was suffering from a mental impairment at the relevant time, was it more likely than not that his mental impairment deprived him of any of the capacities specified in s 27(1) of the Criminal Code?
(1) If an accused pleads not guilty to a charge on account of mental impairment and the judge is satisfied -
(a) that the only fact in issue between the accused and the State is whether, under The Criminal Code section 27, the accused is not criminally responsible for an act or omission on account of mental impairment; and
(b) that the prosecutor consents, and the accused does not object, to the judge doing so; and
(c) that it is in the interests of justice to do so,
(d) may decide the issue referred to in paragraph (a) on any evidence and in any manner the judge thinks just; and
(e) for that purpose, may ascertain any fact by the verdict of a jury or otherwise; and
(f) may find the accused not guilty of the charge on account of mental impairment; and
(g) if such a finding is made and a jury has been sworn to give a verdict on the charge, must discharge the jury from giving its verdict on the charge.
(2) Subsection (1) is in addition to and does not affect the operation of section 146.
14 I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to decide the issues arising in this trial by receiving the Statement of Case, the Agreed Timeline of Events and the tendered documents referred to above as establishing the factual circumstances relevant to the determination of the issues in this trial. I am so satisfied given the formal admissions made by Mr Thomas; Mr Thomas's agreement to the State's Statement of Case; Mr Thomas's consent to the tender of the medical report of Dr Brett; the State's consent to proceed under s 93 of the CPA and the nature of the evidence in support of Mr Thomas's defence.
Background and Context to the Circumstances Attending the Commission of the Alleged Offence
Circumstances Attending the Commission of the Offence
Toxicological Analysis Sample of Blood of the Accused
The Accused's Electronic Record of Interview with Detective Senior Constable Lee McKnight & Detective Senior Constable Andy Smith of Tuesday the 13th July 2020 at 1.26pm
Accused leaves his place of residence at Unit 5/34 Rockford Steet, Mandurah.
Accused enters Unit 15/162 [Mandurah] Terrace picks up frying pan and hits the Victim over the head 1-3 times. Accused grabs victim around the neck and puts him in chokehold. During struggle between accused and victim, accused uses his fingers to gauge out the Victim's eyeballs. Accused picks up a knife and slits the throat of the victim before holding his hand.
Sips from a bottle containing alcohol before leaving it on the ground on way to the Mandurah Police Station by foot.
Accused observed sitting in entrance lobby of Mandurah Police Station and allowed entry into reception area.
Makes first admissions to hitting the victim with a frying pan, gauging his eyes out and slitting his throat. Makes admissions to causing the death of the victim.
Police request conduct welfare check on the victim.
Police arrive at Unit 5/34 Rockford Street to conduct welfare check on the victim and find unit empty.
Police arrive at Unit 15/162 Mandurah Terrace to conduct welfare check on the victim and locate victim.
Police declare Protected Forensic Area at Unit 15/162 Mandurah Terrace.
Police declare Protected Forensic Area at Unit 5/134 Rockford Street.
St John Ambulance arrive at Mandurah Police Station and conduct medical assessment of accused.
Police reiterate to accused that he is under arrest on suspicion of murder.
Accused makes telephone call to Marianne Thomas from police station.
Accused conveyed by police to Homicide squad offices.
Accused participates in Police Video Record of Interview.
(1) that Mr Thomas killed Edward Thomas;
(2) the killing was unlawful; and
(3) at the time Mr Thomas killed Edward Thomas, he intended to cause Edward Thomas's death or intended to cause him a bodily injury of such a nature as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, his life.
Insanity
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission on account of mental impairment if at the time of doing the act or making the omission he is in such a state of mental impairment as to deprive him of the capacity to understand what he is doing, or of capacity to control his actions, or of capacity to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission.
(2) A person whose mind, at the time of his doing or omitting to do an act, is affected by delusions on some specific matter or matters, but who is not otherwise entitled to the benefit of subsection (1), is criminally responsible for the act or omission to the same extent as if the real state of things had been such as he was induced by the delusions to believe to exist.
Intoxication
(1) Section 27 applies to the case of a person whose mind is disordered by intoxication or stupefaction caused without intention on his part by drugs or intoxicating liquor, or by any other means.
(2) Section 27 does not apply to the case of a person who has intentionally caused himself to become intoxicated or stupefied, whether in order to afford excuse for the commission of an offence or not.
(3) When an intention to cause a specific result is an element of an offence, intoxication whether complete or partial, and whether intentional or unintentional, may be regarded for the purpose of ascertaining whether such an intention in fact existed.
An underlying pathological infirmity of the mind, whether of short or long duration, and whether permanent or temporary, but does not include a condition that results from the reaction of a healthy mind to extraordinary stimuli.
The definition of 'mental illness' reflects some of the comments made by King CJ in Radford[20] about the meaning of the expression 'disease of the mind' which is used in the common law of insanity. Summarising the statement of King CJ:
A case of this description must turn very largely upon the jury's appreciation of what amounts to knowledge of the nature and quality of the act and of its wrongness. For it is evident that a jury although satisfied that no capacity existed in a particular accused to reason at all may think that at the back of it all was an awareness of the nature of the act and of the fact that other people might regard it as wrong more especially if that means regarded by the law as wrong. That would not lead to a conviction if the jury understands that, given a disease disorder or defect of reason, then it is enough if it so governed the faculties at the time of the commission of the act that the accused was incapable of reasoning with some moderate degree of calmness as to the wrongness of the act or of comprehending the nature or significance of the act of killing. See R v Davis (1881) 14 Cox CC 563, Stephen J, R v Kay (1904) 68 JP Jo 376, Stephen J. In R v Porter [1933] HCA 1; (1933) 55 CLR 182 at pp 189, 190, this was expressed by Dixon J as follows:
'The question is whether he was able to appreciate the wrongness of the particular act he was doing at the particular time. Could this man be said to know in this sense whether his act was wrong if through a disease or defect or disorder of the mind he could not think rationally of the reasons which to ordinary people make that act right or wrong? If through the disordered condition of the mind he could not reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure it may be said that he could not know that what he was doing was wrong.
Thus the real issue for the jury in this case was whether the appellant had established on the balance of probabilities that at the time of the killing his mental impairment resulted in a complete incapacity to reason as to what is right or wrong according to ordinary standards. The term 'know' means 'understand', 'appreciate' or 'comprehend'. An incapacity to reason rationally as to what is right or wrong according to ordinary standards prevents a person from understanding that he (or she) ought not do the act. Knowledge (short of understanding) that to kill is punishable by law does not prevent such a finding. Nor is a finding of incapacity dependent upon proof of a positive belief in the rightness of the conduct. Whether an act is right or wrong is determined by reference to an objective standard. The question is whether the appellant had a complete incapacity to reason as to what was, by that objective standard, right or wrong.
It is not easy to summarise the detailed discussion of authority in Stapleton in a way which is capable of being fashioned into an appropriate direction in every case of insanity. However, the principles extracted from that discussion appear to focus upon two issues. First, the ability to know that one 'ought not' to do an act or make an omission is a capacity to know that one 'ought not' to do it according to ordinary standards of right and wrong, rather than knowledge that the act is unlawful. As the High Court observed, from a practical point of view it often may not matter much, because in relation to serious offences the two ideas 'are not easily separable' (at 375). However, in cases where, as here, the distinction may arise, it should be made. The second principle is that the capacity which must be found to be lacking is not merely a capacity to appreciate, in some abstract sense, that others would view the act as wrong. Rather, it is a capacity of the particular accused either to discern the difference between moral good and evil, or to 'think rationally' of the reasons which would lead ordinary people to consider the act to be right or wrong.
(a) admitted that he killed Edward Thomas on 12 July 2020. Mr Thomas gave the following description of the offending:[31]
I entered the house and he was sitting in his chair. I picked up a frying pan off of the - off of the kitchen sink, walked up behind him and hit him once over the head with it and then twice. And then I've grabbed him around the neck and I've put him into a choke hold. We were on the ground for - for about 30 or 40 seconds, struggling because I was trying to end his life. And I've - it got to be quite a s - struggle, so, I've used my fingers to gouge his eyes to try and take out his sight because it was - he was quite strong. And after that I picked up a knife and slit his throat and held his hand, and he squeezed it and he left the world. That was that.
(b) explained that after his throat had been slit, Edward Thomas grabbed Mr Thomas's hand, and Mr Thomas told Edward Thomas that he loved him;[32]
(c) explained the above occurred at Edward Thomas's house, around 7.00 pm or 8.00 pm after it was dark. Mr Thomas walked from his house to Edward Thomas's house;[33]
(d) said that he consumed a quarter of a bottle of bourbon on the day of the offence, but was not drunk. Mr Thomas also said that he smoked cannabis and tobacco, but was not intoxicated;[34]
(e) explained that after the offence, he left Edward Thomas's house and walked back to his own house. Mr Thomas then washed blood off his hands in the downstairs sink. Mr Thomas thinks he stayed at his house for two to three minutes, had a drink and a smoke, before walking from his house to the Mandurah Police Station;[35]
(f) explained his actions on the basis that Edward Thomas was getting older, was in pain, was not walking properly, was falling over and was unhappy;[36]
(g) described how he has heard voices in his head since around the age of 21 or 22 and that he was hearing voices or music in his head at the time of the interview. Mr Thomas described himself as having anxiety and psychosis;[37] and
(h) described hearing an inner voice on the night of the offence.[38]
He stated that he had not planned to kill his father when he attended his unit. He described experiencing a single male voice that said 'kill Eddie, kill your father'. He described this as a bad voice. He stated that he also experienced good voices but this one was bad. He stated that in his mind he believed that it was the right thing to do. He stated that he was not feeling or thinking much at that time.
Mr Thomas has a history and presentation that is consistent with a major mental illness. I believe that he has the symptoms and history consistent with chronic treatment resistant schizophrenia. He has the positive symptoms (hallucinations, delusions and thought disorder), and negative symptoms (restricted affect, amotivation, lack of social interest) of schizophrenia. He has a severe illness, that serious [sic] impacts on his functioning and his risk to himself and others.
I believe that he had an untreated mental illness that made him psychotic and a risk to himself and others for at least a year before the alleged offence.
'Schizophrenia is characterised by disturbances in multiple mental modalities, including thinking (e.g., delusions, disorganisation in the form of thought), perception (e.g., hallucinations), self-experience (e.g., the experience that one's feelings, impulses, thoughts, or behaviour are under the control of an external force), cognition (e.g., impaired attention, verbal memory, and social cognition), volition (e.g., loss of motivation), affect (e.g., blunted emotional expression), and behaviour (e.g., behaviour that appears bizarre or purposeless, unpredictable or inappropriate emotional responses that interfere with the organisation of behaviour). Psychomotor disturbances, including catatonia, may be present. Persistent delusions, persistent hallucinations, thought disorder, and experiences of influence, passivity, or control are considered core symptoms. Symptoms must have persisted for at least one month in order for a diagnosis of schizophrenia to be assigned. The symptoms are not a manifestation of another health condition (e.g., a brain tumour) and are not due to the effect of a substance or medication on the central nervous system (e.g., corticosteroids), including withdrawal (e.g., alcohol withdrawal).'
He was paranoid of the services that were trying to provide him with treatment. This reduced his cooperation with their care. Unfortunately, Mr Thomas also experienced significant side effects to several medications, which further entrenched the idea that medical professionals could not be trusted.
It is my opinion that Mr Thomas was suffering the symptoms of severe and untreated schizophrenia at the time of the index offence. He was hearing auditory hallucinations in the form of voices encouraging and commanding him to kill his father. He formed a delusional belief that his father's health was significant [sic] worse than it had been in reality, and a further delusional belief that it was his duty to end his father's suffering by ending his life.
Consideration and findings Finding as to whether Mr Thomas did kill Edward Thomas
Findings as to whether Mr Thomas had a mental impairment
Findings as to whether Mr Thomas's mental impairment deprived him of any of the required capacities
Orders under the Criminal Law (Mental Impairment) Act 2023
(2) If a court makes a custody order, the court must set a limiting term for the order, being the best estimate of the term of imprisonment or term of detention that the court would, in all the circumstances, have imposed if -
(a) the court were sentencing the person for the offence; and
(b) any mental impairment of the person were not taken into account.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the court must assume that -
(a) the person had pleaded guilty to the charge at the earliest opportunity; and
(b) there is no other option but to impose a term of imprisonment or term of detention.
(4) The limiting term commences on the day on which the order is made unless the court, after taking into account any time that the person has already spent in custody in relation to the offence, orders that the term be taken to have commenced on an earlier day.
(4) A person, other than a child, who is guilty of murder must be sentenced to life imprisonment unless -
(a) that sentence would be clearly unjust given the circumstances of the offence and the person; and
(b) the person is unlikely to be a threat to the safety of the community when released from imprisonment,
in which case, subject to subsection (5A), the person is liable to imprisonment for 20 years.
(a) I am required to determine the 'best estimate' of the term of imprisonment that a court 'would, in all the circumstances' have imposed based on certain assumptions. This task is necessarily a hypothetical exercise;[70]
(b) the use of the word 'would' signifies that I am required to 'stand in the shoes' of a hypothetical sentencing court and apply the relevant principles contained in the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), including in s 6 of that Act, in light of ordinary sentencing principles;[71]
(c) one of the assumptions imposed by s 50 of the CLMI Act is that in setting the limiting term, I am not to take into account Mr Thomas's mental impairment. That assumption (or counter-factual) may be relevant to the circumstances of the offence, mitigatory factors and potentially facts that might have resulted in a longer term of imprisonment;[72]
(d) the other assumptions imposed by s 50 of the CLMI Act are that I must assume that Mr Thomas has pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, including all necessary elements of the offence, at the earliest opportunity.[73] I must also assume there is no other option but to impose a term of imprisonment;
(e) subject to the exceptional circumstances identified in s 279(4)(a) and s 279(4)(b) of the Criminal Code, the sentence of life imprisonment for murder is a mandatory sentence. Therefore, on its proper construction s 50 of the CLMI Act requires that if, on the assumptions required by that section, the mandatory term of life imprisonment would have been imposed, then the limiting term must be set as the duration of that mandatory term;[74]
(f) given the exceptional nature of a sentence other than life imprisonment for murder generally, the circumstances in which a limiting term on a charge of murder will be set as a term other than the duration of the person's life will be equally exceptional. This is particularly the case given the statutory requirement to exclude from consideration the accused's mental impairment. This is because an accused's mental impairment at the time of committing an offence might otherwise have been the principal reason for concluding that it would have been 'clearly unjust given the circumstances of the offence and the person' to have imposed a sentence of life imprisonment;[75] and
(g) where the court's 'best estimate' of the sentence that the sentencing court would have imposed is life imprisonment, s 50 of the CLMI Act does not permit, or require, the court to determine the minimum non-parole period that would have been set if the person had been sentenced to life imprisonment.[76]
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[1] The State of Western Australia v Thomas [2023] WASC 405.
[11] Hone v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 283; (2007) 179 A Crim R 138.
[12] Hone v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 283; (2007) 179 A Crim R 138 [2] - [13]; [124] ‑ [125] and the authorities cited therein.
[15] Hawkins v The Queen [1994] HCA 28; (1994) 179 CLR 500, 517; Ward v The Queen [2000] WASCA 413; (2000) 23 WAR 254 [18] - [20], [24] ‑ [25] (Kennedy J); [55] ‑ [56] (Wallwork J); [103] (Scott J).
[17] R v Porter [1933] HCA 1; (1933) 55 CLR 182.
[18] R v Falconer [1990] HCA 49; (1990) 171 CLR 30, 60.
[19] The State of Western Australia v Jones [2018] WASC 395 [43].
[20] R v Radford (1985) 20 A Crim R 388, 396.
[21] Stapleton v The Queen [1952] HCA 56; (1952) 86 CLR 358, 367.
[22] Stapleton v The Queen [1952] HCA 56; (1952) 86 CLR 358, 367 - 368.
[23] Stapleton v The Queen [1952] HCA 56; (1952) 86 CLR 358, 370 - 371.
[24] Evans v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 34.
[25] Evans v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 34, [31].
[26] Evans v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 34, [60].
[27] The State of Western Australia v Taylor [2021] WASC 470 [50] ‑ [52].
[28] The State of Western Australia v Taylor [2021] WASC 470 [53].
[68] CLMI Act Schedule 1, subdivision 3, item 9.
[69] The State of Western Australia v Chokolich [2024] WASC 346 [60] - [99].
[70] The State of Western Australia v Chokolich [2024] WASC 346 [60].
[71] The State of Western Australia v Chokolich [2024] WASC 346 [61] - [62].
[72] The State of Western Australia v Chokolich [2024] WASC 346 [66].
[73] The State of Western Australia v Chokolich [2024] WASC 346 [72].
[74] The State of Western Australia v Chokolich [2024] WASC 346 [78] - [81].
[75] The State of Western Australia v Chokolich [2024] WASC 346 [81].
[76] The State of Western Australia v Chokolich [2024] WASC 346 [89].
[77] Gore v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 163 [40].
(1952) 86 CLR 358
(2000) 23 WAR 254
(1990) 171 CLR 30
(1933) 55 CLR 182
(1994) 179 CLR 500