[2022] WASC 342
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of WA
2022-10-17
Derrick J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Background to the application Proceedings under the Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA)[1]
Even taking these matters into account, the respondent is a person who, without external controls, is at a high risk of committing a serious sexual offence. Despite that finding, in 2009 he was given the chance to live in the community on a supervision order. Despite the existence of the order and a great deal of community support, within 12 months the respondent had breached the order by consuming alcohol which is acknowledged to be a trigger to his sexual and generalised offending. Only a short time later his breaches became more serious and wider ranging. In April 2011 he committed the burglary offence during which he made a threat of sexual violence which he intended to carry out, albeit for a short period of time. Since then he has been in custody but he has not received any sex offender or substance abuse treatment other than the Pathways programme. He has not been rehabilitated. He has no realistic release plans.
Having regard to these matters I find that there is an unacceptable risk that, if an order that the respondent be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care, or treatment is not made, he would commit a serious sexual offence. Thus, pursuant to [the DSO Act], s 23 I am required to make a [continuing detention order].
I consider that a supervision order incorporating the draft conditions proposed by the Community Offender Monitoring Unit will adequately protect the public. The following factors, in combination, lead me to that conclusion.
First, the supervision order that I propose to make will provide for the close supervision and monitoring of Mr Narrier. There will be continuous monitoring of his whereabouts by a global positioning tracking system (a monitoring technique not available under the Act in 2009). He will be subject to a curfew. His home will be subject to random searches by police officers who will also be able to monitor Mr Narrier's use of any telephone or internet connection used by him. It will be a condition of the order that there be complete abstinence from drugs and alcohol and that he be subject to a regime of random testing for drug and alcohol use. Other conditions of the order will be that Mr Narrier comply with the treatment recommendations of his psychiatrist and take the anti‑libidinal medications prescribed for him and that he be subjected to testing to ensure compliance. The conditions of the order are set out in the appendix to these reasons. Strict compliance with the orders is required and the latitude seemingly extended to Mr Narrier in 2010 ‑ 2011 in respect of his breaches of the 2009 supervision order should not be extended to him in respect of any breaches of the order I propose to make.
Second, whilst Mr Narrier's breaches of the 2009 supervision order are a cause for concern about whether he will comply with the terms of a further supervision order, his breaches of the 2009 order must be weighed against the significant progress made by Mr Narrier in his rehabilitation. This is reflected in the evidence by:
(i) the positive observations of the facilitators of the [Sex Offender Treatment Program] in their Program Completion Report...;
(ii) the genuine therapeutic alliance formed with Ms Rankin and the benefits derived from that the [sic] psychological counselling;
(iii) his engagement with the Drug and Alcohol Through‑Care Services; and
(iv) Dr Wojnarowska's evidence that Mr Narrier is more open in the presentation of information.
The progress made by Mr Narrier in his rehabilitation is relevant is [sic] two ways. It provides a foundation for further rehabilitation in the community and it increases the likelihood that Mr Narrier will comply with the terms of the supervision order thereby avoiding the kinds of factors that led to his life being destabilised in the past.
Third, Mr Narrier has not been violent in prison and, apart from one episode of insulting behaviour in October 2015, it appears that he has behaved in a respectful manner to prison officers and other persons with whom he has come into contact. The impression that I have formed is that Mr Narrier is more respectful of authority and that his previous defiant attitude has moderated. In her report Dr Wojnarowska referred to the significant improvement in Mr Narrier's behaviour in recent years. This improvement in Mr Narrier's attitude is a basis for confidence that he will comply with a supervision order.
Fourth, Mr Narrier has now been trialled on anti‑libidinal medication. It appears that Mr Narrier is able to tolerate the medication with no side effects and that when the maximum daily dosage is administered it will have the effect of suppressing his libido thus reducing the risk of sexual offending. As I have already noted the supervision order will contain conditions that Mr Narrier comply with the treatment and medication regimes prescribed for him and his compliance with the medication regime be tested.
Fifth, Mr Narrier's release plan is not detailed but it is realistic. In my view, it is unrealistic to expect a person in Mr Narrier's position to be able to prepare a more detailed plan. Indeed a more detailed plan has the potential to set Mr Narrier up for failure and to undermine his psychological health. Mr Narrier's plan provides a strategy for him to re‑engage with the community by obtaining employment, re‑establishing contact with his family and establishing a social life which does not bring him into contact with pro-criminal influences. There is no doubt that Mr Narrier will require support to assist him re‑adjusting to life in the community and the Community Supervision Plan identifies the support that will be available to him: ongoing psychological counselling; maintaining an ongoing relationship with UCW to assist Mr Narrier with general reintegration (assistance with attendance at appointments, assistance in implementing Mr Narrier's release plan, leisure activities and encouragement to positive lifestyle changes); and, ongoing substance abuse counselling.
Sixth the risk factor that gives rise to the greatest concern is the risk that Mr Narrier will resort to cannabis use to cope with the stresses of life in the community. His relapse earlier this year weighs against the rescinding of the continuing detention order. It suggests that Mr Narrier will be unable to cope with the stresses of living in the community and complying with the supervision order without resorting to cannabis use which has the potential to result in offending. The counselling to which I have referred will attenuate that risk but cannot eliminate it. It will be a condition of the supervision order that Mr Narrier be subject to a strict regime of random testing for alcohol and drug use. As already stressed it is imperative that this regime be enforced and that Mr Narrier be monitored closely for alcohol and drug use. My view is that the combination of counselling and close monitoring for alcohol and drug use provides adequate protection against the risk that Mr Narrier will resort to cannabis use.
Seventh, Mr Narrier is older. He has been detained under the continuing detention order for a year. He has had the opportunity to reflect on how he must behave in the community in the event that a supervision order is made. The prospect of a further period of detention pursuant to [the DSO Act] if he breaches the supervision order will act as a significant personal deterrent.
If a person has committed one serious breach of the SO late in its duration, that breach may still mean that the court cannot be satisfied that the person will substantially comply with the standard conditions of a SO. On the other hand, repeated minor breaches of a number of the standard conditions may also mean that a court is not satisfied that a person will substantially comply with a SO.
I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent will substantially comply with the standard conditions of a SO because:
(1) the respondent remains at a high risk of serious sexual offending;
(2) the respondent presents a high risk of generalised offending, most particularly drug offences and such offences increase his risk of committing serious sexual offences;
(3) the respondent has a history of breaching the first SO and the amended second SO;
(4) the respondent's conduct in removing his transmitter and remaining in hiding from the supervising authorities and police in May 2018, after he had consumed illicit drugs, is a serious breach of the amended second SO;
(5) the measures which are in place to ensure that a DSO complies with a SO and the public are protected are rendered ineffective if the DSO is prepared, as the respondent was, to remove his transmitter and hide from the authorities;
(6) the use of illicit drugs increased the respondent's risk of committing serious sexual offences and breaching other conditions of a SO;
(7) whilst on the amended second SO, the respondent was not prepared to be entirely honest with members of his supervising team about his frustrations and personal problems; and
(8) the respondent was not prepared to comply with the conditions of his amended second SO where he thought it imposed unreasonable restrictions on his conduct.
Tottle J made it clear in 2017 that 'strict compliance' with the amended second SO was required and that the latitude which had seemingly been extended to the respondent in earlier years should not be extended to him in respect of any breaches of the amended second SO. The justification for those comments are obvious. Without strict restrictions on the respondent's behaviour in the community, the respondent poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sexual offence. Not only are those conditions justified but unless they are strictly enforced and the respondent is prepared to comply with them the community cannot be adequately protected.
The breach offences are telling evidence that the respondent cannot be trusted to comply with the standard conditions of a SO. If he does not comply with the standard conditions of a SO the community cannot be adequately protected from the risk which he poses of committing a serious sexual offence.
Taking into account the paramount consideration of ensuring adequate protection of the community, I am satisfied that the only appropriate order is to rescind the amended second SO and make a CDO in relation to the respondent.
As I have previously indicated, by s 29(1) and s 29(2) of the Act I cannot make a supervision order unless the respondent has satisfied me on the balance of probabilities that he will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the order.
The respondent has a history of contravening supervision orders. His contraventions have been serious and have included contraventions of the standard conditions of his supervision orders.
The respondent's contraventions of the amended second supervision order were directly related to his relapse into illicit substance use. Once the respondent relapsed into his illicit substance use he commenced to contravene the amended second supervision order.
Despite the respondent's engagement in a significant amount of psychological counselling since being returned to custody, it is established by the evidence before me that he has made no or very little progress in relation to his illicit substance use problem. His lack of progress in this regard is clearly evidenced by his ongoing use of illicit substances in the highly structured and controlled prison environment.
In the circumstances to which I have referred, and consistently with the evidence given by both Dr Wojnarowska and Dr Galloghly, I am satisfied that if the respondent was to be released into the community, even on the proposed stringent conditions of a supervision order, he would not be able to abstain for any appreciable period of time from illicit substances and/or alcohol. I am also, on the basis of the evidence given by Dr Wojnarowska, and taking into account what has occurred in the past when the respondent has relapsed into illicit substance use while on a supervision order, satisfied that the inevitable result of such a relapse would be that the respondent would fail to comply with the supervision component of the order. I am further satisfied, on the basis of the evidence given by Dr Wojnarowska, that the inevitable result of the respondent relapsing into illicit substance use and/or alcohol use while on a supervision order would be that the respondent would be at significant risk of committing opportunistic serious sexual offences of the type to which I have already referred.
It necessarily follows from my findings stated in the preceding paragraph that the respondent has failed to satisfy me on the balance of probabilities that he would substantially comply with at least the standard conditions of any supervision order specified in s 30(2)(d) and s 30(2)(f) of the Act. For this reason alone I am not persuaded that the respondent should be released on a supervision order.
Even if contrary to my above expressed conclusion the respondent has proved on the balance of probabilities that he would substantially comply with the standard conditions of a supervision order, I am not, bearing in mind that I am required to apply as the paramount consideration the need to ensure adequate protection of the community, satisfied that the community can be adequately protected by releasing the respondent on the proposed supervision order. I am not so satisfied for two main reasons.
The first reason relates to the absence of suitable supported accommodation for the respondent.
...
It is abundantly clear from all the evidence, and is accepted by the respondent, that if the risk presented by him is to be adequately managed in the community it is imperative that he be provided with suitable supported accommodation on his release. If he is not provided with suitable supported accommodation he will, I am satisfied, remain at high risk of committing serious offences including serious sexual offences.
The simple fact of the matter, as is established by the evidence of Ms Cashmore, is that at present there is no suitable supported accommodation that is available for use by the respondent. The absence of any suitable supported accommodation is of itself a basis for concluding that the community will not be adequately protected by releasing the respondent on a supervision order.
...
My second reason for not being satisfied that the need to ensure adequate protection of the community will be able to be met by releasing the respondent on a supervision order relates to his illicit substance use and alcohol use problem.
It is established by the evidence before me to which I have referred that there is a direct link between the respondent's use of illicit substances and/or alcohol and his offending. It is also clear on the evidence that if the respondent uses illicit substances the risk that he will use alcohol is significantly increased.
As I have already indicated and for the reasons I have stated, I am satisfied that the respondent, if released into the community and even if subjected to the stringent conditions of a supervision order, will not be able to abstain for any appreciable period of time from illicit substance use and/or alcohol use. Further, and as I have also already indicated, I am satisfied that the inevitable result of the respondent relapsing into illicit substance use and/or alcohol use will be that he will be at a significant risk of committing opportunistic sexual penetration without consent offences against females with associated additional violence. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the community will be adequately protected if the respondent is released on a supervision order containing the conditions that are proposed. Releasing the respondent on a supervision order on the conditions proposed will not, in my view, reduce the risk of him committing further serious offences, specifically further serious sexual offences, to a level that is reasonably acceptable and that will ensure the adequate protection of the community.
Clearly, my conclusion expressed in the previous paragraph is consistent with the opinion expressed by Dr Wojnarowska that the respondent's high risk of committing sexual offences cannot be adequately managed in the community. However, and as is apparent from what I have said, Dr Wojnarowska's expressed opinion on this ultimate issue is not something that I have relied upon in coming to my conclusion.
I state to avoid any doubt on the point, that even if suitable supported accommodation had been available to the respondent I would still, for the reasons enunciated in [198] - [200] above, have concluded that the community would not be adequately protected by releasing the respondent on a supervision order.
As is apparent from what I have already said, the respondent's most significant risk factor is his illicit substance use problem. Indeed, in my opinion until the respondent can demonstrate some significant gains in addressing his illicit substance use problem it will, given his past poor performance on supervision orders, be difficult for him to discharge his burden of proving that he is capable of complying with the standard conditions of a supervision order. This being the case, it is in my view imperative, as recommended by Dr Wojnarowska and Dr Galloghly, that the respondent be afforded the opportunity to participate in an intensive substance use program. The most preferable option in this regard would appear to be the newly developed Solid Steps Program which, I was told from the bar table, the respondent has applied to be accepted into. The possibility of the respondent being provided with pharmacotherapy should also be explored. In short, everything that can reasonably be done to afford to the respondent the opportunity to address in a substantive way his illicit substance use problem should be done. It will then be a matter for the respondent to take up the opportunities provided to him.
The respondent should also continue to be offered individual psychological counselling so that he can continue to attempt to address the deficits in his emotional functioning and management as identified by Dr Wojnarowska and Dr Galloghly.
The respondent should continue being prescribed medication directed at controlling his libido.
Obviously, prior to the respondent's next review date all efforts should be made to ensure the availability of suitable supported accommodation for him so that if the court concludes that he is otherwise suitable for release he will be able to be released. All possible accommodation options should be reviewed. The inquiry should be pursued early to avoid the almost inevitable failure of inquiries that are only made in the last month or two before a review.
Relevant statutory provisions and applicable legal principles
As will emerge from the outline below of the statutory framework under the DSO Act and [the Act], the concepts and criteria with which the court is concerned in determining an application of this kind are substantially the same under both statutes. Although I have reached that view on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the provisions of both statutes, having regard to the context of the provisions within the statutes and the objects underlying the statutes, the construction is confirmed, in my opinion, by the second reading speech made to the Legislative Assembly in respect of the High Risk Offenders Bill 2019 by the Honourable Attorney General. The Attorney informed the House that the bill was intended to 'extend the Supreme Court's ability to make a continuing detention order or supervision order to serious violent offenders in the same manner as the provisions contained in the [DSO Act]'. He went on to say:
'In doing so, this bill fully preserves the provisions that apply in respect of dangerous sexual offenders in the [DSO Act].'
Whether or not that has been achieved remains to be seen upon analysis of the provisions. However, in my opinion, as the concepts and criteria in both statutes are substantially the same, the jurisprudence established in respect of the DSO Act remains relevant in construing and applying [the Act], with appropriate adaptation in cases involving non-sexual offences.
The purpose of this Part is to ensure that an offender's detention under a continuing detention order is regularly reviewed.[37]
Review of detention under continuing detention order
(1) On a review under section 66 of an offender's detention -
(a) if the court does not find that the offender remains a high risk serious offender it must rescind the continuing detention order; or
(b) if the court finds that the offender remains a high risk serious offender it must -
(i) affirm the continuing detention order; or
(ii) subject to section 29, rescind the continuing detention order and make a supervision order.
(2) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (1)(b)(i) or (ii), the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community.
An offender is a high risk serious offender if the court dealing with an application under this Act finds that it is satisfied, by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability, that it is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to the offender to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence.
(1) In this Act a continuing detention order in relation to an offender is an order that the offender be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care, or treatment.
(2) A continuing detention order has effect in accordance with its terms from the time the order is made until rescinded by a further order of the court.
(1) In this Act a supervision order in relation to an offender is an order that the offender, when not in custody, is to be subject to stated conditions that the court considers appropriate, in accordance with section 30.
(2) A supervision order has effect in accordance with its terms -
(a) from a date stated in the order; and
(b) for a period stated in the order.
(3) The date from which a supervision order has effect must not be earlier than 21 days after the date the order is made unless the court is satisfied that the implementation of the order from an earlier date is practically feasible.
In choosing between an indefinite detention order or a supervision order, the fact that the paramount consideration is the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community does not exclude other considerations. The use of the word 'adequate' indicates that a qualitative assessment is required. In considering whether a supervision order would adequately protect the community, account must be taken of conditions which can be placed on a supervision order so as to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the rehabilitation of the respondent and his care and treatment. The [DSO Act] does not require that there be no risk of reoffending. Such a requirement could never be met and would mean no person to whom the [DSO Act] applies would ever be released. The question is whether the risk is reduced to a reasonably acceptable level that ensures adequate protection of the community. That requires a weighing of the nature and degree of risk in the context of methods for the management and reduction of that risk. If, after considering all the evidence, the court is left in doubt as to whether the conditions of a supervision order would adequately protect the community, because the paramount consideration is the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the court must expressly decline to rescind the continuing detention order.
(a) any report prepared under section 74 for the hearing of the application and the extent to which the offender cooperated in the examination required by that section;
(b) any other medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other assessment relating to the offender;
(c) information indicating whether or not the offender has a propensity to commit serious offences in the future;
(d) whether or not there is any pattern of offending behaviour by the offender;
(e) any efforts by the offender to address the cause or causes of the offender's offending behaviour, including whether the offender has participated in any rehabilitation programme;
(f) whether or not the offender's participation in any rehabilitation programme has had a positive effect on the offender;
(g) the offender's antecedents and criminal record;
(h) the risk that, if the offender were not subject to a restriction order, the offender would commit a serious offence;
(i) the need to protect members of the community from that risk;
(j) any other relevant matter.
(1) A court cannot make, affirm or amend a supervision order in relation to an offender unless it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the order as made, affirmed or amended.
(2) The onus proof as to the matter described in subsection (1) is on the offender.
The clear intention of the review process is to allow for the possibility of a change of circumstances. Detention under the DSO Act is not a punishment for past offending, rather it is a protective mechanism designed to prevent the risk of future serious sexual offending from being realised. If circumstances change such that the risk of reoffending reduces or can be better managed in the community, then the continuing need for detention must be considered.
The risk of reoffending may change over time. It may be affected by age, health or the successful completion of treatment. The availability of new technology or resources in the community may also affect whether the risk of reoffending can be managed on a supervision order.
The justification for making a detention order is the existence of an unacceptable risk of serious sexual offending that cannot be adequately controlled by conditional release. However, detention also serves the purpose of allowing treatment and care in a secure environment: s 17 DSO Act. This confirms an obligation on the part of the prison authorities to facilitate change by offering programs and access to counselling.
If the risk changes or resources improve to enable more efficacious conditions then the need for detention may dissipate. In these circumstances continuing detention may be unjust.
The review process is intended to ensure that detention only continues where necessary. It mitigates the otherwise potentially draconian effect of imprisoning people for crimes that they have not committed. Reviews are not, therefore, merely a welfare check, rather they are an exercise of judicial power to affirm, vary or rescind a detention order. Continuing detention should not be ordered unless that course is justified by the circumstances existing at the time of the review. The court should choose the order that is least invasive of the person's right to be at liberty, whilst ensuring an adequate degree of protection of the community.
Although there is no doubt, under the Western Australian Act, that a court must have regard to the psychiatrists' reports (and must bear in mind that the authors have an area of expertise not shared by the court), the reports are only a part of the materials that must be considered and the weight to be accorded to them will depend upon their cogency and reliability, when considered in light of the whole of the evidence. The responsibility for deciding whether or not the offender is a serious danger to the community as defined and, if so, what order should be made is that of the judge alone.
The respondent's personal circumstances and antecedents - s 7(3)(g)[57]
The respondent's history of serious offending - s 7(3)(g) [58]
On 24 March 1990 Mr Narrier, then aged 17, knocked on the door of the house of the victim and asked for a drink of water. When the victim returned, Mr Narrier was armed. Mr Narrier grabbed the victim by the throat, forced her into the bedroom and stripped her of her clothing. He then penetrated her anus and vagina with his fingers before attempting to penetrate her anus with his penis. Mr Narrier stole $25 from the victim before he bound her, gagged her and assaulted her whilst demanding more money. Following his arrest, Mr Narrier entered pleas of guilty to offences of aggravated sexual assault, armed robbery and burglary, and was sentenced by the President of the Children's Court on 1 May 1990 to a total of 4 years imprisonment. He was released on 21 January 1993.
On 5 February 1993, shortly after his release at the end of the 4 year sentence, Mr Narrier committed two offences of burglary, one of child stealing and one of assault occasioning bodily harm. The circumstances were that, whilst armed with a knife, Mr Narrier entered a house at 11.30 pm and removed the 12‑year‑old child/victim by force. He took the victim across the road where he forced her to the ground and removed her nightgown. Mr Narrier punched the victim three times to the face. Mr Narrier attempted to undo his trousers and lay on top of the victim. The victim's screams attracted the attention of neighbours who came to assist. On 17 June 1993 Mr Narrier was sentenced to a total of 5 years imprisonment. Mr Narrier was released on 3 February 1997.
Between 16 and 17 January 1998 Mr Narrier committed offences involving two female victims in their homes on a single night, namely, an aggravated burglary and sexual assault, and a second aggravated burglary with an associated assault occasioning bodily harm. The details are as follows. At about 11.00 pm on 16 January 1998, Mr Narrier grabbed the 30‑year‑old victim by the throat as she put her dog outside the back of her house. Mr Narrier forced her to the lounge room and pulled down her pants. Mr Narrier threatened to kill her if she did not stay quiet. Mr Narrier then penetrated the victim's vagina with his penis. After withdrawing from the victim, Mr Narrier went to the kitchen and later spoke to and apologised to her before leaving. Later that night, at about 1.15 am on 17 January 1998, Mr Narrier entered a different house through an unlocked door in order to steal money. The victim, who was asleep on the lounge, awoke and was restrained by the neck and head by Mr Narrier. She managed to struggle free. No sexual assault took place. For the offending on that night, Mr Narrier was sentenced on 16 June 1998 to terms of imprisonment structured to arrive at an aggregate term of 12 years imprisonment without parole. A term of indefinite detention was also imposed but later quashed by the Court of Appeal.
On 25 December 1998 Mr Narrier whilst in custody was involved in a riot at Casuarina Prison. He was convicted of nine offences including assault of a public officer, damage, threats to kill, threats to injure and threats to harm. On 28 April 2000 Mr Narrier was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment, without eligibility for parole, to be served cumulatively upon the 12-year term already imposed.
The effect was that Mr Narrier was required to serve a term of 15 years imprisonment from 19 January 1998. The end date of the aggregate sentences was 12 July 2008.
Efforts by offender to address causes of offending behaviour including participation in rehabilitation programmes - s 7(3)(e) and s 7(3)(f)[62]
Reports prepared under s 74 and extent to which respondent cooperated in examinations - s 7(3)(a)
Other assessments undertaken specifically for the purposes of the application - s 7(3)(b)
Overall, [the respondent] demonstrated some insight into his psychological, interpersonal and behavioural functioning, including his substance use and non-compliance issues, and some progress towards addressing risk relevant factors. However, and while it is recognised that this is to some extent likely to be influenced by personality variables, [the respondent] appears to be still vulnerable to lapse into problematic communication patterns and decision making, habitual patterns of responding to stressors and heightened emotion, and general antisocial behaviour despite the knowledge he has gained through his participation in intervention and consequences experienced. He therefore continues to have treatment needs related to substance abuse, emotional management, decision making, and interpersonal relationships. In addition to utilising the Departmental resources available to address these needs, it would be beneficial for [the respondent] to form relationships with external service providers to develop a broader network that would be able to support him in his eventual community transition.
Propensity to commit serious offences in the future - s 7(3)(c)
Risk of committing serious offences if not subject to a restriction order - s 7(3)(h)
Does the respondent remain a high risk serious offender?
The purpose of a legislative regime, such as the DPSO Act or the HRSO Act, is discernibly distinct from the imposition of retribution or deterrence pursued by the criminal law. To the extent that detention or supervised release is part of the legislative regime, the character of the curtailment of the liberty of the individual offender under the regime can be seen to be protective rather than punitive because any curtailment of liberty must be supported by the risk evaluation contemplated by s 7 of the HRSO Act. In that evaluation, considerations of retribution and deterrence, central to sentencing by way of punishment under the common law, have no part to play. In addition, any curtailment of liberty must be no greater than is necessary adequately to protect the community from the demonstrated unacceptable risk of harm to the community...
ANNEXURE A STANDARD CONDITIONS REQUIRED BY THE ACT
a) For the purpose of averting or minimising a serious risk of death or injury to yourself or another person
>
> b) For a purpose, and duration approved in advance by a CCO;
>
> c) On the order of a CCO or Police Officer;
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[1] This section of my reasons reproduces what I wrote in The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 6] [2020] WASC 349.
[2] The State of Western Australia v PLN [No 2] [2009] WASC 21.
[3] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 3] [2014] WASC 131 [21] ‑ [26]; Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4] [2017] WASC 306 [12] ‑ [20].
[4] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 3] [32]; Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4] [21].
[5] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 3] [30]; Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4] [21].
[6] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 3].
[7] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 3] [88] ‑ [89].
[8] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4].
[9] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4] [82] ‑ [90].
[10] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [2019] WASC 17 [11].
[11] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [41].
[12] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [41].
[13] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [41]. The amended supervision order had 'effect in accordance with its terms': DSO Act, s 26.
[14] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [44].
[15] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [44].
[16] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [44].
[17] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [45].
[18] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [3].
[19] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [118] ‑ [122].
[20]The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [4]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Narrier [2018] WASCSR 228. The five contravention offences for which Jenkins J sentenced the respondent (failing to observe his curfew, being at the home of another without prior approval, using amphetamine and methylamphetamine, using cannabis, and removing his transmitter) were the offences committed by him in May 2018. The remaining three contravention offences referred to in [18] above (visiting a house used by squatters, providing a urine sample that tested positive for cannabis, and permitting his partner to stay overnight at his house) were committed by the respondent in January 2018 and April 2018. The respondent pleaded guilty to these three offences also and was sentenced for them by the Magistrates Court by way of the imposition of fines.
[21]The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [4]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Narrier [35].
[22]The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [4]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Narrier [35].
[24] The term 'commencement day' is defined for the purposes of the provisions contained in pt 10 of the Act (s 122 - 125) to mean 'the day on which the section comes into operation'. The 'day on which this section comes into operation' is, by virtue of proclamation, 26 August 2020: Act s 2(1)(c).
[26] I will say more about the relevant provisions of the Act in due course. At this point it suffices to say that the provisions of the Act relating to reviews do not operate significantly differently to the way in which the corresponding provisions of the DSO Act operated.
[27] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 6].
[28] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 6] [186] - [193], [195] - [196] and [198] - [202].
[29] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 6] [205] - [208].
[31] Dr Wojnarowska is a 'qualified expert' as defined in s 3 of the Act. Her report was prepared and obtained pursuant to s 67(1) of the Act in accordance with s 74 of the Act.
[35] The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [2020] WASC 330 [30] ‑ [31].
[36] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [2022] HCA 30.
[37] The respondent is an 'offender' for the purposes of the relevant provisions of the Act: Act, definition of 'offender' and 'serious offender under restriction' in s 3.
[39] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [100] - [101], [225].
[40] The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [2019] WASC 427 [21]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [44].
[41] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [72].
[43] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187; (2008) 38 WAR 307 [28]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [24]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [47].
[44] The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [24]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [47].
[45] Italiano v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 116 [46]; The State of Western Australia v Newland [2018] WASC 344 [12]; GBT v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 40 [21]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [22]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [45]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [73], [226].
[46] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [73], [227].
[47] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Williams [2007] WASCA 206; (2007) 35 WAR 297 [63]; GBT v The State of Western Australia [21]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [22]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [45]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [73], [226] - [227], [279]
[48] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [84].
[49] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Williams [63] ‑ [64]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Decke [2009] WASC 312 [14]; The State of Western Australia v Newland [21]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [26]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [51]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [106].
[50] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v DAL [No 2] [2016] WASC 212 [33]. Also adopted in The State of Western Australia v Narkle [2019] WASC 404 [13] and The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [26].
[51] The State of Western Australia v Latimer [2006] WASC 235 [24]; The State of Western Australia v Patrick [No 5] [2022] WASC 61 [56]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [85], [229] - [230].
[52] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [102], [231].
[53] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Hart [2019] WASC 4 [52]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [29]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [56] ‑ [58]; The State of Western Australia v Patrick [No 4] [2020] WASC 48 [109]-[111].
[54] The State of Western Australia v ACJ [2021] WASC 219 [416]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [103] - [104], [233].
[55] The State of Western Australia v Paul Douglas Allen also known as Paul Alan Francis Deverell [No 5] [2019] WASC 359 [7] ‑ [11].
[56] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [62].
[57] This section of my reasons substantially reproduces what I wrote in The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 6].
[58] This section of my reasons substantially reproduces what I wrote in The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 6].
[59] The State of Western Australia v PLN [No 2] [2009] WASC 21; Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 3]; Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4].
[60] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4] [5] ‑ [9].
[62] Treatment Progress Report prepared by Ms Korda, exhibit 1, vol 5, 1917 - 1919.
[63] Programme Completion Report, exhibit 1, vol 5, 1938.
[64] Pathways Programme Completion Report, exhibit 1, vol 4, 1870 - 1876.
[65] Treatment Progress Report prepared by Dr Poli, exhibit 1, vol 4, 1877.
[66] Treatment Progress Report prepared by Dr Poli, exhibit 1, vol 4, 1880; Exhibit 2. The Mallee Rehabilitation Centre is a unit at Casuarina Prison that is used to conduct the Solid Steps Programme: evidence of Ms Korda, ts 109, 5 October 2022.
[67] Treatment Progress Report prepared by Dr Poli, exhibit 1, vol 4,1881.
[68] Treatment Progress Report prepared by Ms Korda, exhibit 1, vol 5,1918.
[78] ts 90 - 91 and 105; 5 October 2022.
[140] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [178].
[141] Supervision Assessment Report, exhibit 1, vol 5, 1900; Treatment Progress Report prepared by Ms Korda, exhibit 1, vol 5, 1919; Department's Substance Use Test Results Report, exhibit 1, vol 5, 1949; This section of my reasons in part reproduces what I wrote in The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 6].
[142] Charge History, date range 22 August 2020-- 19 July 2022, exhibit 1, volume 1, 142.
[143] Treatment Progress report prepared by Ms Korda, exhibit 1, vol 5, 1921.
[144] Treatment Progress report prepared by Ms Korda, exhibit 1, vol 5, 1921.
[145] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [62].
[147] ts 85 - 86 and 135 - 136, 5 October 2022.
[151] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [55].
[152] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 6] [103] - [112].
[153] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 6] [205].
[154] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 6] [205].
[156] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 6] [205].
(2007) 35 WAR 297
(2008) 38 WAR 307