[2020] WASC 349
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of WA
2020-10-02
Derrick J
Original judgment source is linked above.
The enactment of the High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA)
Background to the application - the proceedings under the DSO Act
Even taking these matters into account, the respondent is a person who, without external controls, is at a high risk of committing a serious sexual offence. Despite that finding, in 2009 he was given the chance to live in the community on a supervision order. Despite the existence of the order and a great deal of community support, within 12 months the respondent had breached the order by consuming alcohol which is acknowledged to be a trigger to his sexual and generalised offending. Only a short time later his breaches became more serious and wider ranging. In April 2011 he committed the burglary offence during which he made a threat of sexual violence which he intended to carry out, albeit for a short period of time. Since then he has been in custody but he has not received any sex offender or substance abuse treatment other than the Pathways programme. He has not been rehabilitated. He has no realistic release plans.
Having regard to these matters I find that there is an unacceptable risk that, if an order that the respondent be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care, or treatment is not made, he would commit a serious sexual offence. Thus, pursuant to [the DSO Act], s 23 I am required to make a [continuing detention order].
I consider that a supervision order incorporating the draft conditions proposed by the Community Offender Monitoring Unit will adequately protect the public. The following factors, in combination, lead me to that conclusion.
First, the supervision order that I propose to make will provide for the close supervision and monitoring of Mr Narrier. There will be continuous monitoring of his whereabouts by a global positioning tracking system (a monitoring technique not available under the Act in 2009). He will be subject to a curfew. His home will be subject to random searches by police officers who will also be able to monitor Mr Narrier's use of any telephone or internet connection used by him. It will be a condition of the order that there be complete abstinence from drugs and alcohol and that he be subject to a regime of random testing for drug and alcohol use. Other conditions of the order will be that Mr Narrier comply with the treatment recommendations of his psychiatrist and take the anti‑libidinal medications prescribed for him and that he be subjected to testing to ensure compliance. The conditions of the order are set out in the appendix to these reasons. Strict compliance with the orders is required and the latitude seemingly extended to Mr Narrier in 2010 ‑ 2011 in respect of his breaches of the 2009 supervision order should not be extended to him in respect of any breaches of the order I propose to make.
Second, whilst Mr Narrier's breaches of the 2009 supervision order are a cause for concern about whether he will comply with the terms of a further supervision order, his breaches of the 2009 order must be weighed against the significant progress made by Mr Narrier in his rehabilitation. This is reflected in the evidence by:
(i) the positive observations of the facilitators of the [Sex Offender Treatment Program] in their Program Completion Report...;
(ii) the genuine therapeutic alliance formed with Ms Rankin and the benefits derived from that the [sic] psychological counselling;
(iii) his engagement with the Drug and Alcohol Through‑Care Services; and
(iv) Dr Wojnarowska's evidence that Mr Narrier is more open in the presentation of information.
The progress made by Mr Narrier in his rehabilitation is relevant is [sic] two ways. It provides a foundation for further rehabilitation in the community and it increases the likelihood that Mr Narrier will comply with the terms of the supervision order thereby avoiding the kinds of factors that led to his life being destabilised in the past.
Third, Mr Narrier has not been violent in prison and, apart from one episode of insulting behaviour in October 2015, it appears that he has behaved in a respectful manner to prison officers and other persons with whom he has come into contact. The impression that I have formed is that Mr Narrier is more respectful of authority and that his previous defiant attitude has moderated. In her report Dr Wojnarowska referred to the significant improvement in Mr Narrier's behaviour in recent years. This improvement in Mr Narrier's attitude is a basis for confidence that he will comply with a supervision order.
Fourth, Mr Narrier has now been trialled on anti‑libidinal medication. It appears that Mr Narrier is able to tolerate the medication with no side effects and that when the maximum daily dosage is administered it will have the effect of suppressing his libido thus reducing the risk of sexual offending. As I have already noted the supervision order will contain conditions that Mr Narrier comply with the treatment and medication regimes prescribed for him and his compliance with the medication regime be tested.
Fifth, Mr Narrier's release plan is not detailed but it is realistic. In my view, it is unrealistic to expect a person in Mr Narrier's position to be able to prepare a more detailed plan. Indeed a more detailed plan has the potential to set Mr Narrier up for failure and to undermine his psychological health. Mr Narrier's plan provides a strategy for him to re‑engage with the community by obtaining employment, re‑establishing contact with his family and establishing a social life which does not bring him into contact with pro-criminal influences. There is no doubt that Mr Narrier will require support to assist him re‑adjusting to life in the community and the Community Supervision Plan identifies the support that will be available to him: ongoing psychological counselling; maintaining an ongoing relationship with UCW to assist Mr Narrier with general reintegration (assistance with attendance at appointments, assistance in implementing Mr Narrier's release plan, leisure activities and encouragement to positive lifestyle changes); and, ongoing substance abuse counselling.
Sixth the risk factor that gives rise to the greatest concern is the risk that Mr Narrier will resort to cannabis use to cope with the stresses of life in the community. His relapse earlier this year weighs against the rescinding of the continuing detention order. It suggests that Mr Narrier will be unable to cope with the stresses of living in the community and complying with the supervision order without resorting to cannabis use which has the potential to result in offending. The counselling to which I have referred will attenuate that risk but cannot eliminate it. It will be a condition of the supervision order that Mr Narrier be subject to a strict regime of random testing for alcohol and drug use. As already stressed it is imperative that this regime be enforced and that Mr Narrier be monitored closely for alcohol and drug use. My view is that the combination of counselling and close monitoring for alcohol and drug use provides adequate protection against the risk that Mr Narrier will resort to cannabis use.
Seventh, Mr Narrier is older. He has been detained under the continuing detention order for a year. He has had the opportunity to reflect on how he must behave in the community in the event that a supervision order is made. The prospect of a further period of detention pursuant to [the DSO Act] if he breaches the supervision order will act as a significant personal deterrent.
If a person has committed one serious breach of the SO late in its duration, that breach may still mean that the court cannot be satisfied that the person will substantially comply with the standard conditions of a SO. On the other hand, repeated minor breaches of a number of the standard conditions may also mean that a court is not satisfied that a person will substantially comply with a SO.
I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent will substantially comply with the standard conditions of a SO because:
(1) the respondent remains at a high risk of serious sexual offending;
(2) the respondent presents a high risk of generalised offending, most particularly drug offences and such offences increase his risk of committing serious sexual offences;
(3) the respondent has a history of breaching the first SO and the amended second SO;
(4) the respondent's conduct in removing his transmitter and remaining in hiding from the supervising authorities and police in May 2018, after he had consumed illicit drugs, is a serious breach of the amended second SO;
(5) the measures which are in place to ensure that a DSO complies with a SO and the public are protected are rendered ineffective if the DSO is prepared, as the respondent was, to remove his transmitter and hide from the authorities;
(6) the use of illicit drugs increased the respondent's risk of committing serious sexual offences and breaching other conditions of a SO;
(7) whilst on the amended second SO, the respondent was not prepared to be entirely honest with members of his supervising team about his frustrations and personal problems; and
(8) the respondent was not prepared to comply with the conditions of his amended second SO where he thought it imposed unreasonable restrictions on his conduct.
Tottle J made it clear in 2017 that 'strict compliance' with the amended second SO was required and that the latitude which had seemingly been extended to the respondent in earlier years should not be extended to him in respect of any breaches of the amended second SO. The justification for those comments are obvious. Without strict restrictions on the respondent's behaviour in the community, the respondent poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sexual offence. Not only are those conditions justified but unless they are strictly enforced and the respondent is prepared to comply with them the community cannot be adequately protected.
The breach offences are telling evidence that the respondent cannot be trusted to comply with the standard conditions of a SO. If he does not comply with the standard conditions of a SO the community cannot be adequately protected from the risk which he poses of committing a serious sexual offence.
Taking into account the paramount consideration of ensuring adequate protection of the community, I am satisfied that the only appropriate order is to rescind the amended second SO and make a CDO in relation to the respondent.
Relevant statutory provisions and applicable legal principles
As will emerge from the outline below of the statutory framework under the DSO Act and [the Act], the concepts and criteria with which the court is concerned in determining an application of this kind are substantially the same under both statutes. Although I have reached that view on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the provisions of both statutes, having regard to the context of the provisions within the statutes and the objects underlying the statutes, the construction is confirmed, in my opinion, by the second reading speech made to the Legislative Assembly in respect of the High Risk Offenders Bill 2019 by the Honourable Attorney General. The Attorney informed the House that the bill was intended to 'extend the Supreme Court's ability to make a continuing detention order or supervision order to serious violent offenders in the same manner as the provisions contained in the [DSO Act]'. He went on to say:
'In doing so, this bill fully preserves the provisions that apply in respect of dangerous sexual offenders in the [DSO Act].'
Whether or not that has been achieved remains to be seen upon analysis of the provisions. However, in my opinion, as the concepts and criteria in both statutes are substantially the same, the jurisprudence established in respect of the DSO Act remains relevant in construing and applying [the Act], with appropriate adaptation in cases involving non-sexual offences.
The purpose of this Part is to ensure that an offender's detention under a continuing detention order is regularly reviewed.[31]
Review - periodic
(1) While an offender is subject to a continuing detention order, the State may apply to the Supreme Court for the offender's detention under the order to be reviewed.
(2) The State must apply under subsection (1) so as to ensure that reviews are carried out -
(a) as soon as practicable after the end of the period of 1 year commencing when the offender is first in custody on a day on which the offender would not have been in custody had the continuing detention order not been made; and
(b) as soon as practicable after the end of the period of 2 years commencing when the detention was most recently reviewed under this section or section 65.
(3) The periods mentioned in subsection (2)(a) and (b) are extended by any period during which the offender is in custody serving a sentence of imprisonment.
Dealing with application
(1) As soon as practicable after an application is made under section 64 or 65, the court must give directions for the hearing of the application.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), the application must be heard, and the review must be carried out, as soon as it is practicable to do so in accordance with any directions given by the court.
(3) The court may adjourn the hearing of the application, and the carrying out of the review, where good cause is shown.
Review of detention under continuing detention order
(1) On a review under section 66 of an offender's detention -
(a) if the court does not find that the offender remains a high risk serious offender it must rescind the continuing detention order; or
(b) if the court finds that the offender remains a high risk serious offender it must -
(i) affirm the continuing detention order; or
(ii) subject to section 29, rescind the continuing detention order and make a supervision order.
(2) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (1)(b)(i) or (ii), the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community.
An offender is a high risk serious offender if the court dealing with an application under this Act finds that it is satisfied, by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability, that it is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to the offender to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence.
(1) In this Act a continuing detention order in relation to an offender is an order that the offender be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care, or treatment.
(2) A continuing detention order has effect in accordance with its terms from the time the order is made until rescinded by a further order of the court.
(1) In this Act a supervision order in relation to an offender is an order that the offender, when not in custody, is to be subject to stated conditions that the court considers appropriate, in accordance with section 30.
(2) A supervision order has effect in accordance with its terms -
(a) from a date stated in the order; and
(b) for a period stated in the order.
(3) The date from which a supervision order has effect must not be earlier than 21 days after the date the order is made unless the court is satisfied that the implementation of the order from an earlier date is practically feasible.
In choosing between an indefinite detention order or a supervision order, the fact that the paramount consideration is the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community does not exclude other considerations. The use of the word 'adequate' indicates that a qualitative assessment is required. In considering whether a supervision order would adequately protect the community, account must be taken of conditions which can be placed on a supervision order so as to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the rehabilitation of the respondent and his care and treatment. The [DSO Act] does not require that there be no risk of reoffending. Such a requirement could never be met and would mean no person to whom the [DSO Act] applies would ever be released. The question is whether the risk is reduced to a reasonably acceptable level that ensures adequate protection of the community. That requires a weighing of the nature and degree of risk in the context of methods for the management and reduction of that risk. If, after considering all the evidence, the court is left in doubt as to whether the conditions of a supervision order would adequately protect the community, because the paramount consideration is the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the court must expressly decline to rescind the continuing detention order.
(1) A court cannot make, affirm or amend a supervision order in relation to an offender unless it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the order as made, affirmed or amended.
(2) The onus proof as to the matter described in subsection (1) is on the offender.
The clear intention of the review process is to allow for the possibility of a change of circumstances. Detention under the DSO Act is not a punishment for past offending, rather it is a protective mechanism designed to prevent the risk of future serious sexual offending from being realised. If circumstances change such that the risk of reoffending reduces or can be better managed in the community, then the continuing need for detention must be considered.
The risk of reoffending may change over time. It may be affected by age, health or the successful completion of treatment. The availability of new technology or resources in the community may also affect whether the risk of reoffending can be managed on a supervision order.
The justification for making a detention order is the existence of an unacceptable risk of serious sexual offending that cannot be adequately controlled by conditional release. However, detention also serves the purpose of allowing treatment and care in a secure environment: s 17 DSO Act. This confirms an obligation on the part of the prison authorities to facilitate change by offering programs and access to counselling.
If the risk changes or resources improve to enable more efficacious conditions then the need for detention may dissipate. In these circumstances continuing detention may be unjust.
The review process is intended to ensure that detention only continues where necessary. It mitigates the otherwise potentially draconian effect of imprisoning people for crimes that they have not committed. Reviews are not, therefore, merely a welfare check, rather they are an exercise of judicial power to affirm, vary or rescind a detention order. Continuing detention should not be ordered unless that course is justified by the circumstances existing at the time of the review. The court should choose the order that is least invasive of the person's right to be at liberty, whilst ensuring an adequate degree of protection of the community.
Although there is no doubt, under the Western Australian Act, that a court must have regard to the psychiatrists' reports (and must bear in mind that the authors have an area of expertise not shared by the court), the reports are only a part of the materials that must be considered and the weight to be accorded to them will depend upon their cogency and reliability, when considered in light of the whole of the evidence. The responsibility for deciding whether or not the offender is a serious danger to the community as defined and, if so, what order should be made is that of the judge alone.
On 24 March 1990 Mr Narrier, then aged 17, knocked on the door of the house of the victim and asked for a drink of water. When the victim returned, Mr Narrier was armed. Mr Narrier grabbed the victim by the throat, forced her into the bedroom and stripped her of her clothing. He then penetrated her anus and vagina with his fingers before attempting to penetrate her anus with his penis. Mr Narrier stole $25 from the victim before he bound her, gagged her and assaulted her whilst demanding more money. Following his arrest, Mr Narrier entered pleas of guilty to offences of aggravated sexual assault, armed robbery and burglary, and was sentenced by the President of the Children's Court on 1 May 1990 to a total of 4 years imprisonment. He was released on 21 January 1993.
On 5 February 1993, shortly after his release at the end of the 4 year sentence, Mr Narrier committed two offences of burglary, one of child stealing and one of assault occasioning bodily harm. The circumstances were that, whilst armed with a knife, Mr Narrier entered a house at 11.30 pm and removed the 12‑year‑old child/victim by force. He took the victim across the road where he forced her to the ground and removed her nightgown. Mr Narrier punched the victim three times to the face. Mr Narrier attempted to undo his trousers and lay on top of the victim. The victim's screams attracted the attention of neighbours who came to assist. On 17 June 1993 Mr Narrier was sentenced to a total of 5 years imprisonment. Mr Narrier was released on 3 February 1997.
Between 16 and 17 January 1998 Mr Narrier committed offences involving two female victims in their homes on a single night, namely, an aggravated burglary and sexual assault, and a second aggravated burglary with an associated assault occasioning bodily harm. The details are as follows. At about 11.00 pm on 16 January 1998, Mr Narrier grabbed the 30‑year‑old victim by the throat as she put her dog outside the back of her house. Mr Narrier forced her to the lounge room and pulled down her pants. Mr Narrier threatened to kill her if she did not stay quiet. Mr Narrier then penetrated the victim's vagina with his penis. After withdrawing from the victim, Mr Narrier went to the kitchen and later spoke to and apologised to her before leaving. Later that night, at about 1.15 am on 17 January 1998, Mr Narrier entered a different house through an unlocked door in order to steal money. The victim, who was asleep on the lounge, awoke and was restrained by the neck and head by Mr Narrier. She managed to struggle free. No sexual assault took place. For the offending on that night, Mr Narrier was sentenced on 16 June 1998 to terms of imprisonment structured to arrive at an aggregate term of 12 years imprisonment without parole. A term of indefinite detention was also imposed but later quashed by the Court of Appeal.
On 25 December 1998 Mr Narrier whilst in custody was involved in a riot at Casuarina Prison. He was convicted of nine offences including assault of a public officer, damage, threats to kill, threats to injure and threats to harm. On 28 April 2000 Mr Narrier was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment, without eligibility for parole, to be served cumulatively upon the 12-year term already imposed.
The effect was that Mr Narrier was required to serve a term of 15 years imprisonment from 19 January 1998. The end date of the aggregate sentences was 12 July 2008.
Developments since the determination of the second contravention application
Does the respondent remain a high risk serious offender?
Recommendations for ongoing treatment and management
ANNEXURE 1 STANDARD CONDITIONS REQUIRED BY THE ACT
The following conditions incorporate the above standard conditions and are suggested to strengthen and add to the standard conditions required by the Act for the more effective management of the offender in the community.
(a) For the purpose of averting or minimising a serious risk of death or injury to yourself or another person;
(b) For a purpose, and for a duration, approved in advance by a CCO;
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[1] Act, s 2(1)(a).
[2] The term 'commencement day' is defined for the purposes of the provisions contained in pt 10 of the Act (s 122 ‑ s 125) to mean 'the day on which this section comes into operation'. The 'day on which this section comes into operation' is, by virtue of proclamation, 26 August 2020: Act, s 2(1)(c).
[4] The State of Western Australia v PLN [No 2] [2009] WASC 21.
[5] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 3] [2014] WASC 131 [21] ‑ [26]; Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4] [2017] WASC 306 [12] ‑ [20].
[6] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 3] [32]; Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4] [21].
[7] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 3] [30]; Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4] [21].
[8] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 3].
[9] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 3] [88] ‑ [89].
[10] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4].
[11] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4] [82] ‑ [90].
[12] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [2019] WASC 17 [11].
[13] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [41].
[14] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [41].
[15] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [41]. The amended supervision order had 'effect in accordance with its terms': DSO Act, s 26.
[16] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [44].
[17] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [44].
[18] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [44].
[19] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [45].
[20] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [3].
[21] The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [118] ‑ [122].
[22]The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [4]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Narrier [2018] WASCSR 228. The five contravention offences for which Jenkins J sentenced the respondent (failing to observe his curfew, being at the home of another without prior approval, using amphetamine and methylamphetamine, using cannabis, and removing his transmitter) were the offences committed by him in May 2018. The remaining three contravention offences referred to in [18] above (visiting a house used by squatters, providing a urine sample that tested positive for cannabis, permitting his partner to stay overnight at his house) were committed by the respondent in January 2018 and April 2018. The respondent pleaded guilty to these three offences also and was sentenced for them by the Magistrates Court by way of the imposition of fines.
[23]The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [4]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Narrier [35].
[24]The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [4]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Narrier [35].
[26] Dr Wojnarowska and Dr Galloghly are 'qualified experts' as defined in s 3 of the Act. Their reports were prepared and obtained pursuant to s 67 of the Act and in accordance with s 74 of the Act.
[30] The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [2020] WASC 330 [30] ‑ [31].
[31] The respondent is an 'offender' for the purposes of the relevant provisions of the Act: Act, definition of 'offender' and 'serious offender under restriction' in s 3.
[32] The relevant date for the purposes of s 64(2)(a) is 9 July 2020, the continuing detention order having commenced on 9 July 2019 upon the expiration of the 14 month sentence imposed by Jenkins J on the respondent for the five contravention offences.
[33] On 17 September 2020 the court, as required by s 66(1), gave directions for the hearing of the application.
[35] The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [2019] WASC 427 [21]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [44].
[36] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187; (2008) 38 WAR 307 [28]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [24]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [47].
[37] The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [24]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [47].
[38] Italiano v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 116 [46]; The State of Western Australia v Newland [2018] WASC 344 [12]; GBT v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 40 [21]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [22]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [45].
[39] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Williams [2007] WASCA 206; (2007) 35 WAR 297 [63]; GBT v The State of Western Australia [21]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [22]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [45].
[40] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Williams [63] ‑ [64]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Decke [2009] WASC 312 [14]; The State of Western Australia v Newland [21]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [26]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [51].
[41] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v DAL [No 2] [2016] WASC 212 [33]. Also adopted in The State of Western Australia v Narkle [2019] WASC 404 [13] and The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [26].
[42] The State of Western Australia v Latimer [2006] WASC 235 [25]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Decke [15]; The State of Western Australia v Newland [22]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [27]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [52].
[43] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Hart [2019] WASC 4 [52]; The State of Western Australia v Narrier [No 5] [113]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [29]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [56] ‑ [58].
[44] The State of Western Australia v Paul Douglas Allen also known as Paul Alan Francis Deverell [No 5] [2019] WASC 359 [7] ‑ [11].
[45] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [62].
[46] The State of Western Australia v PNL [No 2]; Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 3]; Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4].
[47] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Narrier [No 4] [5] ‑ [9].
[48] Suboxone (Buprenorphine) is an opioid used to treat opioid use disorder.
[101] The State of Western Australia v Corbett [No 5] [2017] WASC 115 [80].
[102] The State of Western Australia v Corbett [No 5] [78], [81] ‑ [82].
[103] The respondent did not seek an adjournment of the application on the basis of the current unavailability to him of suitable supported accommodation. In all the circumstances of the application, including the uncertainty as to when any such accommodation may become available to him, the respondent's approach in this regard was understandable.
(2008) 38 WAR 307
(2007) 35 WAR 297