[2025] WASC 318
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of WA
2025-08-08
Strk J
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) remanded in custody from 7 September 2024 to 2 October 2025 (26 days);
(b) served a custodial sentence from 2 October 2024 to 6 May 2025 (217 days); and
(c) remanded in custody from 25 June 2025 to date.
(a) on 27 March 2024 the conditions of the supervision order were explained to the respondent, and he initialled each condition to confirm his understanding;
(b) on 2 October 2024 the respondent was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 8 months, backdated to commence on 7 September 2024;
(c) the respondent was made eligible for parole in relation to various offences for which he had been sentenced on 2 October 2025;
(d) on 10 December 2024 the Prisoners Review Board denied the respondent's release to parole;
(e) on 6 May 2025, when the respondent was released from custody after serving his full sentence, the conditions of his supervision order were again explained to him, and he initialled each condition to confirm his understanding and re‑signed the supervision order;
(f) upon his release from custody the respondent continued to reside at the address prescribed in the supervision order;
(g) the respondent is currently remanded at Hakea Prison due to 13 pending alleged charges under s 80 of the High Risk Serious Offenders Act, and three pending alleged charges under the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act. He is alleged to have committed these further offences following his re‑release to the community on 6 May 2025;
(h) the respondent is next due to appear in Midland Magistrates Court on 8 August 2025;
(i) she does not consider there to be any meaningful amendments that could be made to the supervision order to allow for adequate management of the respondent's risk of serious offending in the community; and
(j) of particular concern is the respondent's ability to access the internet and circumvent conditions in place to authorise or supervise the respondent's use of the same.
Contraventions had resulted in outcomes other than formal charges
impacting the management of the Respondent's risk of serious sexual offending, due to the correlation with the risk scenarios predicted during expert risk assessments completed for the purpose of the Restriction Order hearing.
The contravening behaviour has involved the Respondent using public computers to minimise detection when creating email addresses, failing to declare electronic devices inclusive of mobile telephones, storage devices, and engaging in various online chat rooms. The Respondent's use of electronic devices and the internet without approval from a [Community Corrections Officer] has continued to be a significant and high-level risk factor relating to his case management in the community and ability to monitor his increase in contravening his [High Risk Serious Offender supervision order].
(1) This section applies if an offender who is subject to a supervision order is before the Supreme Court and proceedings on an application made under section 53 in respect of the offender are pending (the pending proceedings).
(2) The court may at any time in the pending proceedings -
(a) if the offender is detained in custody, order the offender to be released, subject to subsection (3); or
(b) if the offender is not detained in custody, order the offender to be detained in custody.
(3) The court cannot order the offender to be released unless it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that -
(a) releasing the offender is justified by exceptional circumstances; and
(b) the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the supervision order, including any amendments to the standard conditions made under subsection (7)(b).
(4) The onus of proof as to the matter described in subsection (3)(b) is on the offender.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (3), in considering whether releasing the offender is justified by exceptional circumstances the court may, as it thinks fit, receive and take into account information put before it, whether or not that information would normally be admissible in a court of law.
(6) In making a decision under subsections (2) and (3), the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure adequate protection of the community.
(7) If the court releases the offender -
(a) the offender remains subject to the supervision order; and
(b) the court may, before the pending proceedings are determined, make an interim order amending the supervision order to include any requirements the court considers appropriate to ensure adequate protection of the community; and
(c) the court may order the offender to reappear before the court at any adjourned hearing of the pending proceedings; and
(d) if it is alleged that the offender has further breached the supervision order or breached an order made under paragraph (c), the court may issue a warrant to have the offender arrested and brought before the court.
Prima facie, in my view, 'detained in custody', within the meaning of s 56, means detained pursuant to the provisions of the Act. Section 56(2)(a) cannot be construed as providing this Court with a general dispensing power to release persons who are otherwise in custody, either as sentenced prisoners or on remand for other offences. In the context of pt 4 div 5 of the Act, in my view, the expression 'detained in custody' would ordinarily apply to a person who is in custody as a consequence of having been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued under s 51 of the Act in relation to a suspected or anticipated contravention of a supervision order. An order of the Court would be necessary to 'release' such a person from custody, and so s 56(2)(a) would apply - including the requirements of s 56(3).
Similarly, a person detained pursuant to an order of the Court made under s 53(2)(b) of the Act would be 'detained in custody' within the meaning of s 56(2)(a).
[T]he real issue is that which applies generally to an interim detention order (under s 46(2)(c)) or an interim supervision order under (s 58(2)(c)); namely, whether the Court is satisfied that, to ensure adequate protection of the community, it is desirable to make either an interim detention order or an interim supervision order. That is, in effect, the test that applies to the making of an interim supervision order generally.
This points up an important aspect of any consideration of alleged contraventions of an interim supervision order. Compliance with an interim supervision order (and, indeed, any supervision order) is an important matter, and the importance of such compliance should not be understated. Nevertheless, it must be recognised, having regard to the text and structure of the Act as a whole, that an interim supervision order is not an end in, and of, itself. An interim supervision order is a means to an end: the end being the protection of the community against the risk of serious offences.
In that sense, a supervision order or an interim supervision order will have served its purpose if it protects the community from serious offences, even if compliance with the conditions of the order, in the particular case, has not been perfect. The Court must always keep in mind that the object of the Act to be achieved is the adequate protection of the community from the commission of serious offences.
The most likely risk scenario for [the respondent] is a breach of the conditions of a Community Supervision Order. This may be brought about due to his underestimation of the seriousness of the obligations inherent in an imposed Order. Specifically, his [autism spectrum disorder] means that he may be more likely to engage in behaviours that are egocentric and consequently fail to naturally consider the outcomes of those behaviours (such as those that constitute a breach of conditions). The most serious risk scenario would involve [the respondent] offending against identifiable victims, brought about by his sexual deviancy and sexual compulsivity overriding his self-regulation skills.
At the conclusion of Dr Bannister's report, he set out a number of recommendations which included conditions that he suggested the court consider imposing should the respondent be made subject to a supervision order. The suggested conditions were that the respondent should be restricted in his internet use specifically in relation to searching for, collecting, accessing, or possessing images of children or documentation relating to child exploitation material, as well as restrictions placed on his capacity to conceal such activity where possible; the devices he has in his possession to access the internet should be regularly monitored; and he should also be restricted from having any unsupervised contact with someone under the age of 18 years.
The RSVP can guide professional judgement of the type of offending scenarios that may occur for an offender. The resulting scenario planning can then provide a basis for management interventions that may ameliorate risk in the community.
Were [the respondent] to reoffend, the most probable scenario would be repetition of prior offending, that is, accessing child exploitation material or participating in chat rooms to write about and thereby distribute such material. His past behaviour suggests that, without any intervention, he could reoffend within a timeframe of six months to two years. The risk he poses is chronic given his long history of offending and his still relatively young age. Warning signs that might signal that risk is increasing or imminent include use of legal child images for masturbatory purposes and increasing time spent online.
A potential shift in [the respondent's] offending behaviour could involve the above scenario with activities undertaken on internet capable devices acquired surreptitiously (such as a 'burner' phone) and connected via third party Wi-Fi networks in an effort to avoid detection.
Although less likely, there exists a scenario where [the respondent] could escalate to direct contact offending against children. Given his poor social skills any such victims would likely need to already be accessible to, and trusting of, [the respondent]. His very limited existing network and limited capacity to create future networks suggests a very low likelihood of this occurring. The potential for such offences to escalate to serious physical violence is also low, but the psychological impact on victims of contact offending would be very serious. (Emphasis added)
As to management strategies, Dr Hall set out in his report a number of recommendations. As to monitoring, Dr Hall recorded that he considered that effective monitoring of the respondent should include vigilant oversight of his online activities and his adherence to the conditions of a restriction order, particularly his level of engagement with mental health services. He further noted that disengagement from health services or supervision, entering a relationship, or obtaining employment would warrant a reassessment of risk.
STANDARD CONDITIONS REQUIRED BY THE HIGH RISK SERIOUS OFFENDERS ACT
('Contact' under this condition and the following two conditions means any form of interaction or communication whether by word, gesture, expression or touch and whether in person, in writing, by telephonic or electronic means, but does not include the bare minimum of interaction or communication necessary between an adult and child to promptly and civilly terminate any inadvertent or uninvited interaction or communication);
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[2] Affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, par 18.
[6] Affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, par 96.
[7] Affidavit of JM Lloyd affirmed on 4 August 2025, par 24.
[8] Affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, par 9; affidavit of JM Lloyd affirmed on 4 August 2025, par 25.
[9] Affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, par 10.
[10] Affidavit of JM Lloyd affirmed on 4 August 2025, par 34.
[11] Affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, par 19.
[12] Affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, par 44.
[13] Affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, par 45.
[14] The State of Western Australia v Slater [No 2] [2021] WASC 465 [17], cited with approval in The State of Western Australia v MAR [No 4] [2023] WASC 271 [14].
[15] The State of Western Australia v Slater [No 2] [18], cited with approval in The State of Western Australia v MAR [No 4] [15].
[16] The State of Western Australia v Slater [No 2] [24], cited with approval in The State of Western Australia v MAR [No 4] [17].
[20] As required by s 74(2) of the High Risk Serious Offenders Act.
[21] The State of Western Australia v Hoskin [No 2] [122].
[23] The State of Western Australia v Hoskin [No 2] [172].
[24] The State of Western Australia v Hoskin [No 2].
[25] The State of Western Australia v Hoskin [No 2] [170]; affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, page 18.
[27] Affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, pages 253, 258.
[28] Affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, page 254.
[29] Affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, page 256.
[30] Affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, pars 84 - 86 and page 259.
[31] Affidavit of TJ Lilly affirmed on 4 August 2025, par 99.