[2015] VSC 257
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of Victoria
2015-06-05
OSBORN JA
Original judgment source is linked above.
PROCEDURE - Application for change of venue - Pre-trial publicity - Adequacy of arrangements for accommodation of accused during trial.
Ms V Anscombe, Acting Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
1 The accused man is charged with the murder of Michelle Buckingham at Shepparton on 21 October 1983. His trial is fixed for hearing at Shepparton in the September circuit this year.
2 He makes application for a change of venue to Melbourne on two bases:
(a) the inability to obtain a fair trial as a result of pre-trial publicity in Shepparton; and
(b) the inadequacy of the arrangements for his custody during the trial.
3 Section 192 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 provides -
If a court considers that -
(a) a fair trial in a criminal proceeding cannot otherwise be had; or
(b) for any other reason it is appropriate to do so -
the court may order that the trial be held at any other place that the court considers appropriate.
4 The principles governing the relevant discretion were summarised in R v Vjestica:
Ordinarily, a trial will proceed in the district in which the offence charged is alleged to have been committed. As Lush J explained in Re Ratten,[1] this course is adopted:
so that justice will be seen to be done by those who are interested in seeing it and so that no feeling can arise that justice is done in a distant place and community.
More recently, in Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Bennett, Cummins J expressed the view that there were:
powerful reasons of public policy why the venue of offence should be the venue of trial. The local community is the community in which the alleged crime took place; it is concerned to have the law administered within it; and to remove a circuit trial to Melbourne can lead the vacated community to feel disenfranchised, marginalised or alienated. All this is common experience. This basal requirement should not be watered down by mere administrative convenience. This is the Supreme Court of Victoria, not the Supreme Court of Melbourne.[2]
But the presumption in favour of a local trial is a rule of practice, not a rule of law. However powerful the considerations favouring a local trial may be, they must give way to the paramount requirement that the defendant have a fair trial. The venue of the trial must be changed if there is a real risk that a trial held locally will not be fair - or will not be seen to be fair[3] - and that risk cannot be eliminated:
by controlling the procedures of the trial by adjournments or other interlocutory orders, by rulings on evidence and, especially, by directions to the jury designed to counteract any prejudice which the accused might otherwise suffer.[4]
As Nettle J said in R v Iaria,[5] each application for change of venue falls to be considered on its own merits, without preconceptions. There is no necessity for an applicant to show exceptional circumstances. Nor is the applicant to be regarded as bearing a 'heavy onus'.[6] It is both necessary and sufficient for the applicant to show that the change of venue is necessary for the purpose of securing a fair and impartial trial.[7]
But the test of necessity is, in practice, a stringent one. As discussed below, our system of jury trial has its own built-in protections against unfairness resulting from (for example) prejudicial pre-trial publicity. Those safeguards are: the excusing of any potential juror who may have difficulty deciding the case impartially; warnings and directions from the trial judge to the jury about deciding the case strictly on the evidence; and the discipline of participation in the trial itself. Even where a risk of prejudice is identified, the applicant for change of venue will often be hard pressed to establish that these safeguards will not be sufficient to eliminate the risk.[8]
5 In the present case, the presumption that the trial should take place in Shepparton is fortified by the following considerations:
(a) the transfer of the trial to Melbourne would present difficulties to the family of the deceased in terms of their ongoing ability to attend and observe the trial and would cause them consequential inconvenience and stress;
(b) such transfer would cause substantial inconvenience to the majority of the prosecution witnesses who also reside in and around Shepparton;
(c) it will be logistically more difficult to organise the Shepparton-based witnesses to attend Melbourne rather than Shepparton; and
(d) there is a particular local public interest in demonstrating the adequacy of the justice system to the community which is concerned with a cold case of this kind.
6 Nevertheless, the fundamental principle is that the accused is entitled to a fair trial and that this concept requires the Court to consider whether there is a real risk that the trial will be unfair, or be seen to be unfair, if held in Shepparton.
7 The deceased was fifteen years old when she disappeared on 21 October 1983. Some 14 days later her body was found. She had died as the result of 19 stab wounds.
8 The Crown case relies in part on a number of circumstantial matters which are said to tend to confirm that the accused was implicated in the killing. At its core, however, it centres in material part upon evidence that, before the body was found, the accused admitted to his brother-in-law, Mr Gribble, that he killed the deceased and admitted other matters (such as the location of the body) not known by the public.
9 Mr Gribble did not speak to police for many years thereafter. When he did so, the accused made a series of recorded interviews with police in which he progressively admitted knowledge of the circumstances of the deceased's death.
10 Ultimately and after the committal hearing, the accused admitted direct participation in the events surrounding the killing but denied responsibility for it. The proposed Crown opening summarises the critical aspects of the accused's fourth record of interview as follows:
11 In turn, the issues at trial are now materially more confined than they were even at the time of the accused's committal. Significantly, for the purposes of the present application, they are much more confined than they were during the course of the bulk of the media coverage relied on for the purposes of this application.
12 I have considered the material submitted to the Court evidencing extended coverage relating to the initial reportage of the deceased's death, the investigation of the deceased's death, the arrest of the accused and the committal.
13 The material comprises newspaper articles from both regional and Melbourne newspapers, television and radio coverage and social media coverage. It relates essentially to five aspects:
(a) events relating to the circumstances of the death as described in 1983;
(b) the revival of the cold case investigation in 2012 in which the Shepparton News played a significant part;
(c) the activities of the cold case unit of Victoria Police and, in particular, of former Detective Senior Sergeant Iddles;
14 Defence counsel summarises the material relied on as follows:
15 It is conceded on behalf of the accused that none of the material relied on is materially inaccurate or unfairly prejudicial in the sense that it states matters directly relating to the accused which have no foundation.
16 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the effect of the publicity to which the Shepparton community has been exposed is such that it is probable that any jury empanelled at Shepparton:
(a) will be influenced by community feeling calling for the righting of a long-standing injustice; and
(b) will have some preconceptions concerning the case.
17 More particularly, it is submitted that the effect of the media reporting in the Shepparton area has been to:
(a) engender widespread support and sympathy in the Shepparton area for the family and friends of Michelle Buckingham;
(b) encourage the belief in the Shepparton area that Detective Senior Sergeant Iddles is a highly distinguished and experienced police investigator who is publically confident that the accused is guilty of the offence charged;
(c) reflect credit in the Shepparton area on the intrepid reporting of local reporter Ms Tammy Mills and her urging that the case concerning Michelle Buckingham be re-opened by the police;
(d) enflame disquiet in the Shepparton area that the death of Michelle Buckingham should have remained unsolved for such a long time;
(e) widely disseminate in the Shepparton area details of the evidence to be given in the case;
(f) reflect the fact that in the Shepparton area, the death of Michelle Buckingham is a widespread topic of discussion and speculation.
18 I accept that the circumstances of the deceased's death will have engendered widespread sympathy and support for the family and friends of the deceased. In consequence, it will be necessary to exclude from the jury persons who know the family and friends of the deceased.
19 Nevertheless, subject to adoption of this course, I am not persuaded that the potential for such sympathy at trial will derive so much from pre-trial publicity as from the underlying facts of the case. Whether or not the Crown's or the accused's version of events is ultimately preferred by the jury, sympathy for the deceased's family and friends will necessarily inure simply from the underlying and uncontested facts that a 15 year old girl was picked up in her home town and brutally stabbed to death. In consequence, the jury will need to be instructed to decide the case on the evidence and not on the basis of sympathy or emotion.
20 I do not accept that the need for such a direction would be materially less in Melbourne or that the case is so different from other homicide cases that the capacity of a Shepparton jury to abide by proper instructions can sensibly be doubted.
21 Next, I accept that both the Shepparton and statewide press coverage of the cold case investigation was personalised in the sense that it emphasised the roles of both the Shepparton News reporter Ms Mills and Mr Iddles. I doubt that Mr Iddles's reputation is significantly less well known in Melbourne than in Shepparton. Indeed, The Age articles to which reference is made by the accused might be thought to support the contrary view. Nevertheless, I accept that the real question is whether the community of Shepparton has been adversely impacted by the combined effect of the local press coverage and the statewide press coverage. It is relevant to observe that the reportage of the cold case investigation essentially pointed to the need to resolve the puzzle of the underlying facts connected with the death of the deceased. As such, the purpose of the cold case investigation and associated publicity was not itself inimical to the conduct of a proper trial subsequently.
22 The jury will now be confronted with a case which has in effect crystallised after the cold case investigation by reason of the fourth record of interview given by the accused. As stated above, they will need to be properly instructed that they must decide the case at the trial on the evidence and on the evidence alone. I am not persuaded that the press coverage relating to the cold case investigation is such that a Shepparton jury would be materially influenced by it or would be unable to follow appropriate directions.
23 The same considerations apply to the propositions that the media reporting relied on has enflamed disquiet in the Shepparton area because the death of the deceased has remained unsolved for such a long time, and that the death of the deceased is a widespread topic of discussion and speculation in the area.
24 There may well be a widespread desire within the Shepparton area to properly investigate the cause of the deceased's death and resolve the question of criminal responsibility for it. Once again, however, these matters are not in themselves incompatible with the conduct of a fair trial in accordance with law. In one sense, they simply tend to reinforce the significance of the trial process and the jury's role in it.
25 Lastly, in this context, I am not persuaded that there has been a dissemination of evidence which will preclude a fair trial for the following reasons:
(a) dissemination of evidence commenced in 1983 and has been a protracted and somewhat patchy process;
(b) much of the evidence which has been disseminated goes to contextual circumstances which are now not controversial;
(c) the complexion of the real evidentiary issues in the case has materially changed as a result of the fourth record of interview and the statements made in that record of interview have not been the subject of dissemination in the manner complained of;
(d) it is not suggested that the dissemination of evidence has been materially inaccurate or misleading; and
(e) the jury can and will be instructed of the necessity to decide the case on the evidence which they hear and that necessity will be reinforced by the whole trial process, including directions as to their role, the need to disregard extraneous information, the onus of proof, the standard of proof, the evidence in the case, the issues in the case and the contentions of both the Crown and the defence as to those issues.
26 It follows that I am not persuaded by the matters raised on behalf of the accused either individually or taken together that it is necessary to change the trial venue. As will be apparent from what I have already said, my conclusions are premised in part on acceptance of the proposition that juries can fulfil the independent role required of them despite some media publicity prior to the trial. Whether that publicity gives rise to an unacceptable risk of an unfair trial will always be a question of fact and degree.
27 In the present case, such risks as may be inherent in the pre-trial publicity can, in my view, be managed by the trial process. The principal safeguards are the excusing of potential jurors who may have difficulty deciding the case impartially; warnings and directions from the trial judge to the jury of the need to decide the case strictly on the evidence and not upon considerations of sympathy or emotion; and the effect of participation in the trial itself including the definition of the issue they must decide.
Whilst the criminal justice system assumes the efficacy of juries, that 'does not involve the assumption that their decisionmaking is unaffected by matters of possible prejudice.'[13] In Glennon, Mason CJ and Toohey J recognised that '[t]he possibility that a juror might acquire irrelevant and prejudicial information is inherent in a criminal trial.'[14] What, however, is vital to the criminal justice system is the capacity of jurors, when properly directed by trial judges, to decide cases in accordance with the law, that is, by reference only to admissible evidence led in court and relevant submissions, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations. That capacity is critical to ensuring that criminal proceedings are fair to an accused.[15]
30 These observations were made in the context of an application for a permanent stay of proceedings and not an application for change of venue. Nevertheless, they endorse the procedural mechanisms which will be adopted in this case and which support the conclusion that a fair trial can be had, and be seen to be had, at Shepparton.
31 In the present case, the prosecution submitted that there are a number of relatively recent instances in this State of cases in which, despite the refusal of a change of venue application, a jury has nevertheless brought in a verdict of not guilty. These cases and the general experience of the Court fortify my view that this is a case in which the jury can be expected to put aside any preconceptions they may have about the matter.
32 I am not persuaded in the present case either that the matters which have been disseminated by media publicity are in themselves materially prejudicial to the accused or that the jury cannot be properly and effectively directed to ensure that they base their verdict upon the evidence alone and that a fair trial is had.
33 The second basis of the application arises out of the circumstances in which the accused was held in the police cells at Shepparton during the committal period between 19-21 November 2014. During this period, he was incarcerated in three different police cells. The bedding provided was of a very basic standard placed directly on the cement slab of the cell. The accused suffers from chronic back pain as a result of a long history of working as a shearer. The sleeping conditions caused him to experience more severe pain than normal and made sleep difficult. Fluorescent tube lighting was kept on in the cell block all night and the areas in which he was required to sleep remained highly lit.
34 Intoxicated people were brought into the cell block throughout the night which sometimes resulted in the police moving the accused from cell to cell. The noise made by other prisoners interrupted the accused's sleep.
35 There was little privacy provided in respect of toilet and washing facilities. The accused was unable to obtain adequate shaving equipment, toothpaste or toiletries. He was abused and shouted at by other prisoners. He was denied access to his written brief and was denied access to any paper, pens, pencils or reading matter while he remained in the cells. The food was not fresh.
37 The prosecutor accepts that the conditions described are not adequate for the proper accommodation of the accused during the trial. I agree and I would add that the Shepparton Court is one of those in which the accused is placed in a dock centrally located within the courtroom during his trial. The effect of this is to expose him to close scrutiny by the jury and in my view this set up heightens the relevance of a number of the concerns expressed by the accused.
38 In response to the matters raised by the accused, an affidavit of Detective Senior Constable Simon Hunt has been sworn deposing to arrangements proposed for the accommodation of the accused during the trial.
39 It is apparent that the arrangements proposed materially address a large number of the accused's concerns. If he is provided with a separate cell in the manner proposed and otherwise accommodated as proposed I am not persuaded that the standard of accommodation will be such that it is necessary to change the venue of the trial.
40 Nevertheless, it will be open to the accused to re-agitate his concerns if in the course of the trial his conditions of accommodation are in fact inadequate.
41 The Court will also have the power to itself inspect the cells.
42 As things stand at present, however, I am not persuaded that the trial venue should be changed from Shepparton to Melbourne. The application for change of venue is refused.
[1] Re Ratten (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Lush J, 4 August 1970).
[2] Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Bennett [2004] VSC 148; (2004) 10 VR 355 [6].
[3] Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Bennett [2004] VSC 148; (2004) 10 VR 355 [10] and the cases there cited; Cording v Trembath [1921] VicLawRp 27; [1921] VLR 163, 166-167 (Cussen J): to ensure that not only would a fair trial be had in fact 'but that it should be had in such circumstances that all reasonable men would so admit'.
[4] Jago v District Court (NSW) [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 CLR 23, 47; [1989] HCA 46; 41 A Crim R 307, 324 (Brennan J), cited by Nettle J in R v Iaria [2004] VSC 96; (2004) 9 VR 425, 430; [2004] VSC 96; 145 A Crim R 74, 79 [18]; R v Georgiou [2002] QCA 206; (2002) 131 A Crim R 150, 154 [23].
[5] R v Iaria [2004] VSC 96; (2004) 9 VR 425; 145 A Crim R 74, 77 [10] citing R v Yanner [1998] 2 Qd R 208, 209; (1997) 98 A Crim R 51, 52 (Pincus JA).
[6] Cf R v Cattell [1968] 1 NSWR 156.
[7] R v Holden [1833] EngR 653; (1833) 110 ER 819; 5 B & Ad 347; R v Boughton [1895] 2 IR 386.
[8] R v Vjestica [2008] VSCA 47; (2008) 182 A Crim R 350, 352-3 [2]-[5] (Maxwell P) (citations in original) ('Vjestica').
[9] Summary of Prosecution Opening dated 21 April 2015, [48].
[10] Applicant's Outline of Submissions on Change of Venue dated 20 May 2015, [9]-[29].
[13] Gilbert v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 414 at 420 [13] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow J).
[14] [1992] HCA 16; (1992) 173 CLR 592, 603. See also Murphy v The Queen [1989] HCA 28; (1989) 167 CLR 94, 99; [1989] HCA 28.
[15] Dupas v The Queen [2010] HCA 20; (2010) 241 CLR 237, 248-9 [29].
[16] Affidavit of Steven Bradley sworn 1 May 2015, [18]-[22].
[17] Affidavit of Simon Hunt sworn 26 May 2015, [9]-[11].
The Queen
Bradley
(2004) 10 VR 355
(1989) 168 CLR 23
(2004) 9 VR 425
(2010) 241 CLR 237
(2000) 201 CLR 414
(1992) 173 CLR 592
(1989) 167 CLR 94