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[2003] FCA 619
procedural. The applicant's motion was dismissed. Kiefel J stated that Mr Tait would need to file an address for service satisfying the rule before the Court could consider whether to extend the time for his...
The Federal Court Rules required Mr Tait to provide an address where documents could both be posted and left for him. His university post office address accepted mail sent through Australia Post but not documents delivered by hand or courier, so it did not meet the rule. Kiefel J rejected the argument that a postal address was enough or that an exemption should be made on the circumstances presented. The motion to review the Registrar's decision was dismissed. The Court did not decide whether Mr Tait should receive more time to appeal the Tribunal decision.
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1,941 words · generated 28/09/2026
In Tait v C Reynolds, William “Billy” Tait asked the Federal Court to review a Deputy District Registrar’s decision not to accept documents for filing. Those documents related to an appeal he had brought from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The issue was not the substance of that Tribunal decision. It was whether the address Mr Tait had given for service met the Federal Court Rules.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
On 21 May 2003, the Queensland District Registry received Mr Tait’s documents. The Deputy District Registrar wrote to him that the documents could not be accepted because he had not nominated an address for service in accordance with Order 7 r 6. The Registrar supplied a pro forma notice of change of address and said the documents would be held until it was received ([2]).
Mr Tait’s nominated address was “c/- James Cook University Post Office, James Cook University, Townsville, Qld 4811” ([4]). The Registry understood from his correspondence that the post office would accept documents only if they had been sent through Australia Post. It would not accept documents delivered by hand or courier ([5]–[6]). Mr Tait had also said that correspondence should be sent by ordinary or express post and that he would not accept responsibility for registered post if collection required his signature ([7]).
Kiefel J heard Mr Tait’s motion by video-link on 19 June 2003 and dismissed it. Her reasons, dated 20 June 2003, explain that the address met the postal aspect of the rule but not the separate requirement that documents could be left there. The Court did not decide the merits of the underlying Tribunal appeal or whether more time to appeal should be allowed. It said that the latter question could be considered if Mr Tait filed an address for service that complied with the rule ([10]).
The judgment records that Mr Tait was homeless, a pension recipient and a student, and that he said financial reasons prevented him from paying someone to accept service on his behalf ([9]). Those circumstances formed part of the context, but the decision turned on the wording and purpose of Order 7 r 6 and whether the nominated address satisfied it.
The rule quoted by Kiefel J required an address for service to be within the relevant Registry District and to be a place “at which documents in the proceeding may, during ordinary business hours, be left” and “to which documents in the proceeding may be posted” ([3]). The Court treated those as cumulative requirements, not alternatives.
The nominated post office address could receive documents sent through Australia Post. But, on the material before the Court, it would not accept documents delivered by hand or courier. Kiefel J therefore considered that it did not appear to be an address at which documents could be left for Mr Tait ([5]). She distinguished the issue from Australia Post’s requirements for registered mail: whether Mr Tait would sign for registered items did not answer whether the post office would accept documents left there for him ([7]).
Mr Tait argued that he had substantially complied by giving a postal address and that the “may be left” requirement was not mandatory. Kiefel J rejected that reading. She cited Sarikaya v Victorian Workcover Authority (1997) 80 FCR 262 for the proposition that the requirement was additional to a postal address. She also cited Croker v Ewen; Croker v Challoner [2000] NSWCA 186, which involved a rule in identical terms and a post office address. As Kiefel J explained, an address that allowed only postal service would leave a gap in the scheme contemplated by the rule ([8]).
The judgment connected the rule’s wording with its procedural purpose: facilitating the prompt exchange of documents in litigation. That purpose would not be achieved if service by post were the only possible means of delivering documents ([8]). Kiefel J also noted that prompt service mattered to respondents and the Court, including where respondents were tribunals or court officers ([9]).
The Court considered Mr Tait’s personal circumstances but did not treat them as establishing a basis for exemption. It recorded that he was homeless and said he could not afford to pay someone to accept service, but also said it was not apparent that he had tried to find an address that could be used. When asked about that, he declined to answer ([9]). Kiefel J added that she could not see a basis for exemption, even if the rule could be read as permitting one, given the interests of respondents and the Court ([10]).
The decision was therefore procedural and specific: the nominated address did not meet the rule, and the Court dismissed the motion challenging the Registrar’s decision. It did not resolve the underlying appeal.
The judgment describes the rule in force in 2003 and applies it to Mr Tait’s nominated address. Order 7 r 6, as quoted, required both a place where documents could be left during ordinary business hours and an address to which they could be posted ([3]). The reasons do not suggest that the postal element could replace the “may be left” element.
In explaining that reading, Kiefel J relied on two cited authorities. She said that Sarikaya confirmed the requirement was additional to a postal address. She also said that Croker concerned a post office as an address for service under a rule in identical terms, and that using such an address would leave a gap in the scheme ([8]). The heading of the judgment also identifies both authorities as followed.
The decision applies those propositions to the facts before it: a post office that would accept Australia Post items but not documents delivered by hand or courier did not provide the full functionality required by the rule ([5]–[8]). The judgment does not report an amendment to Order 7 r 6, a change in the cited authorities, or any later development in the law. It therefore supports an account of how Kiefel J interpreted and applied the rule in 2003, but does not, by itself, establish the rule’s current wording or subsequent legal history.
The judgment also leaves separate the filing issue and the time limit for the underlying appeal. Kiefel J said that, if Mr Tait filed a compliant address, the Court could then consider whether he should receive an extension of time to appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ([10]). No extension decision was made in this judgment.
Order 7 r 6, quoted at [3]: an address for service must be somewhere documents may be left during ordinary business hours and somewhere they may be posted.
Plain English: The rule requires more than a postal destination. The place must also be able to receive documents left there for the person.
Kiefel J’s assessment at [5]: the nominated address “satisfies the requirements of the rule that it be an address to which documents may be posted,” but it did not appear to be one at which documents “may be left”.
Plain English: The address met one part of the test but failed the other because the post office would not accept hand-delivered or courier documents for Mr Tait.
Purpose of the rule at [8]: prompt exchange of documents “would not be achieved if only service by post were possible”.
Plain English: The Court considered the ability to leave documents at an address an important part of the procedural system, not a technical extra that could be ignored when an address for post had been provided.
The practical consequence at [10]: Mr Tait “must file an address for service” if he wished to pursue his appeal.
Plain English: The Court treated provision of a compliant address as necessary before it would consider whether to extend the time for the Tribunal appeal. It did not decide whether an extension should be granted.
The judgment is relevant to a procedural dispute about whether a nominated address meets the wording of Order 7 r 6 as quoted in the reasons. The central fact pattern is an address that can receive post but cannot accept documents left there during ordinary business hours. That was the distinction Kiefel J applied to the university post office address ([4]–[8]).
It is also relevant where a party argues that a postal address amounts to substantial compliance, or that the “may be left” requirement is not mandatory. The judgment rejected those arguments by reading the rule as requiring both capabilities and by referring to the purpose of prompt document exchange ([8]).
The case illustrates that objections to particular postal methods do not necessarily answer the separate question of whether documents can be left at the address. Mr Tait’s concerns about registered post and his request for ordinary or express post were treated as irrelevant to whether the post office would accept documents simply left for him ([7]).
The decision should be read within its stated context. It concerns the rule quoted in the 2003 judgment and the facts about that particular post office. The reasons do not decide all questions about homelessness, inability to pay for an agent, alternative addresses, or possible exceptions in other circumstances. Kiefel J recorded Mr Tait’s circumstances but found no basis for exemption on the material before her ([9]–[10]).
The supplied judgment contains no account of any later court considering Tait v Reynolds. It therefore does not establish whether later courts have followed, distinguished, criticised or otherwise treated this decision.
The relationships that can be identified from this judgment are its stated treatment of the earlier authorities: Kiefel J followed Sarikaya v Victorian Workcover Authority (1997) 80 FCR 262 and Croker v Ewen; Croker v Challoner [2000] NSWCA 186 ([8]). The judgment says Sarikaya confirmed that the ability to leave documents was additional to a postal address. It says Croker considered a post office address under a rule in identical terms and identified a gap in the scheme if only postal service were available.
Any account of subsequent treatment would require later decisions or a current citator, neither of which is included in the judgment text supplied here. No claim about later treatment can safely be drawn from this judgment alone.
The judgment does not decide whether the Federal Court could ever exempt a party from the address-for-service requirement. Kiefel J said she could see no basis for exemption on the circumstances before her, “even if the rule could be seen as permitting that course” ([10]). That phrasing leaves open the broader question whether the rule allowed an exemption at all.
The reasons also do not determine what alternative address might have been acceptable for Mr Tait. Kiefel J noted that it was not apparent he had tried to find a usable address, and that he declined to answer questions about it ([9]). The judgment does not assess any particular alternative arrangement.
Nor does the decision determine the merits of Mr Tait’s Administrative Appeals Tribunal appeal, or whether an extension of time would have been granted. The Court said that an extension question could be considered after a compliant address was filed ([10]).
Finally, the reasons do not show whether the relevant wording of Order 7 r 6 has since changed or how later courts have interpreted it. Those questions require sources beyond this judgment. This is general legal information, not legal advice; Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 I have today head a motion by video-link brought by Mr Tait and ordered that it be dismissed. I explained then that the time available for the video link did not permit me to give reasons and that I would provide them later. I do so now. 2 On 21 May 2003 the Queensland District Registry of this Court received documents from Mr Tait for filing. The related to an appeal brought by him from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal On that day a Deputy District Registrar wrote to Mr Tait advising that since he had not nominated a proper address for service in accordance with O 7 r 6 of the Federal Court Rules, the documents could not be accepted for filing. The Deputy District Registrar provided a proforma notice of change of address and advised that she would hold the documents until it was received. 3 Order 7 r 6 provides: 6(1) An Address for service must be the address of a place within the District for the Registry in the proper place (other than the document exchange referred to in rule 7 of this Order), at which documents in the proceeding may, during ordinary business hours, be left for the person whose address for service it is and to which documents in the proceeding may be posted for that person.' 4 The address for service provided by Mr Tait was 'c/- James Cook University Post Office, James Cook University, Townsville, Qld 4811'. 5 Clearly the address provided satisfies the requirements of the rule that it be an address to which documents may be posted, but it would not appear to be one at which documents 'may be left' for Mr Tait by way of service. These matters are confirmed by the advices of Deputy District Registrar in her letter: 'I understand from recent correspondence which you forwarded to the Court that James Cook Post Office will only accept documents for you which have been through the Australia Post system. Therefore, documents which may be delivered by hand or by courier cannot be left for you at the Post Office.' 6 The letter from Mr Tait to which this refers I take to be that of 9 May 2003 to the Registry which is filed in Q47 of 2003. In it he advises that the Registry should not attempt to send correspondence to him at the Post Office by way of private courier services and that it would not be accepted unless sent by way of the postal service. 7 There is a further advice from Mr Tait concerning problems with even the mail service. They appear in his letter of 28 April 2003, which appears as annexure FAFSD1 to his affidavit filed on 28 May 2003. In it he requires the Registry to forward only mail to him and then by way of ordinary (postage prepaid) surface mail or by express post. He says that he would not accept responsibility for registered post, on the basis that the post office will not deliver documents or articles to him by this method unless he signs for them, and he refuses to do so. In any event there is no suggestion that the Post Office will accept documents simply left for Mr Tait. The matter of Australia Post's requirements as to registered mail is irrelevant to it. 8 Mr Tait submits that he has substantially complied with the rule by providing a postal address and that the requirement for an address at which documents may be left is not a mandatory requirement. In Sarikaya v Victorian Workcover Authority (1997) 80 FCR 262, Black CJ confirmed that the requirement under the rule is additional to a postal address. The rule is couched in obligatory terms and it can readily be appreciated that the purpose of the rule, to facilitate the prompt exchange of documents in litigation, would not be achieved if only service by post were possible. In Croker v Ewen; Croker v Challoner [2000] NSWCA 186, Giles JA held, in a case also involving a post office as the address for service and a rule in identical terms, that the use of it would leave a gap in the scheme contemplated by the rule. 9 Mr Tait has no fixed place of abode and says that, due to financial reasons, he cannot afford to pay someone to accept service on his behalf. Mr Tait is a pension recipient and a student, and is homeless. It is not obvious to me that he has attempted to find an address which could be utilised for him. He declined to answer my questions in that regard. I am aware that this is not the first time that the question of his address for service has been raised with him. On previous occasions however documents had already been accepted for filing, the matter was in Court and there was no respondent appearing to take the point. Even if respondents tend to be tribunals and court officers, this would not make the need for prompt service unnecessary, both from their point of view and that of the Court. 10 If Mr Tait wishes to pursue his appeal he must file an address for service. I cannot see that there is a basis for exemption, even if the rule could be seen as permitting that course, contrary to the interests of respondents joined to proceedings and the Court. In the event that Mr Tait does file an address for service the Court can then consider whether he should be given an extension of time in which to appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 11 The motion to review the Deputy District Registrar's decision will be dismissed. I certify that the preceding eleven (11) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Kiefel.
Associate: Dated: 20 June 2003 For the Applicant: In Person
Tait
C Reynolds a Deputy District Registrar of the Queensland District Registry of the Federal Court of Australia
(1997) 80 FCR 262
The applicant's motion was dismissed. Kiefel J stated that Mr Tait would need to file an address for service satisfying the rule before the Court could consider whether to extend the time for his Administrative Appeals Tribunal appeal ([10]–[11]).