Tadman & Tadman (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 38 (22 January 2026)

Ashby v Slipper (No 2) [2016] FCA 550

Bailey v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1995] 1 Qd R 476

Canavan & Dowd [2023] FedCFamC1F 207

Chakora & Bhander [2023] FedCFamC1F 127

Commissioner of Taxation & Darling and Anor [2014] FamCAFC 59; (2014) FLC 93-583

Earnshaw & Farella (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1F 1020

Eastick & Burrows [2024] FedCFamC1F 718

Edgar & Edgar (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 574

Esso Australia Resources Limited v Plowman [1995] HCA 19; (1995) 183 CLR 10

Featon & Featon [2020] FamCA 1061

Fletcher & Jones [2015] FamCA 193

Gerardo & Gerardo (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC2F 1802

Gilford & Cavaco [2024] FedCFamC1A 55; (2024) FLC 94-183

Harman v Secretary of State for Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280

Harradine & Michaels [2024] FedCFamC1F 753

Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36

Helicopter Aerial Surveys Pty Ltd v Robertson [2015] NSWSC 2104

Hermann & Hermann (No 2) [2014] FamCA 587

Holpitt Pty Ltd v Varimu Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 269

Kipling & Netis [2020] FamCAFC 79

Laen v At the Heads Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 315

Liberty Funding Pty Ltd v Phoenix Capital Ltd [2005] FCAFC 3

Lincoln & Wyatt [2025] FedCFamC2F 710

Merovic & Groff [2025] FedCFamC1F 427

Ness & Firmin (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC2F 1454

Nicolosi & Faron [2025] FedCFamC1A 146

Pace & Halkias [2021] FamCAFC 81

Patchell & Maddern [2024] FedCFamC2F 325

Paviello & Paviello [2018] FamCA 454

R Pty Ltd atf the Fletcher Trust & Jones and Anor [2016] FamCA 928

Sahadi & Savva and Anor [2016] FamCAFC 65; (2016) FLC 93-704

Sokoloff & Sokoloff [2024] FedCFamC1F 509

Spedding v New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 503

Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd [1992] FCA 720; (1992) 38 FCR 217

Tauber & Farrens [2024] FedCFamC2F 792

Thornton & Workcover Corp [2009] FamCA 449

Vossen & Vossen [2024] FedCFamC1F 485

Zarins & Mylne (No 3) [2013] FamCA 737

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

MR REMEIKA AS THE LEGAL PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE LATE MR TADMAN

1. Orders 2 to 5 hereof are made by the agreement of the applicant and the interested party.

1. Pursuant to subsection 51(1) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), the Application in a Proceeding filed on 27 November 2025 and Response thereto are transferred to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1).
2. Each of the applicant and the interested party (collectively "the parties") is granted leave to use the following documents obtained in these proceedings for the purpose of the Supreme Court of South Australia Proceedings ("Supreme Court Proceedings"):

(a) Court Orders dated 28 September 2022;

(b) Application to Intervene filed on 3 March 2023;

(c) Affidavit of Ms B Tadman filed on 3 March 2023;

(d) Affidavit of Mr Remeika filed on 3 April 2023;

(e) Court Orders dated 29 June 2023;

(f) Email correspondence between G Real Estate and Mr Remeika produced under the subpoena dated 30 September 2025;

(g) Affidavit of Ms B Tadman filed on 28 August 2025;

(h) Application in a Proceeding filed on 28 August 2025;

(i) Affidavit of Ms H filed on 28 August 2025;

(j) Outline of Case by Ms B Tadman filed on 8 September 2025;

(k) Outline of Case by the late Mr Tadman filed on 8 September 2025;

(l) Affidavit of Ms Tadman filed on 12 September 2025;

(m) Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed on 12 September 2025; and

(n) Outline of Case by Ms Tadman filed on 12 September 2025.

1. The documents identified in order 1 2 hereof be used solely for the purpose of preparing, filing and serving evidence, submissions, and other documents in the Supreme Court Proceedings and for the purposes of any hearing in those proceedings.
2. The parties are each granted leave to disclose the documents referred to in order 1 2 hereof to their legal representatives, counsel, and any expert engaged for the purposes of the Supreme Court proceedings.
3. The parties are each released from any obligations of confidentiality that would otherwise be applicable to their use of those documents for any of the purposes described in order 2 3 herein.
4. The costs application of the interested party is withdrawn with a right of reinstatement.
5. The Application in a Proceeding filed on 27 November 2025 and Response thereto filed on 14 January 2026 are otherwise dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These reasons were delivered ex tempore and have been settled from the transcript. Grammatical errors have been corrected, citations have been added and amendments have been made to make the orally delivered reasons clearer and easier to read.
2. The application before the Court is an application brought by the legal personal representative of the deceased husband ("the applicant") seeking to be relieved of the obligation commonly known as the Harman obligation and to be granted permission under rule 15.26 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 ("the Rules") for the use of documents for the purpose of proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia ("the Supreme Court proceedings") with respect to the estate of the husband.
3. The application sought permission to use following documents:

(a) Court orders dated 28 September 2022;

(b) Application to Intervene filed 3 March 2023;

(c) Affidavit of Ms B Tadman filed 3 March 2023;

(d) Affidavit of Mr Remeika filed 3 April 2023;

(e) Court orders dated 29 June 2023; and

(f) Email correspondence between G Real Estate and Mr Remeika produced under the subpoena dated 30 September 2025.

1. In addition to the Harman obligation and the Rules, the applicant's application made reference to sections 114Q and 114S of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"). In my view, in light of the contents of subsection 114S(2)(b)(i), which provides that the communication of a document for use in connection with proceedings in a court is not a "communication to the public" for the purposes of subsections 114Q(1)(a) and 114R(1)(a), leave under those sections is not required.
2. The application was originally listed for hearing on 10 December 2025. That hearing was adjourned because, notwithstanding an order of 1 December 2025 requiring that it occur, the applicant had failed to serve a copy of the application and supporting affidavit on Ms B Tadman ("the interested party"). The interested party has now been served and has participated in the hearing this day by way of counsel.
3. By way of a Response filed on 14 February 2026, the interested party seeks leave to use the same documents as those to which the applicant's application relates in addition to the following:

(a) Affidavit of Ms B Tadman filed 28 August 2025;

(b) Application to Intervene filed on 28 August 2025;

(c) Affidavit of Ms H filed on 28 August 2025;

(d) Outline of Case of Ms B Tadman filed on 8 September 2025;

(e) Outline of Case of the late Mr Tadman filed on 8 September 2025;

(f) Affidavit of Ms Tadman filed on 12 September 2025;

(g) Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed on 12 September 2025; and

(h) Outline of Case of Ms Tadman filed on 12 September 2025.

1. There is a joint position between the applicant and the interested party that each of them should be permitted to use all of the documents in relation to which leave has been sought by either or both of them for the purpose of the Supreme Court proceedings, on the basis that:

(a) the documents be used solely for the purpose of preparing, filing and serving evidence, submissions, and other documents in the Supreme Court proceedings and for the purposes of any hearing in those proceedings; and

(b) each of the relevant parties be granted leave to disclose the documents in question to their legal representatives, counsel, and any expert engaged for the purposes of the Supreme Court proceedings.

1. The wife filed a submitting notice on 16 January 2026 and did not participate in this hearing.

1. The husband and wife were married in August 2001 and commenced cohabitation at that time. They separated in December 2021.
2. The present proceedings were commenced in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) ("Division 2") by the wife on 2 March 2022, prior to the death of the husband, which occurred in 2023. The proceedings have been continued following the husband's death, pursuant to what is now section 79AA(8) of the Act. They were transferred to this Court on 15 April 2025.
3. By his last will, the husband appointed the applicant, who is his brother, as executor of his estate. Although there was originally an additional executor and an alternate, both have renounced probate, leaving the applicant as the sole executor. Probate was granted to the applicant on 19 May 2023, and he was substituted as the legal personal representative for the husband pursuant to rule 3.19 of the Rules on 29 June 2023.
4. The interested party makes serious allegations against the applicant, to the effect that he has retained large sums of cash formerly belonging to the husband which should form part of the estate. She also makes a number of complaints about his conduct as executor of the estate.
5. On 3 March 2023, the interested party filed an application in Division 2, where these proceedings were then pending, seeking, inter alia, that she be granted leave to intervene in the proceedings and that she be substituted for the applicant as the legal personal representative for the husband. That application was dismissed by consent on 29 June 2023.
6. On 29 August 2025, the interested party filed another application in essentially the same terms, this time in this Court, following the transfer of the proceedings. That application was dismissed for the reasons as set out in the judgment delivered on 15 September 2025.[1]
7. Shortly prior to the hearing of the second application brought by the interested party in this jurisdiction, she made an application in the Supreme Court, being the appropriate jurisdiction, seeking to revoke the grant of probate in favour of the applicant and seeking in its place a grant of letters of administration to her. As submitted on behalf of the applicant, that is the same application as was twice brought in this jurisdiction, now brought in the correct forum.
8. It is for the purpose of the Supreme Court proceedings that the applicant and the interested party each seek the use of the documents subject of the present application.
9. On 15 September 2025, the proceedings in this Court were stayed pending the outcome of the interested party's application in the Supreme Court.

1. The Harman obligation arises from the House of Lords decision in Harman v Secretary of State for Home Department.[2] The principle was described by the High Court of Australia in Hearne v Street[3] as follows:
   1. Where one party to litigation is compelled, either by reason of a rule of court, or by reason of a specific order of the court, or otherwise, to disclose documents or information, the party obtaining the disclosure cannot, without the leave of the court, use it for any purpose other than that for which it was given unless it is received into evidence...
   2. ... to call the obligation of the litigant who has received material generated by litigious processes one which arises from an "implied undertaking" is misleading unless it is understood that in truth it is an obligation of law arising from circumstances in which the material was generated and received.
2. The purpose of the obligation is to ensure that any invasion of the privacy of litigants who are compelled to produce documents is minimised, and to ensure that documents produced in the course of litigation are not used for any ulterior purpose.[4]
3. Similar, but somewhat more extensive obligations and restrictions, are set out in rule 6.04(1) of the Rules, which provides that:

(1) Unless the court gives permission, a person who inspects, copies or receives a document in relation to a proceeding, under these Rules or an order:

(a) must use the document for the purpose of the proceeding only; and

(b) must not otherwise disclose the contents of the document, or give a copy of it, to any other person.

1. It was submitted in the case outline filed on behalf of the interested party that the application of rule 6.04 is limited to documents the subject of the duty of disclosure outlined in Part 6.1 of the Rules. I do not accept that submission. The rule contains no such limitation and that interpretation is contrary to numerous cases,[5] including at appellate level,[6] in which that rule has been applied or considered in the context of broader categories of documents.
2. No authority was cited to support that suggested limitation on the operation of rule 6.04. Only one relevant case[7] was referred to in the context of that submission, and it was simply suggested without any explanation or foundation, but purportedly "respectfully," that the interpretation adopted in that case was wrong. I do not agree. Establishing that a decision of a court is wrong requires significantly more than a solicitor simply stating that he or she holds a different opinion.
3. Use of documents or information obtained in proceedings in this Court is regulated by rule 15.26, which provides as follows:

(1) The court may grant permission for a person to use a document or information obtained in proceedings for another purpose, including in proceedings before another court or tribunal, if the person can satisfy the court that special circumstances exist to permit the person to use the document or information for that other purpose.

(2) In this rule:

document includes, but is not limited to, the following:

(a) a document filed in a proceeding in accordance with these Rules or an order;

(b) a document produced in accordance with a disclosure obligation or a subpoena;

(c) a document admitted into evidence in a proceeding;

(d) a document provided to the court in accordance with section 67ZBD or 67ZBE of the Family Law Act;

(e) a family report or single expert report;

(f) reasons for judgment whether anonymised or not.

Note 1: For restrictions on the use of a document produced in compliance with the duty of disclosure, see rule 6.04.

Note 2: For restrictions on the use of a document produced in compliance with a subpoena for production, see rule 6.36.

Note 3: Nothing in this rule limits the ability of a person to use a document for another purpose if the use is authorised by other legislation, for example, the Assessment Act.

1. Special circumstances are required before leave will be given for a party to use documents to which the obligation applies for purposes other than the litigation in which they were produced, both at common law and pursuant to the Rules. In Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd ("Springfield Nominees"),[8] Wilcox J of the Federal Court of Australia held at [26] that:

For special circumstances to exist, it is enough that there is a special feature of the case which affords a reason for modifying or releasing the undertaking and is not usually present. The matter then becomes one of the proper exercise of the court's discretion, many factors being relevant.

In Liberty Funding Pty Ltd v Phoenix Capital Ltd,[9] the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia held at [31] that:

The notion of "special circumstances" does not require that some extraordinary factors must bear on the question before the discretion will be exercised. It is sufficient to say that, in all the circumstances, good reason must be shown why, contrary to the usual position, documents produced or information obtained in one piece of litigation should be used for the advantage of a party in another piece of litigation or for other non-litigious purposes.

In Holpitt Pty Ltd v Varimu Pty Ltd,[10] the court discussed the meaning of special circumstances as follows:

1. Counsel for the Bank laid great emphasis on the expression "special circumstances", and on the onus, acknowledged at 859, upon an applicant for release from the implied undertaking "to demonstrate cogent and persuasive reasons why it should be released". That was said in the context of a case where release was sought, not in order to enable an obligation to make discovery in an existing action to be performed, but in order to facilitate the bringing of a charge of contempt of court. As appears at 857-858, Lord Oliver was concerned to meet an argument (which had the support of A.J. Bekhor and Co Ltd v Bilton [1981] EWCA Civ 8; (1981) QB 923) that "the court will not order a defendant to discover documents for the purpose of incriminating him" - to which, it was urged, grant of the relief sought would be tantamount. In those circumstances, it is easy to understand why it may have been thought the reasons required to be cogent and persuasive. As far as the expression "special circumstances" is concerned, it is an expression which is liable to be misunderstood unless care is taken to ask and answer the question, special in relation to what? "Special" is one of those words which derive almost all their meaning from the context. In relation to animals generally, any man is special; but when you are speaking of poets, he may need to be a Milton. If all that is required is that, among the great number of cases in the court in which documents have been discovered, this one must evince some special feature which affords a reason for releasing or modifying the undertaking, there will be no difficulty. Circumstances in which there is a legitimate reason why documents discovered in one proceeding should be made available in another will, viewed in this way, be rare. In the ordinary course, the ordinary rule should apply, there being no special circumstance to suggest otherwise. Cf. Jess v Scott [1986] FCA 365; (1986) 12 FCR 187, where the full court was concerned with the construction of order 52 r. 15(2), by which leave to file an appeal out of time could be granted "for special reasons". At 195, the joint judgment described the expression "special reasons" in this rule as

"an expression describing a flexible discretionary power, but one

requiring a case to be made upon grounds sufficient to justify a

departure, in the particular circumstances, from the ordinary rule

prescribing a period within which an appeal must be filed and served."

1. Once special circumstances are found, the Court needs to determine whether to exercise the discretion in light of the interests of justice.[11] The relevance of the documents to proceedings in another court is for that court to determine, but this Court should consider it in general terms in considering the connection between the documents and the proceedings.[12] It is not necessary for the Court to examine and determine the issue in relation to each individual document separately, much less each and every paragraph of each proposed document.[13]
2. I have turned my mind to the fact that some of the documents sought to be used are, in fact, documents that were filed or produced in Division 2 prior to the transfer of the proceedings to this Court and were not filed or produced in this Court, and to the question of whether that has the result that an application would need to be made separately to that Court with respect to the documents filed and produced in that Court. I note, however, that upon the transfer of the proceedings, the entirety of the Court file in these proceedings became the file of this Court, and it remains the same continuous proceeding,[14] and on that basis I am satisfied that I have both power and jurisdiction to determine the application for permission to use all of the documents on what is now the file of this Court.

1. The common law obligation applies to documents a party is compelled to produce and which have not yet been received into evidence. This includes affidavits that have been filed and not yet relied upon. The element of compulsion is the foundation of the common law obligation.[15] Parties to family law proceedings are compelled by the Rules to file affidavits, and this element of compulsion has been held to attract the obligation.[16]
2. The Harman obligation does not apply once a document is formally read into evidence,[17] and it therefore does not apply to affidavits that have been relied upon at trial. There has not yet been a trial in these proceedings. I note that the affidavits filed on 3 April 2023 were not formally read into evidence and were not relied on because the application to which they related was not ultimately pressed. The same is not true of the affidavits filed in August and September of 2025. However, the relevant rules at least arguably apply to affidavits, irrespective of whether they have been read into evidence or not.
3. The obligation does not apply to orders[18] and nor does either of the relevant rules. Leave is therefore not required for their use.
4. Neither the Harman obligation nor rule 6.04 restrict a litigant from using documents they themselves have produced or filed, however I note that the scope of rule 15.26 is broader than either the common law or rule 6.04, and that rule applies to all of the documents itemised in subrule (2).
5. In these circumstances, in an abundance of caution, I will consider the application of the relevant principles to all of the documents sought to be used in the Supreme Court proceedings, other than orders, but for clarity and certainty, permission to use the earlier sets of orders as sought will be included as part of the orders made.

1. In Springfield Nominees,[19] Wilcox J set out a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors to be considered in the determination of whether there are special circumstances, as follows:

... the nature of the document; the circumstances under which it came into existence, the attitude of the author of the document and any prejudice the author may sustain; whether the document pre-existed litigation or was created for that purpose and therefore expected to enter the public domain, the nature of the information in the document (in particular whether it contains personal data or commercially sensitive information), the circumstances in which the document came into the hands of the applicant for leave, and perhaps most important of all, the likely contribution of the document to achieving justice in the second proceeding.

1. In subsequent cases,[20] additional factors have been held to be relevant. These include:

(a) the commonality of the subject matter between the two sets of proceedings and whether the document sought to be released could assist in determining an issue in dispute in the second proceedings (which has been recognised as a very important factor);

(b) the interrelationship between the parties involved in the two proceedings;

(c) whether the party seeking to be released from the obligation would be at a disadvantage if they were unable to use the documents in the second proceedings;

(d) whether there is an inconsistency between the documents to which the obligation applies and pleadings or documents provided in the second proceedings;

(e) whether the matters set out in the documents to which the obligation applies are personal matters, and if so, whether they are not already in the public domain;

(f) whether the documents sought to be released could assist the second court in determining issues of credit;

(g) whether release would discourage parties from making full disclosure;

(h) whether there are overlapping allegations in multiple jurisdictions;

(i) the broader public interest in the administration of justice; and

(j) the likely contribution of the documents to achieving justice in the second proceeding.

1. Turning to the present matter and considering these factors insofar as they are relevant, I note firstly that the interested party's solicitor has deposed that the affidavit relied upon by the applicant does not explain the reason for which use of the documents sought. That allegation is false and should not have been made, much less to the Court and less still by a legal practitioner, particularly on oath.
2. The applicant's solicitor has deposed to a need to make use of the requested documents in order to properly set out the background of the applicant's executorship and his conduct in these proceedings for the purpose of the Supreme Court proceedings brought by the third party.
3. If what the third party's solicitor actually meant by her allegation is that she would have preferred more detail or more precision as to the proposed use of the documents, that is what the affidavit should have said. The importance of accuracy in sworn evidence cannot be understated, particularly when the deponent is an officer of the court.[21]
4. The third party's solicitor has deposed that it is "highly likely" that she will be required to utilise the further material sought to be used by her in responding to the use made by the applicant of the documents sought by him.
5. I have regard to the fact that the relevant documents were filed in the context of misconceived applications brought by the interested party in this jurisdiction on two occasions, which ought never have been brought in this jurisdiction at all, much less twice. The relevant application and all documents resulting therefrom should always have been before the Supreme Court in the first place.
6. To the extent that the author of the relevant documents is one of the parties to the proceedings, or the interested party, there is no resistance. Although the attitude of each of the authors of the subpoenaed email correspondence is not known, I have regard to the fact that the applicant is a party to the email correspondence in question, and would therefore ordinarily have been expected to have had access to those documents separately from the subpoena process utilised in these proceedings.
7. There is no evidence or even suggestion before the Court to indicate that any person will suffer prejudice if the application is granted.
8. Only the email correspondence produced by way of subpoena was created separately from the litigation.
9. The information contained within the documents is not commercially sensitive. It is personal, but not in a manner which is different in any way from the information that would reasonably be expected to be put before the Supreme Court in any event.
10. The subject matter of the two proceedings, so far as is relevant (noting that the documents sought to be used relate to the interested party 's involvement in these proceedings, and not these proceedings more broadly), are extremely closely related. The application twice made by the interested party in this jurisdiction, to the extent that it related to substitute of legal personal representative, is one that should have been, and now has been, made to the Supreme Court.
11. The allegations made by the interested party in the two sets of proceedings would appear to be the same. Although the wife is not a party to the Supreme Court proceedings, both parties to the Supreme Court proceedings are parties to this application and were parties to the other relevant applications in this jurisdiction, and there is therefore considerable overlap. This is particularly so, noting that the application brought once in Division 2 and again in this Court by the interested party, were for all intents and purposes the same application that is now being brought in the Supreme Court, and should always simply have been brought there from the outset.
12. I accept the submission that the fact that the application in the Supreme Court is functionally identical to the relevant applications that were brought in this jurisdiction has the effect that the proposed use of the documents is not for a separate purpose in the sense that is usually the case in applications of this nature.
13. There would appear to be no basis for any concern that release would discourage full disclosure.
14. As to the consideration noted to be "most important of all," it would appear likely that these documents, which go directly to the issues before the Supreme Court, would or at least could, assist in achieving justice in that proceeding.
15. In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that there are special circumstances as defined in the authorities to which I have referred.

IS IT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE TO EXERCISE THE DISCRETION TO PERMIT THE USE OF THE DOCUMENTS?

1. There is nothing before the Court to suggest that the purpose for which either the applicant or the interested party seek to use the documents is anything other than a legitimate forensic purpose.
2. I have regard to the recognised fact that where the proposed use is for the purpose of litigation, that use does not automatically mean that the documents will end up entering the public domain because they are likely to be subject to the same or similar obligations in the other court.[22] The interests of privacy must be weighed against considerations of public interest and achieving justice.[23] In this case, no infringement of privacy is asserted.
3. Having regard to these considerations, I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to permit the use of the documents by both the applicant and the interested party in the terms as sought.

1. As a result, I am satisfied that I should exercise the discretion to release both the applicant and the third party from the obligation not to use the documents in question for any purpose other than these proceedings, and to grant them permission to use the documents pursuant to the Rules so as to enable the use of the documents as proposed in the proceedings pending in the Supreme Court, upon the conditions proposed in both the application and the response.
2. Accordingly, orders will be made authorising each of the applicant and the interested party to use the documents specified in the application in a proceeding and the response thereto for the purpose and upon the conditions as jointly proposed by them.

I certify that the preceding fifty-three (53) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Parker.

[1] Tadman & Tadman [2025] FedCFamC1F 664.

[2] [1983] 1 AC 280.

[3] [2008] HCA 36.

[4] Kipling & Netis [2020] FamCAFC 79 at [9].

[5] See, for example, Chakora & Bhander [2023] FedCFamC1F 127; Harradine & Michaels [2024] FedCFamC1F 753; Vossen & Vossen [2024] FedCFamC1F 485; Sokoloff & Sokoloff [2024] FedCFamC1F 509; Eastick & Burrows [2024] FedCFamC1F 718; Patchell & Maddern [2024] FedCFamC2F 325; Tauber & Farrens [2024] FedCFamC2F 792; Ness & Firmin (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC2F 1454; Gerardo & Gerardo (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC2F 1802; Merovic & Groff [2025] FedCFamC1F 427; Edgar & Edgar (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 574; Arora & Dash (No 7) [2025] FedCFamC2F 550; Lincoln & Wyatt [2025] FedCFamC2F 710.

[6] Abramsson & Abramsson (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 86.

[7] The non-anonymised name of the judgment in question, which has not been published, was impermissibly cited.

[8] [1992] FCA 720; (1992) 38 FCR 217.

[9] [2005] FCAFC 3.

[10] [1991] FCA 269.

[11] Bailey v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1995] 1 Qd R 476.

[12] Hermann & Hermann (No 2) [2014] FamCA 587; Featon & Featon [2020] FamCA 1061.

[13] Hermann & Hermann (No 2) [2014] FamCA 587; Sahadi & Savva and Anor [2016] FamCAFC 65; (2016) FLC 93-704.

[14] See the discussion as to the institution and transfer of proceedings in Gilford & Cavaco [2024] FedCFamC1A 55; (2024) FLC 94-183.

[15] Zarins & Mylne (No 3) [2013] FamCA 737.

[16] Evert & Pascal [2022] FedCFamC1F 569.

[17] Esso Australia Resources Limited v Plowman [1995] HCA 19; (1995) 183 CLR 10; Pace & Halkias [2021] FamCAFC 81; Spedding v New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 503; Nicolosi & Faron [2025] FedCFamC1A 146.

[18] Earnshaw & Farella (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1F 1020; Chakora & Bhander [2023] FedCFamC1F 127.

[19] [1992] FCA 720; (1992) 38 FCR 217 at [26].

[20] Such as Commissioner of Taxation & Darling and Anor [2014] FamCAFC 59; (2014) FLC 93-583; Fletcher & Jones [2015] FamCA 193; Helicopter Aerial Surveys Pty Ltd v Robertson [2015] NSWSC 2104; Ashby v Slipper (No 2) [2016] FCA 550; Canavan & Dowd [2023] FedCFamC1F 207; Laen v At the Heads Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 315.

[21] It is noted that following the oral delivery of these reasons, counsel for the interested party advised the Court that he had settled the affidavit in question. It remains the case that it was sworn by the solicitor.

[22] R Pty Ltd atf the Fletcher Trust & Jones and Anor [2016] FamCA 928.

[23] Paviello & Paviello [2018] FamCA 454; Thornton & Workcover Corp [2009] FamCA 449.