CA's submissions as to why the implied undertaking should not be discharged
56 CA made a number of submissions as to why the implied undertaking should not be released. None were persuasive.
57 First, I do not accept that it is necessary for Isentia to show that there is a reasonable or close relationship between its potential contract claims and the claims it makes in the Tribunal. In his oral submissions, Mr Dimitriadis for CA identified this principle as being located in the authorities at footnote 20 of his written submissions. These were, first, Perdaman Chemicals & Fertilisers Pty Ltd v Griffin Coal Mining Company Pty Ltd [No 2] [2011] WASC 189 at [20] and [24] ('Perdaman'). In that case, Beech J concluded that the proposed claim was 'closely connected' to the claim which was already before the court: at [24]. He did not, however, apply that as the relevant standard. The standard his Honour applied was the standard at [17]-[10] which was the ordinary 'special circumstances' approach. Perdaman is therefore not authority for the proposition that it is necessary to show that there is a reasonable or close connection.
58 Further, the context in which the question arose concerned an amendment to a case already before the court. This is quite different to the situation in the present case where the Tribunal lacks any jurisdiction over the proposed contract suit.
59 The second authority CA relied upon was what said to be an unreported decision of the Federal Court of Australia, Mann v Medical Defence Union Limited but which in fact appears at [1997] FCA 45. Like Perdaman it was concerned with an attempt to add a claim to an existing claim. It does not bear on the current situation.
60 If I were wrong in that conclusion of law, I am satisfied that there is in any event just such a relationship. A central question in the Tribunal proceedings is whether the Isentia, Meltwater and Streem should each be charged the same rate by CA. That issue is the subject matter of cl. 6.10.
61 Secondly, whilst I accept CA's submission there was an inconsistency between the purpose for which the four documents were produced and the proposed purpose for which Isentia now seeks to use them, I do not see that as providing a reason not to grant leave. There will always be an inconsistency of this kind on an application such as the present.
62 Thirdly, I do not accept that the fact that the confidentiality regime was agreed consensually is a matter which ought to be afforded much weight. The regime included order 9 which contemplated that a party could apply to be released from it. It is not to the point therefore that the parties have conducted themselves in accordance with that regime for several years.
63 Fourthly, I do not accept that the position of any third parties, apart from Streem, under the confidentiality regime is shown to be relevant. In the case of Streem, I am satisfied that it is on notice of the present application. Apart from communicating the fact that it did not consent, it took no part in the application. I accept that there is prejudice to Streem (and Meltwater) in that Isentia will learn the rates they have been paying to CA. However, it already knows that. What is to change is that it will be able to use that knowledge against CA. CA did not explain what risk Meltwater and Streem faced if CA were sued by Isentia for breach of cl 6.10. To that may be added the fact that the documents in question are historical having expired and having been superseded by the Tribunal's decision.
64 Fifthly, I do not accept that delay is relevant on the present application. CA submitted that it had been held that where release from the undertaking was sought after the event, delay was relevant. Accepting that to be so, CA did not identify any decision in which delay had been held relevant to the prospective release of the undertaking. I do not accept that delay is relevant in that circumstance. If I were wrong in that and that the equitable notion of delay is relevant, I would conclude that it would be necessary for CA to demonstrate some prejudice arising from the delay. There is no evidence of any such prejudice. If I were wrong in that and CA did not need to identify any prejudice, I would conclude that there was no relevant delay. Isentia has been aware of the circumstances since the evidence was served on it in 2018. Since 2018, Isentia has been locked in the litigation before this Tribunal and more recently the Full Court. I do not think it was required during that period to address this satellite issue particularly where CA is protected by s 14 of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW).
65 Sixthly, I do not accept that there is principle that it is not sufficient for the release of the undertaking that the proposed proceeding serves only some private interest. CA referred to a statement by Whitford J in Halcon International Inc v Shell Transport and Trading Co [1979] RPC 97 to the effect that 'furtherance of a private interest could not justify the grant of leave to use discovered documents for the purpose of other proceedings and that some overriding public interest would normally be required'. There is no example of this principle being applied in Australia and it is inconsistent with the outcome in Treasury Wine. It does not reflect the state of Australian law. The most that can be said is that the Federal Court has accepted that the existence of such public considerations is itself a positive reason to release the undertaking: Ashby v Slipper (No 2) [2016] FCA 550; 343 ALR 351 at [10] per Flick J. However, it is not possible to fashion from that proposition the quite different one that such public considerations must be present for the undertaking to be released.
66 Seventhly, whilst I accept that Isentia could obtain the documents through a preliminary discovery application, this would appear to be a cumbersome procedure when it already has them.