Sze Tu v Jam Studios Pty Ltd; Jam Studios Pty Ltd v Sze Tu - [2018] NSWSC 868 - NSWSC 2017 case summary — Zoe

NSWNSWSC

Sze Tu v Jam Studios Pty Ltd; Jam Studios Pty Ltd v Sze Tu

[2018] NSWSC 868

Supreme Court of NSW|2017-10-24|Before: Walton J

View original source

At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2017-10-24

Before

Walton J

Catchwords

[2001] NSWCA 61 Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424
[2010] NSWCA 374 Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483
[2010] NSWCA 84 Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 414
[2014] HCA 19 Turner v York Motors (1951) 85 CLR 55

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

[2001] NSWCA 61 Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424[2010] NSWCA 374 Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483[2010] NSWCA 84 Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 414[2014] HCA 19 Turner v York Motors (1951) 85 CLR 55[1951] HCA 52 Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Mahr (1988) 164 CLR 387

Judgment (41 paragraphs)

[1]

onal Marine Management (UK) Ltd [1980] 1 QB 137 Celermajer Holding Pty Ltd v Kopas (2011) 16 BPR 30,735; [2011] NSWSC 40 County Securities Pty Limited v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Limited [2008] NSWCA 193 Dee-Tech Pty Ltd v Neddam Holdings Pty Ltd (2010) 15 BPR 29,021; [2010] NSWCA 374 Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483; [2010] NSWCA 84 Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 414; [2015] HCA 23 Javad v Aqil [1991] 1 WLR 1007 Kellow-Falkiner Motors Pty Ltd v Nimorakiotakis [2000] VSCA 1 Lighting by Design (Aust) Pty Ltd v Cannington Nominees Pty Ltd (2008) 35 WAR 520; [2008] WASCA 23 Lin v State Rail Authority of NSW [2006] FCAFC 42 Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353 McKinnon v Portelli (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 343 Milling v Hardy [2014] NSWCA 163 Ozden v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2014] VSCA 127 Pacific National (ACT) Ltd v Queensland Rail [2006] FCA 91 Petersen v Moloney (1951) 84 CLR 91 Piggott v Williams (1821) 6 Madd 95; 56 ER 1027 Priestley v Priestley [2016] NSWSC 1096 Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155 Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HR 129 Rawson v Samuel (1841) Cr & Ph 161; 41 ER 451 Roadshow Entertainment Pty Ltd v (ACN 053 006 269) Pty Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) (1997) 42 NSWLR 462 Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd [2008] NSWCA 149 Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; [2014] HCA 19 Turner v York Motors (1951) 85 CLR 55; [1951] HCA 52 Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Mahr (1988) 164 CLR 387; [1988] HCA 7 Texts Cited: B Edgeworth, Butt's Land Law (Law Book Co, 7th ed, 2017) G E Dal Pont, Law of Agency (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2014) J D Heydon, M J Leeming and P G Turner, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane's Equity Doctrines & Remedies (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2015) M J Weir, 'A Tenant's Right of Set-off' (1994) 68 Australian Law Journal 857 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Margaret Sze Tu (First Plaintiff / First Cross-Defendant) Shiu How Sze Tu (Second Plaintiff / Second Cross-Defendant) Shiu Shing Sze Tu (Third Plaintiff / Third Cross-Defendant) Helen Sze Tu (Fourth Plaintiff / Fourth Cross-Defendant) C H Real Estate Pty Ltd (First Defendant) Jam Studios Pty Ltd (Second Defendant / Cross-Claimant) Representation: Counsel: R P V Carey (Plaintiffs / Cross-Defendants)

[4]

THE ESSENCE OF THE PARTIES' CASES

There was no dispute that the premises were a "retail shop" for the purposes of the Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW). Further, there was no dispute that, in early July 2013, CH Real Estate (on the plaintiffs' behalf) negotiated with Jam for a proposed lease of the premises.
However, the plaintiffs denied the existence of a lease. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that: 1. CH Real Estate had no authority to enter into any binding lease on their behalf; 2. they consented to no more than a license for Jam to enter the premises for limited purposes prior the conclusion of negotiations for a lease, which negotiations broke down without agreement; 3. Jam's evidence is capable of establishing no more than the existence of an implied "tenancy at will" in accordance with s 127(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW); and 4. any such licence or tenancy at will was validly terminated in February 2014 or, alternatively, May 2014.
In the alternative, the plaintiffs also contended, if there was a lease, that: 1. it required Jam to pay rent in the amount of $4,125 per month, which it had not done since April 2014. It may be noted that it was common ground that Jam had paid no rent in relation to its possession and occupation of the premises since April 2014; 2. the plaintiffs were thereby entitled to terminate the lease and did so by notices to vacate issued on their behalf in February 2014, or alternatively May 2014; and/or 3. the plaintiffs were entitled to re-enter the premises and determine the lease, which, if successful, they will be deemed to have done on service of the further amended statement of claim for the purposes of s 20 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).
In summary, Jam contended that: 1. The plaintiffs, through their agent CH Real Estate, granted Jam a "retail shop lease" of the premises ("the lease"), as defined in s 3 of the Retail Leases Act; 2. it acted in reliance of the express representations made by CH Real Estate and entered into possession of the premises, on or about 11 or 12 July 2013, as a tenant under a retail lease; 3. the plaintiffs breached an essential term of the lease because it never installed any air-conditioning on the premises; 4. the plaintiffs caused loss and damages to Jam as a result of the breach of the essential terms of the lease; and 5. it requested the plaintiffs' consent to Jam's DA to the Council, and the plaintiffs ignored, refused or neglected to provide consent to the DA, which led to the Council issuing an order to cease the use of the premises for the sale of musical instruments and the provision of ancillary services.

[5]

THE ISSUES

From those primary positions of the parties, the following commonly agreed issues may be distilled as the issues requiring resolution in these proceedings: 1. Whether the plaintiffs and Jam entered into a retail shop lease for the premises on or about 11 or 12 July 2013? 2. If there was no retail shop lease, on what basis did Jam occupy the premises from about 12 July 2013? 3. If there was no retail shop lease, was a valid notice to vacate the premises given to Jam on behalf of the plaintiffs on either: 1. 26 February 2014; or 2. 19 May 2014? 1. Are the plaintiffs thereby entitled to possession of the premises? 2. If there was no retail shop lease, are the plaintiffs entitled to damages, mesne profits or any other form of compensation from Jam in relation to its occupation of the premises, and if so, in what amount? 3. If there was a retail shop lease, what terms did it include: 1. in relation to the payment of rent by Jam; 2. in relation to the use of the premises by Jam; 3. that would require the plaintiffs to consent to a DA by Jam that involved a proposed use of the premises as a café; and 4. in relation to the provision of air-conditioning by the plaintiffs? 1. If there was a retail shop lease, and if it included a term in relation to the payment of rent by Jam, had Jam breached that term? 2. If there was a retail shop lease, and if it included a term in relation to the use of the premises by Jam, had Jam breached that term? 3. If there was a retail shop lease, and if it included a term that would require the plaintiffs to consent to a development application by Jam that involved a proposed use of the premises as a café, had the plaintiffs breached that term? 4. If the plaintiffs have breached such a term, what if any damages are they liable to pay to Jam? 5. Is Jam entitled to the injunction that it seeks to require the plaintiffs to consent to its DA? 6. If there was a retail shop lease, and if it included a term in relation to the provision of air-conditioning by the plaintiffs, had the plaintiffs breached that term? 7. If the plaintiffs have breached such a term, what if any damages are they liable to pay to Jam? 8. Is Jam entitled to the injunction that it seeks to require the plaintiffs to install "adequate" air-conditioning and, if so, what type of air-conditioning is required? 9. If there was a retail shop lease, are the plaintiffs entitled to: 1. possession of the premises; and/or 2. recover arrears of rent?
In light of the discussion of issues 1 and 2, later in this judgment, and my findings with respect to the same, I will find that no lease came into existence between the parties but rather a tenancy at will, which was properly terminated. I will nonetheless resolve the balance of issues 3 to 15.

[8]

The Agency Agreement

The plaintiffs appointed CH Real Estate as their agent under a "Management Agency Agreement - Commercial and Industrial" dated 8 March 2006 ("the Agency Agreement"). The Agency Agreement was in the standard form produced by the Real Estate Institute of New South Wales (June 2005 edition) and was stated to have commenced from 15 November 2005. The relevant clauses of that agreement, for the purposes of these proceedings, are extracted below.
Clause 1 provided: The [plaintiffs] hereby appoints [CH Real Estate] to manage all or any part of the premises in accordance with this agreement.
Clause 3 provided: The Authority vested in [CH Real Estate] by this agreement shall be deemed to be vested in [CH Real Estate's] employees from time to time.
Clause 5.1 provided for a "Leasing Fee" as follows: [The plaintiffs] acknowledge that where [CH Real Estate] or [the plaintiffs] prior to the termination of this Agreement introduces a person ("the Lessee") who: (a) executes either any Agreement to Lease, or Lease of the Property or procures another person to execute either any Agreement to Lease, or Lease of the Property irrespective of by whom such documents are prepared; or (b) enters into possession of the Property or procures another person to enter into possession of the Property; or (c) pays rent for the Property or procures another person to pay rent for the Property, including, without limitation, any assignee from a Lessee of the Property (or any part thereof), [CH Real Estate] shall upon the happening of any one of the events stipulated in (a), (b) or (c) above be forthwith entitled to be paid the full leasing fee calculated as a percentage of the average annual rent (including GST, if any) reserved under the Lease hereunder: Leasing Fee: 10% + GST.
Clause 5.2 provided: [CH Real Estate] is granted exclusive leasing rights and shall be entitled to payment of the Leasing Fee if during the period of this Agreement or any extension, EITHER the Property is leased: (a) by [CH Real Estate]; (b) by any other Agent or any other person; or (c) by [the plaintiffs].
Clause 7 provided: Except as provided for in the Special Instructions attached hereto, [CH Real Estate] is not authorised to enter into and sign leases on behalf of [the plaintiffs].
There were no "Special Instructions" attached to the Agency Agreement.
Clause 16 of the Agency Agreement provided for an additional "Management Fee" (in substance an ongoing commission) of 3% plus GST on rent "collected from time to time".

[9]

Preliminary negotiations

On about 3 July 2013, Mr M Irsak and his father and business advisor, Mr G Irsak, were shown around the premises by CH Real Estate's then "Director, Sales and Leasing", Mr Daniel Krobot. There was a discussion about air-conditioning on that day.
Shortly after midday on that same day, Mr M Irsak sent an email to Mr Krobot in the following terms: Further to our conversation today regarding the retail space we saw at Campbelltown. we [sic] are happy with a 3 x 3 year lease at $40,000 - $45,000 p/a plus gst. Ready to start immediately and rent commencement from September 1st 2013. Owner to install security grill to front and include air conditioning.
Later that day, Mr Krobot spoke by telephone with the first plaintiff. She gave evidence that the conversation was in the following terms: Daniel: "Margaret, I have shown 2 prospective tenants through Shop 5". Me: "Yes, who are they?" Daniel: "A karate school and a music academy". Me: "The karate people would be good. We have the size." Daniel: "I recommend Jam Studios - the music academy, because they have been around in Campbelltown for 18 years. I learnt to play drums there in my teens". Me: "So any offers so far?" Daniel: "We are talking 5+5, market rental with 3% increases. You would have to put in air-conditioning but the DA should not be a problem. It will be the same as what they are doing now. They want to shrink their retail in the front counter. I will get something to you today". Me: "Before you go Daniel, where are they now? Are they still operating?" Daniel: "They are at the other end of Queen Street". Me: "Okay, but why are they leaving their existing location? Wouldn't the landlord want to hold onto them?" Daniel: "Their lease is up. Their owners are asking double the rent". Me: "Whoa. How much?" Daniel: "Over $100,000". Me: "What $110,000? $120,000? Daniel did not answer. Me: "What is the current market rental for Shop 5? How much are we asking for?" Daniel: "$55,000".
Her account of that conversation was supported by her contemporaneous file note. It was also consistent (as to the rental sought by Jam's previous landlord) with evidence given by Mr M Irsak in cross-examination.
That evening, Mr Krobot sent an email to the first plaintiff in which he said: As discussed today I have had two prospective tenants through Shop 5 this week and I received a formal offer in witting from Jam Studios as noted below. … Jam Studios have been established in Campbelltown for close to 20 years. They are a well established music school and retail music centre. Terms: Rental - $42,000 per annum gross plus GST. Term - 3 plus 3 years Lease commencement - As soon as practical - they would like to have access to the premises urgently to commence fit out works. Fit out works will include the construction of 8 separate sound proof music rooms, carpet throughout and a retail counter Rental commencement - 1 September 2013 Bond - 2 months gross rental plus GST. Reviews - Annually to CPI or 3%, which ever is the greater. Landlord works/contribution - Air-conditioning System that will cool the premises adequately and the security shutters to the front of the premises as the Pool shop has. Proposed use - Music school and music retail outlet Please let me know your thoughts when possible.
On 4 July 2013 at 12:19 pm, the first plaintiff sent an email to Mr Krobot in the following terms: The term and conditions we are anticipating are: Landlords contribution: - Air-conditioning suitably [sic] to serve the unit (but continual maintenance and service by the lessee during its lease term). … Rental: $55,000 per annum gross plus GST Term: 3 + 3 years Lease commencement: As soon as practical - to commence fit out works, e.g. construction of 8 separate sound proof music rooms, carpet throughout and a retail counter. Rental commencement: 1 September 2013 Bond: 2 months gross rental + GST Reviews: annually to CPI or 3% - whichever is greater. Proposed use: music school + music retail outlet.
Mr Krobot responded to the first plaintiff, that same day, by email sent at 3:59 pm. He stated: Jam Studios cannot afford to pay $55,000 per annum gross as they are reducing there [sic] retail area significantly from the current premises. … I would suggest that if that if [sic] we could get them to pay say $43,000 - $45,000 per annum gross, and complete the shutters themselves, but you complete the air conditioning, then this would be a suitable compromise. Taking in to account how long this space has been vacant and the fact that they are a well-established business I suggest that we do all we can to secure this tenant.
It should be noted, the cross-claim also referred to an "offer letter" from Mr Krobot dated 7 July 2013. No such letter was adduced in evidence. Mr Krobot did, however, send an email on 7 July 2014 to Mr M Irsak, which was in the following terms: The owners have responded as follows: Rental - $46,000 per annum gross plus GST Term - 3 plus 3 years Lease Commencement - 1 August 2013, though access to be provided for fit out works upon providing a certificate of currency for insurance and the bond and the first months rental immediately Rental commencement - 1 September 2013 Bond - 2 months gross rental plus GST Reviews: Annually to CPI or 3%, whichever the greater Landlord works/contribution Air-conditioning System that will cool the premises adequately. Security Shutters are your responsibility and cost Proposed Use: Music school and music retail outlet
The evidence before the Court is that that "offer" was rejected, negotiations continued and that various counter offers were made.
Mr G Irsak gave evidence of a telephone conversation that he had with Mr Krobot. Mr G Irsak recalled he said: $45,000 plus GST is the maximum we are willing to pay. $45,000 is all he's got. I accept that the owners are not going to put in the security grill, but they have to put in the air-conditioning.
His evidence was that Mr Krobot responded: I will put that offer back to the owners.
On 8 July 2013 at 11:37 am, Mr M Irsak sent an email to Mr Krobot in the following terms: Thanks for your email looking forward to hear [sic] the outcome.
It is not immediately clear what email Mr M Irsak was referring to.
On 8 July 2013 at 11:50 am, the first plaintiff sent an email to Mr Krobot in which she said: Thank you for their response. The reasons we put forth fifty-five thousand dollars pa was: - the figure you mentioned during our conversation. - the other is the landlord's contribution i.e. an air conditioning system and the security shutters for all the glass panels and doors of the premise [sic] (to which quotes will have to be obtained from your office) - as well, following from the last rental paid in February 2010 it was, $3935.62, ($47227.35 pa) Anyhow, we are taking into consideration of your suggestion, therefore I think it is fair and reasonable that we propose to them $45,000 - $47,000pa.
That afternoon at 5:59 pm, Mr Krobot sent an email to the first plaintiff in the following terms: The best position I can get from Jam Studios is: $44,000 pa gross with all the other terms noted previously. Landlord to install A/C, though not the security shutters. In regards to the bond also I misunderstood his initial instructions when we spoke on the phone. They are saying due to the cost of the fit out and injecting cash into this, they are willing to pay 1 month. I suggested 1 month may be acceptable, with the view of topping up the bond within 6 months to 12 months, seeing they will need to spend $40,000 - $50,000 dollars fitting out the property initially, this should give us some comfort they will be in the premises for the long term. I await your instructions.
The first plaintiff's evidence was that she did not respond to that email because she was waiting for Mr Krobot to respond in relation to the air-conditioning quotes that she had instructed him to obtain in her email sent earlier that day.
Mr G Irsak gave evidence that he had another conversation with Mr Krobot on about 8 or 9 July 2013 in the following terms: Krobot: The owners accepted your offer of $45,000. They will install the adequate air-conditioning. Mate, they are not going to do the security screens for you. That is your responsibility, but they will install the air. Irsak: That sounds good. What's the chances of storing some stuff before the 1 of August, before we start the fit out? Krobot: I'll put it to them.

[10]

The Lease Advice Sheet

On 11 July 2013 at 7:30 pm, according to the evidence of Mr G Irsak, Mr Krobot sent an email to Mr M Irsak attaching a "Lease Advice Sheet" (which is referred to as the "Heads of Agreement" in the cross-claim at para 7).
The email stated: See attached Heads of Agreement confirming the agreed terms for the lease of Shop 5, 42-44 Queen Street Campbelltown. If all is in order can you please sign and return to our office and organise the transfer of the 1 months bond and rental in our bank account and send me the remittance? Could you also provide a copy of your certificate of currency for public liability insurance. [sic] You can then attend our office to pick up the keys.
The Lease Advice Sheet was dated 12 July 2013 and, relevantly, in the following terms: Commencing Gross Rental: $45,000 per annum excluding GST … Rent Reviews: Annually to CPI or 3% whichever the greater. Rent free Period: One (1) Month. Lease Period: 3 x 3 x 3 years Lease Commencement Date: 1 August 2013 Bond: Cash bond equivalent to One (1) months gross rental plus GST ($4,125). This is to be increased by a further month's rental, to a total off two (2) months within 6 months of lease commencement. Proposed Use: Music school and Music retail outlet … Special Conditions: The Landlord will provide immediate access to the Premises upon the lease being executed, provision of 1 months rental in advance, bond and evidence of public liability insurance for the Lessee to commence fit out works. The landlord will install at their expense an air conditioning unit that is suitably adequate for the premises. Deposit: One (1) month rental plus GST and One (1) month bond ($8,250.00) to be held in Raine & Horne Commercial Campbelltown Trust Account: … Should the matter not be finalised the Lessee will be refunded the above amount, less any reasonably incurred legal expenses for the preparation of the lease documents.
It also included the following statement immediately above the place for execution on behalf of the parties: Please sign below to confirm your intention to execute a lease for Shop 5, 42-44 Queen Street Campbelltown NSW as outlined by the above terms and conditions.
On 12 July 2013 at 12:39 pm, Mr Krobot sent a copy of the Lease Advice Sheet to the first plaintiff. His email said: Please see attached the Heads of Agreement confirming the agreed terms with Jam Studios. I note we are holding $8,250 within our account being the first months rental and 1 month bond. If all is in order I will send this document to Holman Web [sic] so leases can be prepared.
The first plaintiff's evidence was that she never instructed Mr Krobot to prepare the Lease Advice Sheet and that she neither approved it, signed it, nor instructed Mr Krobot to send it to Jam. She stated she was not aware until after 15 July 2013 that Mr Krobot had sent it to Jam. I accept that evidence.
The email dated 12 July 2013 from Mr Krobot to the first plaintiff does not indicate that the Lease Advice Sheet was provided to Jam and it is unsigned. On 15 July 2013, Mr Krobot sent an email to Holman Webb Lawyers ("Holman Webb"), the solicitors for the plaintiffs (at that time), copying in the first plaintiff which said, inter alia, "I have attached a copy of our Lease Advice (Sheet), outlining the essential terms and conditions of the agreement". Holman Webb responded to that email on 16 July 2013 requesting amendments to the Lease Advice Sheet. On 17 July 2013, Mr Krobot responded to Holman Webb and then attached the signed Lease Advice Sheet. From this, the Court may infer that, by 17 July 2013, both Holman Webb and the first plaintiff were aware that the Lease Advice Sheet had been signed by Jam, and it follows that they must have known by 17 July 2013 that the Lease Advice Sheet had been provided to Jam.
Broadly, I accept the first plaintiff as a reliable witness who was candid and responsive to questions asked of her in cross-examination. She was not shaken as to this evidence in cross-examination and her evidence included documents in support. Any confusion by the first plaintiff in cross-examination was as a result of confusion arising from the questioning. Further, in an email dated 12 July 2013, from Mr Krobot to the first plaintiff, the attached Lease Advice Sheet was unsigned. No mention was made of the document provided to Jam, let alone the fact that, by that stage, Mr M Irsak had signed the Lease Advice Sheet.
The first plaintiff's evidence is that she instructed Mr Krobot, that before she would agree to the term in relation to air-conditioning, he was to obtain relevant quotes from air-conditioning contractors. CH Real Estate did not do that until after Mr Krobot sent the Lease Advice Sheet to Jam.
On 12 July 2013, after Mr Krobot had sent the Lease Advice Sheet to Mr M Irsak, Ms Denise Egan of CH Real Estate, sent instructions to Ultimate Air Conditioning Pty Ltd ("Ultimate Air") and New Edge Group Pty Ltd ("New Edge") requesting quotes for air-conditioning for the premises.

[11]

Occupation, fit out and rent

The first plaintiff's evidence was that she received a telephone call from Ms Egan in the late afternoon on 11 July 2013 and that they had a conversation to the following effect: Denise: "Margaret, we've had a phone call from Jam Studios. They want to store some stuff in your premises, Shop 5, because they have nowhere to store them". Me: "Oh gosh Denise, what is the right thing to do? Do we have any money to hold on to if this falls apart? I mean if the whole thing fell through?" Denise: "Yes we have one month's bond and one month's rent paid into our trust account". Me: "I see. I need to be sure Denise before I let them in to store stuff". Denise: "Yes Margaret. They paid into our trust account this afternoon". Me: "Okay, because you said that, I suppose we can let them in to store stuff".
The first plaintiff's file note of that conversation recorded: … Thursday 11/7/13 Denise call [sic] late afternoon and said she just had a call from Jam Studio and said they want to store some stuff in our Premises. They have nowhere to put it.
Mr M Irsak's evidence was that he signed the Lease Advice Sheet on Jam's behalf on 11 July 2013. However, the version he confirmed signing was dated 12 July 2013. The plaintiffs correctly submitted that it is more likely that Mr M Irsak signed the Lease Advice Sheet on 12 July 2013 after having discussed it with Mr G Irsak. Mr M Irsak accepted, in cross-examination, that when he received the Lease Advice Sheet, he discussed the document with Mr G Irsak, and Mr G Irsak had explained to him what the whole of the Lease Advice Sheet meant. The following is an extract from the cross-examination of Mr M Irsak: Q. When you received that document did you show it to your father? A. Yes. Q. Did you discuss the document with him? A. That's correct. Q. Did he tell you what it was or did you already know? A. We saw it as the grounds of the beginning of the agreements of the lease. Q. Could you just focus on the question that I asked you. Did your father tell you what the document was when you showed it to him? A. Yes. Q. Did he explain any part of it to you? A. We discussed that it outlines the original agreement that we spoke with Daniel. Q. Could you just focus on my question. A. And that's what I'm trying to do. Q. Just listen to what I'm asking you because it really just requires a yes or a no answer. When you showed it to him did he explain what any part of it meant? A. Yes, your Honour. Q. And which part was that? A. That there was agreement for $45,000, that there was a one month rent free period, that it was to be annually to CPI or 3% whichever is greater, that there was a three year lease with an option for another two options of three years and that the lease commencement was to be 1 August and the cash bond and one month's rent, gross rental plus GST. We've got the music school and music retail outlet and each party to bear their own legal costs and the landlord to install the air conditioning unit that is suitable adequately for the premises.
Mr M Irsak also stated that, on 11 July 2013, he attended CH Real Estate's offices where: 1. Jam paid $8,250 to CH Real Estate representing the deposit described in the Lease Advice Sheet; 2. Mr Krobot provided him with the keys to the premises; and 3. he returned the signed Lease Advice Sheet to Mr Krobot.
However, given the dates and times printed on the relevant emails and other documents, including the Lease Advice Sheet itself, the plaintiffs correctly contended that it is more likely that Mr M Irsak attended CH Real Estate's offices on 12 July 2013.
The plaintiffs accepted that the amount of $8,250 was paid into CH Real Estate's Trust Account on 12 July 2013 and that Mr M Irsak returned the signed Lease Advice Sheet and obtained the keys to the premises on that day.
Soon after that, Jam took possession of the premises and commenced its fit out. Mr G Irsak gave evidence, by 19 July 2013, that "we moved some of the items from our previous location" into the premises and began work on the fit out of the premises. The fit out works continued throughout the remainder of July and into early August 2013.
The plaintiffs submitted that it was clear that Jam took possession of the premises and commenced work on its fit out without the consent, or even knowledge, of either the plaintiffs or CH Real Estate. That submission was supported by reference to the following: 1. All of the communications between 7 and 12 July 2013, including the Lease Advice Sheet itself, envisaged that the lease would commence on 1 August 2013, with the first month (August) being rent free. 2. The terms of the conversation between Mr Krobot and Mr G Irsak referred to in [39] above (and as explained by Mr M Irsak as extracted at [52] above) envisaged that the lease would commence and Jam would commence its fit out on 1 August 2013, though there was a request for access prior to that to "store stuff". Mr Krobot was to take instructions 3. The Lease Advice Sheet stated that the "[l]andlord will provide immediate access to the premises upon the lease being executed, provision of 1 months rental in advance, bond and evidence of public liability insurance for the Lessee to commence fit out works". 4. There was no evidence to suggest that either Mr Krobot or Ms Egan were told by either of Messrs G or M Irsak that Jam intended to do anything other than store equipment at the premises prior to the formal lease being executed. 5. The instructions sent to both air-conditioning contractors by fax by Ms Egan on 12 July 2013 both direct the contractor to contact "Mathew" to arrange access (and as such the Court would infer, the plaintiffs submitted, that they were sent after he had collected the keys), but also state that "the tenant has not moved in yet". 6. There was no evidence to suggest that, prior to 24 July 2013, anyone from CH Real Estate was, or that the plaintiffs were, aware that Jam had commenced fit out work. The first plaintiff's evidence was that, consistent with her contemporaneous file note, she was shocked to see fit out work going on when she attended the premises on 24 July 2013. I accept her evidence. 7. Consistent with the first plaintiff's instructions, Ms Egan sent emails to Mr M Irsak on 29 and 30 July 2013, directing Jam to cease all fit out work prior to signing the lease.
On the weight of the evidence the submission for the plaintiffs, in that respect, must be accepted.
The plaintiffs conceded, however, that from about September 2013 they accepted rent from Jam whilst they continued to negotiate the terms of a lease through their lawyers. In cross-examination the first plaintiff confirmed that the plaintiffs received rent from August 2013, although the CH Real Estate tenant ledger exhibited to her affidavit indicated that rent was, in fact, paid from September (that part of the deposit held in CH Real Estate's trust account since July 2013 and representing the first month's rent was applied for that purpose in September 2013).
The first plaintiff also confirmed that CH Real Estate began deducting its management fee under cl 16 of the Agency Agreement from rent payments from about that time, though her evidence was that she never paid the "Leasing Fee" under cl 5.
The plaintiffs also accepted that they took no action after the end of July 2013 (until February 2014) to require that Jam cease its fit out works or vacate the premises, although this was in the context of the continuing negotiations.

[12]

Negotiations

On 14 July 2013, Mr Krobot sent an email to Mulally Mylott Lawyers ("Mulally Mylott"), the solicitors for Jam (at that time), which was copied to Mr M Irsak, attaching an unsigned copy of the Lease Advice Sheet. That email stated as follows: We understand you act on behalf of Jam Studios Pty Ltd in regards to the above leasing matter. See attached copy of our lease advice, outlining the essential terms and conditions. The landlords solicitor is in the process of preparing lease documentation for your clients review and execution. Please let me know if I can provide any further assistance to have the matter finalised.
In cross-examination, Mr M Irsak was uncertain as to the precise time that Mulally Mylott were instructed by Jam. He said he believed that he met with Ms Ingrid Boon of Mulally Mylott by 15 or 16 July 2013; at which meeting Ms Boon gave advice to Jam in relation to the Lease Advice Sheet.
Mr Krobot sent an email to Ms Robyn Chamberlain of Holman Webb attaching an unsigned copy of the Lease Advice Sheet at 10:16 am on 15 July 2013. That email stated: I understand you act for the Sze Tu family in regards to the above leasing matter. I have attached a copy of our Lease Advice, outlining the essential terms and conditions of the agreement. Please let me know of any further assistance I can provide in order to have the matter finalised as soon as possible.
On 16 July 2013 at 11:51 am, Ms Chamberlain sent the following email to Mr Krobot: Thank you for the Lease proposal. I have since spoken to our mutual client. Can you please amend as follows: 1. Amend security to bank guarantee rather than security bond. 2. Add Special conditions: a. The tenant is to regularly service and maintain the air conditioning. The tenant will provide the Landlord with a service schedule for the air conditioning if requested by the landlord and will permit the Landlord or the Landlord's agent access on reasonable notice to inspect the air conditioning; b. Tenant is to warrant that their proposed use of the premises will not affect the quiet enjoyment of neighbours use of their premises. If required by the Landlord, the tenant agrees to install suitable sound insulation at the Tenant's cost to a professional standard approved by the Landlord; c. Make good when Tenant vacates the premises - to reinstate the premises and all fittings to the condition and standard as at the commencement of the lease. Tenant to repaint the premises upon vacating if required by the Landlord. Would you kindly arrange to have the Lease Proposal amended accordingly. Would you also advise whether you are preparing the Retail Leases Act Disclosure Statement? Upon receipt of the Lease Proposal executed by the Tenant and your confirmation that you are holding the one month rental we shall commence preparation of the Lease.
Mr Krobot responded on 17 July 2013 with an email in the following terms (to which he appears to have attached a copy of the Lease Advice Sheet that was signed by Mr M Irsak): In regards to the clauses you note below, we usually do not draft them within a Heads of Agreement document as they are always covered in the lease. The HOA is just an intent to move forward with the proposed terms and is not binding until leases are signed. We are already holding the 1 month rental and 1 month bond within our trust account and the HOA clearly states that if they do not proceed, then they are to cover the legal costs incurred by the landlord for preparation of the lease documentation. I would suggest that we provide them we [sic] lease as soon as possible as they [sic] tenant was hoping to have the lease signed and executed this week. Also, we are able to complete the Retail Leases Act Disclosure Statement. See attached the signed Heads of Agreement for your information.
Ms Chamberlain emailed a draft lease ("the draft lease") to Mr Krobot and the first plaintiff on 18 July 2013 at 4:37 pm. The email stated: Please find attached Annexure A to lease prepared in accordance with the signed Lease Advice sheet provided to us yesterday. Would you kindly review and provide your comments. Daniel, I note that you were unable to arrange for the Disclosure Statement to be issued today. I would be grateful if you were able to arrange to have this issued tomorrow and forward to Margaret and myself.
The first plaintiff's evidence was that she had a telephone call from Mr Krobot on 22 July 2013 and that they had a conversation to the following effect: Daniel: "Margaret, Jam Studios have come back to me to add a couple of things". Me: "Oh, what do you mean?" Daniel: "They have requested 8 - 9 car spaces, trading hours from 9 AM to 9 PM Monday to Saturday, and they also want to use the front of the shop as a café". Me: "What? That's the first time you told me anything about a café? The premises do not have grease traps or exhaust fans and I'm not sure whether the air-conditioning will support all that heat and cooking".
That same day, she recalled, Mr Krobot also sent her two drafts of Lessors' Disclosure Statement. Her evidence was that she could not read either draft that Mr Krobot had sent her. The copy produced on subpoena by CH Real Estate includes the following provisions: 2. Permitted Use 2.1 Description of permitted use… Musical School and musical retail outlet. … 8. Lessors Works 8.1 Description of the works to be carried out by the Lessor before the date that the Lease commences… As per lease advice sheet.
Mr M Irsak's evidence is that Mr Krobot also sent the draft Lessors' Disclosure Statement to him on 22 July 2013.
On 22 July the first plaintiff also spoke with Ms Egan by telephone and their conversation was as follows: Me: "Denise, early in the piece I had asked Daniel to get an air-conditioning quote for us. Do you know if the quote is in yet?" Denise: "I don't know. Just give me a moment; I will have a look ". Me: "Please if you can, it has been a while now". I waited on the line for a few moments and then Denise came back and our conversation continued to the following effect: Denise: "The quote from Ultimate is wrong and costly. He seems to have quoted for partitioning of the rooms". Me: "What you mean by that? What are you saying please?" Denise: "No, no. I will get you a second quote from New Edge". Me: "There must be a mix-up of quotes Denise. That sounds awful. Please tell me what it is?" Denise: "No, no. I will get you a second quote from New Edge". Me: "Please tell me what it is?" Denise: "No, no. I will get you a second quote from New Edge". Me: "All right then. While the New Edge man is on-site please ask him to give a quote for Shop 3 to make his trip worthwhile".
Her file note of the conversation, relevantly, recorded: What does she mean?? She will get a second quote from "New Edge" for air-conditioning unit for Unit 5. The quote from Ultimate is wrong + costly, he quoted for "partition" of the rooms.
Holman Webb provided the draft lease to Mulally Mylott on 23 July 2013. It included the following terms: 1. Clause 1.1(33) provided that the "Permitted Use" was the use specified in Item 5. Item 5 appeared in the "Reference Schedule" and included: "Musical school and music retail outlet". 2. Clause 11.1(2) dealt with "Permitted Use" and stipulated that: "[t]he Lessee must not use the Premises for any purpose other than the Permitted Use". 3. Clause 16.15 said: "[t]he Lessor shall install air-conditioning to the Premises".
Mr M Irsak's evidence was that "both parties continued to negotiate the terms of the lease". He contended that this was because the draft lease "did not fully reflect the terms of" the Lease Advice Sheet.
However, on 29 July, Mulally Mylott sent a letter to Holman Webb in relation to the draft lease and the draft Lessors' Disclosure Statement in which they requested the following changes to the Lessors' Disclosure Statement and the draft lease: We are instructed to seek the following further details and amendments to the Lessors Disclosure Statement and the Lease: Lessors Disclosure Statement 1. the description of permitted use in item 2.1 of Part 1 be amended to read "Musical school, music retail outlet and café". The Lease should also reflect this amendment. … Lease 19. the Lessee is yet to obtain approval from the local Council as to its use of the premises, and will require an additional clause 11.1(3) to be inserted into the Lease as follows: "This Lease is conditional upon the Lessee's Development Application as to use of the Premises being approved by the local Council. The Lessee must do all things reasonably necessary to obtain development consent from the local Council within six (6) months of the commencement date of this Lease. If development consent is not forthcoming or the Lessee is unable or unwilling to meet the conditions of such development consent: (a) the Lessor agrees to refund to the Lessee the security bond, being that sum specified in Item [no.] [sic]; and (b) the Lessee may terminate this Lease without compensation to the Lessor upon the Lessee giving the Lessor not less than one (1) month's notice in writing of such termination. …" 30. replace clause 16.15 with the following clause: "The Lessor shall at its own cost and expense, install an air-conditioner suitable to the size of the Premises in a proper and workmanlike manner within one (1) month of the commencement date of this Lease.
Mr M Irsak accepted in cross-examination that he took advice from Ms Boon on both the draft lease and the above letter and that he approved that letter before it was sent: Q. Did you approve that letter before Mulally Mylott sent it to Holman Webb? A. Yes, I did. … Q. Did Ms Boon give you any, don't tell me what it was, if the answer is yes, but did she give you any advice on that lease? A. Yes, that's what the solicitor's supposed to do.

[13]

Negotiations break down

On 30 July 2013, Ms Egan provided the first plaintiff with air-conditioning quotes obtained from Ultimate Air and New Edge. The quotes, which were for a "ducted air-conditioning system" including outlets, ducting work and power circuits, as well a "54kw" "packaged unit". The New Edge quote referred to, inter alia, the supply and installation of a "roof top packaged unit", rigid sheet metal ductwork, flexible ductwork, a "roof platform" and a 50A power circuit "from the main switchboard to unit on [the] roof".
The quotes were as follows: 1. Ultimate Air - $44,773 plus GST; and 2. New Edge - $41,200 plus GST.
The receipt of those quotes precipitated a further round of negotiations in relation to air-conditioning. During the course of negotiations, it would appear a proposal was made by Mr Krobot for the installation of a suspended ceiling, which the parties were advised would reduce the cost of installing an air-conditioning system. However, the parties were unable to agree on who would be responsible for the costs associated with installing the suspended ceiling.
In addition, the parties were unable to agree about changes to the "permitted use" requested by Jam to enable it to use the premises as a café. If that was to occur, the plaintiffs required an increase to the rent. Further, there was a disagreement as to the need for Jam to obtain a DA from the Council.
On 6 September 2013, Mulally Mylott wrote to Holman Webb as follows: We refer to recent emails and discussions between our client and your clients' agent. Re. Installation of air-conditioner We confirm your client initially agreed to install an air-conditioning system and our client moved into the premises on that basis. We understand the cost of installation of an air conditioner suitable to the size of the premises was too costly for your clients; there was discussion between our respective clients regarding the installation of a full ceiling; and your clients obtain a quote from about $19,000 for the installation of a full ceiling and sought our client agreement to contribute to the cost. Our client has been provided with a verbal quote of $13,000 for the installation of a false ceiling. Our client proposes and is prepared to pay for the labour to install the false ceiling if your client is prepared to pay for the cost of materials, estimated at $6,000. We believe this to be a fair proposal and request you obtain your client's instructions in this regard. Re. Use of the premises as a café We understand your clients have some concerns in relation to our client's proposal to use part of the premises as a café. We assure you that our client's only immediate plan is to serve coffee, tea and ice cream in the warmer months. Our client's plans for a fully operational café are still undecided however it would like to have the option left open under the terms of the Lease. Our client assures us that, if it does decide to operate a café at any time in the future, it will meet your clients' requirements pursuant to the terms of the Lease as well as any Council requirements. Re. Lease As we understand it, the above are the only remaining issues.
Holman Webb wrote to Mulally Mylott on 9 September 2013 as follows: … Lessor's Disclosure Statement 1. The Lease Advice Sheet did not include "Café" as part of the permitted use. Our clients are concerned that the Premises are not suitable for use as a café. Our client's note that cafe generally require grease traps and commercial phones etc. and they do not consent to such items being installed. Accordingly, the premises are not suitable for cooking food. Having said that, our clients understand that the Tenants would like to serve coffee/tea and refreshments etc. Our clients may be agreeable to this, though require further information regarding what the tenant proposes. Can you please obtain from the Tenant may proposed suggested menu for our client to review. … Lease … 30. Our client agrees to install our air-conditioning but will not do so until all of the following have been received from the Tenant: (a) Executed Lease in form satisfactory to the Landlords. (b) Lease registration fee being a cheque in favour of "LPI NSW" for $104.50. (c) Evidence of insurance satisfactory to our client (see comments below). (d) Payment of our fees pursuant to clause 25.2(i)(a) of the Lease. (e) Payment of the rent for October. Kindly note that the air-conditioning which it is proposed to install is suitable for the current permitted use and approved configuration of the premises and may not be suitable if the use or configuration changes. We confirm that your client has agreed to pay for the total cost of installing the ceiling (including both materials and labour and adjusting the lighting to fit the new ceiling) but the work cannot be commenced on installing the ceiling until the air-conditioning has been installed. …
On 24 September 2013, Ms Egan reported to Ms Chamberlain: I have just spoken to Ingrid Boon from Mulally Mylott regarding the letter you sent on 9 September 2013. Ingrid has advised that she has not responded to your letter as they are waiting for all parties to come to an agreement, specifically in relation to the air-conditioning and fees they will be charged. Ingrid has stated these issues need to be resolved between the lessor and the lessee before we can move forward.
On 25 September 2013, Mr Krobot emailed Ms Chamberlain: I have spoken to Gordon from Jam Studios this afternoon and he confirms he is not willing to pay any of the landlord's legal costs. The initial heads of agreement states each party to bear their own legal expenses. In regards to the ceiling they have received a quote for the works totalling $13,000. They are seeking that the landlord contribute to half these costs ($6,500). They initially agreed to complete these works at their expense, which has now changed. They maintain that if a ceiling is not installed and the air conditioning needs to be installed as an exposed duct system the cost for this system is in excess of $45,000. With the ceiling installed, the cost is reduced to approximately $29,000. They believe they are saving the landlord a considerable amount of money by installing the ceiling, so they should pay part of the costs. All other issues are in order and they want to proceed to signing lease documents urgently. I also note that we are starting to come into some hot weather so completing the A/C is a priority.
Also on 25 September 2013, Holman Webb wrote to Mulally Mylott: We refer to our letter dated 9 September 2013 and advise we have not received a response. We look forward to receiving a response to a letter as soon as possible. We note that your client's occupation and the Lease must be finalised and executed urgently.
On 27 September 2013, Holman Webb again wrote to Mulally Mylott: … We are instructed that it had been agreed that our clients would install the air conditioning and that your client had agreed to pay the cost of installation of the ceiling including materials and labour and adjusting the lighting to fit the new ceiling. We understand from the agent, however, that your client has since changed their mind and proposes that the [sic] our clients should contribute to half the cost of the installation of the ceiling being $6,500.00. We are instructed that our clients do not agree to this proposal. Our clients agree to install the air conditioning on the condition that your client will then install ceiling and the lighting as set out in the previous paragraph, using qualified tradespeople approved by our clients. Our clients do not agree to contribute to the cost of such installation. We are instructed that if the ceiling is not installed, the cost of the power consumption by the air-conditioning will increase. The cost to your client will be offset by the reduced cost of the power consumption by the air-conditioning if the ceiling is installed. …
On 3 October 2013, Ms Chamberlain sent an email to Ms Egan as follows: We are instructed that the landlords will only proceed on the following commercial terms: 1. Annual increase in rent of 3% on each anniversary of the commencing date; 2. Market review on the commencing date of the new lease if the option is exercised; 3. Landlords will install air-conditioning on the condition that the tenant installs the ceiling. The tenant had previously agreed to this, confirmation of this agreement being the email from the agent to our client dated 26 August 2013. The landlords have proceeded on the basis of this agreement. We are instructed not to spend further time considering the other items which the tenant has raised below if points one - three above are not agreed to by the tenant. Our client requires a response to this email by 5 PM on Tuesday, 8 October 2013. Please urgently forward this email to the Tenant as we cannot send it directly when the tenant has a solicitor acting for them.
On 9 October 2013, Mulally Mylott wrote to Holman Webb: We refer to our telephone discussion yesterday and confirm: 1. In relation to the air-conditioning issue, our client relies on the lessors' agreement to install at their expense air-conditioning unit that is suitably adequate for the premises as evidenced by the agent's Lease Advice Sheet. We also note the letter received by our client from the agent dated 7 July 2013, a copy of which is attached for your reference. Our client entered into occupation of the premises on the promise made by the lessors that they would install a suitable air-conditioning system to the premises. It is a matter for the lessors as to whether or not they wish to install a false ceiling. Our client has no requirement for a false ceiling. We confirm our client has never agreed to contribute to the cost of the installation of an air conditioner or a false ceiling other than in accordance with a proposal, as outlined in our letter to you dated 6 September 2013. Such proposals offered by our clients merely to assist the lessors. Our client simply does not have funds sufficient to enable it to financially contribute towards such costs. …
Then, on 22 October 2013, Mulally Mylott wrote to Holman Webb asserting on Jam's behalf that a retail shop lease had been agreed in July 2013 on the basis of the Lease Advice Sheet: … In our view the following situation applies: 1. there is an agreement between our respective clients granting our client a right of occupation of Shop 5 for value and for the use of the premises as a retail shop; 2. the agreed terms are outlined in the Lease Advice Sheet dated 12 July 2013 of Raine & Horne Commercial; 3. the Retail Leases Act 1994 applies whether the agreement is oral, written or partly oral or partly written (section 3 definitions) 4. the lease was entered into when our client entered into possession of Shop 5 (section 8); 5. the Act provides for a term of not less than 5 years (section 16). …
Jam paid rent in the sum of $4,124 ($3,750 plus GST) for the month of October 2013 on 29 October 2013 (approximately one month later than required by the Lease Advice Sheet).
On 30 October 2013, Holman Webb responded to Mulally Mylott Lawyer's letter dated 22 October 2013 as follows: We refer to your letter of 22 October 2013. We are instructed as follows: 1. A Lease Advice Sheet was issued by Raine & Horne Commercial to your client dated on or about 12 July 2013. That Lease Advice Sheet was expressed to be for the purposes to "confirm your intention to execute a Lease". The proposal was signed and accepted by the Tenant, Jam Studios Pty Ltd, by Mr Mathew Irsak. The proposal was never signed or accepted on behalf of the Landlord. … 5. Our client is of the view that no concluded agreement has been reached with the Tenant regarding the terms of the Lease. … …

[18]

WAS THERE A LEASE? - ISSUES 1 & 2

In paras 5-11 of the cross-claim Jam pleaded that: 1. there was an agreement to that effect on or about 11 or 12 July 2013; or 2. alternatively, that a lease came into existence by reason of an estoppel which arose from "representations" which Jam says CH Real Estate made on the plaintiffs' behalf.
It is common ground that no formal lease document was ever agreed or executed. It follows that any lease, whether it arose by agreement or on the basis of an estoppel, was in the terms set out in the Lease Advice Sheet. The plaintiffs submitted in order for an agreement to exist between the plaintiffs and Jam, Mr Krobot must have had either actual or ostensible authority.
Jam submitted that intention to enter into a lease could be implied by a party's behaviour, and it contended that the following factors were demonstrative of an intention to enter into a contract: 1. an email from Mr Krobot dated 3 July 2013 as to Jam being a prospective tenant; 2. an email from the first plaintiff to Mr Krobot dated 4 July 2013 including instructions as to the anticipated terms and conditions, such as commencing fit out works as soon as practical; 3. money was paid by Jam to the plaintiffs as rent, and that money was not refunded; and 4. the plaintiffs allowed Jam entry into the building before 1 August 2013.
Jam submitted that the first plaintiff's words, intentions and delegations to her agent demonstrated an intention to enter into a lease.
In addition, Jam contended that the plaintiffs entered into a lease when it was provided with the keys because it entered and occupied the building, thereby falling under the definition of "retail shop lease or lease" under s 3 of the Act (which is extracted below).
The plaintiffs denied that there was any such agreement or that they were estopped from denying such an agreement. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that: 1. CH Real Estate had no authority, either actual or ostensible, to enter into such an agreement on their behalf; 2. when the evidence is considered as a whole, it is apparent that there were negotiations for a lease, but no "agreement" was ever concluded; and 3. the plaintiffs say that, at most, Jam was allowed into possession of the premises under a tenancy at will, in anticipation of such an agreement.

[19]

Relevant legislation

The relevant sections of the Conveyancing Act are extracted below: 23C Instruments required to be in writing (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act with respect to the creation of interests in land by parol: (a) no interest in land can be created or disposed of except by writing signed by the person creating or conveying the same, or by the person's agent thereunto lawfully authorised in writing, or by will, or by operation of law, … 23D Creation of interests in land by parol (1) All interests in land created by parol and not put in writing and signed by the person so creating the same, or by the person's agent thereunto lawfully authorised in writing, shall have, notwithstanding any consideration having been given for the same, the force and effect of interests at will only. … 54A Contracts for sale etc of land to be in writing (1) No action or proceedings may be brought upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of land or any interest in land, unless the agreement upon which such action or proceedings is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing, and signed by the party to be charged or by some other person thereunto lawfully authorised by the party to be charged. … 127 Tenancy from year to year not to be implied (1) No tenancy from year to year shall, after the commencement of this Act, be implied by payment of rent; if there is a tenancy, and no agreement as to its duration, then such tenancy shall be deemed to be a tenancy determinable at the will of either of the parties by one month's notice in writing expiring at any time.
Section 3 of the Retail Leases Act defines a "retail shop lease or lease" in the following terms: retail shop lease or lease means any agreement under which a person grants or agrees to grant to another person for value, a right of occupation of premises for the purpose of the use of the premises as a retail shop: (a) whether or not the right is a right of exclusive occupation, and (b) whether the agreement is express or implied, and (c) whether the agreement is oral or in writing, or partly oral and partly in writing.
The definition of a "lease", however, is qualified by s 6A of the Retail Leases Act, with respect to short-term leases. It, relevantly, provides: 6A Application of Act to short-term leases (1) Generally, Act not to apply to short-term leases Subject to subsection (2), this Act does not apply to a lease of a retail shop for a term of less than 6 months without any right for the lessee to extend the lease (whether by means of an option to extend or renew the lease or otherwise). (2) Exception for successive, extended or renewed leases for more than one year If the lessee has been in possession or entitled to be in possession of the retail shop without interruption for more than one year (whether by means of a series of 2 or more leases or by means of an extended or renewed lease or leases, or by any combination of those means), this Act applies to: (a) the lease on and from the day on which the lessee has been in possession or entitled to be in possession of the shop for more than one year, and (b) any succeeding lease or leases of the shop to the lessee, where possession or entitlement to possession is not interrupted. …
Further, s 8 of the Retail Leases Act provides: 8 When the lease is entered into (1) For the purposes of this Act, a retail shop lease is considered to have been entered into when a person enters into possession of the retail shop as lessee under the lease or begins to pay rent as lessee under the lease (whichever happens first). (2) However, if both parties execute the lease before the lessee enters into possession under the lease or begins to pay rent under the lease, the lease is considered to have been entered into as soon as both parties have executed the lease.
Counsel for the plaintiffs properly accepted that the effect of s 3 of the Retail Leases Act (as qualified by s 6A) is that, if Jam established an oral or implied agreement that falls within the definition of "a retail shop lease" under s 3, that agreement would not be ineffective by reason of non-compliance with ss 23C(1)(a), 23D(1) and/or 54A(1) of Conveyancing Act, i.e. want of writing.

[20]

CH Real Estate's authority

CH Real Estate was appointed as the plaintiffs' agent under the Agency Agreement. Under that agreement CH Real Estate had authority to manage the premises and to negotiate with prospective tenants on the plaintiffs' behalf (cll 1-5).
However, it was an express term of the Agency Agreement (cl 7) that: Except as provided for in the Special Instructions attached hereto, [CH Real Estate] is not authorised to enter into and sign leases on behalf of [the plaintiffs].
As mentioned earlier, there were no "Special Instructions" attached to the Agency Agreement.
Hence, the plaintiffs contended that Jam can only succeed in establishing that there was an agreement, for the purposes of s 3 of the Retail Leases Act, if it can establish that CH Real Estate had ostensible authority to enter into such an agreement on the plaintiffs' behalf or that any agreement that was purportedly made by CH Real Estate (without authority) was subsequently ratified by the plaintiffs. In the light of the terms of the Agency Agreement, as described immediately above, and the evidence summarised at [23]-[49] as showing no other bases to demonstrate actual authority, I agree with that submission. The question remains: did CH Real Estate have ostensible authority?
Jam contended that CH Real Estate had ostensible authority for the following reasons: 1. Jam reasonably believed that CH Real Estate had authority to act on the plaintiffs' behalf and was never told by CH Real Estate that it was not authorised to act for the plaintiffs; 2. Jam had no information to suggest the lease agreement was not reasonable, equitable and believable; 3. the plaintiffs' accepted money from Jam as rent which was not refunded; and 4. real estate agents represent landlords and tenants.
The "usual position" is that a real estate agent does not have the ostensible authority to enter into binding agreements on behalf of its principal. The position was stated by the High Court in Petersen v Moloney (1951) 84 CLR 91, at 94-95 (per Dixon, Fullagar and Kitto JJ) as follows: In connection with sales and purchases of property the word "agent" is apt to be used in a misleading way. The legal conception of agency is expressed in the maxim "Qui facit per alium facit per se", and an "agent" is a person who is able, by virtue of authority conferred upon him, to create or affect legal rights and duties as between another person, who is called his principal, and third parties. When a person is employed to find a buyer of property, he is commonly said to be employed as an agent, and the term "estate agent" is a common description of a class of persons whose business is to find buyers for owners who wish to sell property. But the mere employment of such a person under the designation of agent does not, apart from the general rule that the employer will be responsible for misrepresentations made by him, necessarily create any authority to do anything which will affect the legal position of his employer. He may, of course, be given any express authority which the employer thinks fit to give him, and estoppels may arise, but the law does not imply from the mere fact of employment to find a purchaser a general authority to do on behalf of the employer anything which may be incidental to the effecting of a sale.
The position as outlined in the Petersen v Moloney was considered in Celermajer Holdings Pty Ltd v Kopas (2011) 16 BPR 30,735; [2011] NSWSC 40 ("Celermajer Holdings") at [294]-[299] per Ward J. In that case her Honour distinguished Petersen v Moloney, but was concerned with a different set of facts. A notice of termination had been issued in relation to a residential tenancy agreement, following which proceedings were commenced on behalf of the owner in the former Residential Tenancies Tribunal. Those proceedings were prosecuted on behalf of the owner by its real estate agent (consistent with the practice in that Tribunal). It was subsequently alleged that, during the course of settling that dispute, the agent had agreed on behalf of the owner to grant a life tenancy to the respondent tenant.
Her Honour ultimately found that the agent made no such agreement, but on the issue of whether or not the agent had ostensible authority to do so, her Honour observed as follows (at [298]-[299]): [298] In Petersen v Moloney (1951) 84 CLR 9, in considering the circumstance in which a claim for breach of warranty of authority would lie, the High Court commented that in the area of real estate agency, there is limited scope of a real estate agent to make such a warrant of authority, because a real estate agent rarely has any authority to enter into a contract binding upon the principal and that, more often, a real estate agent does little more than represent the principal. Nevertheless it was recognised that there were circumstances in which such a warranty of authority might be seen to have been given - including where a managing agent of real property has authority to enter leases and engage tradespersons. [299] Here, the scope of the activities that Mr Wellner (and the Raine & Horne agency) was permitted to do on behalf of CHPL seems to have covered matters not only to do with access arrangements for the premises and rental increases, but appearance at the tribunal to enter into conciliation hearings and the like. It seems to me that there has been a holding out by CHPL that Mr Wellner (or those after him at the agency who were designated as the property agent) had authority to commit CHPL to matters relating to the tenancy of the property and that in the absence of an express limitation on that authority made clear to the tenant, there was ostensible authority to enter into a tenancy agreement (even one as unusual as the one for which Dr Kopas contended).
Jam has not outlined a basis upon which it says that CH Real Estate had ostensible authority to enter into a lease on behalf of the plaintiffs, either in the cross-claim or in its evidence. No conduct by the plaintiffs amounting to a relevant representation or "holding out" was identified by Jam and no evidence of any reliance upon such conduct by Jam has been adduced (cf Celermajer Holdings at [294]-[299]; see also G E Dal Pont, Law of Agency (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2014) at [20.29]-[20.34] and [20.38]). I accept the plaintiffs' submission that the usual position referred to in the authorities must, therefore, be taken to apply.
Further, Jam has not pointed to any conduct by the plaintiffs that might amount to ratification of an agreement made with it by CH Real Estate. Having regard to matters discussed at [57]-[76] above and [137]-[139] below, I also accept the plaintiffs' submission that no such ratification may, on the evidence, be properly found.
Unless the agreement said to be struck with Mr Krobot was subsequently ratified by the plaintiffs (and I will find no such ratification occurred), in the absence of demonstration of CH Real Estate's ostensible authority, the contention that there was an agreement to lease must fail. There was no ostensible authority and, as I will discuss below, negotiations continued after 12 July 2013 given that no agreement was reached.

[21]

Relevant principles

In the plaintiffs' submission, the evidence does not establish a clear case of an offer having been made by one party and accepted by the other, and the existence of an agreement (as distinct from its proper construction) can therefore only be inferred, in the circumstances of this case, objectively and consistently with the principles set out by the Court of Appeal in Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153; [2001] NSWCA 61 at [71]-[81] (per Heydon JA) and [171]-[173] (per Ipp JA), that is, by asking what the reasonable bystander would conclude from the parties' words and conduct, including conduct that might in other circumstances be considered "post-contractual", when considered against the surrounding circumstances. I agree. (See also Priestley v Priestley [2017] NSWCA 155 at [5] (per Macfarlan JA) and [104]-[105] (per Emmett AJA, with whom McColl JA agreed); Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; [2001] FCA 1833 at [369] (per Allsop J, with whom Drummond and Mansfield JJ agreed); County Securities Pty Limited v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Limited [2008] NSWCA 193 at [7]-[8] (per Spigelman CJ).
The plaintiffs further submitted, correctly in my view, when all of the objective facts are considered, it is apparent that, to the extent that the Lease Advice Sheet and the associated correspondence between CH Real Estate and Jam constituted any "agreement", it was an agreement in the nature of the third category referred to by Dixon CJ and McTiernan and Kitto JJ in Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353 (at 360), being "one in which the intention of the parties is not to make a concluded bargain at all, unless and until they execute a formal contract".
As to how the distinction should be drawn, in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540 Gleeson CJ observed (at 547): It is submitted on behalf of the respondents, correctly in my view, that even an assertion that "an agreement has been concluded" is equivocal when one bears in mind the nature of the issue in the case. It is not in doubt that the parties regarded themselves as having reached an agreement on price and, further, that they had no reason to expect that there would be any difficulty in coming to terms on other matters concerning their relationship.
His Honour continued (at 547-549): There is ample authority for the proposition that reference may be made to the correspondence between the parties subsequent to 13 June 1986 for the purpose of showing that "it was not in the contemplation of either party that they were to be bound until all the essential preliminaries had been agreed to, nor until a formal contract had been drawn up embodying all the matters incidental to a transaction of such a nature": Barrier Wharfs Ltd v W Scott Fell & Co Ltd (1908) 5 CLR 647 at 669 per Griffiths CJ; see also Howard Smith and Co Ltd v Varawa (1907) 5 CLR 68; Hussey v Horne-Payne (1879) 4 App Cas 311; B Seppelt and Sons Ltd v Commissioner for Main Roads (1975) 1 BPR 9147 and Film Bars Pty Ltd v Pacific Film Laboratories Pty Ltd (1979) 1 BPR 9251. In the present case that correspondence has a particular bearing on the interpretation and understanding of the earlier communications in that it constitutes an important source of information as to what are matters incidental, or for that matter essential, to a transaction of the nature in question. In a case where a court is required to make a judgment concerning the intention of the parties in relation to what might broadly be described as a Masters v Cameron ((1954) 91 CLR 353) dispute, it will normally be of importance that the court have an understanding of the commercial context in which the dispute arises, and a most significant feature of that context will relate to the subject which the parties regard, or would ordinarily be expected to regard, as matters to be covered by their contract. In some cases, such as transactions involving the sale and purchase of land, or leases, courts may properly feel well equipped to form a view on such matters without the need for much evidence. In many cases, however, of which the present is a good example, there is a need for evidence in one form or another as to what subjects would be regarded as requiring agreement between the parties. In this case the best evidence on that subject is to be found in the actual communications between the parties and, in particular, in the issues which they in fact addressed when they set about drafting their detailed contract. It is to be noted that the question in a case such as the present is expressed in terms of the intention of the parties to make a concluded bargain: see, eg, Masters v Cameron (at 360). That is not the same as, although in a given case it may be closely related to, the question whether the parties have reached agreement upon such terms as are, in the circumstances, legally necessary to constitute a contract. To say that parties to negotiations have agreed upon sufficient matters to produce the consequence that, perhaps by reference to implied terms or by resort to considerations of reasonableness, a court will treat their consensus as sufficiently comprehensive to be legally binding, is not the same thing as to say that a court will decide that they intended to make a concluded bargain. Nevertheless, in the ordinary case, as a matter of fact and commonsense, other things being equal, the more numerous and significant the areas in respect of which the parties have failed to reach agreement, the slower a court will be to conclude that they had the requisite contractual intention. Reference has earlier been made to "intention". Cases which typically give rise to problems of the kind presently under consideration are cases in which there is no doubt that the parties had a common intention that at some stage, and by some means, they would enter into contractual relations. They have entered into negotiations for that specific purpose. The problem which arises is that they have exchanged communications which, on the one hand, use the language of agreement but, on the other hand, disclose an expectation that at some future time a document embodying the terms of their contractual arrangement will be brought into existence. Where, as in the present case, the communications which the parties have exchanged are in writing, the question of their "intention" is, prima facie, to be resolved objectively, and as a matter of construction of the relevant documents.
His Honour stated further (at 549-550): This is not a case in which the parties have signed a single document which, because it contains some such expression as "subject to contract", gives rise to the problem in question. In such a case, the outcome of which will ordinarily turn upon the construction of the single document referred to, questions may arise as to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in aid of the construction of the document: see Air Great Lakes Pty Ltd v K S Easter (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 309 per Hope JA. The case involves the objective determination of the intention of the parties from a consideration of a series of communications exchanged by them in the context of their dealings over a period of time. In those circumstances it is both appropriate and necessary to have regard to the commercial circumstances surrounding the exchange of communications and, in particular to the subject matter of those communications: Allen v Carbone (1975) 132 CLR 528 at 531-532. Furthermore, as was noted earlier, it is proper to have regard to communications between the parties subsequent to the date of the alleged contract to the extent to which those communications throw light upon the meaning of the language which is being considered for the purpose of determining whether it expresses an intention one way or the other upon the critical matter. At the least, such subsequent communications will often form part of the context in which the particular exchanges in question are to be evaluated.
After referring to both Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council and Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd, Giles JA (with whom Hodgson and Campbell JJA agreed) made the following observations in Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd [2008] NSWCA 149 (at [101]-[105]): [101] In Barrier Wharfs Ltd v W Scott Fell & Co Ltd at 669 Griffiths CJ had considered that subsequent correspondence between the parties showing that they continued in negotiation "negatives the idea of an existing concluded contract". In Howard Smith and Co Ltd v Varawa (1907) 5 CLR 68 his Honour had said at 78 that "the question being whether the parties had in fact concluded an agreement on 1st December, any statements or conduct on their part after that date inconsistent with the existence of a concluded contract are relevant for this purpose". In B Seppelt and Sons Ltd v Commissioner for Main Roads (1975) 1 BPR 9147 regard was had to subsequent communications showing that the parties contemplated the execution of a formal contract, and Mahoney JA said at 9155, with reference to Barrier Wharfs Ltd v W Scott Fell & Co Ltd and Howard Smith and Co Ltd v Varawa, that although it was not conclusive on whether a binding contract had previously been made, the regard - "… does provide support in the present case for the view that, as the parties understood it, whether the contract was to proceed was affected by matters to be agreed concerning settlement, and that in relation to that agreement, it was proposed to exchange contracts and proceed in the normal course of conveyancing". [102] The juridical basis on which the subsequent communications bear upon contractual intention may not be settled. [103] In Film Bars Pty Ltd v Pacific Film Laboratories Pty Ltd (1979) 1 BPR 9251 McLelland J suggested at 9255-6 that the probative value of subsequent communications lay in the light they shed on "the proper interpretation of the earlier communications alleged to constitute the contract", such as by showing continued negotiations whereby the alleged contractual dealings could not properly be interpreted as mutual assents to be bound; his Honour said they could also be admissions by conduct of the existence or non-existence of a subsisting contract, with the probative force "vary[ing] inversely with the strength of the available direct evidence of the matters in question". [104] Interpretation of the earlier communications may not be an ideal description of the use of the subsequent communications on the first basis to which his Honour referred. It has been put a little differently in other cases. In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd at 548 Gleeson CJ spoke of "interpretation and understanding of the earlier communications in that it constitutes an important source of information as to what are matters incidental, or for that matter essential, to a transaction of the nature in question". In Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd one of Kirby P's "principles" was - "4.In order to determine in what areas the parties were, and were not, in agreement, and what matters they considered necessary in order for an agreement to exist, it is legitimate to examine their subsequent conduct. Where correspondence between the parties after an informal agreement refers to important terms and conditions not mentioned during that informal discussion, it may more readily be inferred that the earlier discussion was simply a preliminary negotiation and not a binding agreement;" [105] I respectfully suggest that subsequent communications are not simply aids to interpretation, or a source of information as to matters with which a concluded contract should deal. Their probative value may be more direct. To repeat, the objective intention of the parties is fact-based, and found in all the circumstances. That in their subsequent communications the parties have continued in negotiations, or have expressed the common understanding that they are not legally bound unless and until a formal contract is executed, is of itself probative as to their contractual intention: see Howard Smith and Co Ltd v Varawa, stating simply that any statements or conduct inconsistent with the existence of a concluded contract are relevant.
I shall apply these principles to the question of whether an agreement for or constituting a lease was reached between the plaintiffs and Jam.

[23]

Relevant principles

The cross-claim refers to "representations" made by CH Real Estate on behalf of the plaintiffs at para 11. It was claimed that: [Jam] in reliance on the express representations made by [CH Real Estate], considered to have entered into possession of the premises as the lessee under a retail lease.
The particulars to that paragraph refer to "email and oral correspondence" with Mr Krobot and Ms Egan but do not specify the precise conversations or correspondence.
The plaintiffs correctly submitted that the estoppel asserted by Jam could only arise in equity and then only on one of two possible bases, being either: 1. a "proprietary estoppel" in the nature of that referred to by Lord Kingsdown in his dissenting judgment in Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HR 129 (see also Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; [2014] HCA 19; Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483; [2010] NSWCA 84 at [21] (per Handley JA with whom Allsop P and Giles JA agreed); Milling v Hardy [2014] NSWCA 163 at [50]-[52] (per Macfarlan JA, with whom Beazley P and Sackville AJA agreed); Priestley v Priestley [2016] NSWSC 1096 at [109]-[116] (per White J)); or 2. a "promissory estoppel" in the nature of that held by Mason CJ and Wilson and Brennan JJ, to have bound the prospective tenant in Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Mahr (1988) 164 CLR 387; [1988] HCA 7 ("Walton Stores").
The relevant passage from Lord Kingsdown's speech in Ramsden v Dyson was as follows (at 170): If a man, under a verbal agreement with a landlord for a certain interest in land, or, what amounts to the same thing, under an expectation created or encouraged by the landlord that he shall have a certain interest, takes possession of such land with the consent of the landlord, and upon the faith of such promise or expectation, with the knowledge of the landlord and without objection by him, lays out money upon the land, a Court of equity will compel the landlord to give effect to such promise or expectation.
To establish that a lease arose by reason of an estoppel, consistently with the reasons given by Brennan J in Walton Stores (at 428-429), (which his Honour stated were relevant to all species of equitable estoppel), Jam would, similarly, need to establish that: 1. Jam assumed that a particular legal relationship existed between Jam and the plaintiffs, or expected a particular legal relationship would exist between them and, in the latter case, that the plaintiffs would not be free to withdraw from the expected legal relationship; 2. the plaintiffs induced Jam to adopt that assumption or expectation; 3. Jam has acted, or abstained from acting, in reliance on the assumption or expectation; 4. the plaintiffs knew or intended that Jam do so; 5. Jam's action or inaction will occasion detriment if the assumption or expectation is not fulfilled; and 6. the plaintiffs have failed to act to avoid that detriment whether by fulfilling the assumption or expectation or otherwise.
Further, the following statement by French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ in Sidhu v Van Dyke (at [58]) must be kept in mind: [58] … Reliance is a fact to be found; it is not to be imputed on the basis of evidence which falls short of proof of the fact. It is actual reliance by the promisee, and the state of affairs so created, which answers the concern that equitable estoppel not be allowed to outflank Jorden v Money by dispensing with the need for consideration if a promise is to be enforceable as a contract. It is not the breach of promise, but the promisor's responsibility for the detrimental reliance by the promisee, which makes it unconscionable for the promisor to resile from his or her promise. In Giumelli v Giumelli, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ approved the statement of McPherson J in Riches v Hogben that: "It is not the existence of an unperformed promise that invites the intervention of equity but the conduct of the plaintiff in acting upon the expectation to which it gives rise." [Footnotes omitted.]
In the same case, Gageler J stated (at [91]-[92]): [91] To establish that the belief to which she was induced by the appellant's representations was a contributing cause to the course of action or inaction which she took, the respondent needed to establish more than that she had the belief and took the belief into account when she acted or refrained from acting. She needed to establish that having the belief and taking the belief into account made a difference to her taking the course of action or inaction: that she would not have so acted or refrained from acting if she did not have the belief. [92] The need for the respondent to establish such a difference stems from what Dixon J described in Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd as the "indispensable" condition that a party asserting an estoppel "must have so acted or abstained from acting upon the footing of the state of affairs assumed" that the party asserting the estoppel "would suffer a detriment if the opposite party were afterwards allowed to set up rights against him inconsistent with the assumption". That is to say, "the real detriment or harm from which the law seeks to give protection is that which would flow from the change of position if the assumption were deserted". There can be no real detriment if the party asserting the estoppel would have been in the same position in any event. [Footnote omitted.]
Situations in which a prospective tenant is allowed into premises prior to the conclusion of a formal lease, and in the anticipation that a lease will be concluded are not unknown to the law. Such a situation was considered by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Kellow-Falkiner Motors Pty Ltd v Nimorakiotakis [2000] VSCA 1 at [39]-[41], per Charles JA (with whom Ormiston and Buchanan JJA agreed). The Court there considered that, in the absence of a concluded lease or agreement for a lease, it should be slow to infer that a lease arose by reason of an estoppel arising from representations made during the course of negotiations. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales has similarly held that "caution" must be exercised in such circumstances: see Javad v Aqil [1991] 1 WLR 1007 at 1012-1013 (per Nicholls LJ with whom Mustill and Ralph Gibson LJJ agreed); see also Lighting by Design (Aust) Pty Ltd v Cannington Nominees Pty Ltd (2008) 35 WAR 520; [2008] WASCA 23 at [28], per Pullin JA (dissenting).
In a similar vein, Jacobson J made the following points in Pacific National (ACT) Ltd v Queensland Rail [2006] FCA 91 (at [668]): [668] … (15) In order to found an estoppel between parties who are in contractual negotiations, it is necessary for the party asserting the estoppel to prove that the other party induced him or her to believe that the other's freedom to withdraw has gone; that is to say, there must be an expectation that the other party is bound to proceed. This is reflected in the first of the six principles stated by Brennan J above and in the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Humphreys Estate (Queen's Gardens) Ltd [1987] 1 AC 114 ("Humphreys"). (16) The adoption of any assumption or expectation by the party asserting the estoppel must be reasonable in all the circumstances: Waltons at 406 per Mason CJ and Wilson J, Verwayen at 414 per Mason CJ and at 445 per Deane J and Standard Chartered Bank Aust Ltd v Bank of China (1991) 23 NSWLR 164 at 180 per Giles J. (17) A representation or conduct relied upon as founding an estoppel must be clear and unambiguous: Legione at 435-437, Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385 at 410-411 per Mason J, and Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellcome International Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 475 ("Mobil Oil") at 513 per Lockhart, Lindgren and Tamberlin JJ; see also Spencer Bower's Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation at [V111.4.1].

[24]

Relevant factual background

Mr M Irsak's evidence was that "in reliance upon the representations in the [Lease Advice Sheet] I signed the [Lease Advice Sheet]". Mr M Irsak also gave evidence that he relied on the representations of CH Real Estate when he signed the Lease Advice Sheet. Other than those factors, he gave no evidence of having relied upon any other consideration. The only change of position that he directly gave evidence of having made was a reliance on the Lease Advice Sheet was that he signed it.
There was no clear articulation of an assumption. The "assumption" Messrs G and M Irsak appear to have made was that a lease had or would be granted on the basis of the terms set out in the Lease Advice Sheet. In cross-examination, Mr M Irsak confirmed that, as at 12 July 2013 when he signed the Lease Advice Sheet, he understood that Jam had a binding agreement with the plaintiffs because he had signed the document, been given the keys and gained possession of the premises: Q. Is it your evidence that you saying that you understood as at 12 July that you had an agreement with, a binding agreement with the plaintiffs? A. Correct. Q. Is that because your father told you that that's what you had? A. No it's because we signed this document, we were handed the keys, and we gained possession of the premises. And began to pay rent under the lease.
Notwithstanding the Court's warning to Mr G Irsak during Mr M Irsak's cross-examination that it was not his role to assist Mr M Irsak with his evidence, counsel for the plaintiff did not make submissions as to Mr M Irsak's credit as a witness. On the issue of credit, it is worth noting that Mr M Irsak conceded that he failed to refer to an email from Mr Krobot dated 11 July 2013 attaching the Lease Advice Sheet in his affidavit which deposed to receiving the Lease Advice Sheet, however that omission is of little significance.
The relevant detriment appears to be that, having taken possession of the premises, Jam commenced to undertake its fit out.
However, it was an express term of the Lease Advice Sheet, signed by Mr M Irsak that "the Landlord will provide immediate access to the premises upon the lease being executed". Further, the Lease Advice Sheet made it clear that the lease may not proceed, in which case, the deposit would be re-funded, save for any legal costs reasonably incurred in relation to the preparation of the lease. In addition, the evidence is inconsistent with an assumption being made because Jam continued to negotiate the terms of the lease.
Mr M Irsak accepted in cross-examination that that the language used in the Lease Advice Sheet was not consistent with the assumptions he said that he made and proceeded upon: Q. Could you go to page 2 of that document. Could you just read the printing on the page. There's three or four paragraphs to the side of the word "Deposit". Could you just focus on the first and last of those printed paragraphs, that is, the paragraph beginning "One month rental" et cetera and then the final paragraph, that is, in that section that is the paragraph beginning, "Should the matter not be finalised". Do you remember reading those two paragraphs before you signed the lease advice sheet? A. Yes. Q. Did you understand at the time that what the lease advice sheet was saying in these two paragraphs was that the matter may or may not proceed? A. As far as I understood that the matter was going to proceed because I saw it as a simple transaction. There's a tenant wanting to lease out the premises and there's a premises that is for lease. … Q. Do you agree with me that that's not what those two paragraphs say? A. I agree. Q. Those two paragraphs contemplate that you might not proceed with the lease don't they? A. Correct.
Further, his evidence was that he had the benefit of legal advice in relation to the Lease Advice Sheet from about 15 or 16 July 2013 before Jam's fit out work began.
Having obtained entry to the premises, Jam took possession of them and proceeded with its fit out without the permission or knowledge of either the plaintiffs or CH Real Estate. The evidence of the first plaintiff was that she initially gave permission for Jam to enter the premises prior to the conclusion of a lease, for the limited purpose of storing equipment and other items of personal property. Upon being directed by CH Real Estate to cease work on the fit out, once the plaintiffs and CH Real Estate became aware of the situation, Jam continued.
The plaintiffs submitted the evidence adduced by Jam does not address the requirements for establishing an estoppel. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended: 1. the assumption made in Walton Stores could be distinguished because in that case, the form of lease had been concluded and executed by one of the parties, whereas in the current case the parties continued to negotiate the terms of the lease which is inconsistent with reliance having been placed on the terms set out in the Lease Advice Sheet; 2. there was no "encouragement" by or on behalf of the plaintiffs for Jam to take possession of the premises and begin its fit out; 3. there was no "unequivocal representation" by or on behalf of the plaintiffs to the effect either that a lease had been granted on the basis of the Lease Advice Sheet, or that such a lease would be granted in due course; 4. there was no encouragement or representation either to the effect that the plaintiffs had committed to a lease or that they were "no longer free to withdraw"; 5. Jam's conduct in attempting to renegotiate the terms of a lease was inconsistent with any reliance having been placed on the representations in the Lease Advice Sheet; 6. to the extent that reliance was placed on the Lease Advice Sheet (or any other conduct) to found an assumption that a lease had or would be granted, it was unreasonable because the Lease Advice sheet was not an unequivocal statement of the terms of a lease (as that was not what the Lease Advice Sheet said); and 7. there was nothing unconscionable about the plaintiffs' conduct - they were not aware (nor was CH Real Estate) that Jam had taken possession and commenced its fit out until late July 2013, by which time both Jam's possession and the fit out had become a fait accompli.
Jam contended in its oral submissions that express representations were made in the form of an offer from CH Real Estate, the Lease Advice Sheet and the final documents to which they said everything was agreed to; although Jam did not expand on whether any reliance was placed on those representations. Further in written submissions, Jam left it open to the Court "to consider all aspects of 'estoppel'" in the context of the plaintiffs' overall argument.

[26]

Tenancy at Will

The plaintiffs contended that Jam was only ever expressly granted a limited licence to store equipment on the premises and that it took possession of them without their consent or agreement.
The plaintiffs further contended that Jam's evidence can establish no more than that an implied tenancy came into existence, which tenancy was terminable by either the plaintiffs or Jam at will in accordance with s 127(1) of the Conveyancing Act (see Turner v York Motors (1951) 85 CLR 55; [1951] HCA 52 per Dixon J at 64-65). In that regard, the plaintiffs were prepared to accept that, whatever the position prior to August 2013, upon accepting rent and by not taking action to evict Jam after they became aware that it had taken possession and commenced its fit out, any more limited licence must have become a tenancy at will. Having regard to the foregoing conclusions as to the existence of an agreement on an estoppel (or the lack thereof) together with the true circumstances, as I have found, in which Jam came to take possession of the premises (it was permitted only to "store"). I consider that submission must be accepted.
Such a tenancy could not constitute a "retail shop lease" for the purposes of either ss 3 or 6A of the Retail Leases Act (see Lin v State Rail Authority of NSW [2006] FCAFC 42 at [7]-[9] (per Heerey, Dowsett and Conti JJ)) unless either: 1. a lease was ultimately agreed which, by virtue of s 8 of the Retail Leases Act, extended for a term of more than 6 months from the date on which the Jam went into possession: Aspromonte Pty Ltd v Zagari (1999) 9 BPR 17,247; [1999] NSWSC 831 at [48]-[53] (per Hodgson CJ in Eq); or 2. if no lease was ultimately agreed, the tenancy at will subsisted for 12 months for the purposes of s 6A(2) of the Retail Leases Act: Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 414; [2015] HCA 23 at [33].
There was no subsequent agreement for the reasons stated above. Further, as I will discuss, the tenancy was validly terminated with one month's notice in February 2014 such that s 6A(2) had no application.

[31]

Set-off

It appears Jam contended that it has a right to set-off a claim for unliquidated damages (or possibly for compensation under s 34(1)(d) of the Retail Leases Act) against the rent that would otherwise be payable under the lease that it contended was in place. That claim was predicated on the breaches of the lease set out in the cross-claim.
However, as the claim is for unliquidated damages, the only basis upon which Jam could succeed in establishing a right of set-off is in equity. To do so, it would need to establish both: 1. an entitlement to damages in excess of the amount of the unpaid rent; and 2. that any breach of the lease (noting that none has been found) was so intimately connected with the claim for rent as to "impeach" that claim. (See B Edgeworth, Butt's Land Law (Law Book Co, 7th ed, 2017) [7.1520]-[7.1530]; J D Heydon, M J Leeming and P G Turner, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane's Equity Doctrines & Remedies (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2015) [39-055] and [39-060(g)]).
The existence of a "counter-demand" is not sufficient of itself to give rise to an equitable right of set-off: Rawson v Samuel (1841) Cr & Ph 161 at 178; 41 ER 451 at 458. Any cross-claim must go to the root of the plaintiff's claim. The classic example of a counter-claim giving rise to an equitable right of set-off was Piggott v Williams (1821) 6 Madd 95; 56 ER 1027 where a solicitor claimed fees from his client that were only incurred by reason of the solicitor's negligence.
In the case of a landlord's claim for arrears of rent, the plaintiffs submitted that the position is that held to have been the case by Forbes J in British Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v International Marine Management (UK) Ltd [1980] 1 QB 137 ("British Anzani").
In that case, which has been cited with approval in Australia by both the New South Wales Court of Appeal and the Victorian Court of Appeal (see Roadshow Entertainment Pty Ltd v (ACN 053 006 269) Pty Ltd (receiver and manager appointed) (1997) 42 NSWLR 462 per Gleeson CJ, Handley JA and Brownie AJA (at 488) and Ozden v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2014] VSCA 127 per Tait and Beach JJA and Sifris AJA (at [81]-[82]), respectively), the tenant was held to have been entitled to withhold rent, but only because the landlord's breach (of a separate agreement in relation to the design of the floors of two warehouses) was so serious as to require the evacuation of the building. Thereafter only part of the building was able to be used.
Forbes J pointed out that the existence of a counterclaim for a breach of the lease would not give rise to a right of set-off in all cases. But in the case before him, he held that the tenant's "equity" went to the root of the landlord's claim, because of the extent of the interference with the tenants use and enjoyment of the premises (at 152): While I am satisfied that it is proper in principle to allow that a cross-claim could be effective as an equitable set off against a claim for rent, it by no means follows that such a defence is available in all circumstances. The important qualification is that the equity must impeach the title to the legal demand, or in other words go to the very foundation of the landlord's claim. This seems to me to involve consideration of the proposition that the tenant's cross-claim must at least arise under the lease itself, or directly from the relationship of landlord and tenant created by the lease. The landlord's covenant to repair contained in the lease, if broken, might found, as has been seen earlier, the ancient common law defence to a claim for rent if the tenant had been forced to pay for repairs to maintain the premises in a state fit for the purpose for which they were let. If instead of paying for the repairs the tenant cross-claims for damages for breach of the covenant, there is no common law defence, but there must, in my view, be an equitable right to set off the unliquidated damages. But in this case, there is no covenant by the landlord to repair contained in the lease, and it is necessary to see how the defendants put their case on this aspect.
The plaintiffs contended that any breach of a term for air-conditioning could not have given rise to an equitable right to off-set rent and that the circumstances of this case are simply not in the same category as those considered by Forbes J in British Anzani. Jam has retained the use of, and continued to use, the premises.
The evidence in the defendant's case does not prove, as I will discuss below, that it has been prevented from trading, or suffered any diminution in its ability to trade as a result of any breach of any term relating to the installation of air-conditioning (see [196]-[215] below).
I find that Jam has not established a right of set-off because a breach of a term requiring the plaintiffs to install air-conditioning (as discussed below) is not intimately connected with the plaintiffs' claim for rent because Jam retained the use of the premises. As such, the present case can be distinguished from the decision in British Anzani.

[33]

Consent to the DA

As noted earlier, there was no term in the Lease Advice Sheet which referred to consent to a DA. The plaintiffs submitted they did not understand the basis upon which it was alleged that there was a term in any lease requiring them to consent to a DA that included a "use" that went beyond the "permitted use" specified in the Lease Advice Sheet. As such the plaintiffs did not understand the basis upon which the claim for a breach of such a term was pursued.
Jam did not provide an explanation as to why it contended that the permitted use of the premises should have been expanded to include a proposed use as a café. It only referred to the letter from the plaintiffs' former solicitors to Jam's former solicitors dated 30 October 2013 which indicated that the plaintiffs had permitted Jam "to serve pre-packaged food and light refreshments which was outside the original permitted use as a music school and music retail outlet". Jam submitted that this demonstrated that terms relating to the use of the premises were finalised at that time.
Furthermore, in cross-examination, Mr M Irsak gave evidence that either at the time of, shortly before or shortly after signing the lease advice sheet that he had no concern about not getting through a development application. A letter from Mulally Mylott to Holman Webb dated 29 July 2013 requested an amendment to the draft lease which would have made the lease conditional upon Jam's DA being approved. When questioned about the requested amendment in that letter, Mr M Irsak conceded that his solicitor was "being overly cautious", and he confirmed that he "didn't instruct her" to request the amendment, rather it was "included in the letter and [Jam] agreed with her".
It is clear from the above analysis that there is no basis for finding that the alleged lease would have included a term regarding consent to a DA because such a term was not included in the Lease Advice Sheet and because Mr M Irsak confirmed that consent to the DA was an afterthought to signing the Lease Advice Sheet.

[34]

Air-conditioning

The Lease Advice Sheet included a "Special Condition" to the following effect: The landlord will install at their expense an air conditioning unit that is suitably adequate for the premises.
The plaintiffs submitted that, if there was a lease based upon the Lease Advice Sheet, that provision could only require the installation of air-conditioning that was "suitably adequate" for the premises in the state in which they existed at the time Jam went into possession.
However, it was submitted, Jam's complaint seemed to be that the plaintiffs refused to install a sophisticated "ducted" air-conditioning system, at a cost of in excess of $45,000 (equivalent to almost an entire year's rent) which they said was required to cool the premises in summer, as they had been fitted out by Jam during the course of late July and August 2013. That fit out involved the partitioning of the premises into numerous rooms.
The plaintiffs submitted that the Special Condition in the Lease Advice Sheet, with respect to air-conditioning, even if it was found to have contractual force, could not possibly have had the effect contended for by Jam and that its claim for breach of the lease in that regard is not maintainable.
The plaintiffs referred to the quotes regarding the air-conditioning as outlined at [77] and [78] of this judgment. The plaintiffs' submitted that those quotes were for a ducted air-conditioning system which was much more significant in price and fit than an air-conditioning unit as specified in the Lease Advice Sheet. The quotes included references to supplying and installing flexible duct work and metal duct work, which went beyond an air-conditioning unit.
Jam did not make any written or oral submissions as to this point, and I accept the plaintiffs' submission based on the evidence.
However, the plaintiffs properly conceded that they did not install air-conditioning at all and that, if that term is found to have had contractual force, they must therefore have been in breach of it. That fact gives rise to issues of causation and loss.

[35]

Causation and loss

Jam sought to lead evidence as to the loss suffered as a result of the plaintiffs' failure to install an air-conditioning system: 1. In his affidavit, Mr M Irsak deposed as to the losses incurred due to the lack of air-conditioning. However this was ruled to be inadmissible on an opinion basis. 2. Annexed to Mr M Irsak's affidavit were complaints from customers. These complaints were ruled to be inadmissible pursuant to s 69(3)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) because they were documents prepared or obtained for the purposes of, in contemplation of, or in connection with an Australian proceeding, namely the Tribunal proceedings. 3. Also annexed to Mr M Irsak's affidavit were financial documents prepared by Mr Kehlet. The Court ruled that those documents were inadmissible on the basis that annexing the report constituted hearsay of Mr Kehlet's opinion. As noted above, Jam sought to further tender those documents after the evidence had closed, and the Court held that the documents were still inadmissible on the aforementioned ruling. 4. Mr M Irsak included evidence of the weather conditions in Campbelltown in his final submissions, and the Court ruled that evidence could not be admitted considering the evidence for parties had closed. 5. Sections of Ms McCallum's report were also ruled to be inadmissible pursuant to ss 76 and 79 of the Evidence Act because, inter alia: 1. her opinions as to the cause of drop in customers and her commentary on law with respect to damages were outside the her field of knowledge or experience; and 2. her opinions expressed as to damage to guitars appeared to be based on the information supplied by Jam which was not identified and to which no evidence was adduced or sought to be adduced (it was beyond her field of expertise).
As a result of those rulings, the only admissible evidence before the Court as to loss suffered as a result of a lack of air-conditioning was Mr Irsak's evidence that the damage to guitars and music was approximately $7,370, and a quote from Heeler Guitars on an estimate of repairs to instruments damaged by heat or damp. However, there was no evidence as to whether the lack of air-conditioning caused the damage to the instruments.
Furthermore, the evidence available to this Court does not permit a conclusion that a "suitably adequate" air-conditioning unit referred to in the Lease Advice Sheet required a ducted air-conditioning system for the purpose of the fit out installed by Jam.
As a result, I consider that there are significant difficulties with respect to Jam's contention on causation and loss arising from the failure of the plaintiffs' to install an air conditioner. They were as follows: 1. Whilst there is some evidence of a reduction in the number of lessons and drop off in customer numbers during the period between August 2013 and November/December 2014, the evidence in the proceedings does not demonstrate that this was causally connected to a failure by the plaintiffs to install air-conditioning. 2. There is some evidence that might tend to suggest that the temperature in some parts of the premises exceeded 30 degrees Celsius on some days. However, there is no evidence of any consistent measurement or monitoring of temperatures inside the premises in the period between August 2013 and November 2014. 3. Nor was there admissible evidence in the form of records of customer complaints or other business records that would establish the extent to which temperatures inside the premises actually caused any reduction in customer numbers or lessons in the period between August 2013 and November 2014. 4. In my view, the only obligation under the lease advice argument was for the plaintiffs to install an air-conditioning unit "suitably adequate" for the premises as they existed prior to Jam taking possession. There is no expert or other relevant evidence that would allow the Court to conclude what type of air-conditioning unit would have been required for that purpose or whether such an air-conditioning unit would have made any difference, or had any effect upon the atmosphere inside the premises, having regard to the nature of the fit out subsequently undertaken by Jam. 5. In any event, to the extent that there was a reduction in customer numbers or lessons, it occurred immediately upon Jam moving from its previous premises. Mr M Irsak's evidence in cross-examination was that Jam elected to move out of its previous premises because the rent being charged by its previous landlord was almost double that which it had agreed to pay for the premises. Apart from that, there was no admissible evidence upon which the Court could draw any conclusion in relation to the comparability of the premises to Jam's previous premises.
Having regard to those deficiencies in Jam's case regarding the failure of the plaintiffs to install a suitably adequate air-conditioning unit (or an air-conditioning unit of a particular character), I do not consider that, if a lease existed, Jam has established a case for damages on that basis. The only evidence before the Court as to loss suffered by Jam was the damage to instruments, but there was no evidence that loss was as a result of a lack of a "suitably adequate" air-conditioning unit. In any event, even if the additional evidence as to losses suffered by Jam was admissible, there was no evidence to prove that the losses were caused by the lack of air-conditioning.
For those reasons, if, contrary to my earlier conclusion, a lease was found to exist, and the lease required the plaintiffs to install air-conditioning, I agree with the plaintiffs' submission that Jam's damages claim must fail.

[36]

The quantification of damages

As earlier mentioned, Jam served the report of Ms McCallum, an accountant, for the purposes of quantifying its damages claim. However, the plaintiffs contended that none of the assumptions of fact upon which that report was based have been proved by Jam.
Specifically, it was submitted that Jam had not adduced any evidence to prove that: 1. there was a lack of adequate air-conditioning at the premises (see para 1.3.1(c) of the report); 2. the lack of adequate air-conditioning caused reduced "customer satisfaction", which in turn resulted in reduced cash flows and revenues (see paras 1.3.1(c) and 1.3.1(g) of the report); 3. Jam was an established business prior to moving to the premises that did not change its services and market offering on moving to the premises (see paras 1.3.1(d) and 1.3.1(e) of the report); or 4. the only material difference between the premises and Jam's previous premises was the lack of adequate air-conditioning (see paras 5.1.14-5.1.21 of the report).
On the evidence before the Court that submission must be accepted.
Further, Ms McCallum's report had been prepared on the basis of assumptions about the accuracy of financial information supplied to her by Jam (see paras 1.4.1-1.4.3 of the report). That information was described, in Appendix D of the report, as including: 1. "summaries" of financial statements for the financial years ending 30 June 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014; 2. estimated "projections" of cash flows for the period January 2015 to July 2022; and 3. "discussions" with the "company director", management and accountant.
The "summaries" referred were produced and no evidence was adduced to explain how or by whom they were prepared. No evidence had been given in relation to the subject matter or content of the conversations between the expert and anyone on behalf of Jam. Further, it was not apparent that the expert was provided with access to any of the company's primary or secondary accounting records, save for "historical records in relation to lessons and memberships".
Further, Ms McCallum's opinion in relation to Jam's "actual" and "but for" cash flows, as expressed at paras 4.3.9-4.7 of the report, was almost entirely based upon "forecasts of cash flows" provided to her by Jam together with information supplied by Jam concerning "key drivers of revenue and expenses" but which there was no evidentiary basis.
Ms McCallum relied almost entirely upon projections of cash flows created by Jam in order to reach her conclusions in relation to both its "actual cash flows" for the period following January 2015 and its "but for cash flows" for the entire period following August 2013. At para 3.3.6(d) Ms McCallum stated (in substance) that, in order to have confidence in the reliability of Jam's forecasting in that regard, it was necessary to undertake a comparative analysis between its "historical financial forecasts" and corresponding "actual historical results". However, there was no indication that she has undertaken such an analysis.
I do not consider Ms McCallum's report constituted reliable evidence as to loss or damage experienced by Jam as a result of any pleaded breach of the lease.

Sze Tu v Jam Studios Pty Ltd; Jam Studios Pty Ltd v Sze Tu

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