Stonhill v Katherine Town Council [2026] FCA 334

1. By an urgent application, the applicant, Ms Ingrid Stonhill, applies for an interim injunction under s 46PP of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (the Act), against the respondent, Katherine Town Council, the local council for the township of Katherine in the Northern Territory. Ms Stonhill was the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Council from 7 February 2022 to 5 March 2026. Her extended contract was to expire on 7 February 2028. However, she was dismissed by the Council upon the stated ground of serious and wilful misconduct in relation to her conduct concerning an industrial dispute with council employees and in relation to her management of conflict of interest issues. She had been on leave with workers compensation since 17 September 2025 by reason of post traumatic stress disorder attributed to workplace bullying directed to her by a former councillor on the Council.
2. On 13 February 2026, Ms Stonhill was given notice to show cause why she should not be dismissed. On 20 February 2026, she made a complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission alleging disability discrimination. On 5 March 2026, her employment was terminated, with the Council relying upon the reference to the grounds of her termination in the complaint to the Commission in lieu of any other response to the show cause letter. On 10 March 2026, she made a further complaint to the Commission, maintaining and extending her allegation of disability discrimination. It is convenient to refer to the handling of the two complaints before the Commission as the complaints process. On 12 March 2026, she filed an urgent originating application in this Court, which was then listed for hearing before myself as duty judge on 20 March 2026.
3. The terms of the injunction sought are set out in an amended originating application relied upon in Court last Friday, 20 March 2026. Ms Stonhill seeks reinstatement to her position as CEO, but continuation on workers compensation leave, and reinstatement of access to her emails and electronic files at the Council for the purpose of her two complaints to the Commission, to take effect until the conclusion of the complaints process.
4. For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that the reinstatement relief relating to her employment should be granted, but on condition that Ms Stonhill take all reasonable steps to expedite the complaint process being conducted by the Commission. I will also grant the Council liberty to apply for the discharge of the injunction in the event that Ms Stonhill fails to take all reasonable steps to expedite the complaint process. However, I do not consider it appropriate to require continued access by Ms Stonhill to her emails and electronic records for the purposes of pursuing her complaints, noting that if reasonable provision of copies of such records is denied by the Council, that may stand in the way of them effectively exercising the liberty that has been granted.
5. I have been taken to three cases in particular dealing with applications for injunctions under s 46PP of the Act: Abraham v Housing Authority [2022] FCA 1145 (Jackson J); Millar v FQM Australia Nickel Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 1331 (Colvin J); and Smith v A High School [2025] FCA 1432 (Perram J), including the further authority cited and discussed in those cases. I have read and carefully considered those cases and some of the cases to which their Honours refer, and see no need to repeat what is said in each of them. I also rely upon the factual outlines contained in the competing submissions of the parties, both orally and in writing, and have considered the evidence to which I was taken, contained in competing affidavits with annexures.
6. I address briefly the competing cases put on the key issues, as follows.
7. I do not accept that Ms Stonhill has established, as she contends, that the basis for her dismissal was a sham. That may yet be established at any later trial. However it suffices for present purposes that the express basis for the dismissal provided by the Council may not be the complete reason for that having taken place, and that it is reasonably arguable that a further contributing reason may be able to be established, namely that Ms Stonhill was unable to perform her obligations as CEO due to the disability she suffers as a result of workplace bullying at the Council. That is, she raises a case of direct disability discrimination. The complaints are sufficiently meritorious and are reasonably arguable, so as to justify the exercise of the power under s 46PP of the Act: Millar at [18]-[19].
8. The parties point to various factors favouring granting or not granting the injunctive relief sought. On Ms Stonhill's side, grant of the relief will enable her to continue to receive workplace benefits to which she is reasonably entitled, while remaining the holder of the substantive position of CEO while on leave. It is important to note in that regard, that Ms Stonhill has not sought unconditional reinstatement. On the Council's side, they are unable to fill the CEO position and will not be able to do so for some time. It is a matter of public record that Katherine is presently suffering severe flooding problems. I have concluded that, on balance, those competing considerations presently favour Ms Stonhill, and accordingly, a subset of the relief sought should be granted.
9. The duration of the complaint process is of considerable concern to me. That is why I make the injunctive relief conditional and subject to liberty to apply.
10. The Council should be ordered to pay Ms Stonhill's costs. It will be given leave to seek a different costs order.

I certify that the preceding ten (10) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Bromwich.