State of Victoria v Blythman [1999] VSC 498

Supreme Court of Victoria|1999-12-07|Before: Nathan J

For the reasons I now give I am satisfied that the Magistrate could have so found. He did not fall into error.

The word "expectation" in the sub-section must be interpreted subjectively. It is the expectation of the worker whether or not one of the defined events might occur, which must be ascertained. If the worker had that expectation, and that expectation itself induced, or predominantly did so, the stress, then the employer would be excused from the obligation to pay compensation if the resultant stress was incapacitating.

The case was only tangentially argued on the basis of "expectation". Rather it proceeded upon what was, and when did, action became disciplinary. Passing reference to sub-part(c) was made. It received more prominence at this appeal.

The Magistrate found that Blythman's stress arose from the five episodes which all pre-dated his departure from the police service.

His stress related incapacity, was not caused by the "expectation" of anything. The medical evidence accepted by the Magistrate, and not contested, was that the five episodes induced the stress which disabled him. The Magistrate found, none of the five episodes related to any of the classes of events encompassed by sub-part(a) and sub-part(b) was not advanced. Thus he found the stresses which visited Blythman, disabled him before he received notification that should he return to work, further matters would be investigated. The notification therefore, could not amount to an "expectation" that he was amendable to disciplinary action, if indeed it could be contended that the notification of possible further investigation could amount to disciplinary action.

The proper construction of s.82A(2)(a)-(c) obligated the police service to establish that Blythman's stress arose either wholly or predominantly because of the expectation that one or all of the types of events details in parts (a) and (b) might confront him.[3] It did not do so. The overwhelming evidence pointed in the other direction.

There was simply no evidence upon which the Magistrate could have found that Blythman's incapacitating disorder of the mind was attached to any of the qualifying events enumerated in parts (a) and (b). He was not in error. Of course it is not for this court to substitute its view of the evidence for that of the Magistrate a fortiori when there was little evidence upon which to do so.

The Magistrate was entitled to summarily dismiss the part (c) argument as irrelevant. The test for adequacy of reasons enunciated in Sun Alliance v Massoud was satisfied.[4 ]

Accordingly the Magistrate was not merely entitled but compelled to find, part (c) was irrelevant. He was equally entitled to dismiss the argument in relation to it in few words.

[1] Magistrates' Court Act 1989 s.109. The order directed toward the police service to pay weekly payments of compensation to Blythman.

[2] Bill William P/L v Williams [1972] HCA 23; (1972) 126 CLR 146 see Walsh J at 154 and Stephen J at 158

Compensation Act 1985

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