Bill Williams Pty Ltd v Williams [1972] HCA 23;

Bill Williams Pty Ltd v Williams [1972] HCA 23; - HCA 1972 case summary — Zoe

[29]

WALSH J. The problem raised by this appeal is such that, however it may be resolved, the result will not be one that can be viewed with great satisfaction. If the respondent should succeed, he will obtain compensation for an injury which might well be thought to be far removed from the class of injuries which one would expect to be compensable under an Act by which employers are required to provide compensation for workers in respect of employment injuries. On the other hand, if the respondent should fail, a decision denying to him the benefits of the Act cannot be made without reluctance, having regard to the fact that the benefits of that legislation or other similar legislation have been accorded to workers or to their dependants in circumstances having a similar lack of any real connexion with the employment. In saying that, I have in mind not only the case of Weston v. Great Boulder Gold Mines Ltd. [1964] HCA 59; (1964) 112 CLR 30 and other cases in which assaults have been made on workers, such as Evans v. Australian Gas Light Co. (1958) WCR (NSW) 30 and Carney v. Excelsior Spring Co. Pty. Ltd. (1958) WCR (NSW) 69 . I have in mind, also, other cases of injury or death from natural causes or from non-industrial accidents, such as Kavanagh v. The Commonwealth [1960] HCA 25; (1960) 103 CLR 547 and The Commonwealth v. Oliver [1962] HCA 38; (1962) 107 CLR 353 . But the Court is, of course, concerned in this appeal only with the case before it and the question of law therein raised. We have no authority to make any findings of fact. The question of law is limited to the legal effect of the facts found by the learned judge in the Workers' Compensation Commission who heard the case. The question does not relate to any other findings of fact which, if made, may have been supported by the evidence. We are not able to resolve the question before us by means of a comparison between the facts of this case and those of any other case. In the Court of Appeal, Asprey J.A. set out reasons for his conclusion that such differences as may be found between the facts of this case and those of Weston's Case [1964] HCA 59; (1964) 112 CLR 30 ought not to be regarded as relevant (1971) 1 NSWLR, at pp 550-552 . But such a comparison and evaluation of different sets of facts cannot determine, in my opinion, the question here, which is not whether the learned judge ought to have decided the case in the respondent's favour, but whether he was bound in law to do so. (at p154)

[30]

2. In judgments of this Court it has been laid down that an injury, which occurs to an employee whilst he is performing the duties of his employment or is doing something which is incidental to the performance of his duties, constitutes an injury "arising in the course of his employment", althought there is no causal relation between the injury and the employment or its incidents. This principle has not been challenged in this appeal and it must be accepted. It was applied in Kavanagh's Case [1960] HCA 25; (1960) 103 CLR 547 to a rupture of the oesophagus which occurred when a worker being on duty at his place of employment was on his way back from a visit to the toilet. It was applied in Weston's Case [1964] HCA 59; (1964) 112 CLR 30 to injuries suffered by a worker who was assaulted by a man who had a grievance against the worker, derived from circumstances having no association with the employment. The Board which heard the claim at first instance found that the injuries arose in the course of the employment. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia decided that in so holding the Board had erred in law. On an appeal to this Court, it was stated by Menzies J. (1964) 112 CLR, at p 35 that if the appellant's injury was injury by accident "then Kavanagh's Case [1960] HCA 25; (1960) 103 CLR 547 , compels the conclusion that as it happened while he was working, it was injury by accident arising in the course of his employment". But what this Court decided was that the Board had not erred in law in holding that the injuries arose in the course of the employment. It is important to observe that the statement made by Menzies J. to the effect that Kavanagh's Case [1960] HCA 25; (1960) 103 CLR 547 compelled that conclusion was based on the premise that the injury happened while the applicant was working. This means, in my opinion, that Weston's Case [1964] HCA 59; (1964) 112 CLR 30 cannot be regarded as governing this case, unless it should first be decided that the learned member of the Workers' Compensation Commission was bound to find that the injury sustained by the respondent happened "while he was working" or, at any rate, while he was actually engaged in doing something which was incidental to his employment. A conclusion that his Honour was bound to make that finding cannot be said, in my opinion, to be a necessary consequence of the decision in Weston's Case [1964] HCA 59; (1964) 112 CLR 30 , notwithstanding the similarities that exist in several respects between the facts of that case and the facts found in this case. It is not enough for the respondent to assert that it would have been open to the learned judge to find that the respondent was doing at the time of his injury something that was incidental to his employment and that, therefore, he was in the course of employment at that time. He must establish that the circumstances, as they were found by the judge, were such that as a necessary legal consequence the respondent must be held to have been then engaged in the course of his employment. (at p155)

[34]

6. The decisions of fact of the learned primary judge require to be considered in two aspects. The first is that he found, according to the answers given to the questions submitted to him by the Court of Appeal, that there was a "discussion" between the man named O'Neill and the present respondent near the drum and there was a "further discussion" after the appellant had spoken to a man named Innes and both these discussions "interrupted" the course of employment. The latter "interruption" continued up to the time when the respondent was injured. On these findings the comment may be made that findings as to the events that actually occurred were truly findings of fact, but a conclusion that something which did occur "interrupted" the "course of employment" was not simply a finding of fact but was a conclusion that the events which occurred took the case out of the scope of the statute. I assume therefore that the description of what occurred as an "interruption" of the course of employment was examinable by the Court of Appeal and that it was not a finding which concluded the case against the present respondent. But upon that assumption, I think that when the answers to the special questions are considered in conjunction with the findings in the original case stated, findings were made that in fact there was an occurrence of incidents, the second of these being the important one, in which the respondent took part and during which he was not actually performing his work and was engaged in some kind of exchange with O'Neill. One may question whether when describing these incidents it was apt to use the term "discussion" but that is, in my opinion, of no consequence. In my opinion, it is not legitimate, having regard to what the learned primary judge stated, for an appellate court to say that there was no relevant break in what the respondent was doing. That there was a break must be accepted as a fact, although this does not necessarily preclude any further consideration of the ultimate question asked by the case stated. (at p157)

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (45 paragraphs)

Bill Williams Pty Ltd v Williams [1972] HCA 23; (1972) 126 CLR 146 (10 April 1972)

Parties

Cases Cited (9)