State of Queensland (Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety) v Workers' Compensation Regulator and Anor [2026] QIRC 61

Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 5, s 549, s 553, s 556 and s 558

Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 031; (2015) 252 IR 461

DZY (a pseudonym) v Trustees of the Christian Brothers 2025] HCA 16; (2025) 422 ALR 372

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24

SAMI Bitumen Technologies Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 290

Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) v Mahaffey [2016] ICQ 010

State of Queensland (Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 179

Workers' Compensation Regulator v Simounds [2023] QIRC 245

[1] These reasons assume familiarity with the decision in State of Queensland (Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety) v Workers' Compensation Regulator ('Clement No. 1').[1] Unless otherwise stated, the definitions used in the body, and in the footnotes, of Clement No. 1 are used in these reasons.

[2] In Clement No. 1, I made orders that certain non-parties disclose particular documents as sought by notices of non-party production served by the Appellant.

[3] Following Clement No. 1, the following events occurred:

• by application in existing proceedings filed on 3 October 2025, the Department sought:

• - pursuant to s 556(2) of the Act, an order that Ms Clement be directed to attend an independent medical examination with Consultant Psychiatrist Dr Frank Varghese ('Dr Varghese'); and

• - pursuant to s 556(3) of the Act, orders that the Department:

• pay all specialist fees relating to the independent medical examination by Dr Varghese; and

• pay all reasonable transport and/or accommodation costs necessary for Ms Clement to attend the independent medical examination by Dr Varghese ('the Department's IME application');

• on 12 December 2025, following a further application in existing proceedings filed by the Department on 20 November 2025, I made a Directions Order for the hearing and determination of the Department's IME application; and

• on 19 December 2025, Ms Clement, pursuant to s 549(3)(a) of the Act, exercised her right to be a party to the Appellant's appeal against the review decision.

[4] The Department and Ms Clement have filed and served material pursuant to the Directions Orders I made on 12 December 2025. The sixth order I made was that the Department's IME application would be dealt with on the papers unless any party, by 20 February 2026, requested an oral hearing. No party has requested an oral hearing.

[5] The issue for my determination is whether I should grant the Department's IME application and exercise my discretion, pursuant to s 556(2) of the Act, to order that Ms Clement submit to a personal examination by Dr Varghese.

[6] In determining this issue, there are three questions that need to be answered.

[7] First, is the Commission's discretion, contained in s 556(2) of the Act, enlivened in the circumstances of this case?

[8] Secondly, if the Commission's discretion is so enlivened, should the Commission's discretion be exercised?

[9] Thirdly, if the Commission's discretion is to be exercised, given the submissions of the parties, what orders should be made?

[10] For the reasons that follow, I will grant the Department's IME application and make orders of the kind sought by the Department.

Is the Commission's discretion contained in s 556(2) of the Act enlivened in the circumstances of this case?

[11] Chapter 13, pt 3, div 1 of the Act relevantly deals with appeals, to this Commission, against certain review decisions of the Regulator. That division deals with, amongst other matters, certain pre-hearing procedural aspects of such appeals. Included in that division is s 556 of the Act which provides:

(a) the condition of a claimant or worker who has, or is said to have, sustained an injury is relevant to the appeal; or

(b) the cause, nature or extent of the injury or incapacity arising from the injury is relevant to the appeal.

(2) The appeal body may, at any time before or after the start of the hearing, order the claimant or worker to submit to a personal examination by 1 or more specified registered persons.

(3) The appeal body may also, as the appeal body considers appropriate, make an order about-

(a) the way, time and place of the examination; and

(b) costs of the application for the order and of the examination.

(4) An opinion formed on the examination must be given to the respondent and the respondent must make the opinion available to the appellant.

(5) Subsection (6) applies if the claimant or worker-

(a) fails, without reasonable excuse, to attend for the examination at the time and place ordered by the appeal body; or

(b) having attended, refuses to be examined by a registered person; or

(c) obstructs, or attempts to obstruct, the examination.

(6) Any entitlement the claimant or worker may have to compensation is suspended until the claimant or worker undergoes the examination.

[12] Both the Department and Ms Clement, in their submissions, addressed the construction of s 556(1) and s 556(2) of the Act by referring to previous decisions of the Commission that have addressed this issue.[2]

[13] There is no significant dispute between the parties about the construction of these provisions.

[14] First, by virtue of s 556(1) of the Act, one or other of the following facts must be made out:

• the condition of a claimant or worker who has, or is said to have, sustained an injury, is relevant to the appeal; or

• the cause, nature or extent of the injury or incapacity arising from the injury is relevant to the appeal.[3]

[15] Secondly, if either of the above two facts are made out, the Commission's discretion, to make an order that the claimant or worker submit to a personal examination by one or more specified registered persons, is enlivened.[4]

[16] Thirdly, the exercise of the Commission's enlivened discretion is informed by such factors as determined by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act.[5] One such factor is agreed between the Department and Ms Clement. That is it is accepted that ordering a claimant or worker to submit to such an examination is to ensure that the Commission has before it evidence to be able to determine the issue on appeal.[6]

[17] On the application of the ordinary rules of construction, I accept that these submissions of the parties are correct.

[18] Further, in respect of either of the facts set out in s 556(1) of the Act being satisfied, it does not seem to be in dispute that the fact referred to in s 556(1)(b) is made out in the present case. The Department submits that the cause of Ms Clement's injury is relevant to its appeal.[7] This was not disputed by Ms Clement's in her submissions.[8]

[19] Again, I accept this position of the parties to be correct. This is because, having regard to the decision in Clement No.1, the following matters are in issue in the Department's appeal:

• whether Ms Clement suffered a personal injury of a psychological/psychiatric nature; and, if so

• whether such a personal injury arose out of, or in the course of, Ms Clement's employment in the Department; and, if so

• whether Ms Clement's employment in the Department was a significant contributing factor to such an injury; and, if so

• whether such an injury arose out of, or in the course of:

• - reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the Department in connection with Ms Clement's employment; or
• - Ms Clement's expectation or perception of reasonable management action being taken against her.[9]

[20] As a consequence, it is not in dispute that the Commission's discretion to make an order of the kind, set out in s 556(2) of the Act, is enlivened.

[21] The first real issue of contention between the parties is whether or not the Commission's enlivened discretion should be exercised to make orders of the kind sought by the Department.

If the Commission's discretion is enlivened, should the Commission's discretion be exercised to make orders of the kind sought by the Department?

[22] The Department submits that there are three factors in favour of the Commission exercising its discretion to make orders of the kind sought by it, namely:

[23] The Department submits that the current medical evidence, by way of written expert reports, are from Dr Perry, Mental Health Social Worker who currently treats Ms Clement, and Dr Duke, a Psychiatrist who provided a report commissioned by WorkCover Queensland.[10]

[24] The Department submits there are two difficulties with Dr Perry's evidence.

[25] First, the Department submits that Dr Perry lacks any independence and objectivity in that she has a therapeutic relationship with Ms Clement; and that the lack of objectivity was demonstrated through the substance of her submissions objecting to its application seeking non-party production of Dr Perry's records. In particular, the Department referred to Dr Perry's inaccurate submission to the Commission, that if she was ordered to disclose the records sought by the Department, she would be in contravention of the Australian Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics 2020, despite the fact that sub-cl 5.4.5 of the same Code provided that Social Workers could reveal confidential information where disclosure was required by law.[11]

[26] Secondly, the Department submits that the two reports by Dr Perry about Ms Clement[12] do not adequately establish the factual basis upon which Dr Perry's opinions were premised; and that it was unclear whether Dr Perry has had regard to, or knows of, Ms Clement's prior history of mental health difficulties that have been identified by the Department following the disclosure of medical records.[13]

[27] The Department submits there are two concerns about the report dated 6 September 2024 by Dr Duke.[14]

[28] First, the Department submits that having regard to the material briefed to Dr Duke, Dr Duke had very little of Ms Clement's medical history in that the only medical records briefed to Dr Duke were:

• Dr Perry's report to WorkCover Queensland dated 15 June 2024 ( Dr Perry's first report);[15] and

• three workers' compensation medical certificates of Dr Hariri dated 12 September 2023, 27 September 2023 and 15 May 2024.[16]

[29] The Department submits that based upon that limited medical history, much of Dr Duke's report otherwise appears premised on '... Ms Clement's self-reporting of the events and medical history.'[17]

[30] The Department then submits (footnotes omitted):

1. Significantly, in answer to the first questions posed by WorkCover for opinion, Dr Duke opines that (underlining added):

1. Past medical history/pre-existing conditions - (this must include details of the level of pre-injury functioning in each of the areas of function and mood) Ms Clement reports being physically well. She has no allergies. There is no previous history of mental health difficulties.[18]

1. Following this answer, Dr Duke provides an opinion about whether he considers employment to be a significant contributing factor and the events he identifies caused the injury - which he identifies as those reported by Ms Clement.

1. Noting the answer to Question 1, Dr Duke also opines:
   1. If employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury/ies, do you consider the injury/ies to be an aggravation of an underlying or pre-existing condition?

1. In the premise of the disclosed medical records (summarised in Annexure B), Dr Duke's opinion as to whether there is a previous history of mental health difficulties must be doubted. The balance of Dr Duke's medical opinion, in answer to further questions, therefore proceeds on an incorrect factual premise of some significance. That is, Dr Duke's opinion about the nature of the injury, the date of the injury, the causes of the injury and whether there was an aggravation of an underlying pre-existing condition, as well as Dr Duke's assessment of the accuracy and relevance of Ms Clement's self-reporting about the matters, all proceed on the incorrect foundation that Ms Clement had no prior history of mental health difficulties. As observed in the NNPD Decision, Ms Clement's medical history concerning any mental health matters 'would tend to prove or disprove' the issues the subject of the appeal and be relevant to the reliability of expert evidence."

[31] Annexure B to the Department's submissions is its identification of the records, produced by the relevant non-parties following Clement No. 1, which it submits speaks to Ms Clement's history of mental health treatment. The records identified in Annexure B are exhibited in an affidavit of Ms Samantha Gray filed on 16 January 2026 (Ms Gray's affidavit).

[32] Secondly, the Department submits that Dr Duke swears the issue in that, in his report, he provides an unsolicited opinion about what constitutes management action and whether or not there was reasonable management action on the part of the Department.[19]

[33] The Department submits that the fact that Dr Duke has already provided a report on an incorrect factual premise, which weakens his report, and Dr Duke's inclination to provide an unsolicited opinion about matters not within his expertise, which is critical of the Department, is such that the Department '... would prefer a completely new and objective independent medical expert opinion.'[20]

[34] The Department submits that the steps taken by it previously (in respect of serving the notices of non-party production) and its present application have been deliberately progressed at an early stage in the proceedings for the very purpose of being able to confine and articulate the scope of its appeal if possible.[21]

[35] The Department submits that given that the appeal before the Commission is a hearing de novo in which it carries the onus of proof, and given the significance of expert evidence in an appeal of this kind, the circumstances are such that it ought to have the opportunity to obtain and present its own expert evidence.[22]

[36] Ms Clement submits that the current medical evidence '... is adequate' in that, at a minimum, she has been examined by Dr Duke for the purposes of a medico-legal report and that Dr Duke's report is clear regarding her psychiatric condition, information provided by her regarding her employment and the causal relationship (if any) between her employment and her condition.[23] In support of this submission, Ms Clement referred to the decision of Martin J, President in Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) v Mahaffey,[24] where his honour stated:

[10] Before turning to a consideration of the grounds of appeal, it will assist if the expert evidence is set out. Dr Chau provided a psychiatric report which was not as clear as it might have been. Such a report should, at a minimum, discuss, and offer an opinion on:

(b) what the subject told the psychiatrist about the employment, and

(c) the causal relationship (if any) between the employment and the condition.

[11] In the process of doing that, the psychiatrist should specifically consider the stressors nominated by the subject and express a view, on the assumption that they will be established, as to any causal relationship.

[37] Ms Clement further submitted that the reference by Dr Duke, in his report, to management action did not render the whole of Dr Duke's report unreliable in that the relevant comments are brief, constituted a limited overreach and are entirely severable from the other admissible opinion.[25]

[38] In respect of the records referred to in Annexure B of the Department's submissions, Ms Clement submits that those records are not determinative of any hidden medical history of mental health difficulties in the sense advanced by the Department. Ms Clement submits that properly construed, they are contemporaneous general practitioner records of a worker describing common emotions and stress responses in the context of a demanding workplace.[26] Specifically, Ms Clement submits:

1. At their highest, the records demonstrate that Ms Clement:
   1. experienced periods of stress, worry, low mood and feeling overwhelmed; and
   2. sought appropriate GP support in response to those symptoms.
2. Such presentations are commonplace in primary care and do not, without more, establish a diagnosed mental illness, a chronic condition, or a material pre-existing impairment. The notes identified by the Appellant do not record:
   1. any formal psychiatric diagnosis made by a psychiatrist or psychologist;
   2. any structured diagnostic formulation;
   3. any hospital admission, acute crisis intervention, or specialist mental health treatment;
   4. any ongoing course of psychotherapy; or
   5. any sustained functional incapacity.
3. The Appellant's characterisation of those records as a "history of mental health treatment" overstates their content. The more accurate characterisation is that Ms Clement reported common symptoms of stress in the context of a demanding job and her GP responded with routine management options.
4. Accordingly, it is submitted Dr Duke not having access to these records is not a deficiency which would reduce the probative value of the current medical evidence.

The Commission's discretion, pursuant to s 556(2) of the Act, should be exercised in the present case

[39] In my view, this is a case where the Commission's enlivened discretion, to make an order that Ms Clement submit to a personal examination by one or more specified registered persons, should be exercised. This is for three reasons.

[40] First, the hearing of the Department's appeal by the Commission is a hearing de novo of the issue that was decided by the Regulator, which was that Ms Clement had an injury within the meaning of the Act.[27] That is, the Commission exercises original jurisdiction and hears the issue afresh where the parties start again. In the present case, the issue being heard afresh is whether or not Ms Clement suffered an injury within the meaning of the Act.[28]

[41] Secondly, for the reasons I referred to earlier, one of the agreed factors relevant to the exercise of the Commission's enlivened discretion, to order that a worker submit to a personal examination by one or more specified registered persons, is to ensure that the Commission has before it the evidence to determine the issue being heard afresh. Even if this was not an agreed relevant consideration between the parties, I would determine that it was a relevant consideration having regard to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act.

[42] Section 5(1) of the Act provides that the Act establishes a workers' compensation scheme for Queensland which, relevantly, provides benefits for workers who sustain injury in their employment. Section 5(2)(h) of the Act provides that the main provisions of the scheme provide for rights of review of, and appeal against, decisions made under the Act for injuries sustained by workers in their employment.

[43] Chapter 13 of the Act provides for those rights of review and appeal. Chapter 13, pt 3, div 1 of the Act provides for appeals to this Commission against certain review decisions of the Regulator, including review decisions made by the Regulator about whether or not a claimant or worker has suffered an injury within the meaning of the Act.

[44] Furthermore, the Commission, in deciding an appeal, may confirm the review decision, vary the review decision, set aside the review decision and substitute another decision or set aside the review decision and return the matter to the Regulator with directions the Commission considers appropriate.[29]

[45] The appeal is a hearing de novo because of the procedures for the hearing and determining of such an appeal are set out in ch 13, pt 3 of the Act, as well as the fact that, pursuant to s 553(1) of the Act, all of the rules contained in the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 apply to the hearing and determination of such an appeal.[30]

[46] In the hearing of such a de novo appeal, the Parliament has conferred discretion on the Commission to make an order, where the described circumstances are met, that a worker submit to a personal examination by one or more specified registered persons. Having regard to the relevant purpose of the Act, as discerned from the provisions of the Act as canvassed above, being to provide for de novo appeals against review decisions about whether a worker has suffered an injury, it seems to me that a relevant consideration, in the exercise of the Commission's enlivened discretion pursuant to s 556(2) of the Act, is whether the Commission has evidence before it to allow the Commission to discharge its function in determining such an appeal. A similar conclusion was reached by Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon in Workers' Compensation Regulator v Simounds[31]and by Industrial Commissioner Pratt in SAMI Bitumen Technologies Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator.[32]

[47] Thirdly, Ms Clement's claimed injury is of a psychological nature. In the present case, I am not persuaded that any party can lead evidence of an opinion of a relevant expert medical practitioner, about whether or not Ms Clement's employment had a causal connection with her claimed injury, which is based upon all relevant available facts.

[48] There is a history of Ms Clement consulting Dr Hariri, in respect of her mental state, on four occasions between September 2019 and June 2023. That history is contained in Exhibit 'SG-04' to Ms Gray's affidavit. It consists of the documents received by the Department by way of a notice of non-party production issued to Dr Hariri of Health Hub Doctors Morayfield. The documents are extracts from Ms Clement's Patient Health Summary from that medical practice.

[49] Having regard to Dr Duke's report, I am not persuaded that Dr Duke had before him all of Ms Clement's relevant history in being able to answer the fundamental question posed for him by WorkCover Queensland.

[50] The fundamental question asked of Dr Duke by WorkCover Queensland was whether he considered employment to be a significant contributing factor to the injury of which he diagnosed Ms Clement was suffering.[33] As part of that question, Dr Duke was also asked, if the answer to the principal part of the question was in the affirmative, to then detail all events arising from Ms Clement's employment that he considered '... caused the psychological/psychiatric injury.'[34]

[51] To be able to express an opinion in respect of that question, Dr Duke was provided with Dr Perry's first report, a statement of events from Ms Clement, and medical certificates of Dr Hariri dated 12 September 2023, 27 September 2023 and 15 May 2024.[35] That is to say, it is not apparent that Dr Duke was provided with the extracts from Ms Clement's patient health summary from Health Hub Doctors Morayfield as I have referred to above; namely, the four occasions Ms Clement consulted Dr Hariri between September 2019 and June 2023 about her mental state. In my view, that material would be directly relevant in respect of a psychiatrist providing an expert opinion as to what matters had a causal connection with any psychological injury suffered by Ms Clement. This is because, contrary to Ms Clement's submissions that those records are benign, such material sets out the recent relevant history of Ms Clement's mental state.

[52] For these reasons, I consider that, for the Commission to be able to determine the issue before it on appeal afresh, it should have before it the opinion of an expert, in this case a psychiatrist, where the history of Ms Clement's mental state may be put before the expert for a relevant opinion as to what events may have had a causal connection with any psychological injury suffered by Ms Clement.

If the Commission's discretion is to be exercised, given the submissions of the parties, what precise orders should be made?

[53] The second disputed issue between the parties is, on the basis that an order pursuant to s 556(2) of the Act should be made, the precise nature of an order

[54] The Department submits that an order should be made that Ms Clement submit to an independent medical examination to be conducted by Dr Varghese, and that it meets all costs relating to that examination as well as paying Ms Clement's reasonable transport and accommodation costs necessary for her to be examined by Dr Varghese.[36]

[55] Ms Clement submitted that notwithstanding her earlier submissions, she did not oppose an order requiring her to attend a further independent medical examination in that she is (understandably) eager for these proceedings to be brought to a conclusion.[37]

[56] Ms Clement submits that (footnotes omitted):

1. Should the Commission exercise their discretion to order Ms Clement submit to a personal examination, it is submitted amendments to the orders sought by the Appellant would be appropriate and reasonable in the circumstances.
2. Ms Clement's medical records have previously been disclosed to the Appellant and filed in the Commission, outside the scope permitted by the orders made in State of Queensland (Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety) v Workers' Compensation Regulator.

1. This disclosure has caused Ms Clement considerable distress, and she continues to harbour concerns regarding the conduct of the process moving forward. Accordingly, Ms Clement proposes amendments to the orders sought by the Appellant to ensure she is afforded appropriate support and that her confidence in the process is maintained.

1. Should the Commission determine to exercise its discretion to order a further personal examination, it is submitted that such discretion ought properly be exercised in favour of making the orders proposed by Ms Clement.

[57] The orders sought by Ms Clement are clearly set out in her submissions, namely:

1. Pursuant to section 556 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, Ms Clement must submit to an independent medical examination to be conducted by a Psychiatrist to be fixed on a date to be fixed.
2. Within five days of the release of the decision to the parties, the Appellant must provide Ms Clement a list of three Psychiatrists to conduct the independent medical examination. Within five days of the provision of the list of Psychiatrists to Ms Clement, Ms Clement must make an election in writing to the parties confirming which Psychiatrist she wishes to attend.
3. If Ms Clement fails to make the election referred to in Order 2, Ms Clement must submit to a medical examination to be conducted by Dr Frank Varghese (consultant Psychiatrist) on a date to be arranged by the appellant's solicitors.
4. The Appellant is to provide at least one week's notice to Ms Clement of the date and time of the medical examination report appointment referred to above in order 1 or in the alternative, order 3.
5. The Appellant is to pay the cost of the medical examination report appointment, production of the report, and any of Ms Clement's reasonable travel and/or accommodation costs necessary to attend the medical examination.
6. The Appellant will provide a copy of the medical report to Ms Clement within 2 days of receipt.

[58] What Ms Clements submits, in paragraph 27 of her submissions, that her medical records were (inadvertently) filed in the Commission by the Department outside the scope of the orders made in Clement No. 1, is true. It was for that reason that I made the Directions Orders on 12 December 2025. I accept that the filing of that material by the Department did cause Ms Clement some considerable distress. In saying that, I also acknowledge the prompt action by the Department to take steps to remedy the situation upon it being informed of the distress suffered by Ms Clement.

[59] In its submissions in reply, the Department submitted that if the Commission was minded to make an order requiring Ms Clement to attend a medical examination pursuant to s 556 of the Act, it did not oppose the orders sought by Ms Clement that I have reproduced in paragraph [57] of these reasons. This included that the Department provide a list of three psychiatrists to Ms Clement for her to make an election as to which one will examine her for the purposes of complying with the order that I would make. Neither party provided any submissions on the power of the Commission to make such an order.

[60] In the absence of argument by the parties, my preliminary view is that, having regard to the text of s 556 of the Act, I lack the power to direct the Department to provide a list of three psychiatrists to Ms Clement for her to then make an election as to which psychiatrist will examine her for the purposes of complying with an order that I would make pursuant to s 556(2) of the Act. This comes down to a matter of construction.

[61] In DZY (a pseudonym) v Trustees of the Christian Brothers[38] Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman and Gleeson JJ stated:

[23] The principles of statutory construction are well established. The language which has actually been used in the text, in light of its context and purpose, is the surest guide to legislative intention. One reason that the context and purpose of a provision are important to its proper construction is that an object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. Or, as was explained in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority, statutory construction requires deciding what the legal meaning of the relevant provision is "by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole". Further, the purpose of the legislation is not to be derived from any a priori assumption about the desired reach or operation of the relevant provisions.

[62] The text of s 556(2) of the Act confers discretion on the Commission to order the claimant or worker '... to submit to a personal examination by 1 or more specified registered persons.' On the plain text used, the discretion conferred on the Commission extends to the claimant or worker being examined by at least one specified registered person, and potentially more than one specified registered person.

[63] When regard is had to the purpose of the provision, namely, to obtain an opinion from one or more specified registered persons where, relevantly, the cause of the injury is relevant to the appeal, it seems obvious that the Commission may determine the claimant or worker be examined by, for example, two specified registered persons who have different, but relevant, fields of speciality.

[64] Having regard to the text and purpose of s 556(2) of the Act, it does not seem to me that the Commission has power to order that an applicant provide a panel of specified registered persons from which the claimant or worker chooses one in fulfilment of an order made pursuant to that section. To do so would abrogate the Commission's function of selecting the specified registered person to conduct such a personal examination, and would amount to conferring that function on the worker or claimant.

[65] Ultimately, it is a matter for the Commission to determine the identity of the specified registered person or persons to conduct the personal examination. In respect of an order that may be made pursuant to s 556(2) of the Act, it may be necessary for the Commission to receive submissions from the parties about who should be the specified registered person or persons.

[66] I do acknowledge Ms Clement's distress by the filing of the material by the Department that was inconsistent with the orders I made in Clement No.1. However, that fact is not a basis for me to make the order sought by Ms Clement.

[67] From the alternative orders proposed by Ms Clement, namely, that if she failed to make a relevant election, she would submit to a medical examination to be conducted by Dr Varghese, it seems to me that Ms Clement has no fundamental objection to being examined by Dr Varghese. In the circumstances, I will order that Ms Clement submit to a personal examination by Dr Varghese.

[68] For the reasons given, I will make orders of the kind sought by the Department.

1. Pursuant to s 556(2) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, the Second Respondent must submit to a personal examination by Dr Frank Varghese, Consultant Psychiatrist ('Dr Varghese') on a date to be determined.

(a) must organise the personal examination referred to in Order 1; and

(b) must provide at least one weeks' notice to the Second Respondent of the date, time and location of the personal examination referred to in Order 1.

1. Pursuant to s 556(3) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, the Appellant must pay:

(a) all the costs of the personal examination referred to in Order 1;

(b) all transport costs reasonably necessary for the Second Respondent to attend the personal examination referred to in Order 1; and

(c) all accommodation costs reasonably necessary for the Second Respondent to attend the personal examination referred to in Order 1.

1. Pursuant to s 556(4) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, any written report of Dr Varghese, containing an opinion formed on the personal examination referred to in Order 1, must forthwith be made available to the Second Respondent.

1. There be no order as to the costs of the Appellant's present application.

[1] [2025] QIRC 179 ('Clement No. 1').

[2] The submissions of the State of Queensland through the Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety filed on 15 January 2026 ('the Department's submissions'), paras. 10-12 and the submissions of Ms Silvana Clement filed on 9 February 2026 ('Ms Clement's submissions'), paras. 11-13.

[3] The Department's submissions, para. 10 and Ms Clement's submissions, para. 13 a.

[4] The Department's submissions, para. 10 and Ms Clement's submissions, para. 13 a.

[5] See Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24, 39-40 (Mason J).

[6] The Department's submissions, paras. 11-12, citing SAMI Bitumen Technologies Pty Ltd v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 290 ('SAMI'), [34]-[37] and [41] (Industrial Commissioner Pratt) and Ms Clement's submissions, para. 13 b, citing SAMI, [36].

[7] The Department's submissions, para. 14.

[8] Ms Clement's submissions, paras. 14-24, in that Ms Clement's submissions went to whether the Commission's enlivened discretion should be exercised.

[10] The Department's submissions, para. 16.

[11] The Department's submissions, paras. 17-18.

[12] Exhibit 'JV-9' to Ms Versteeg's second affidavit, pages 59-61, being a first report of Dr Perry to WorkCover Queensland dated 13 June 2024. Exhibit 'JV-12' to Ms Versteeg's second affidavit, page 86, being a further report of Dr Perry to WorkCover Queensland dated 3 October 2024.

[13] The Department's submissions, para. 19.

[14] Exhibit 'JV-10' to Ms Versteeg's second affidavit, pages 63-73.

[15] Exhibit 'JV-9' to Ms Versteeg's second affidavit, pages 59-61, which is Dr Perry's first report to WorkCover Queensland and is actually dated 13 June 2024.

[16] The Department's submissions, para. 20.

[17] The Department's submissions, para 20.

[18] Underlining added in the Department's submissions.

[19] The Department's submissions, para. 25. Dr Duke relevantly stated:

I would note that not all of the above factors are management action, and that some of those that do appear to be management action would appear to be questionable. In particular the actions of the business services officer in calling Ms Clement into the meeting with the organiser of the social club, and then specifically naming her in a discussion within the team meeting about the cessation of the service club operations appears to be unreasonably targeting her following the raising of concerns about the funds within the social club: Exhibit 'JV-9' to Ms Versteeg's second affidavit, page 70.

[20] The Department's submissions, para. 26.

[21] The Department's submissions, para. 29.

[22] The Department's submissions, para. 31.

[23] Ms Clement's submissions, paras. 14-15.

[24] [2016] ICQ 010.

[25] Ms Clement's submissions, para. 16.

[26] Ms Clement's submissions, para. 20.

[27] Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 031; (2015) 252 IR 461 ('Church'), [24]-[31] (Martin J, President).

[29] Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 558.

[31] [2023] QIRC 245, [64].

[32] SAMI (n 6), [36]-[37] and [41].

[33] Namely, a chronic adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depression: Exhibit 'JV-9' to Ms Versteeg's second affidavit, page 68.

[34] Exhibit 'JV-9' to Ms Versteeg's second affidavit, page 69.

[35] Exhibit 'JV-9' to Ms Versteeg's second affidavit, page 64.

[36] The Department's submissions, para. 34.

[37] Ms Clement's submissions, para. 25.

[38] [2025] HCA 16; (2025) 422 ALR 372.