• Lawyers in Sydney
• Lawyers in Melbourne
• Lawyers in Brisbane
• Lawyers in Perth
• Family lawyers
• Employment lawyers
• Criminal lawyers
• Wills and estates lawyers
• Find a lawyer

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Kieran Loveridge (Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
Mr H El-Hage SC / Mr I Fraser (Plaintiff)
Ms K Edwards SC / Ms E Sullivan (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Plaintiff)
KPT Legal (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2026/00125756

Publication restriction: Nil.

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

The State of New South Wales (“the State”) applied to the Supreme Court seeking that an interim supervision order (“ISO”) be made with respect to the defendant, Kieran Loveridge, pursuant to the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”).

On 7 July 2012, when the defendant was 18 years old, he committed a series of random and unprovoked physical assaults against five different bystanders in Kings Cross when he was highly intoxicated. One victim, Thomas Kelly, was punched to the face by the defendant which caused him to fall backwards and sustain fatal injuries. Alongside one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and three counts of common assault, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act, a serious violence offence within the meaning of s 5A of the Act.

The defendant received an effective head sentence of 13 years and 8 months’ imprisonment and an effective non-parole period of 10 years and 2 months for this offending. In custody, the defendant was convicted of two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm in March 2015 and February 2018.

The defendant was released on parole on 19 April 2024. He initially responded well to supervision for the first year. He was employed and was in a pro-social relationship. However, the defendant’s behaviour begun to deteriorate after the birth of his first child in March or April 2025 when he commenced illicit drug use.

The defendant has not been convicted of any further offences of violence since his release.

At the preliminary hearing, the issue in dispute was whether the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order on the basis that the Court was satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant posed an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision.

N Adams CJ at CL held, dismissing the summons:

1. Section 5A(2A)(b) of the Act extends the definition of a “serious violence offence” to an offence of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act despite recklessness as to causing death not being the mental element of that offence. This extended statutory definition made the prediction of the defendant’s risk of future serious violence offending difficult: at [264]-[268].
2. The Court was bound to take the risk assessment report (“RAR”) tendered in support of the State’s application into account on the basis that it was proved. However, the high point of the RAR was that although the defendant’s risk is of committing an offence that would fall short of a “serious violence offence”, it might “escalate” in certain circumstances. Even taking the RAR at its highest, it would not justify the making of a final order because it only assessed the defendant as being of high risk of further violent offending rather than serious violen**ce offending: at [269]-[279].

Attorney‑General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119; State of New South Wales v Welsh (Preliminary) [2025] NSWSC 987; State of New South Wales v Hampton [2018] NSWSC 360, considered.

3. The defendant’s illicit drug use is a problematic risk factor and the success or otherwise of his current detoxification is unknown: at [280]
4. The Court could only have regard to withdrawn charges of assault against the defendant’s partner to the extent that police were called to the premises but there was no evidence of any assaults having occurred: at [285].

State of New South Wales v Heness (Preliminary) [2019] NSWSC 1710, considered.

5. The defendant’s convictions for assault occasioning actual bodily harm were committed whilst in custody and concerned very different risk scenarios to the index offending. The 2018 offence was a pre-emptive case of self-defence occurring when the defendant was placed in an area with members of a rival outlaw motorcycle gang due to the oversight of Corrective Services: at [286].
6. As against these problematic matters, the defendant demonstrated the capacity to successfully re-integrate for the first year following his initial release. He had strong protective factors, including a supportive wife and family, a desire to be a good father to his son, and a history of employment. The defendant was highly motivated to overcome his drug addiction, gain employment and live a pro-social life with his new family: at [289]-[294].

JUDGMENT

1. By summons filed on 27 March 2026, the State of New South Wales (“the State”) seeks orders in respect of the defendant, Kieran Loveridge, pursuant to ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”) that he be subject to an extended supervision order (“ESO”) for a period of two years.

2. Mr Loveridge is a 32-year-old Indigenous man with a history of alcohol and illicit drug use. On the evening of 7 July 2012, when he was 18 years old, he committed a series of random and unprovoked physical assaults against bystanders in Kings Cross. Of the five men he randomly punched, four received minor or no injuries. Tragically, the fifth young man, 18-year-old Thomas Kelly, was punched in the face by Mr Loveridge which caused him to fall backwards, hit the ground and sustain fatal injuries from that fall.

3. Mr Loveridge pleaded guilty to the offence of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act contrary to s 18(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), one offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 59(1) of the Crimes Act and three offences of common assault contrary to s 61 of the Crimes Act. On 8 November 2013, Campbell J sentenced him to an effective head sentence of 7 years and 2 months’ imprisonment with an effective non-parole period of 5 years and 2 months. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, this sentence was increased to an effective head sentence of 13 years and 8 months’ imprisonment with an effective non-parole period of 10 years and 2 months.

4. The defendant was released on parole on 19 April 2024, and his head sentence expires this Sunday, 17 May 2026.

5. It should be noted at the outset that the circumstances of Mr Kelly’s death and Mr Loveridge’s court proceedings attracted a significant amount of publicity. Public outrage at that time about alcohol fuelled violence in popular entertainment areas such as Kings Cross and the Sydney CBD led to the introduction of “lock-out” laws in parts of Sydney and changes to sentencing legislation concerning “one-punch” manslaughter charges. Regrettably, the Kelly family and Mr Loveridge were subjected to intense media attention at that time and for years thereafter.

6. After the defendant was released on parole on 19 April 2024, he responded well to supervision for the first year. He was working full time as a painter and was in a pro-social relationship with a woman who works full time. Things began to unravel after the birth of his first child in March/April 2025. At around the same time, his employer ceased his painting business and Mr Loveridge lost his job. Mr Loveridge became overcome by shame that Mr Kelly would never have the opportunity to become a father as he had and he commenced illicit drug use at this time.

7. Although Mr Loveridge has not been convicted of any further offences of violence since his release, on 22 December 2025 police attended his residence in response to a call from neighbours who suspected a domestic violence incident was occurring. Although he was initially charged with common assault and assault occasioning actual bodily harm, those charges were withdrawn by police soon thereafter. He was also charged with and pleaded guilty to contravening an apprehended domestic violence order (“ADVO”) in relation to contact only for which he received no penalty.

8. Thus, by way of overview, although Mr Loveridge has struggled with illicit drug use over the past year, there is no evidence he has committed any acts of violence since his release on parole on 19 April 2024 over two years ago.

9. A preliminary hearing was conducted before me on 8 May 2026. At the hearing, the State sought the following interim relief:

10. An order pursuant to s 7(4) of the Act appointing two qualified psychiatrists, two registered psychologists or a combination of both to conduct separate psychiatric and/or psychological examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by a date to be fixed by the Court, and that the defendant be directed to attend those examinations; and

11. An interim order pursuant to ss 10A, 10C(1) and 11 of the Act that the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order (“ISO”) for a period of 28 days commencing from 17 May 2026, and that the defendant comply with the conditions set out in the schedule to the Summons during the duration of the order.

12. Mr Loveridge opposed the making of any orders on the basis that the statutory test could not be met, even at this preliminary stage. He was not present at the preliminary hearing as he had entered a drug detoxification facility on 5 May 2026.

13. As trite as it is to observe, the experience of the courts is that rehabilitation is not a linear process. Mr Loveridge had a very promising start to adjusting to life in the community after being incarcerated from the age of 18 to 30 years old; but he then lapsed into drug use which is a significant risk factor for further offending. Despite this, the index offence occurred 14 years ago and he has committed no serious violence offences since that date.

14. For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that the statutory test for the making of the orders sought has been satisfied even at this preliminary stage. In order to understand why I have arrived at that conclusion, it is necessary to first understand the statutory test that the State must establish at a preliminary hearing in order for the matter to proceed through to a final hearing.

The legislative scheme

13. I have extracted the following summary of the relevant legislative scheme in part from my decision in State of New South Wales v Patten (Preliminary) [2025] NSWSC 1067.

14. The primary object of the Act, as set out in s 3, is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of “high risk offenders” to ensure the safety and protection of the community. Another object of the Act is to encourage such offenders to undertake rehabilitation. Thus, it should be noted from the outset that the Act is concerned with “high risk offenders”. As for what that means in this statutory context, the answer is to be found in s 5B of the Act.

15. Section 5B of the Act provides that this Court may make an ESO if:

(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and

(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and

(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and

(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.

16. A “serious offence” is defined in s 4 of the Act as either a “serious sex offence” or a “serious violence offence”. A “serious violence offence” is defined in s 5A(1) of the Act. It is a specific and narrow test. Mr Loveridge did not suggest that he did not fall within it. I will consider the scope of that definition and how it is that Mr Loveridge comes within it further below in my consideration.

17. Section 5I(1) of the Act provides that an application for an ESO may be made only in respect of a supervised offender, which is defined in s 5I(2)(a)(i) as an offender who, when the application for the order is made, is in custody or under supervision while serving a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence.

18. Thus, the statutory requirements for making an ESO are, relevantly, that the offender is a serious violent offender as required by ss 5 and 5B of the Act, is a supervised offender (within the meaning of s 5I of the Act) and is still in custody or under supervision at the time the application is made. Mr Loveridge did not challenge that these three of the four statutory prerequisites were established.

19. It is the fourth statutory prerequisite in relation to which the parties joined issue; namely, that the Court must be satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order: s 5B(d).

20. As will be seen below, although the supporting material, taken at its highest, is capable of establishing that Mr Loveridge may well commit a further offence of violence, that is not the statutory test. The relevant risk is that he will commit a “serious violence offence”.

21. Section 6(1) of the Act provides that the application for an ESO may be made within nine months of the expiry of the defendant’s current custody or supervision. That section has been complied with.

22. Section 7(3)-(5) of the Act provides for a preliminary hearing of an ESO application and is in these terms:

(3) A preliminary hearing into the application is to be conducted by the Supreme Court within 28 days after the application is filed in the Supreme Court or within such further time as the Supreme Court may allow.

(4) If, following the preliminary hearing, it is satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must make orders:

(a) appointing:

(i) 2 qualified psychiatrists, or

(ii) 2 registered psychologists, or

(iii) 1 qualified psychiatrist and 1 registered psychologist, or

(iv) 2 qualified psychiatrists and 2 registered psychologists,

to conduct separate psychiatric or psychological examinations (as the case requires) of the offender and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations, and

(b) directing the offender to attend those examinations.

(5) If, following the preliminary hearing, it is not satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must dismiss the application.

(Emphasis added.)

23. Section 10A of the Act provides that this Court may make an order for an ISO if it appears to the Court:

(a) that the offender’s current custody or supervision will expire before the proceedings are determined, and

(b) that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order. (Emphasis added.)

24. Thus, the statutory test to be applied at the preliminary hearing in order to make the ISO and order the appointment of court experts is that it must appear to the Court that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO. It has been held that the task of the Court at a preliminary hearing such as this is similar to the task in committal proceedings: Attorney General (NSW) v Hayter [2007] NSWSC 983 at [6].

25. During the preliminary hearing before me, an issue arose as to the nature of this Court’s task at the preliminary hearing where aspects of the supporting material are contested by the parties.

26. The nature of the Court’s task at the preliminary stage was described as a “balancing exercise” by Harrison J (as his Honour then was) in State of New South Wales v Pacey [2015] NSWSC 1983 at [44] (“Pacey”):

The assessment that I am required to make on this application for orders pursuant to s 7(4) and s 10B of the Act is the equivalent of an inquiry into the existence of a prima facie case. It nevertheless follows that the difficult task that is to be undertaken necessarily involves a balancing exercise taking into account all of the positive and negative material in the supporting documentation, based upon the assumption that it can ultimately be proved. (Emphasis added.)

27. As for what is meant by assuming that the “matters alleged” will be proved, in State of New South Wales v Mustapha (Preliminary) [2025] NSWSC 926 (“Mustapha”), Wright J considered this phrase in the context of s 27(b) of the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW), which is relevantly identical to s 10A(b) of the Act. His Honour observed the following (at [35]-[38], [41]):

[35] The expression “matters alleged” has been held to refer to facts rather than conclusions. In State of New South Wales v Elomar (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1034, Rothman J said that the test does not require “prima facie” proof of the matters alleged and continued:

“[7] … I should make it clear that the term ‘matters alleged’ does not refer to a conclusion. It refers to matters of fact that, if proved, would be open to lead to a particular conclusion.

[8] To use an example may better illustrate the distinction. If an application for an ISO and/or ESO were to allege that a person was ‘a terrorist’, that would not, in my view, of itself, satisfy the condition prescribed by s 27(b) of the THRO Act. Whether or not the defendant in any such hypothetical proceeding was “a terrorist” is a conclusion that must be based upon facts that are adduced.

[9] In such a circumstance, it is necessary for the State of New South Wales to allege certain facts, which, if proved, would lead to a conclusion that would justify the making of an ESO…

[10] As a consequence, the ‘matters alleged’ must be facts or based on facts that are, firstly, capable of being proved; and, secondly, such that, if proved, they would satisfy the Court that an ESO should or would be made.”

[36] In my view, Rothman J’s comment that the phrase “matters alleged” refers to facts not conclusions should be understood as distinguishing between facts, including inferences and expert opinions based on other facts, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, necessary or ultimate conclusions as to the issues which the Court has to decide, for example whether a defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence.

[37] Thus, if the supporting documentation included an expert psychiatrist’s or psychologist’s opinion as to the likelihood of the offender committing a serious terrorism offence, as referred to in s 23(3)(b) and (c), that opinion would be a “matter alleged” in the supporting documentation. If other matters alleged in the supporting documentation provided a substantial reason to doubt the validity or correctness of such an opinion, that would be a matter that should be taken into account in determining whether to refuse to exercise the discretion to make an ISO if the power to do so under s 27 is enlivened.

[38] Further, Campbell J held in State of New South Wales v Naaman (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1329 at [48] that in applying the test in ss 24(5) and 27(b):

“… it is necessary to look at the allegations and the documentation put before the Court through the lens of the plaintiff’s case and to take them at their highest when deciding whether the test articulated in s 27(b) has been made good in all the circumstances of the case.”

…

[41] N Adams J accepted that the test on a preliminary application under the THRO Act is a “low one” in State of New South Wales v Dunn (a pseudonym) [2018] NSWSC 1008 at [44]. Garling J took the same approach in State of New South Wales v Sturgeon [2019] NSWSC 559, when considering substantially the same wording in the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW). His Honour said at [5] - [6]:

“The Court, in undertaking this exercise, is not involved in weighing up the documentation or resolving any conflicts, inconsistencies or uncertainties which appear in the documentation. It is no part of the Court’s function to predict the ultimate result, or assess the likelihood of the ultimate result. If on the matters alleged in the supporting documentation it is open to the Court at a final hearing to make a CDO or [an] ESO, then a conclusion that the Court would be justified in making the order, is inevitable. The issue is to be resolved without considering what evidence might be called by [the defendant] at a final hearing, and without taking into account any evidence which may be called by a defendant at an interim hearing, because such evidence would not cast light upon what is alleged in the supporting documentation: Attorney-General (NSW) v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119 at [98].”

28. I shall return to this issue of contested material at a preliminary hearing in my consideration below.

29. The Court’s power to make an ESO is discretionary. Section 9(1) of the Act provides that this Court may determine an application for an ESO by either making an ESO or dismissing the application. Subsections 9(2) and (3) of the Act provide a number of mandatory considerations to which the Court must have regard in determining whether or not to make an ESO as follows:

(2) In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration of the Supreme Court.

(2A) (Repealed)

(3) In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must also have regard to the following matters in addition to any other matter it considers relevant:

(a) (Repealed)

(b) the reports received from the persons appointed under section 7 (4) to conduct examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such examination,

(c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such assessment,

(d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further serious offence,

(d1) any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community,

(e) any treatment or rehabilitation programs in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such programs,

(e1) options (if any) available if the offender is kept in custody or is in the community (whether or not under supervision) that might reduce the likelihood of the offender re-offending over time,

(e2) the likelihood that the offender will comply with the obligations of an extended supervision order,

(f) without limiting paragraph (e2), the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an earlier extended supervision order,

(g) the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004,

(h) the offender’s criminal history (including prior convictions and findings of guilt in respect of offences committed in New South Wales or elsewhere), and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history,

(h1) the views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the offender,

(i) any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will commit a further serious offence.

The supporting documentation

30. At this preliminary stage, the Court is required to take into account all of the supporting documentation and assume it would be proved at a final hearing. The supporting documentation was tendered in accordance with s 6(3) of the Act, which provides that an application such as this must be supported by specified documentation that addresses the matters to which s 9(3) of the Act refers and must include a report (prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner) that assesses the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious offence.

31. At the preliminary hearing, the State relied on the following supporting material:

32. Affidavits of Jamie McLachlan, the solicitor with carriage of the matter at the Crown Solicitor’s Office, affirmed on 26 March 2026 (with Exhibit “JM-1”), 13 April 2026, 29 April 2026 and 5 May 2026 (all with annexures);

33. Affidavit of Celia Langton, Acting Manager of Risk Management Programs in Corrective Services NSW, affirmed on 26 March 2026;

34. Risk Assessment Report (“RAR”) prepared by Dr Richard Parker dated 27 February 2026. A supplementary RAR dated 5 May 2026 was also annexed to Mr McLachlan’s affidavit of 5 May; and

35. Risk Management Report (“RMR”) prepared by Vicki McCarthy, a Community Corrections officer, dated 24 March 2026.

36. The State also relied on a Statement of Case dated 27 March 2026, a Schedule of Proposed Conditions and a Chronology, in addition to its submissions.

37. Exhibit JM-1 to the affidavit of Jamie McLachlan of 25 March 2026 included the defendant’s criminal and custodial history and a copy of the RAR. With respect to the index offences, it included the agreed facts on sentence, psychological reports, the remarks on sentence by Campbell J and the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal. With respect to other offences, it included court attendance notices, facts sheets, and sentencing remarks. The exhibit also included documents from Corrective Services NSW, parole material and Offender Integrated Management System (“OIMS”) case notes.

38. Annexures to Jamie McLachlan’s affidavits of 13 April 2026 and 29 April 2026 included further OIMS notes, material related to the defendant’s further charges and ADVO and the defendant’s Breach of Parole Report dated 13 April 2026.

39. The defendant relied on the following supporting material:

40. Report of Dr Kerri Eagle dated 1 May 2026;

41. Briefing letter and emails sent to Dr Kerri Eagle;

42. Affidavits of Andrew Sant, the defendant’s solicitor, sworn on 20 April 2026 and 4 May 2026 annexing, inter alia, a statement from the defendant’s partner, Jessica [I do not consider it necessary to state her full name], concerning the recent charges; and

43. Jessica’s affidavit sworn on 4 May 2026.

44. At the hearing, the parties handed up a Joint Statement of Agreed Facts pursuant to Practice Note SC CL 12.

45. The supporting documentation contained significant detail about, inter alia, Mr Loveridge’s recent conduct whilst on parole. I propose to address the supporting documentation relied upon chronologically rather than by subject matter.

The defendant’s background

38. The defendant is a 32-year-old man of Aboriginal descent. He had an unsettled and at times chaotic upbringing, being exposed to violence and substance abuse from a young age. His parents separated when he was about 4 years old but reconciled some time later during which time his sister was born. He believed that his father was a drinker and that there had been domestic violence in that relationship, although he did not witness it. He reported being physically abused by his father and that he sustained a scar above his eye when his father hit him in the face with a bamboo cane. His contact with his father during his childhood was limited which he ascribed to his father’s indifference.

39. The defendant reported being abused by a family friend when he was very young. He was afraid to report this. It resulted in him becoming “clingy” with his mother.

40. The defendant’s history with his mother was reportedly also troubled. His mother held employment but tended to consume alcohol on the weekend to such a degree that it was one of the reasons for him “rebelling” in his adolescence and leaving home while still at school. Mr Loveridge also described observing his mother being a victim to domestic violence by different partners.

41. After being expelled from one high school in year 9 for juvenile offending, the defendant completed year 10 and was involved in a program which combined years 11 and 12 with vocational training. During this period, he worked as a landscaper and carpet layer with his uncle (who was also a football coach), who died just prior to the index offending. Mr Loveridge was a promising rugby league player and was picked for the under 17 development squad for the Parramatta Juniors. At the time of the index offence, he had been selected for the Bulldogs NRL under 20 squad.

Juvenile offending

42. On 7 June 2009, when the defendant was 15 years old, police were attempting to arrest the defendant’s friend. Whilst police were attempting to control the friend, the friend shouted, “they are bashing me”. The defendant with seven other juveniles ran towards the friend and the police. The defendant shouted, “Get the fuck off him you dogs”, and tackled a police officer. The defendant was arrested and charged with assaulting an officer in the execution of their duty and affray. On 1 September 2009, at the Parramatta Children’s Court, the defendant was sentenced to probation for 12 months.

43. On 28 January 2011, when the defendant was 16 years old, he gatecrashed a party organised by the victim. The victim was expecting 100 guests at the party. The defendant attended the party uninvited with about ten to fifteen males. By 11pm, there were approximately 120 people at the party where fights had broken out, and glass was being thrown around. When asked to leave, and after an exchange of words with the victim, the defendant chased the victim and then threw a bottle towards the victim but missed him. The defendant then punched the victim in the face multiple times, causing bruising to his face and eye. Following his arrest by police, the defendant made full admissions. The following day, the defendant wrote an apology message to the victim.

44. On 13 August 2011, the defendant was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm. On 7 June 2012, at the Parramatta Children’s Court, the defendant received a probation order of 18 months. As a result of this order, the defendant was subject to conditional liberty at the time of the index offending. The order was subsequently breached by the commission of the index offence, and the defendant was sentenced to a control order for two months commencing on 18 July 2012.

45. A few months prior to the index offence, the defendant had moved into the family home of his partner of 16 months. This partner experienced a miscarriage in the week preceding the index offence.

46. Approximately two weeks prior to the index offence, Mr Loveridge’s friend was involved in a serious motorcycle accident for which he was placed in an induced coma. This friend came out of the coma the day prior to the index offence and the defendant’s friends encouraged Mr Loveridge to celebrate this development by going out to the Sydney CBD on the night of the index offence. The defendant was also celebrating the start of training after signing a contract with the Bulldogs Junior NRL team approximately one week prior.

The index offence

47. On 7 July 2012, the defendant committed the index offence; namely manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act contrary to 18(1)(b) of the Crimes Act. That offence carries a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment. He was aged 18 years and 4 months at the time.

48. In Kings Cross that evening, over the period of one hour, the defendant committed the offences of manslaughter, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and three counts of common assault against five different victims. Prior to the offending, the defendant had consumed a significant amount of alcohol. It is common ground that he was highly intoxicated.

49. The first offence in time was one of assault occasioning actual bodily harm committed against Marco Compagnoni. Mr Compagnoni had been walking along Victoria Road in the company of two friends and noticed a group of three males ahead who were loud and jostling with each other. As he approached the group, without warning, the defendant elbowed Mr Compagnoni above his left eyebrow, lacerating his skin and drawing blood.

50. The next offence was the manslaughter of Thomas Kelly. Mr Kelly and his two friends walked towards the point where Mr Compagnoni had been assaulted. As Mr Kelly (who was on the phone) passed the defendant, the defendant stepped out from the wall he was standing against and, for no reason and without notice, punched Mr Kelly in the face with sufficient force to knock him down to the ground. This caused Mr Kelly to hit his head on the pavement. He was completely limp and did not move. A pool of blood started to form around his head. The impact of the pavement caused a severe fracture to Mr Kelly’s skull and severe injuries to his brain, which ultimately proved fatal.

51. Witnesses said that the defendant looked at Mr Kelly as he lay on the ground, and appeared angry and intoxicated. The defendant was then seen to run away.

52. Mr Kelly was taken by ambulance to St Vincent’s Hospital where emergency surgery was carried out. He died on the evening of 9 July 2012.

53. The defendant wandered around the area until about 10:50pm when he randomly punched Matthew Serrao to the left side of his face. The attack was entirely unprovoked. This led to a charge of common assault. After the assault, Mr Serrao demanded an apology. In response, the defendant swung another punch at Mr Serrao, missing him, before being pulled away by an acquaintance.

54. Shortly after, Rhyse Saliba accidentally bumped into the defendant whilst walking along the street. Despite Mr Saliba’s apology, the defendant responded by punching Mr Saliba in the face. This led to a charge of common assault.

55. The defendant then punched Mr Saliba’s friend Aden Gazi on the right side of his face. A pushing and shoving match developed between the two before it was broken up by two police officers patrolling the area on foot. This led to a charge of common assault.

56. On 8 July 2012, the defendant was watching television with a companion at Seven Hills when a story was broadcast concerning Mr Kelly being in hospital in a critical condition after being assaulted in Kings Cross the previous night. The defendant appeared to his companion to be very worried. The defendant said, “Was that one of my fights, I don’t know?” The defendant made comments querying whether he fit the description given on the television.

57. On 12 July 2012, the defendant spoke with a companion concerning the night of 7 July 2012, saying “I don’t remember what happened that night, it could have been me. I was drunk. I remember getting into a few fights that night. One was at Fake [Club] where police fined me. I am scared”. Later, the defendant was asked by others whether he remembered doing anything and each time he replied that he did not remember.

58. The defendant was arrested on 18 July 2012. He pleaded guilty in the Local Court.

Report of Mr Peter Champion dated 22 August 2013

59. Mr Peter Champion prepared a report to be used for the defendant’s sentence hearing for manslaughter.

60. Mr Champion administered the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI-II). The defendant achieved an overall score in the lower half of the average range. The Verbal Comprehension Index and Perceptual Reasoning Index were in the lower half of the average range. The defendant was found to be literate to an adequate degree. Mr Champion found there was no indication that the defendant was suffering from an intellectual disability or a global limitation on intelligence.

61. Mr Champion found that the defendant did not appear to be mentally ill. He stated that there was a need to address the defendant’s alcohol issues while he was in detention.

62. Mr Champion found the defendant to be able to articulate his remorse and stated that it was pleasing to note that it was primarily directed towards the victims not himself. The defendant spoke of having lost many friends, his girlfriend, his education and employment as a result of his actions but stated these as simple facts, rather than seeking special consideration.

63. Mr Champion concluded that if the defendant can return to the community with values and attitudes not too disrupted by longer incarceration, can return to employment, have a safe and supportive place to live, and avoid subcultural peers, then this should reduce the risk of future similar offending.

Sentencing before Campbell J

64. Mr Loveridge was sentenced by Campbell J on 8 November 2013 to a total effective sentence of 7 years and 2 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years and 2 months: R v Loveridge [2013] NSWSC 1638.

65. As to the level of the defendant’s intoxication on the night the index offence was committed, the sentencing judge, Campbell J, was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that at the time of the offending he was “very drunk”. Campbell J found that “by reason of his drunkenness, the offender was unable or unwilling to control his aggressive urges”.

66. Notwithstanding that the defendant did not give evidence Campbell J was satisfied that the defendant was remorseful for his offending and for taking the life of Mr Kelly based on his statements to Mr Champion and others. Campbell J also noted that the defendant wept in court when the deceased’s parents read their victim impact statements, which his Honour found to be “a sincere expression of his remorse”.

67. When assessing the objective seriousness of the manslaughter offence, Campbell J found that:

the attacks were on the whole spontaneous, in the sense of being unpremeditated, even if because of his drunkenness the offender was unable to control his aggression. That he may have in his drunken state decided to give vent to it does not detract significantly from this consideration. (Emphasis added.)

68. The Crown appealed the sentence to the Court of Criminal Appeal (“CCA”). Before that appeal was held Mr Loveridge completed the Getting Smart program (a drug and alcohol program) on 10 December 2013.

69. Mr Champion prepared an updated report in the event of re-sentencing and on the question of the residual discretion.

Report of Mr Peter Champion dated 15 April 2014

70. Mr Champion was asked to address whether the ongoing media coverage of the defendant’s matter had impacted upon him. Mr Champion commented on how the defendant had learned of the appeal through the media before hearing about it from his lawyer. Mr Champion also discussed how articles had rated him as Australia’s “No:1 scumbag”, and claimed he had gone on a rampage. The defendant disclosed to Mr Champion that his 14-year-old sister was bullied at school because of him and had on one occasion been chased home by two men, who were unknown to her.

71. Mr Champion did not otherwise alter any of the opinions expressed in his earlier report.

Successful Crown appeal

72. The Crown appeal was heard by Bathurst CJ, Johnson and R A Hulme JJ on 7 May 2014 and the judgment was delivered on 4 July 2014: R v Loveridge [2014] NSWCCA 120. The CCA found that the sentences imposed by Campbell J were manifestly inadequate and the defendant’s sentence was increased. For the offence of manslaughter, the defendant received a sentence of 10 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years. The sentence commenced on 18 November 2015. The non-parole period expired on 17 November 2022, and the head sentence will expire on 17 May 2026.

73. The CCA disagreed with Campbell J’s description of the offending as “spontaneous”, noting that the description was inapt to describe all of the offending that occurred after the first offence and tended “to downgrade the criminality reflected in the accumulating serious of attacks which the [defendant] was making against different victims, over the period of about an hour at different points in the streets of Kings Cross”.

74. The CCA found that there was no evidentiary foundation for Campbell J’s finding that it was very unlikely that the defendant would reoffend. Their Honours noted that the offending occurred whilst the defendant was subject to conditional liberty and observed that (at [122]):

Far from exercising restraint in accordance with the terms of his conditional liberty, and utilising such assistance and support in the community as was available as a condition of his probation, the [defendant] embarked upon a course of violent conduct which culminated in the death of a young man and the assaulting of others selected randomly in a public street.

75. While Campbell J was satisfied that the defendant was remorseful, the CCA found that a “guarded approach” to the defendant’s expressions of remorse to his psychologist was warranted where the defendant did not give direct evidence as to his remorse (at [125]).

76. In re-sentencing the defendant, the CCA found that the objective seriousness of the offending was increased by the following factors:

77. The blow which had ended Mr Kelly’s life being delivered after the defendant had previously delivered another “powerful blow” to a different victim;

78. Consciousness of guilt as evidenced by the defendant running away (in agreement with Campbell J’s earlier finding); and

79. The defendant’s statements after he had assaulted Mr Kelly to the effect that he was going to “bash someone”.

Mr Loveridge’s conduct in custody

77. Mr Loveridge received the following custodial infringements over the 11-year period he was incarcerated: on 25 April 2013, participating in a fight; on 5 February 2014, concealing a shiv in his cell; on 10 October 2015, participating in a fight; on 20 November 2019, inciting a wing disturbance and threatening correctional staff safety with a number of other inmates; on 29 May 2020, behaving aggressively to a staff member; on 22 October 2020 and 24 January 2021, returning positive urinalysis for Buprenorphine; on 27 February 2024, consuming alcohol (it is alleged he consumed hand sanitizer although the defendant reports he consumed vodka); and on 27 February 2024, threatening a corrective service staff member by saying “I’ll put you in a box”.

78. It was submitted at the preliminary hearing that these charges were not proven to the criminal standard, and it is unknown what procedural fairness was afforded to the defendant. I have considered this material on the basis that it would be established at a final hearing.

79. Mr Loveridge was associated with the Lone Wolf Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (“OMCG”) whilst in custody. There is some dispute between the parties as to when those affiliations commenced; the defendant states that they are associated with his time in custody, while the State points to evidence that the affiliations commenced when he was 17 years old. It is not necessary for that dispute to be resolved. It is common ground that the association has now ceased and Mr Loveridge has had his Lone Wolf tattoos removed.

Further convictions

80. Mr Loveridge was charged with two further acts of violence between 2012 and 2024. Neither of them was a “serious violence offence” within the meaning of the Act.

Assault occasioning actual bodily harm – 10 March 2015

81. On 10 March 2015 at around 2pm, the defendant and co-offender entered the victim’s cell at the Mid North Coast Correctional Centre for approximately 30 seconds and assaulted him. Both offenders participated in the assault and then left the cell.

82. The victim informed Corrections Officers that he had been assaulted. He was taken by ambulance to Kempsey District Hospital.

83. The victim had bruising to the left cheek and right side of his head, dried blood around his nose and mouth, lower abdominal tenderness and fractures to his right cheek. He was given pain relief as well as tetanus immunisation.

84. On 26 May 2016, at the Port Macquarie District Court, the defendant was sentenced for the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm in company to a fixed term of imprisonment of one year commencing on 18 May 2022.

Assault occasioning actual bodily harm – 26 February 2018

85. On 26 February 2018, the defendant was being transferred to Nowra with a view that he was being promoted to a C Classification. The defendant was temporarily brought to Silverwater Correctional Centre while en route to Nowra Correctional Centre from Cessnock Correctional Centre. Despite numerous alerts within Corrective Services, the defendant was placed into a section of the Metropolitan Remand and Reception Centre at Silverwater which was occupied by numerous members of the Rebels OMCG. The defendant was an associate of the Lone Wolf OMCG at that time.

86. The defendant walked across the common area and up to the president of the Rebels, who was seated on a milk crate and talking on the phone. The defendant immediately, and without warning, punched the victim to the head. Following a flurry of punches, of which at least one or two punches appeared to connect, the two men grabbed hold of each other and fell to the floor where they continued wrestling and fighting. Corrective Services officers immediately ran from the adjacent office and broke up the struggle between them. The defendant was taken away and the victim returned to his phone conversation. The defendant was taken into an adjacent office and then a hallway. The victim then ran into the hallway and attempted to assault the defendant. The victim was taken to the ground by Corrective Services officers before he could strike the defendant. Both men were then removed from the area and taken for medical treatment.

87. The victim suffered a laceration to his eyebrow which required a number of sutures. The defendant sustained bruising to his eyelids and a finger as well as minor grazes.

Report of Dr Paul Pusey dated 11 May 2019

88. Dr Paul Pusey, a clinical and forensic psychologist, prepared two reports in preparation for the defendant’s sentencing hearing in respect of the above charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm committed in February 2018.

89. He first conducted a psychological assessment of the defendant on 9 May 2019 and prepared a report dated 11 May 2019.

90. Dr Pusey noted that upon assessment, the defendant did not display any overt symptoms of somatoform or psychotic disorder. However, Dr Pusey noted that the defendant did acknowledge his experience of mood and anxiety pathology which he expressed had worsened in response to the events of 2018.

91. Dr Pusey opined, that based on the information provided for the assessment, at the time that the offence, it is likely that the defendant would have met the diagnosis for a psychological or psychiatric diagnosis. Dr Pusey noted that the diagnosis would most likely be one characterised by prominent anxiety pathology. More broadly, Dr Pusey opined that the defendant would have likely met the diagnostic criterion for a co-morbid disorder characterised by prominent mood pathology. Dr Pusey noted that it is likely the onset of such symptoms was in response to his attempt to cope with imprisonment or the perceived threat to his life by being associated with members of an OMCG. It was noted that the defendant reiterated throughout the assessment that his sole motivation was to be removed from an environment in which he believed that his safety was at risk by virtue of his exposure to members of the Rebels OMCG.

92. Dr Pusey noted his opinion that the defendant’s perception of and response to the severity of the risk posed to him by the members of the Rebels OMCG in the pod provides the most likely explanation for his offending behaviour. Dr Pusey stated that “his actions indicate that he had attempted to raise his concerns through what appears to have been an appropriate avenue – alerting the guards to his non-association order and that he reacted when it became apparent to him that no change in the situation would occur without his direct intervention”.

93. Dr Pusey opined that a possible diagnosis congruent with the aforementioned factors which likely contributed to the defendant’s behaviour would be acute stress disorder.

94. Dr Pusey considered an appropriate treatment pathway for the defendant would aim to address the following areas, given its continuing impact on his mental health pathology:

95. Support his ability to develop and implement present moment awareness.

96. Support his ability to develop and utilise more effective emotion regulation strategies.

97. Support the development of a more authentic sense of self which supports the ability to make prosocial decisions.

98. Assistance to more fully process this situation.

99. Address long-term mood pathology impacting his functioning within the prison environment.

100. Dr Pusey opined that the defendant’s offending appeared to have occurred in the context of his perception and response to what he believed to be life-threating circumstances and the potential role played by Corrective Services staff in their creation. Dr Pusey noted that throughout the duration of his incarceration to date, there have been only a minimal number of institutional charges for violent behaviour. This suggested that this pattern of behaviour had significantly diminished during his period of incarceration suggesting that the defendant was finding and utilizing alternative means of addressing episodes of conflict.

Report of Dr Paul Pusey dated 8 May 2020

96. Dr Pusey conducted a further psychological assessment of the defendant on 5 May 2020.

97. Dr Pusey noted that at his most recent assessment, the defendant denied receipt of any further charges for any breaches or violent offending. Dr Pusey opined that this could suggest that his likelihood of engaging in this pattern of behaviour was either contextually specific, had continued to significantly diminish during his period of incarceration or that he had developed a more effective set of interpersonal skills.

98. Dr Pusey noted that in his view, the unique nature of the contextual and perceptual contexts which had led to this offence must be considered when assessing the defendant’s risk of recidivism.

Sentencing for assault occasioning actual bodily harm

99. On 29 May 2020, at Parramatta District Court, the defendant was sentenced for the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm to a fixed term of imprisonment for 12 months commencing on 18 June 2022: R v Loveridge [2020] NSWDC 256. Sutherland SC DCJ noted a causal connection between the offending and the fact that the defendant had been placed in the same pod as a member of the Rebels OMCG given his own OMCG connections. Judge Sutherland found the offence fell well below the mid-range of objective seriousness and that the defendant’s moral culpability was substantially reduced due to the circumstances.

100. Portions of Judge Sutherland’s judgment are extracted in the Agreed Facts and read as follows:

[21] The offender was brought from Cessnock to Silverwater en route to Nowra. It is uncertain as to precisely how long it was intended that he would be kept in Silverwater pending his transfer to Nowra. For reasons which I will examine in more detail shortly, numerous alerts within Corrective Services made it clear that the offender was not to be housed within the prison system with members of the Rebels Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMCG).

[22] Notwithstanding such a clear alert, the offender was placed into a section in the prison described as a Pod at the Metropolitan Remand and Reception Centre (MRRC) at Silverwater which was occupied by numerous members of the Rebels. Just how and why that occurred is a matter of considerable concern. The fact of him being placed with sworn enemies of the Lone Wolf OMCG, of which Mr Loveridge was identified as an associate or member, played a direct causative part in what unfolded.

…

[82] I am satisfied that the assault which Loveridge carried out in the full view and immediate proximity of numerous Corrective Service Officers was done as a means which would guarantee his immediate removal from that Pod. I am satisfied that he held genuine fears for his safety were he to be left in that Pod and placed in a cell overnight.

[83] It is self-evident that fears of violence by or towards the offender from members of the Rebels was the very reason for the alerts which had been raised years earlier and which were noted throughout the various Corrective Services records.

…

[88] It is also appropriate to take into account that provocation and duress are both identified as mitigating factors in the statutory considerations set out in section 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

[89] I am satisfied on all of the evidence that the position in which Mr Loveridge found himself, in a Pod containing some 14 members of the Rebels outlaw motorcycle gang, would have caused a level of apprehension and fear in him which was both predictable and justifiable.

[90] I am satisfied that the position in which he was placed operated to provoke him to react in the way that he did. I am satisfied that his reaction was occasioned by fear of what might happen were he to remain in the Pod and that in the mitigating sense that the term is used in the relevant statutory provision, he was acting under duress because of the fear which he perceived existed.

[91] I am satisfied that his actions were a deliberate means of ensuring his removal from that Pod. I am also satisfied that any verbal request within the Pod to be removed because of the existence of an alert was on the evidence before me unlikely to have been acted on in the circumstances.

[92] In my view his moral culpability with respect to the commission of the assault is substantially reduced as a consequence.

[93] It would be abundantly clear from the narrative earlier in these Remarks with respect to Mr Loveridge’s childhood and past history, that he has both been subjected to violence and has himself been an offender in such offences on numerous occasions. Without examining them in detail, Bugmy-type considerations go some way to an understanding of his present predicament.

[94] Whilst his record in custody has been far from perfect, there have been some positive indications, particularly in more recent times.

Events prior to release on parole

101. Given the two additional sentences imposed whilst Mr Loveridge was serving his sentence for the index offence, he first became eligible for parole on 17 June 2023. A number of reports were prepared in anticipation of that event and Mr Loveridge became eligible for and completed two significant programs before he was released.

Report of Alita Caon dated 28 January 2021

102. Alita Caon prepared a psychological report on the defendant for the Serious Offenders Review Council (“SORC”) in order to determine an appropriate program pathway.

103. Ms Caon summarised that the defendant’s behaviour in custody had been mixed, whereby he had been sanctioned and segregated for numerous offences, but he had also sought out treatment and engaged appropriately in employment. She stated that he had made limited progress to date in terms of addressing his offending behaviour due to regressions in classification and placement concerns due to high media profile and OMCG status, however he had reported a willingness to engage in programs and case management for eventual release.

Violence Risk Scale (VRS)

104. Ms Caon administered the Violence Risk Scale (“VRS”). The VRS is a dynamic violence risk assessment and treatment tool. It assesses both static and dynamic risk factors to provide a comprehensive evaluation of an individual’s risk of violence, relevant treatment targets and areas of strength. It assesses an individual’s level of risk compared to a sample of adult males.

105. The defendant’s overall result on the VRS fell within the high range for violent recidivism. The defendant’s score on the VRS was compared to a group of 918 federally sentenced Canadian inmates who had also been rated on the VRS. Of those offenders from this group who obtained a similar score to the defendant, 39.5% were criminally convicted for a new violent offence within 5 years after release to the community, and 62% were convicted of a new non-violent offence.

106. Mr Loveridge participated in and completed the CONNECT program, a general therapeutic program, on 15 December 2021.

VOTP: High Intensity Program Unit Violent Offenders Therapeutic Program Treatment Report prepared by Tamara Gradden dated 27 April 2023

107. On 27 April 2023, Tamara Gradden, a senior specialist psychologist, prepared a report summarising the defendant’s participation and progress in the High Intensity Program Unit (“HIPU”) Violent Offender Treatment Program (“VOTP”).

108. Ms Gradden noted that throughout treatment the defendant:

presented as a consistently engaged and motivated participant. He demonstrated very good attendance and was mostly punctual to sessions. He completed all tasks asked of him to a high standard.

109. Ms Gradden opined that the defendant “displayed a high level of insight into risk factors leading to offending behaviour, including those which precipitate and maintain his violent behaviour”.

110. When asked to address the defendant’s “Pathways to Offending”, Ms Gradden wrote:

Mr Loveridge possesses some protective factors which may mitigate risk and assist him in desisting from violent specific and general offending behaviour. He has consistently expressed a desire to participate in behaviour change programs and meaningful employment while in custody. His case notes in these areas generally reflect he has consistently been motivated and maintained a positive attitude. Mr Loveridge reports he maintains a supportive and stable relationship with his mother and sister, both of whom are prosocial.

111. Ms Gradden also discussed the defendant’s risk factors, stating:

Mr Loveridge demonstrated an understanding of the factors increasing his risk of offending, including violent offending. By the end of treatment, Mr Loveridge implicated the following risk factors in his violence offending: relapse with alcohol; being confronted with violence and feeling the need to retaliate; maintaining a gaol mentality in the community; and feeling he is being scrutinised by the media. He was able to identify warning signs for these risk factors, as well as protective factors to aid in mitigating the presence of these risk factors.

112. Ms Gradden concluded as follows:

Overall, Mr Loveridge presented as someone who has developed insight into a number of his criminogenic needs and high risk situations for violence, although struggles to apply these in a personally meaningful way. He has the ability to demonstrate a range of prosocial skills which at times may assist him in getting his needs met without resorting to violence, including; perspective taking, assertive communication, consequential thinking, seeking support and removing himself from high risk situations. While he demonstrated the ability to develop insight and some skills, Mr Loveridge has some outstanding risk factors he will need to continue to address. Mr Loveridge’s risk of re-offending may increase if he does not continue to address his outstanding treatment needs and acknowledge his true level of risk.

Serious Offenders Review Council reports

113. In a report of the SORC dated 20 March 2023 prepared in consideration for the release of parole, the defendant’s participation and completion of the “Connect Program” was summarised as follows:

Inmate was an enthusiastic group member who participated in group-based activities. Inmate contributed generously to group discussion and shared personal experiences within the group. Inmate’s responses to questioning indicated a high level of understanding of the concepts presented in the in the program and demonstrated ability to apply these concepts to his own experience. Inmate committed to practice and allowed for making small changes using a small change diary each week. Inmate was motivated to learn and reinforced his learning by asking questions for clarification to ensure a high level of understanding. The inmate advised he took a lot from the course content in particular the importance of understanding the 3 mind states and reflected that wise mind is a balance of both emotional and logical minds. Inmate reinforced that “tomorrow is day one for the rest of his life”. Inmate was provided with certificate of completion and thanked facilitator for the last 10 sessions. Inmate shared that he was proud to have completed CONNECT.

114. This report also details the defendant’s engagement in the VOTP program. It includes a case note which reads as follows:

Inmate Loveridge has been engaged in the VOTP program since 28 March 2022. To date he has completed 154 hours and has 6 hours remaining until completion. Inmate Loveridge has completed all his core tasks to a high standard. Throughout the program he has engaged in group and maintained consistency with his level of participation. Inmate Loveridge has been open and transparent and cooperative with facilitators. He has been respectful and genuine and demonstrated a level of maturity and sincerity.

115. A pre-release report was prepared by Jonathan van de Bovenkamp, a Community Corrections officer, dated 9 March 2023, recommending against a parole order. Despite this, he recounted the courses completed by the defendant in custody and his employment history is set out. This includes being employed as a cleaner. The author of the report observes:

Mr Loveridge is not currently employed due to his allocation to HIPU. On several occasions his employment was disrupted due to being transferred to another Centre.

Records from multiple areas of employment reflect that during his employment he demonstrated a good work ethic, worked well in a team environment and engaged politely with staff and co-workers.

116. In a supplementary report dated 18 January 2024, the advice of SORC to the State Parole Authority included the following:

Mr Loveridge does not have any outstanding therapeutic programs and has since completed the Positive Lifestyles program and continues with VOTP Maintenance. He does not appear to have any mental health issues of concern were he to be released into the community and has been working with positive work reports.

…

In our Initial Report we had reflected upon the need for a good period of positive behaviour in minimum security, which he has now delivered for almost the last ten (10) months. We also note the Broken Hill CC Progress Report of 3 January 2024 records his compliant and good work behaviour finding he is suitable for community projects and around the CC grounds. We advise that his release to parole is necessary for his re integration and the protection of the public. We advise that his release to parole is appropriate.

OIMS notes

117. The Agreed Facts included a summary of relevant Offender Integrated Management System (“OIMS”) notes from the defendant’s time in custody and since his release on parole. They are notes taken by Corrections staff of interactions with offenders. They are commonly relied upon in applications for ESOs.

118. In his affidavit of 4 May 2026, the defendant’s solicitor, Mr Sant, observed the following about the OIMS notes:

I have spoken with Kieran, his partner, Jessica, and his mother, Michelle, in relation to various references and entries contained in the OIMS notes. It is clear to me from these enquiries that the OIMS notes contain numerous misrepresentations and references to matters which have been taken out of context. The various misrepresentations relate to matters including Kieran’s drug use, OMCG matters, and specific communications and interactions with Community Corrections and other supervising officers.

119. It is unclear what Mr Sant is referring to. A significant number of the OIMS notes were included in the Agreed Facts and I have proceeded on the basis that those at least are in fact “agreed”. I have not placed any significant weight on the OIMS notes which were not included in the Agreed Facts. Otherwise, I propose to proceed on the basis that what is asserted in the OIMS notes could be established at any final hearing.

120. I have included summaries of many of the OIMS notes which were already summarised in the Agreed Facts as they provide a helpful summary of the defendant’s response to supervision, particularly since his release on parole. They have been extracted chronologically.

OIMS notes (in custody)

121. During his time in custody, the defendant was questioned about his OMCG affiliations on multiple occasions. He reported that his OMCG association was historical and he “has done what he had to do at the time”. The defendant said that by keeping “club business as club business” the other members had nothing to hold over him, allowing him to exit without repercussion. Subsequently, in his exit interview prior to his release in April 2024, the defendant stated that he had managed to make a clean break from his former associations and expressed a desire to have his OMCG tattoos removed.

122. Various case notes also discuss the defendant’s employment in custody. As a wing painter in October 2023, he was reported to have brought a positive problem-solving attitude to solving painting issues or issues with other inmates. In April 2024, the defendant was working in the kitchen and was reported to have excellent working skills and to always be happy to help out with all kitchen duties.

123. Generally, the case notes from this period in custody speak to the defendant’s progress. In November 2023, following a VOTP maintenance and outreach session, the defendant discussed the impact and consequences of his offending and the heavy weight of unintentionally taking a life, expressing that he wanted to make something of his life such as mentoring youth. He also stated that his time in custody had allowed him to move away from drug and alcohol use. In February 2024, the defendant discussed his engagement with programs and he expressed a willingness to engage with any interventions deemed suitable by Community Corrections.

Mr Loveridge is released to parole on 19 April 2024

124. In its reasons for granting parole, the State Parole Authority observed the following:

… that risk [to the safety of the community is mitigated in the present case by this offender’s completion of the VOTP, some improvement in his custodial behaviour, his suitable post-release plans which incorporate stringent supervision and the implementation of suitable interventions in which the offender is willing to participate, and the additional conditions which the Authority proposes to impose.

… the evidence available to the Authority generally supports a conclusion that positive progress has been made by the offender in custody.

125. In addition to the standard conditions of parole (conditions 1 to 11), the defendant was made subject to the following conditions:

Condition 12: abstain from alcohol.

Condition 13: If directed, participate in VOTP maintenance.

Condition 14: No contact with victims and their families.

Condition 15: No contact with OMCG members or associates without express prior approval, and not to visit or frequent any “OMCG premises frequented by members and associates of OMCGs”.

Condition 16: Not to frequent or visit the LGA of Shoalhaven, City of Sydney and suburb of Neutral Bay.

126. The defendant was released on parole for the index offence on 19 April 2024.

127. Upon his release he went on to live with his partner, Jessica, who he met through his cousin when they were approximately 16 years old. Their relationship had developed while he was in custody. Upon his release he was employed as a painter.

OIMS notes 2024

128. During 2024, the defendant was reported to be in regular contact with a psychologist as part of his VOTP maintenance. Multiple appointments were recorded. For example, on 15 May 2024, the defendant’s psychologist informed a Community Corrections officer that the defendant was consistently engaging in his sessions with VOTP maintenance and he appeared to be managing well with his adjustment to the community, despite media attention and potential targeting. On 16 July 2024, the psychologist discussed with the defendant how well he was progressing and the positive feedback he had received. In the notes, the defendant also expressed his motivation to “start fresh”, gain employment and “prove people wrong” about him by avoiding reoffending.

129. The defendant was notified on 22 April 2024 that alcohol testing would be incorporated into his supervision. A breathalyser test was conducted on that date and the defendant had no alcohol in his system. On 21 May 2024, Jessica also confirmed that the defendant had not consumed alcohol since being released and had no concerns regarding cravings.

130. Following the defendant’s release to parole, there appeared to initially be some concerns about Jessica’s OMCG associations, particularly in May 2024 when the defendant wished to relocate to her address. It was advised that these affiliations were likely historical because it appeared that many of her associations were ex-partners. There was no record of Jessica visiting OMCG affiliates in custody since 2021.

131. Further, in April 2024, the defendant confirmed that he had an appointment to have his gang-related tattoos lasered off. It was also recorded that the defendant and Jessica had verbalised their intentions to separate from any OMCG affiliates. For example, in June 2024, the defendant once again explained that he did not have anything more to do with OMCG and just wanted to get on with his life.

132. On 21 May 2024, Jessica was reminded by a Community Corrections officer that any contact with OMCG affiliations would be likely to result in breach action. However, she stated that the defendant may continue those relationships, particularly in relation to his cousin’s partner, when his parole finished. Indeed, on 4 July 2024, the defendant requested approval to associate with his cousin’s partner, who is an ex-Lone Wolf member. The defendant said that he and the other man would sign statutory declarations and submit to police to ensure that they were no longer classified as active OMCG members. The defendant also showed the officer the laser removal of his tattoos.

133. On 8 May 2024, Jessica told an officer that the defendant had been followed by the media and they had published a photo of him having lunch with his nieces.

134. On 21 November 2024, the defendant’s curfew was removed. This decision was noted to have been based on the defendant’s ongoing compliance with supervision, his engagement with VOTP and his employment.

Progress Report to the State Parole Authority dated 28 June 2024

135. Community Corrections provided this report to the State Parole Authority in relation to the defendant’s response to supervision while on parole.

136. The advice and comments of Community Corrections included the following:

Mr Loveridge’s current offending risk factors are Aggression/Violence, Alcohol and Impulsive Personality. The initial case plan steps being implemented to assist Mr Loveridge in addressing his risk factors involve maintaining engagement with VOTP Maintenance, fortnightly reporting, engaging with a community-based Psychologist and seeking employment. Mr Loveridge’s response to his supervision since his release would be described as satisfactory. He has maintained reporting obligations and acknowledges his responsibilities towards his Parole conditions.

Mr Loveridge has had contact with Police via the Raptor Squad and Community Corrections were informed that he was issued a FPO and WPO. No information was received in regard to him associating with OMCG’s and he informed both Police and Community Corrections he is in the process of removing his OMCG tattoos.

It is recommended that Mr Loveridge be provided the opportunity to continue to address his risk factors within the community and that his current parole conditions appear to be sufficient to manage the risk factors.

Events in 2025

137. The supporting information did not include details of when Mr Loveridge’s son was born but it would appear to be in March or April 2025. As will be discussed further below, the birth of his child triggered “something bittersweet” in light of his offending and made him feel not “worthy being a father”.

138. Nor did the supporting information clearly describe the cessation of Mr Loveridge’s employment. It was submitted during the hearing that he was employed as a painter, but his employer received a job offer to work on an oil rig and was no longer able to provide employment for Mr Loveridge. It is unclear from the documentation precisely when that was, but it would appear to have been in early 2025.

139. Overall, between June to December 2025, the defendant returned positive drug swipes on two occasions and reported to Community Corrections in a drug affected state on other occasions. He disclosed cocaine, ice and heroin use.

OIMS notes in Agreed Facts 2025

June-July 2025

140. On 12 June 2025, during a home visit, the defendant disclosed prior to a drug swipe that he had used cocaine. He later described this as a “once off” only. The defendant attributed his use to the impact that the birth of his son had on his mental health and the reality of his index offending. He also referred to resentment towards his mother for addressing her addiction issues to benefit his son (her grandson) when she had not addressed them during his childhood.

141. The defendant was referred to a specialist service to address disclosures concerning childhood issues. He was provided with a formal direction to immediately cease all illicit substance use.

142. On 30 June, a drug wipe showed a faint positive result for both benzodiazepines and methamphetamine. The defendant admitted to using cocaine regularly. He also admitted to using unprescribed Valium to help him manage his relationship with Jessica. However, he denied ice use.

143. Following this positive drug wipe, the defendant had his curfew reimposed and he was directed to attend drug and alcohol (“AOD”) counselling. Drug tests on 7 and 14 July returned a negative result.

144. In a breach report dated 15 July 2024, Community Corrections recommended that only a warning be issued instead of any breach action because the defendant appeared “to be making significant progress in returning to a pro-social lifestyle in the community”.

145. During this period, the defendant reported conflicts in his relationship with Jessica which he felt “were further attributing [sic] to his current behaviours”. He requested to stay with his mother and also stayed at hotels on a few occasions.

August-December 2025

146. The defendant returned negative drug wipes on 7 August and 19 August 2025. He also reported that he was attending drug and alcohol counselling at Marrin Weejali (an Indigenous AOD service) and appointments with a psychologist. However, in early September, a representative from Marrin Weejali informed Corrective Services that he had in fact not been attending the services on some of the dates he claimed. On 9 September, the defendant admitted to ongoing ice use. He subsequently disclosed heroin use in late September. Representatives from Marrin Weejali and the defendant’s mother and partner reported an escalation in his behaviour during this period.

147. Plans were made for the defendant to complete a detoxification program at Nepean Hospital. There was a significant delay because the earliest admission date was 8 October.

148. On 13 October, the defendant self-discharged from detox. He reported that the clinic offered a Suboxone program for support but he declined to participate in this program because he wanted to manage his cravings without medical support. The defendant was verbally directed to engage in detox and rehabilitation if he continued to fail drug wipes and to engage with his AOD service provider for additional support.

149. Due to his erratic behaviour, neither the defendant’s mother nor his partner wanted him to reside with them.

150. On 14 October 2025, a drug wipe was negative. The defendant was again directed to engage with his AOD service provider for support. However, on 27 October, the defendant’s AOD counsellor confirmed that the defendant had failed to engage in counselling as scheduled for the previous week and had not started programs.

151. On 28 October, a drug wipe displayed a trace amount for opiates. Mr Loveridge denied using them and blamed his use of Valium. Another drug wipe was conducted and the results were inconclusive for opiates. The defendant was provided with a formal direction to engage with his AOD counsellor, his psychologist and to actively look for employment.

152. It was around this time that Jessica disclosed that the defendant knew how to “dodge” drug wipes. He had masked drug use by using an off-market substance in his car.

153. On 4 November, a drug wipe was not performed because the defendant appeared drug affected due to glazed over and blood shot eyes. The defendant did not deny drug use on this occasion and verbalised that he was struggling with addiction. Marrin Weejali confirmed that he had not contacted the service. The defendant’s psychologist also subsequently confirmed that he had not engaged since September.

154. On 20 November, the defendant reported self-detoxing from illicit substances and stated that his body was going through withdrawals. The defendant said that he had abstained from alcohol due to parole conditions but his addiction had escalated to heroin use.

155. On 26 November, the defendant returned a negative drug wipe. However, the defendant’s counsellor from Marrin Weejali informed Community Corrections that he had failed to attend his appointments on three occasions and had consequently been discharged from their service.

156. On 2 December, the defendant presented looking clear eyed and focused. He confirmed his abstinence from drugs. The defendant confirmed he was getting his mental health care plan that day and that he had an appointment to re-engage with psychological intervention. The officer commended the defendant on his progress.

157. The defendant was detected in officer exclusion zones on seven occasions and failed to adhere to his curfew time of 10pm on eight occasions across October and November 2025.

158. In a breach report dated 2 December 2025, Community Corrections recommended that a caution be issued.

159. On 9 December 2025, a home visit was conducted. The defendant appeared to be under the influence but denied recent use. Jessica told officers that the defendant’s behaviour was escalating on heroin and ice. He had also been sleeping in his car in the basement car park of the residence.

160. In a breach report dated 9 December 2025, Community Corrections recommended that the parole order conditions be varied to require engagement in detox and rehabilitation through the Who’s Hub Penrith.

Events on 22 December 2025

161. At about 1:00am on 22 December 2025, police attended the defendant’s home in Penrith where he, Jessica, and their 9-month-old child resided. Police had been called by neighbours. At that time, the defendant and Jessica were preparing for a trip to Coffs Harbour later that morning.

162. Police observed blood on Jessica’s lower lip and neck which caused it to bleed onto her shirt. Jessica advised police that the injury happened as she was mopping the residence. She said that no argument occurred and did not provide a statement to police.

163. The defendant told police that there had been an argument but declined to provide any further details. Police placed the defendant under arrest and cautioned him. The defendant was conveyed to Penrith Police Station.

164. Police later discontinued the arrest and gave the defendant a direction to remain at another location while an ADVO was applied for. The conditions of the ADVO included a condition that the defendant not approach Jessica or contact her in any way (subject to limited exceptions).

165. On 22 December 2025, at about 10:45am, police were notified by Community Corrections that the defendant was at Sydney Domestic Airport and that he was in the company of a woman matching the description of Jessica. Police approached the defendant and arrested him. The defendant stated he was at the airport to retrieve the charger for his electronic monitoring device from Jessica.

166. On 3 March 2026, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to a charge of contravening a prohibition or restriction in an ADVO (contact only). The defendant was convicted without the imposition of any other penalty.

167. The charges of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and common assault were withdrawn and dismissed on 3 March 2026.

OIMS notes after 22 December 2025

168. Following the events on 22 December 2025, the defendant stated that he had no idea why police were called. When questioned about the injury to Jessica’s lip, he stated, “you’ll have to ask her”. He claimed he was not with Jessica and was instead with a friend, who spoke with the officer and confirmed he was travelling with the defendant.

169. On 23 December 2025, the defendant’s psychologist advised that he had not attended any scheduled sessions since 19 September despite multiple attempts to reengage him. The defendant was consequently discharged from ongoing psychological case management.

170. In a breach report dated 30 December, Community Corrections recommended that the parole order be revoked due to the defendant’s ongoing non-compliance with intervention and the recent alleged offences. The report stated that despite repeated verbal and written directions, the defendant failed to engage in required interventions aimed at addressing escalating behaviour, and that his ongoing refusal to comply had been accompanied by “a marked increase in aggressive conduct” (the details of which were not specified).

171. On 28 January 2026, the State Parole Authority revoked the defendant’s parole due to the outstanding charges (which were ultimately withdrawn on 3 March 2026), and the fact that he was bail refused.

172. On 4 March 2026, when asked about his drug use, the defendant explained that after his son was born he felt guilty for being so happy when there was a family that were suffering because he had taken their son’s life. He had resorted to drugs to cope with the guilt. When discussing intervention upon his release, the defendant said that he was prepared to re-engage with Marrin Weejali, VOTP maintenance and accepted a referral to the Corrective Services NSW Aboriginal Community Engagement and Culture Officer.

173. On 6 March 2026, the State Parole Authority rescinded the revocation of parole. The reasons given were that the outstanding charges had been dealt with without the imposition of a custodial sentence and the availability of rehabilitation interventions upon release. The defendant was ordered to be released no later than 7 March 2026.

OIMS notes after release from custody on 6 March 2026

174. On 9 March 2026, a drug wipe returned a negative result. However, on 25 March 2026, drugs were detected including Valium, Methylamphetamine, Amphetamine, 6-Acetyl morphine and Morphine. Upon advising of these results, the defendant became defensive and stated that he had only used Tramadol for a leg injury and cough medicine.

175. On 26 March, the defendant was issued with two non-association directions in relation to individuals with OMCG affiliations who lived at addresses he had been frequenting.

176. On 27 March, after failing to provide evidence of his Tramadol prescription as requested, the defendant accepted that he had been using Tramadol and Valium that had not been prescribed. The defendant admitted, when asked, to having used drugs on eight occasions since his release. A drug test was collected.

177. During this appointment, the defendant repeated that he “had lost his family and his son” when asked the status of his relationship with Jessica.

178. Subsequent OIMS notes and other records indicate that the defendant has continued to disclose drug use and report positive drug wipes collected on 2, 17, 23 and 30 April 2026. At the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff tendered a certificate of analysis following a drug test on 30 April 2026 which detected Morphine, 6-Acetyl morphine, Amphetamine and Methylamphetamine.

179. The defendant entered detoxification at Nepean Hospital on 5 May 2026. The defendant has expressed a willingness to enter residential rehabilitation thereafter.

The final ADVO

180. On 7 April 2026, the defendant agreed to a final ADVO, on a “without admissions” basis, for two years. The final ADVO includes the standard condition 1 (preventing, inter alia, assaulting or threatening the protected persons) and condition 10 (preventing possession of firearms or prohibited weapons). The ADVO does not prevent the defendant from seeing Jessica or his son.

181. As to the withdrawn charges of assault, Jessica made a statement to police dated 14 January 2026. In that statement, she states that the cut on her lip was not caused by the defendant and that she did not make a complaint about any injury to her neck.

182. In her affidavit of 4 May 2026, Jessica also stated:

Whilst I am very disappointed in Kieran for turning to drugs as a way to cope with his immense guilt and shame, I have never observed him to display signs of aggression or violence. I have seen Kieran affected by drugs on many occasions and he has never become violent or aggressive in any way during these times. (Emphasis added.)

Remaining mandatory considerations in s 9(3) of the Act

183. I have already summarised the supporting material which addresses s 9(3)(e), (e1), (e2), (f), (h) and (h1) above.

184. The remaining relevant mandatory considerations in s 9(3) are ss 9(3)(c), (d) and (d1) of the Act which are all directed at expert evidence about risk assessment and management.

185. Section 6(3)(b) of the Act provides that an application for an ESO must be supported by a report (prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner) that assesses the likelihood of the offender committing a serious offence. Such a report is known as a Risk Assessment Report (“RAR”). On 27 February 2026, Dr Parker, a Senior Psychologist, prepared a RAR.

186. By virtue of s 9(3)(c) of the Act, it is a mandatory consideration to consider the results of “any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such assessment”.

187. In addition to Dr Parker’s RAR, Mr Loveridge relied upon the report of Dr Kerri Eagle dated 1 May 2026. Dr Eagle is an experienced Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, who regularly prepares reports for both the State and defendants in proceedings under the Act. I will address the question of how I can have regard to Dr Eagle’s report in my consideration below.

188. A further mandatory consideration is to be found in s 9(3)(d), namely, the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further serious offence.

189. Dr Parker conducted risk assessments within the meaning of s 9(3)(d) of the Act, as did Dr Eagle.

190. Although the assessment for this preliminary hearing is based on all of the supporting documentation, the Court usually places significant weight on the expert evidence about potential risk in applications of this nature.

Risk assessment report of Dr Richard Parker dated 27 February 2026

191. Dr Parker noted that Mr Loveridge attended his RAR appointment and was polite and cordial. However, he told Dr Parker that he did not wish to participate in the interview, as “he did not believe he would get an ESO”. Consequently, the RAR was based upon “file review alone”.

192. Dr Parker identified the various limitations of actuarial risk assessment instructions, including that they adopt a broader definition of recidivism than the definition of “serious offence” in the Act. In other words, the tools assess the risk for violent offending generally and are not directed at the statutory definition of a “serious violence offence”.

193. Dr Parker prepared his report at a time after Mr Loveridge had been charged with the 22 December 2025 offences but before they had been withdrawn by police. In his executive summary and outline of the defendant’s criminal history, Dr Parker referred to those then outstanding charges.

194. As for Mr Loveridge’s initial progress following release from custody, Dr Parker observed:

When he was initially released from custody, he appeared to be on a positive trajectory, gaining work and building a relationship. However, after about a year he fell into drug use, which quickly developed into a serious addiction. This deterioration and charges for assaulting his partner have seen him returned to custody.

195. While observing that the defendant had “expressed appropriate remorse” for his offending, Dr Parker observed that this remorse had not been sufficient to deter him from further substance abuse and “unprovoked attacks on others”.

196. Dr Parker assessed the defendant’s risk of future offending using both the Violent Risk Appraisal Guide – Revised (“VRAG-R”) and the VRS (described above at [104]). There was some dispute as between Dr Parker and Dr Eagle as to the nature of these tests that I will address below

197. Using the VRAG-R guide, Dr Parker assessed Mr Loveridge as falling within the highest of nine “bins” by receiving a score of 27. This is equal to or higher than the score of 91% of the construction sample. Dr Parker noted that this would classify the defendant as “high risk” compared to other serious violent offenders. 76% of violent offenders with a similar score reoffend violently within five years, and 87% within twelve years.

198. Using the VRS tool Dr Parker assessed Mr Loveridge as scoring 54. He was classified as being “above average” risk. Dr Parker stated that this is similar to a group of offenders who had a violent recidivism rate of 29.3% after three years, and 44.7% after five years. His score was higher than 69.3% of offenders in the development cohort.

199. Dr Parker observed the following as to the two functions of this risk assessment:

A balanced proposition is that SPJ [structured professional judgment] tools are most helpful for managing risk, by alerting staff to the factors thought to be significant for each individual, but that actuarial tools are best for assessing the level of that risk (Oliver & Wong, 2019). Ultimately, there are two separate, but related functions of risk assessment: prediction and management. It would appear that the former is best served by actuarial instruments and the latter by SPJ and/or case formulation. Ogloff and Davis (2020, p. 87) concluded: “It would seem that the prediction model is the better fit for the evaluation of offenders, subject to post-sentence detention legislation”.

200. Under the heading “Criminogenic factors”, Dr Parker identified the following factors:

i. Normalisation of violence: This is the idea that violence is a normal (acceptable) means of solving problems. Mr Loveridge has used violence in a number of different contexts – instrumentally to achieve certain goals (such as the assault on an OMCG member to get out of a dangerous pod), as emotional expression (such as the index serious violence offences), and as a means of expressing dominance (such as the gatecrashing offence). It appears that he sees violence as a normal, unavoidable, part of life;

ii. I am the Law: This is essentially a rejection of society’s role in setting laws – the offender decides, for himself, which laws he will follow. This also appears to be a problem for Mr Loveridge, as evidenced by his numerous institutional misconducts and his chaotic behaviour under community supervision;

iii. Beat or be Beaten: Similar to other conceptions such as Dangerous World (Ward, 2000), this is the idea that the world is a hostile place and that survival depends upon being hyper-alert for potential threats and dealing with these severely, including pre-emptive violence. The assault on the other OMCG member is a clear example of this theme. This suggests this particular implicit theory is a significant contributor to his violence.

iv. I get out of Control: This involves a belief that, at times, one’s actions are outside one’s own control. This can function as a permission-giving statement, especially in the presence of disinhibiting substances. It is possible that Mr Loveridge subscribes to this implicit theory, but it might only be activated in certain situations, such as when he is under the influence of drugs, or perceives himself to be in danger.

201. Under the heading “Responsivity Issues”, Dr Parker opined:

The persistence of Mr Loveridge’s offending, over so many decades, and after substantial criminal penalties and psychological interventions, raises the question as to why he has not been able to desist from offending. Research indicates that desistance is the normal course of events for offenders (McGuire, 2025) which means that persistence requires some explanation.

…

Shame is a powerful, unpleasant emotion, and people are motivated to resolve unpleasant emotions (Tomkins, 2008). Faced with the ongoing, experience of shame, Mr Loveridge will naturally look for ways to escape that pain – even if those strategies only provide temporary relief. Consequently, a retreat into a comfortable fantasy (avoidance – through substance abuse) distracts him from the reality of his existence – even as it paves the way for the next offence.

(Emphasis added.)

202. Dr Parker identified some of the contextual stressors surrounding the defendant’s index offending as follows:

It appears likely that he was gradually building up a chronic sense of anger at the world through this period, and that this anger was given freer expression when he was under the influence of alcohol, as evidenced by his violence prior to the index serious offence. A combination of events appears to have led to the anger he felt on the night of the index serious violence offences. The death of his uncle some time prior may have been resurrected by news of a contract to play football; a good friend who had been in a coma (from a motorcycle accident that Mr Loveridge witnessed) had awoken from that coma on the day of the offences; his partner had apparently miscarried a few weeks prior; and his friends were encouraging him to go out an [sic] celebrate.

203. Dr Parker noted that as result of the index offences, the defendant gained considerable notoriety and it is likely that this exacerbated the underlying “shame-proneness” he had already developed. His time in custody appeared to have reinforced this “beat or be beaten” script.

204. An important part of any RAR is the expert’s opinion as to what the risk scenario for the defendant committing a serious violence offence would be. Dr Parker considered that the most likely risk scenario for future violent offending would involve factors such as escalating drug use or the defendant spending more time with antisocial individuals who also abuse substances. Dr Parker noted that this will likely involve the commission of other crimes, such as drug dealing or offences of dishonesty.

205. The only portion of Dr Parker’s report which dealt with his risk of committing a further serious violence offence (as opposed to an offence of violence per se) was at [76] as follows:

In this scenario, violence is likely to be unplanned. His substance abuse will weaken any internal constraints to violence, whilst simultaneously fuelling his experience of, and expression of, his anger. Given the lack of evidence he has used weapons, this would most likely fall short of a serious offence. However, as with the serious violence index offence, it could nevertheless escalate to that level. The difference between serious and lower levels of violence would, most likely, not be the result of a considered decision, rather it would be an interplay between Mr Loveridge’s mood, and random environmental considerations, such as the actions of the victim and/or any bystanders. The index serious violence offence is an example of the random nature of the consequences, as four victims escaped with nil or minor injuries whereas one lost his life. The difference in these situations is basically unpredictable …

(Emphasis added.)

206. Dr Parker continued:

To adapt to a law-abiding lifestyle, Mr Loveridge will need to find ways to think that make the use of violence totally unacceptable and have practiced that new thinking so he can use it in situations involving heightened emotional states. This will require him changing his views about the acceptability of violence and the contributing role of substance-abuse. To achieve this, he will need to have developed a sense of self that his [sic] not shame-infused. (Emphasis added.)

207. Dr Parker described the defendant’s risk as follows:

He is assessed as well above average risk of committing further violent offences. His behaviour, whilst under supervision, suggests that the thinking patterns that fuelled his violence in the past are still active. Similarly, his escalating substance abuse suggests he has a number of unresolved issues, that would impede an adaptation to a law-abiding lifestyle. (Emphasis added.)

208. Dr Parker ultimately opined that the defendant was:

… assessed as high risk for further violent offending on a number of actuarial instruments which have been validated for that purpose. To reduce his risk of future violence, he will need to resolve the thinking patterns that fuel this, and his substance abuse, develop a range of prosocial associates, and disassociate himself from antisocial associates. (Emphasis added.)

Report of Dr Kerri Eagle dated 1 May 2026

209. Dr Eagle conducted a two-hour in-person clinical assessment of the defendant on 26 April 2026. Unlike Dr Parker, she prepared her report after the 22 December 2025 charges had been withdrawn and he had been released on parole again.

210. Dr Eagle opined that Mr Loveridge did not satisfy criteria for a major mental illness, such as a psychotic disorder, or major mood disturbance. She acknowledged that he has a history of exposure to traumatic events, including serious childhood trauma and dysfunction. Dr Eagle also observed that:

His childhood trauma and social disadvantage have been compounded by the circumstances of the Index Offences which have clearly been traumatic and resulted in prolonged institutionalization from an age which is developmentally significant in terms of emotional and relational maturation.

211. Dr Eagle opined that the defendant has a substance use disorder, involving the use of amphetamines and opioid substances. She described his substance abuse as follows:

He has previously engaged in the problematic use of alcohol, but has been abstinent from alcohol since his release. His use of illicit substances appears to have occurred in the context of psychosocial stressors, including the birth of his son and general community adjustment after a prolonged period of incarceration. He has attempted to control his use by engaging in drug and alcohol programs. It appears he has successfully minimized and avoided his drug use at times, but has again relapsed. He has described signs of opioid physical dependence and withdrawal. He will require professional support to overcome his substance use disorder.

212. Dr Eagle observed that the defendant has engaged in anti-social behaviours since adolescence, including oppositional behaviours at school, associating with antisocial peers and criminal offending. However, she noted that he has also demonstrated positive behaviours including a capacity to work and study from adolescence and continuing during incarceration, an ability to develop close relationships with orders and a willingness to engage in and benefit from psychologist’s programs.

213. Dr Eagle conducted a risk assessment based on a structured professional judgment approach, together with the HCR 20 (Version 3). The HCR 20 is a structural professional judgment tool that aims to formulate an individual’s violence risk based on empirically derived historical, clinical and risk management factors.

214. Dr Eagle noted the following under the heading “Historical Factors”:

Mr Loveridge has a history of problems with:

a. Violence: a history of violent offending predating and following the Index Offences involving strangers and authority figures (police), in custody and in the community.

b. Other antisocial behaviour: association with gangs, car theft, offending onset during adolescence.

c. Substance use: problematic alcohol abuse, substance use disorder involving illicit substances and resulting in problematic behaviours.

d. Traumatic experiences: exposure to childhood … abuse, witnessed domestic violence, traumatic experiences during incarceration.

e. Violent attitudes: violent attitudes evident in the context of violent offences including the Index Offences, gang involvement.

f. Treatment or supervision response: breaches of conditional release, disciplinary sanctions in custody.

He has consistently sustained employment, even during incarceration and has been described as a positive, hard working employee and good team member. He is currently unemployed, but describes having another work prospect. Prolonged unemployment would be considered a risk factor. He has sustained relationships, including a four year intimate relationship with his current wife. Allegations of domestic violence have not been substantiated. He has a supportive family, despite having experienced early childhood family dysfunction and trauma.

215. Under the heading “Clinical Factors”, Dr Eagle stated:

Mr Loveridge has had recent problems with:

a. Instability: Mr Loveridge has recently relapsed into substance use, causing emotional instability.

b. Treatment or supervision response: Breaches of parole and supervision, and lack of response to existing programs, although notably there have been reported barriers to accessing appropriate programs.

Mr Loveridge has demonstrated insight into his offending behaviour substance use and psychological vulnerabilities along with a motivation to engage in programs, and has previously benefited from engaging in therapeutic programs. There appears to be no information to suggest violent attitudes over the last 6 months, or symptoms of a major mental illness.

(Emphasis added.)

216. Dr Eagle’s report included the following under the heading “Risk Management Factors”:

Mr Loveridge will likely have the following future problems with risk management:

a. Treatment or supervision response: Mr Loveridge has had a relapse of substance use, since his release in March 2026 and despite having engaged in AOD programs. He has been reported to have disengaged from programs during his parole period. He needs to demonstrate a sustained commitment to engaging with treatment providers to ensure he can achieve a sustained recovery of his substance use disorder.

b. Stress or coping: Mr Loveridge acknowledges that he has had difficulty coping with stress and this had led to a relapse into substance use. On the other hand, he appears to have insight into these difficulties and a willingness to engage with appropriate treatment programs.

Mr Loveridge has access to appropriate professional services and plans to meet his needs, including AOD programs and private psychological services. He has previously benefited from therapeutic programs. It can be expected he would benefit in future.

He has experienced a significant change in circumstances after a period of extended institutionalization over the past 2 years and problems with adjustment are to be expected. He has meaningful personal supports through his wife, who believes in him, his mother, mother in law, sister and father. He has access to a stable home with his family.

(Emphasis added.)

217. Under the heading “Protective Factors”, Dr Eagle stated the following:

Mr Loveridge demonstrates the following protective factors: Internal - empathy (he has consistency shown the capacity for empathy towards his victims since the Index Offences); Motivational - work (consistent work history demonstrated in custody and for 12 months following release); a motivation for treatment (willingness to enter treatment programs, and the ability to benefit from programs); life goals; External factors – social network; intimate relationship (having a partner who supports and believes in him); access to professional care (AOD programs); and living circumstances (access to stable accommodation).

218. Under the heading “Risk Formulation”, Dr Eagle states the following:

Mr Loveridge has demonstrated ongoing problems with self-esteem and coping, since his release, that have manifested in a substance use disorder. He needs access to appropriate drug and alcohol detoxification and rehabilitation programs to address his substance use disorder and appears to be scheduled to enter a detox facility on 5 May 2026. On the other hand, he has a number of protective factors mitigating his risk of violence including his wife and family; his motivation to work; and meaningful life goals. It is not unexpected that after a significant period of institutionalisation, since 18 years of age, that Mr Loveridge would find it challenging to re-integrate into the community. Despite that he appeared to demonstrate the capacity to successfully re-integrate for at least a year following his initial release, including sustain work and maintain relationships with his family. Mr Loveridge would benefit from ongoing access to clinical programs, including drug and alcohol programs, and following a period of abstinence he may benefit from longer term psychological support through a private or public psychologist to address psychological vulnerabilities.

Future scenarios of elevated violence risk relating to Mr Loveridge, given the nature of prior offending, would include association with pro-criminal or anti-social peers, and a relapse into alcohol intoxication. He would be susceptible to this in circumstances where, for instance, his social network and/or relationship broke down; and/or he experienced longer term unemployment. Persistent illicit substance use would also make him susceptible to associating with pro-criminal peers. Future violence would be expected to continue in a similar pattern to previous episodes of violence and include violence in the context of a group of friends and/or while intoxicated with alcohol. Violence in those circumstances may be directed at strangers or others proximate and/or who are perceived as antagonistic.

Overall, Mr Loveridge has some persistent clinical and risk management factors associated with violence, but these appear to be significantly mitigated by protective factors including his own motivation to address his substance use, his supportive wife, his capacity to work, his life goals and his family.

(Emphasis added.)

219. As to the utility of risk assessment tools, Dr Eagle observed:

It should be noted that there are limitations with all risk assessment tools, which are mitigated by having an understanding of those limitations and information from the tools that can be reasonably relied upon in different contexts. The tools do not consider specifically the risk of a “serious violence offence.” However, the tool applies to all violence as defined and the term is defined broadly and includes a serious violence offence.

220. Dr Eagle ultimately opined:

I am of the view that although Mr Loveridge has some persistent clinical and risk management factors associated with the risk of future violence, these are significantly mitigated by protective factors.

221. Dr Eagle was asked to comment on whether she agreed or disagreed with the opinions expressed in Dr Parker’s RAR. While she was “unable to comment on the results of Dr Parker’s risk assessment”, Dr Eagle noted a number of limitations with Dr Parker’s risk assessment as follows:

- Dr Parker was unable to conduct a clinical assessment of Mr Loveridge. The VRAG R and VRS risk assessment tools are both designed to be completed on the basis of a clinical assessment in additional to collateral information. The lack of a clinical assessment significantly limits the reliability of Dr Parker’s conclusions, particularly in the context of dynamic (changeable) risk factors.

- Notably, in particular the VRS (Wang and Gordon 2023) is a structured professional judgement tool that requires a structured clinical assessment to assess dynamic items.

- Actuarial tools are limited in their utility, in my view – as discussed above, in determining what risk management strategies, including conditions and/or supervision, are likely to be effective in managing risk in future for individuals.

Supplementary report of Dr Richard Parker dated 5 May 2026

222. Dr Parker was requested to prepare a supplementary RAR dated 5 May 2026 in order to respond to Dr Eagle’s report and comment on the VOTP completion report which was previously unavailable. Dr Parker confirmed that after reviewing these documents, his opinions remain unchanged.

223. Dr Parker described Dr Eagle’s comment that the VRAG-R and VRS are designed to be completed on the basis of a clinical assessment as “inaccurate”, noting that the VRAG-R was “specifically designed to be scored by file review alone”. With respect to the VRS, Dr Parker observed:

The manual (Wong & Gordon, 2023, p. 25) note: “Unless there are exceptional circumstances, interview the individual prior to completing VRS risk and SOC ratings”. I would argue that the extensive material available through s.25 materials and the circumstances surrounding applications under the Act would easily qualify as “exceptional”, given the routine nature that tools such as the VRS were designed for.

Additionally, Dr Eagle refers to the VRS as a structured professional judgment tool (SPJ). This is incorrect as the VRS is an actuarial instrument. The difference between the two is that, while each item is scored, in an SPJ, the assessor does not simply add the item scores together, rather they apply their clinical judgement to come up with an overall rating (Ogloff & Davis, 2020). In contrast, actuarial tools, such as the VRS, have explicit rules for calculating the final score and, hence, the risk rating.

224. Dr Parker was asked to comment on the significance of the index offence being listed as “Assault OABH, 22/12/2025” on the scoresheet for the administration of the VRAG-R and was informed that this offence had been withdrawn. His response was:

In the VRAG-R, the index offence is defined as: “… the offense or behaviour (emphasis added) that led to the current assessment or institutionalization, whether violent or not” (Harris, Rice, Quinsey, & Cormier, 2015, p. 301). Throughout the VRAG-R guidelines, charges are treated as equivalent to convictions. Consequently, this charge is the appropriate index offence for scoring the VRAG-R.

225. Dr Parker did not explain why the provision of the VOTP completion report had no impact on his conclusion.

Risk management

226. The final mandatory consideration to address is s 9(3)(d1) of the Act: “any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community”.

227. A RMR is usually filed with an application for an ESO prepared by an employee of Corrective Services NSW. Such a RMR was prepared by Vicki McCarthy, the Team Leader of the ESO Team at Corrective Services NSW, dated 24 March 2026.

228. Ms McCarthy stated an assessment was undertaken on 13 July 2025 using the Level of Service Inventory – Revised (LSI-R) which found that the defendant fell into the “Medium/High risk” for general re-offending.

229. Ms McCarthy referred to Mr Loveridge’s fifteen institutional offences incurred in custody between 2013 and 2024. In Ms McCarthy’s opinion, the records reflected that the defendant’s behaviour in custody was poor.

230. Ms McCarthy stated that upon the defendant’s release to parole his response to supervision was viewed as positive. He attended appointments as scheduled and settled into stable accommodation with his partner. He was engaged in sessions with a private psychologist in addition to engaging well with VOTP maintenance. The defendant commenced employment and was attending TAFE where he was working toward his trade certificate in painting and decorating. He and his partner were expecting their first child in March 2025.

231. Ms McCarthy stated following the birth of his son, the defendant’s behaviour began to deteriorate. He missed several appointments with his supervising officer, disengaged with his private psychologist and was detected at a residence with OMCG associations. On 12 June 2025, the defendant admitted to using drugs and on 30 June 2025 tested positive for drugs. On 30 June 2025, he admitted to cocaine use to the point he burnt a hole in his nostril.

232. Since 6 March 2026 when the defendant’s revocation of parole was rescinded, the defendant had been supervised by the ESO Team. Ms McCarthy stated that:

… whilst he presents in a pleasant and polite manner his responses during discussions appear staged and rehearsed. He accepts minimal responsibility for his actions following his initial release on 19 April 2024, apportions blame onto CSNSW for him “not being reintegrated properly” … minimises his behaviour in custody and his intent during interviews appears to be primarily focussed on attempting to impress those interviewing him. (Emphasis in original.)

233. Ms McCarthy stated that the defendant had expressed a willingness to engage in AOD counselling with the Marrin Weejali Corporation. He had also agreed to re-engage with a community-based psychologist, to participate in sessions with VOTP maintenance and to accept cultural support from the Corrective Services NSW Aboriginal Community Engagement and Culture Officer.

Parties’ submissions

234. Both senior counsel for the State, Mr El-Hage, and senior counsel for Mr Loveridge, Ms Edwards, provided detailed written submissions. Ms Edwards in particular supplemented her submissions with lengthy oral submissions. I will address some of them in my consideration below but, briefly, the parties’ positions can be summarised as follows.

The State’s submissions

235. The State submitted that this Court would be satisfied to a high degree of probability that there is an unacceptable risk of the defendant committing a further serious offence for two primary reasons.

236. First, while accepting that the index offence was impulsive and that the defendant did not intend to cause the victim’s death, the State submitted that the consequences of the index offending were nonetheless the most serious possible. The State also pointed to evidence in the supporting material said to suggest that there is a high likelihood of the defendant committing future acts of violence of the same kind as the index offending, namely assaults to the head of a victim. It was emphasised that the index offence of manslaughter was only one of a series of acts of violence committed on the same night, which also involved assaults to the head of the victim. The State also relied on the two offences in custody which involved punches to the victims’ heads.

237. Secondly, the State pointed to the defendant’s recent deterioration on parole and his relapse into significant drug use. While acknowledging the defendant’s recent admission to a detoxification facility, it was submitted that how the defendant will respond to this treatment and continue to engage in drug rehabilitation in the absence of supervision is unknown. The recent abuse of illicit drugs was also said to increase exposure to anti-social contacts.

238. The State ultimately accepted that the most likely outcome is that any future violent offending will not amount to a serious violence offence. However, it was submitted that the potential consequences of such an offence are sufficiently grave as to justify a finding that the risk is unacceptable.

239. During the preliminary hearing, I raised with Mr El-Hage the fact that Dr Parker’s opinion was that any future violent offence would “most likely fall short of a serious offence” (emphasis in original). His submissions in response were as follows:

… your Honour is considering not only whether the risk of future offending is a risk of committing a serious offence, your Honour is considering the gravity of any such offending, having regard to the risk of future offending in the way that the case is, say, it should be considered.

In other words, … your Honour would not automatically reach the conclusion that the threshold has not been met because Dr Parker has not given an opinion that there is a high risk of the defendant committing a serious violence offence. Rather, your Honour would take into account … his opinion that there is a high risk of a violence offence being committed.

The … conclusion, or at least the inference that emerges from the material that at least the potentiality for such offending to be of a grave nature, and we would say the combination of those things, would lead you to be satisfied of the unacceptable criteria.

The defendant’s submissions

240. Senior counsel for the defendant took issue with the State’s characterisation of the defendant’s risk of violent offending described above. Ms Edwards addressed it in this way:

The submission appears to be he might hit someone in the head and while that probably wouldn’t amount to a serious offence if that person falls badly or dies or is grievously injured then it could be a serious offence and that risk is unacceptable. Our submission is even on its face this case falls into the category of a series of decisions of this Court where there has been a sharp and deliberate distinction drawn between the risk of some offence, even future violent offending and the unacceptable risk of a very specific defined type of offence nominated in the act.

241. It was further submitted that the unacceptable risk asserted by the State was not borne out in the supporting material. Based on that material, the defendant’s ultimate submission was that while the defendant may pose some risk of future offending because of his criminal history and ongoing drug use, these risks are sufficiently mitigated by the presence of protective factors, including his relationships with his supportive partner and family and his work ethic and motivation demonstrated by his successful first year on parole.

242. The defendant relied on the following factors in the supporting material:

243. Dr Parker’s RAR was said to have serious limitations;

244. The index offending when the defendant was 18 years old is the only serious violence offence committed by him. This offence was committed almost 14 years ago, and the defendant did not intend its tragic consequences;

245. The defendant only committed two violent offences in custody over his lengthy sentence. One of these offences was provoked by the “exceptional circumstances” of being placed in a pod with members of a rival OMCG;

246. It was submitted that the withdrawn charges of assault against the defendant’s partner should be given no weight in this Court’s assessment of risk;

247. The defendant performed well in therapeutic programs designed to address the risk of violence, including the VOTP; and

248. It was submitted that the defendant’s current struggles with drug use on parole must be assessed in the context of him having experienced abuse as a child, a prolonged period of institutionalisation from a young age and intense negative media attention. It was also emphasised that despite this descent into drug use, the defendant has not committed any violent offence whilst on parole.

Relevant authorities

243. Both parties relied on a number of authorities to assist the Court as to the relevant test. In addition, both senior counsel relied on specific cases in support of their respective positions.

244. On behalf of the State, Mr El-Hage relied on a number of cases where an ISO and/or eventually an ESO were made in respect of a single serious violence offence. To the extent that it is relevant, of these the only case in which the index offence was manslaughter was State of New South Wales v Azar (Final) [2025] NSWSC 1420. The defendant and a co-offender had attacked the victim using various makeshift weapons following a perceived homosexual advance. The defendant’s plea to manslaughter was on the basis of substantial impairment caused by schizophrenia. Prior to the index offending, the defendant had a relatively minor criminal history of violent offending, but he committed a number of offences following the index offence including intimidation, rioting, assaults and breaching an earlier ESO. McGuire J imposed an ESO for a period of three years.

245. The State also relied on the following decisions in which an ESO was granted when the defendant had only ever committed one prior “serious violence offence”: State of New South Wales v Windle [2016] NSWSC 1816, State of New South Wales v Welsh (Preliminary) [2025] NSWSC 987 (“Welsh”), State of New South Wales v Wainwright (Preliminary) [2019] NSWSC 1603, State of New South Wales v Darryl John Phillips [2015] NSWSC 482, State of New South Wales v McGorm (Final) [2019] NSWSC 484, State of New South Wales v McGrath [2016] NSWSC 1809, State of New South Wales v Silapa (Final) [2024] NSWSC 1151, State of New South Wales v Costigan (Final) [2022] NSWSC 86, State of New South Wales v Devaney (Final) [2022] NSWSC 60, State of New South Wales v Nikua (Final) [2021] NSWSC 1240, State of New South Wales v King (Final) [2019] NSWSC 151, and State of NSW v Weribone [2016] NSWSC 1474.

246. Ms Edwards drew the Court’s attention to a series of previous decisions in this Court in which the State’s application for an ISO has been refused. The relevant principle derived from these decisions is that a distinction needs to be drawn between the risk of future violent reoffending and the risk of future serious violent reoffending, which is the statutory prerequisite. Those decisions included the following.

247. In Pacey, the State sought an ISO in respect of a defendant who was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment for an offence of maliciously inflict grievous bodily harm with intent. This was the only serious violence offence committed by the defendant. In dismissing the State’s summons, Harrison J (as his Honour then was) found as follows (at [48], [53]-[54]):

[48] Mr Pacey has only ever been convicted of committing one serious violence offence. The case for the State proceeds upon the basis that that index offence in combination with all of the other material referred to in Ms Wells’ affidavits produces a conclusion that Mr Pacey is a high risk violent offender. In my opinion, taken at its highest, that material indicates without question that Mr Pacey is by definition a serious violent offender, but I am not satisfied to a high degree of probability, or indeed anything like it, that he poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious violence offence.

…

[53] It goes without saying that the safety of the community is a matter of great importance both generally and as a central theme in the inspiration for, and implementation of, applications such as the present. That does not however equate either to an indication by the legislature or to a necessary acceptance by me that offenders who have in all relevant respects served their sentences and become entitled to be released on parole should be made subject to supervision orders simply because their release is associated with some risk. Indeed, rates of recidivism indicate that a high percentage of offenders who are released into the community are by definition at some risk of reoffending. In contrast to the general prison population, what the Act makes abundantly clear is that only those offenders who are at risk of reoffending in a particular way are to be subjected to the prospect of continuing or extended supervision following their release.

[54] Mr Pacey is at some risk of reoffending. That does not set him apart from a very large number of those with whom he has been incarcerated. The material that I have considered does not, however, satisfy me that there is an identifiable risk of sufficient probability to indicate that he is a high risk violent offender. As I have indicated already, Mr Pacey does not in my opinion qualify as a high risk violent offender because I am not satisfied that he poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious violence offence if he is not kept under supervision. Adopting the formulation suggested in Manners at [8], I am not satisfied that there is a prima facie case for the making of an order under s 7(4) or s 10B of the Act.

(Emphasis in original.)

248. In State of NSW v Williamson (No 1) [2019] NSWSC 812, the State sought an ISO in respect of a defendant who was sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment for nineteen offences of a sexual nature, described as “exceptionally serious”. The defendant had previously been subject to a five-year ESO and his compliance with supervision had been described as “exemplary”. In dismissing the State’s summons, Davies J observed (at [92]):

There is certainly evidence suggesting that the defendant is at risk of committing further serious offences but that is not the test the CHRO Act stipulates. Any judge before whom an application for an ESO comes must be satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant is an unacceptable risk of committing a further serious offence.

249. In State of New South Wales v Youseff [2020] NSWSC 1440, Hoeben CJ at CL declined to make an ISO in respect of a defendant with a history of domestic violence. In reaching the conclusion that his Honour was not satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant posed an unacceptable risk of committing a serious offence, Hoeben CJ at CL identified a number of difficulties with the RAR in that case, including an absence of an interview with the defendant (at [121]-[122]):

[121] There are, however, a number of difficulties with the RAR. In reaching her conclusions, Ms Pateman was dependent upon the assessment by others in that except for a brief introductory meeting, she had not interviewed the defendant. In addition, her assessment was made in March 2020, approximately seven months ago. There is also a significant lacuna in her analysis in that she appears to have had no regard to the absence of any offending, serious or otherwise, following the defendant’s release to parole. Finally, there were matters included in her report upon which the plaintiff did not rely and it was difficult to know to what extent these had influenced her final assessment.

[122] Those matters were the defendant’s sexual intercourse when aged 14 with a 14 year old female, a detailed history of a domestic violence episode which was eventually withdrawn and a grievous bodily harm offence said to have occurred in prison in relation to which the defendant was acquitted after trial. Of those matters the most important in affecting the weight of Ms Pateman’s opinion is the date of her report and its failure to adequately, if at all, acknowledge any improvement in the defendant’s behaviour and outlook while he was on parole.

250. His Honour ultimately reached the following conclusion (at [125]-[126]):

[125] In carrying out the necessary evaluative exercise, and taking into account the supporting documentation, in particular the OIMS reports, and keeping in mind the assumption that the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s supporting documentation are proved, I am not satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious offence if not kept under strict supervision. In reaching that conclusion, I have not sought to assess the weight of the supporting evidence or to predict the outcome of the proceedings for final orders. What I have sought to do is to take those matters into account in order to determine whether the State has satisfied me to the necessary standard that the assumed facts establish that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk to the community of committing a serious offence if not supervised. Amongst other things, I am not persuaded as to the seriousness of the harm which will ensue in the absence of the protective measures sought by the plaintiff.

[126] In reaching that conclusion, I am aware that there is and there must remain some risk that the defendant will relapse into drug abuse and if he enters into another domestic relationship, engage in serious offending. That risk is inherent whenever an application under the Act is refused. In this case, however, for the reasons I have set out I am not persuaded to a high degree of probability that an unacceptable risk will exist if an ISO is not made.

251. In State of New South Wales v Victor David Moore [2018] NSWSC 967, the defendant had a lengthy criminal history but the index offence was his only conviction for a serious violence offence, being an offence of recklessly causing grievous bodily harm. Wilson J found the following (at [95]-[97]):

[95] Accepting that the State can prove the material in the supporting documentation, there is no doubt that there is a risk that the defendant will return to alcohol use and abuse, and to the commission of crime, if he is not supervised. There is some risk that he could commit a serious violence offence.

[96] Unacceptability of risk involves considerations of both the likelihood of the risk eventuating, and the gravity of the risk that may eventuate. Predicting risk is an inexact art, and one in which minds may reasonably differ as to the evaluation made. Here, whilst I accept that there is a moderate, and perhaps even a high degree of risk of the defendant committing crime, I am unable to conclude that the gravity of the crime that he is at risk of committing will be such as to render the risk an unacceptable risk of committing an offence of serious violence.

[97] I am not satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious violence offence if not supervised. On all of the material it seems more likely that, if he does return to his former life of drinking and crime, it will be to commission of the sort of offences that are so prominent in his criminal history, that is, to offences of dishonesty, public misbehaviour, and violence of a sort other than serious violence. Whilst that would be a tragic outcome for the defendant which would see him return to a prison cell, as well as a deeply regrettable result for society, it is not the sort of catastrophic outcome of realised danger to the community that the legislation is designed to protect against.

252. In State of New South Wales v Coffey [2026] NSWSC 199, the defendant assaulted his former intimate partner and was convicted of recklessly causing grievous bodily harm. While he had a long history of violent offending against his intimate partner, that was the only occasion on which he had been convicted of serious violent offending. In dismissing the State’s summons, McGuire J found as follows (at [61]-[63]):

[61] The defendant is 34 years of age. He has only once been convicted of a serious violence offence, despite his criminal history extending over a period of 17 years. The defendant has shown a capacity to engage in rehabilitative programs and a desire to work. The fact that he is displaying some improved engagement with programs and an expressed desire, although tentative, to engage with programs whilst in the community, and the fact that he has some protective factors operating in his favour, in the context that he has not committed any other serious violence offences apart from the index offence, in my view are significant considerations.

[62] The safety of the community, and in particular the defendant’s former intimate partner, is a matter of great importance both generally and in relation to the present application. However, offenders who do not meet the statutory test in s 5B(d) should not be made subject to supervision orders upon their release to parole simply because their release is associated with some risk.

[63] The defendant is at some risk of reoffending. However, the material that I have considered does not satisfy me to the high degree of probability required that he poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that there is a basis for making a supervision order under s 7(4) or s 10A of the Act.

(Emphasis in original.)

253. In State of NSW v Clarke [2019] NSWSC 411, the index offence was an aggravated sexual assault of a person under the age of 16. This was the only serious sex offence in the defendant’s lengthy criminal history. Fullerton J concluded as follows (at [79]-[80]):

[79] … [P]roceeding on the assumed basis that the facts within supporting documents are proved at the final hearing, I am not satisfied that there is a sufficient factual foundation for the making of an extended supervision order against the defendant. That is, after taking into consideration the high risk of reoffending reported upon by Dr Parker based upon actuarial instruments and in Ms Press’ views in her report of two years ago, in light of all of the material the Court is obliged to evaluate for statutory purposes including his conduct in the community on parole, I am not satisfied, to a high degree of probability, that if the defendant is not supervised pursuant to the scheme provided for in the Act there is an unacceptable risk that he will commit a serious offence of violence of a serious sexual offence (as defined).

[80] I accept that there is a possibility that what Dr Parker describes as “a chaotic lifestyle” may trigger the risk of him reoffending, particularly if he responds opportunistically and impulsively to “gratify his desires”, and I also accept that the most likely victims of violence, if he is to use violence at all, will be in the context of intimate or interpersonal relationships. That does not, however, constitute either the level of risk or the specific type of risk of reoffending with which the Act is concerned. The Act is not concerned with the risk of people breaking the law per se or for that matter with risks of reoffending associated with a prisoner leaving a custodial setting and transitioning to an unsupervised environment within the general community, despite the support that an extended supervision order may supply. Rather, the Act is concerned with the risk of such a person committing a serious sexual offence or an offence of violence of a particular kind such that the highly regulated scheme of supervision contemplated by an extended supervision order is the only appropriate means of addressing that particular risk.

254. Reliance was also placed on the decision of Lonergan J in State of New South Wales v Hampton [2018] NSWSC 360 (“Hampton”). The defendant in that decision had an extensive criminal history of serious violence and sexual offences. Lonergan J was not satisfied that the matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an ESO. Relevantly, Lonergan J identified various issues with conclusions reached in the RAR relied upon in that case (at [40]-[46]):

[40] Whilst it is not my task to predict decision-making at final hearing or to weigh in detail the evidence and make formal findings about that evidence, I consider it necessary to provide some analysis of what seems to be conclusions by Dr Parker that are contradicted or not supported by other material tendered in support of the application.

[41] First, Dr Parker has extracted in paragraph 18 of his report snippets of negative observations of the Defendant’s behaviour after release and not a single positive one, although there are many positive and encouraging comments in the materials tendered from DCS.

[42] An analysis carried out under the heading “Criminogenic needs” makes a number of generalised statements with little, if any, reference to the basis of assumptions made. Examples include “it is likely that Mr Hampton’s criminogenic attitudes are reinforced or at best not effectively discouraged by his peers”, and “alcohol abuse appears to be linked to Mr Hampton’s criminality...” despite there being no identification of who the peers are or when or how they were a factor and no evidence that alcohol was involved in any of the index offences, any of the offences that qualify as serious violence offences or indeed much, if any, of the more minor offending between May 2002 and now.

[43] Dr Parker applies “criminal thinking” as a negative factor stating that “the lack of provocation required and his violence within the custodial environment suggest that the idea that violence is a normal (acceptable) means of solving problems is probably endorsed by Mr Hampton”. There is no explanation or elaboration as to how this conclusion is reached and what particular events are referred to, whether they are recent or historical.

[44] The basis Dr Parker cited to support a conclusion that the Defendant “rejects society’s role in setting laws” was that the Defendant expressed the view that Probation and Parole was “stressing him out” and “messing with his life”. These comments are an inadequate basis upon which to reach such a conclusion. Other conclusions reached in para 42 of the report of Dr Parker are similarly inadequately supported and are largely based on inaccurate perceptions of the role of alcohol or drugs in the serious violent offending in the past.

…

[46] Dr Parker ultimately concludes that the Defendant is at high risk of further violent offending. This conclusion only partially informs the issue of whether the Defendant is a person with a “high degree of probability” that he “poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious violence offence if he is not kept under supervision”.

(Emphasis added.)

255. Lonergan J made further comments about the weight to be given to the RAR (at [67]-[69]):

[67] The assertions by Dr Parker that there is criminogenic thinking are not based on any real analysis in the report as to how these matters apply to the Defendant. They are simply blanket statements and how they apply and how they affect the Defendant’s behaviour is not specified, and certainly not how those matters are likely to affect his behaviour in future. Dr Parker’s report is insufficient in these respects to be able to be taken into account.

…

[69] In terms of the actuarial evidence, the results are inconsistent. On the LSIR there is medium to high risk of future violent offending, but on the VRS there is high risk. This does not amount to an inevitable conclusion that there is an unacceptable risk of serious violent offending by the Defendant, if he was not subjected to supervision.

Consideration

256. As stated above, the relevant statutory test at this preliminary stage is akin to that at committal proceedings. Although I have set that test out above at [24]-[27], it is worth re-stating. In Attorney‑General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119, the Court of Appeal (Mason P, Santow and Tobias JJA) observed the following at [98] regarding this test (noting that what is now s 5B of the Act was previously s 16(1)(b)):

The task assigned by s16(1)(b) is for the Court to look at what is alleged in the supporting documentation to see whether it would, if proved, justify the making of either a continuing detention order or extended supervision order (s16(1)(b)). In determining whether the power to grant an interim order is enlivened, the Court is not involved in weighing that documentation or predicting the ultimate result. The power is enlivened if the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of either category of final order bearing in mind the elevated standard of proof stated in ss17(2) and (3). That threshold question is to be resolved without considering what evidence might be called by the offender at the final hearing. Indeed, it is to be considered without taking into account the evidence (if any) called by the offender at the interim hearing: such evidence may go to (relevant) discretionary matters, but would not cast light upon what is alleged in the Attorney General’s supporting documentation. (Emphasis in original.)

257. On behalf of Mr Loveridge, extensive submissions were made by senior counsel opposing the making of these preliminary orders, including reliance on Dr Eagle’s report. At the conclusion of those submissions, senior counsel for the State observed that those submissions largely addressed matters relevant to a final hearing which was the “wrong approach” at a preliminary hearing. There is some force in that submission.

258. One matter that was not addressed during the preliminary hearing is the extent to which I could have regard to Dr Eagle’s report for the purposes of any preliminary orders. As the authorities make clear, at this preliminary stage, I must consider the material without having regard to the evidence called by Mr Loveridge. What is less clear is whether that applies to expert reports. Section 9(3)(c) of the Act requires the Court to have regard to expert reports. The supporting documentation contains expert reports which have been relied on by Mr Loveridge in the past. It seems incongruous that I can have regard to all of Mr Loveridge’s expert reports except for Dr Eagle’s most recent report because it was not strictly part of the “supporting documentation”. Dr Eagle is an expert in this area who complied with the expert witness code of conduct and regularly provides similar reports for the State.

259. In the State’s written submissions, it was submitted that I would only have regard to Dr Eagle’s report at the final discretionary stage, consistent with authorities: see for example Mustapha at [37]. In the absence of any submissions to the contrary, I propose to proceed on the basis that I am precluded from having regard to Dr Eagle’s report other than at the final discretionary stage of my determination.

260. It was common ground that Mr Loveridge is a “serious violent offender” within the meaning of ss 5A and 5B of the Act, a supervised offender within the meaning of s 5I of the Act and was still under supervision at the time the application is made. Thus, the first three of the four statutory prerequisites for the making of the orders sought at this preliminary hearing are satisfied.

261. It is the fourth statutory prerequisite in relation to which the parties joined issue; namely, would the supporting documentation, if proved, justify the making of an ESO on the basis that the Court was satisfied to a high degree of probability that Mr Loveridge poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order: s 5B(d) of the Act.

262. Despite the significant amount of supporting documentation, authorities and submissions put before the Court, the determination of this preliminary application turns on a narrow issue. The question is not whether Mr Loveridge poses an unacceptable risk of committing an offence of violence if not kept under supervision. Offences of common assault (s 61 of the Crimes Act) or assault occasioning actual bodily harm (s 59 of the Crimes Act) are some examples of violent offending that do not fall within the Act. But the test is not whether Mr Loveridge poses an unacceptable risk of committing such an offence. The unacceptable risk contemplated by the statutory scheme is of Mr Loveridge committing another serious violence offence within the meaning of the Act.

263. Given the scope of that definition and the basis upon which the index offence satisfies s 5B(a) of the Act, I propose to set out s 5A of the Act in full:

Definition of “serious violence offence”

(1) For the purposes of this Act, a serious violence offence is a serious indictable offence that is constituted by a person—

(a) engaging in conduct that causes the death of another person or grievous bodily harm to another person, with the intention of causing, or while being reckless as to causing, the death of another person or grievous or actual bodily harm to another person, or

(a1) an offence under the Crimes Act 1900, section 37(1) or (2), or

(b) attempting to commit, or conspiring with or inciting another person to commit, an offence of a kind referred to in paragraph (a) or (a1).

(2) An offence that includes the elements referred to in subsection (1) (a) is a serious violence offence regardless of how those elements are expressed, and whether or not the offence includes other elements.

(2A) A reference in subsection (1) (a) to—

(a) conduct that causes the death of another person with the intention of causing the death of another person includes a reference to murder by an act done (by a person or an accomplice) in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission of, a serious crime, and

(b) conduct that causes the death of another person while being reckless as to causing the death of another person includes a reference to manslaughter caused by an unlawful and dangerous act, and

(c) conduct that causes grievous bodily harm to another person includes conduct that causes the wounding of another person, but only if the conduct was engaged in with the intention of causing the death of another person or grievous bodily harm to another person.

(3) A serious indictable offence is—

(a) an offence committed in New South Wales that was a serious indictable offence (within the meaning of the Crimes Act 1900) at the time that it was committed, or

(b) an offence committed elsewhere than in New South Wales that, if committed in New South Wales, would be a serious indictable offence within the meaning of the Crimes Act 1900 at the time that it was committed, or

(c) an offence that, at the time that it was committed, was not a serious indictable offence but which was committed in circumstances that would make the offence a serious indictable offence if it were committed at the time an application for an order against the person is made under this Act.

(Emphasis added.)

264. It is important to understand the basis upon which Mr Loveridge’s 2012 offence falls within this definition. Section 5A(1)(a) defines serious violence offence as when an offender:

engages in conduct that causes the death of another person or grievous bodily harm to another person,

with the intention of causing the death of another person or grievous or actual bodily harm to another person

or

while being reckless as to causing the death of another person or grievous or actual bodily harm to another person.

265. On its face, Mr Loveridge does not fall into that definition. As devastating as the consequences of his drunken violent actions were on the evening of 7 July 2012, there is no suggestion in any of the material that he ever intended to inflict grievous bodily harm on any of his victims that night, including Mr Kelly. As for the inclusion of recklessness in the statutory definition, an offender can be guilty of murder when the mental element is reckless indifference to life, but recklessness as to causing the death of another person or grievous or actual bodily harm to another person is not an element of manslaughter by dangerous and unlawful act (which was the basis upon which Mr Loveridge was sentenced).

266. The elements of the offence of manslaughter by dangerous and unlawful act are:

267. That an offender does an unlawful act. Examples could be common assault (pushing someone) or an assault occasioning actual bodily harm (hitting or punching someone causing bruising).

268. That the unlawful act is objectively dangerous. An unlawful act will be dangerous if it carries with it an appreciable risk of serious injury. This is an objective test.

269. The reason that Mr Loveridge is caught by the statutory definition is by the operation of s 5A(2A)(b) of the Act which provides that the reference in s 5A(1)(a) to conduct that causes the death of another person while being reckless as to causing the death of another person “includes a reference to manslaughter caused by an unlawful and dangerous act”. In other words, s 5A(2A) of the Act provides that the offence of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter is deemed to have the same mental element as murder for the purpose of the Act.

270. This extension of the definition of “serious violence offence” in s 5A(2A)(b) of the Act is significant for two reasons. First, Mr Loveridge falls within the definition of having committed a “serious violence offence” in the past because of the operation of s 5A(2A)(b) which effectively elevates the offence of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter to an offence of murder for the purpose of the Act despite the mental element actually being lower. Secondly, this somewhat tortured statutory definition makes the prediction of risk difficult because the only serious violence offence ever committed by Mr Loveridge was one in which the mental element falls short of murder or any other intentional act of serious violence. This has led to some difficulty in framing a risk scenario for Mr Loveridge’s future serious violence offending.

271. Turning to the expert evidence, the high point of Dr Parker’s risk assessment is that although Mr Loveridge’s risk is of committing an offence that would fall short of a serious violence offence, it might escalate if there was an “interplay between Mr Loveridge’s mood, and random environmental considerations, such as the actions of the victim and/or any bystanders”. Otherwise, the nub of Dr Parker’s opinion is that Mr Loveridge poses a well above average risk of committing further “violent offences” (as opposed to serious violence offences).

272. Further, Dr Parker assessed Mr Loveridge as “high risk” compared to other serious violent offenders on the VRAG-R and “above average” risk on the VRS tool. Given that these tools are not specifically directed towards the commission of a serious violence offence, they fall to be considered in light of the rest of Dr Parker’s report, in particular, his risk scenario set out above.

273. During the preliminary hearing, the parties joined issue as to the extent to which certain conclusions reached by Dr Parker in the RAR could be challenged at a preliminary hearing. Ms Edwards submitted that there were various inconsistencies or difficulties with Dr Parker’s risk assessment and conclusions. In response, Mr El-Hage submitted, effectively, that there were no substantive differences between the opinions of Dr Parker and Dr Eagle that would lead to this Court doubting the correctness of Dr Parker’s conclusions for the purpose of the preliminary stage.

274. In this regard, I note the observations of Rigg J in Welsh at [61]:

Because of its timing (October 2024) the RAR of Dr Parker has not taken into account this positive demonstration by the defendant after his release from custody in December 2024. However for the purposes of this preliminary hearing I am required to take Dr Parker’s report as proved (as well as positive considerations). This, in combination with the nature of the defendant’s other offending, supports the requisite conclusion. However ongoing positive progress from now to the time of the final hearing may mean that the orders sought are not ultimately justified, having regard to the terms of the legislation.

273. On the other hand, in Hampton Lonergan J accepted this test but went on to observe that the Court can look at conclusions in a RAR which are contradicted or not supported by other evidence: at [40].

274. Although I am bound to take Dr Parker’s report on the basis that it is proved, I consider it relevant to note the four key criticisms of it made on behalf of Mr Loveridge.

275. First, at the time of preparation of the RAR, Dr Parker did not have the VOTP completion report before him nor was he aware that the 22 December 2025 assault charges had been withdrawn. When these matters were subsequently brought to his attention, Dr Parker provided a supplementary RAR, in which he stated that his opinion has not changed. Secondly, Dr Parker does not make any reference to the absence of violent offending since 2018 and Mr Loveridge’s positive improvement in custody. Instead, he reaches conclusions including that the defendant has normalised violence as a means to solve his problems without identifying the basis of these opinions. Thirdly, unlike Dr Eagle, Dr Parker does not identify any protective factors in his report, which are said to be necessary to the risk assessment process. Fourthly, the various limitations with the actuarial tools used by Dr Parker were identified in Dr Eagle’s report, particularly in the absence of a clinical assessment.

276. Although these are matters that may well have been found in Mr Loveridge’s favour at a final hearing, not only is it arguable that I am precluded from having regard to them, but I also do not consider it necessary to do so. Having close regard to Dr Parker’s report, I am not satisfied that even taking it at its highest, it would justify the making of a final order.

277. The risk scenario advanced by Dr Parker is that Mr Loveridge would commit a non-serious violent offence which might escalate if there was an “interplay between Mr Loveridge’s mood, and random environmental considerations, such as the actions of the victim and/or any bystanders”. It is pertinent to note that that is not what happened in relation to the index offence; the offence did not escalate due to the conduct of any bystander; the offence “escalated” to an offence of manslaughter because the impact of the punch caused Mr Kelly to fall and hit his head on the ground. It did not “escalate” because of anything Mr Kelly did nor the actions of any bystander. The identified risk is that if Mr Loveridge ever assaulted anyone in the future (and he has not assaulted anyone outside of the custodial environment since that night on 7 July 2012 when he was 18 years old) it might escalate from a non-serious violence to a serious violence offence in circumstances that remain opaque.

278. That is not to say that a risk scenario which only rises to the level of a serious violence offence (rather than an offence of violence per se) due to an “escalation” could never meet the statutory test. For example, in Welsh, the defendant’s risk scenarios included acting impulsively with weapons. It is not difficult to see how that conduct could easily escalate to a serious violence offence. But that same prediction as to escalation is not as easily made in circumstances where Mr Loveridge has never used a weapon to inflict violence and his index offence involved one punch.

279. Given that Dr Parker’s report at its highest only assesses Mr Loveridge as being at high risk of further violent offending rather than serious violent offending, the next question is whether the RAR, which falls short of the relevant statutory test, when combined with other aspects of the supporting documentation, could, if proved, justify the making of an ESO at a final hearing. It seems to me that, putting the index offence to one side, the matters most relevant to that test are as follows.

280. First, Mr Loveridge’s illicit drug use is deeply problematic. The known risk factors of methamphetamine (ice) in particular are well known. The OIMS notes show that he has struggled with drug use since the birth of his child last year. It is regrettable that he left rehabilitation last October when he refused to be placed on suboxone. It is also unfortunate timing that he booked himself into detoxification only days before this preliminary hearing and thus was not present at it. The Court is left in a state of uncertainty as to the success or otherwise of his current progress. Further, the OIMS notes show that Mr Loveridge was initially not completely honest about his drug use. Those notes also show that when Mr Loveridge was withdrawing from drugs he became aggressive such that his mother did not want to be with him.

281. Secondly, the fact of the withdrawn charges is a problematic feature of this application. On the one hand, the altercation between Mr Loveridge and his partner caused at least one neighbour to contact police. When police arrived, they saw blood on Jessica’s lip and Mr Loveridge had a torn shirt. The explanation for the blood provided by Jessica, that it was caused by some sort of “mopping” incident, seems implausible. On the other hand, Mr Loveridge has no history of domestic violence offending. He has been very closely supervised over the past two years, and Jessica has been in regular contact with the relevant officers (as reflected in the voluminous OIMS notes provided to the Court). There has been no concern raised of any suspected violence towards her. On the contrary, she was at pains in both her statement and affidavit to stress that although Mr Loveridge has taken illicit drugs, she has never seen him to be violent when he does so.

282. The parties took different positions as to what weight I could put on these withdrawn charges. Senior counsel for Mr Loveridge submitted that no weight could be placed on them at all, in light of the absence of complaint by the alleged victim and indeed a statement from her denying that any violence had been committed against her. Further, Ms Edwards referred to the observations of Fullerton J in State of New South Wales v Heness (Preliminary) [2019] NSWSC 1710 concerning withdrawn charges (at [30]):

In my view, the fact that an assessment was made by the New South Wales prosecuting authorities that there were no reasonable prospects of conviction because of credibility issues, significantly minimises the weight that should be given to the laying of the 1997 charges based, as it must be assumed they were, on the reasonable suspicion of the arresting police that the offences had been committed.

283. Her Honour went on to observe the following:

That position differs from alleged criminal conduct that did not result in conviction because a jury was not satisfied of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In those circumstances, as other decisions of this Court have recognised, the fact that a defendant was prosecuted at trial has been treated as information bearing on the likelihood that the defendant will commit a further serious offence as provided for in s 9(3)(i) (see for example Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Steadman [2016] NSWSC 174 per Adamson J at [27] and [124]). The position here also differs from a case where trial proceedings had commenced but were discontinued because a prosecution witness did not attend the trial, the circumstances with which Harrison J was concerned in Tiggelen.

284. While accepting that limited significance attaches to these withdrawn charges, the State submitted that the episode was indicative of the defendant’s destabilisation in the community at that time and that, for the purpose of this preliminary inquiry, I would take the charges and police facts “at their highest”. I do not understand this to mean that I would find them proved but, rather, that it must be accepted that police were called to the premises that day and they saw what they saw, despite the charges being withdrawn.

285. I accept that, consistent with the authorities, there is a difference between an acquittal that could not be established to the high standard of beyond reasonable doubt, and proceedings that were withdrawn at any early stage for want of evidence, as occurred here. Accordingly, I can only have regard to the withdrawn charges to the extent that police were called to the premises but there is no evidence of any assaults having occurred.

286. Thirdly, Mr Loveridge was convicted of two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm whilst in custody, in 2015 and again in 2018. Although any further offending after the index offending is of concern, it seems to me that these were two offences of a very different category, both to each other and to the index offence. Both offences were committed in custody which is, regrettably, a more violent environment than in the general community. Further, as Judge Sutherland observed, the 2018 offence was, effectively, a pre-emptive case of self-defence in the face of Corrective Services error. This latter offence does not feed easily into the risk scenario for future offending in the community. Putting it to one side, his most recent violent offending occurred 11 years ago, when he was 21 years old, within the custodial environment.

287. Fourthly, there is some doubt in the material as to the extent of Mr Loveridge’s pro-social friends. His partner has suggested that he will be in contact with at least one cousin who has former OMCG connections when his parole expires. He is clearly getting the illicit drugs from somewhere. Whilst under supervision, non-association directions can be made, but that power would not exist unless an ESO was made.

288. As against these problematic matters, there are factors in the supporting documentation pointing in the opposite direction.

289. First, Mr Loveridge demonstrated the capacity to successfully re-integrate for at least a year following his initial release. During that time, he was able to remain employed and maintain family relationships. Given he had been incarcerated from the age of 18 to 30 years old, that was a very promising start.

290. Secondly, Mr Loveridge has had no criminal convictions for many years and the index offence occurred 14 years ago when he had just turned 18.

291. Thirdly, Mr Loveridge has no mental health, cognitive impairment or personality disorder which could impede his rehabilitation. It should be noted, however, that psychological counselling has been recommended for him to address his feelings of shame as well as childhood issues. That feeling of shame escalated after the birth of his son and led to profound sadness that Thomas Kelly would never have the opportunity to be a father.

292. Fourthly, unlike many offenders who come before the court, Mr Loveridge has some protective factors including a supportive wife and a desire to be a good father to his son. He also has the support of his mother and sister and has recently reconnected with his father.

293. Fifthly, Mr Loveridge has a history of employment and the capacity to work again. He was employed prior to his arrest in 2012 and again on his release to parole in 2024.

294. Finally, the supporting material suggests that despite his drug addiction, Mr Loveridge is highly motivated to overcome his drug addiction, gain employment and live a pro-social life with his new family.

295. As I have already observed, rehabilitation, and in particular recovery from drug addiction, is rarely a linear path. There can be no doubt that Mr Loveridge would benefit from ongoing access to drug and alcohol programs and long-term psychological support to address his ongoing issues. He would be provided with these services were he to continue to be supervised. In the absence of an ESO he will be on his own from this Sunday having to fund these services for himself. That places him in the same position as most prisoners after their parole period expires.

296. I have given paramount consideration to the protection of the community as required by s 9(2) of the Act and have considered all of the relevant mandatory considerations in s 9(3) of the Act. As to the statutory test, I have given particular attention to the State’s submission that insofar as the “unacceptable risk” is concerned, the relevant risk may be low but the consequences are catastrophic. This submission is no doubt based on decisions such as State of New South Wales v Simcock (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1805 where Wilson J observed at [71] that “[u]nacceptability of risk involves considerations of both likelihood of the risk eventuating, and the gravity of the risk that may eventuate”.

297. I accept the State’s submission that this is the appropriate way to approach the question of unacceptable risk, but, again, the identified risk in this application is that Mr Loveridge would commit a non-serious violence offence which could “escalate” in circumstances where no weapon would be used but something might otherwise occur outside of Mr Loveridge’s control. If that was sufficient to satisfy the test, then every offender in NSW who has ever committed an act of violence without a weapon could be assessed as being a risk of committing a serious violence offence in the future for the purposes of s 5B(d) of the Act.

298. It is most unfortunate that the outreach services such as drug and alcohol programs and psychological counselling that are provided as part of an ESO cannot be made available to former inmates who are struggling to recover from drug addiction unless they fall within the definition of a high risk offender under the Act. There can be no doubt that Mr Loveridge would benefit from being under supervision for at least another year in order to see how his drug detoxication and rehabilitation continues and to see whether he is able to gain employment again. But, as the observations made in the decisions summarised above at [247]-[255] make clear, the Act only provides such supervision and assistance to former inmates if they are at risk of committing a particular type of offence rather than being a risk of offending more generally.

299. Having regard to all of the above, I am not satisfied that the supporting documentation, if proved, would justify the making of an ESO in relation to Mr Loveridge.

300. Given that I am not satisfied that the test has been met for the purposes of this preliminary hearing, it has not been necessary to consider Dr Eagle’s report on the question of the exercise of the discretion. It was submitted on behalf of Mr Loveridge that even if I was satisfied that the statutory criteria were met, I would decline to make the orders sought as a matter of discretion on the basis that it would only exacerbate Mr Loveridge’s shame and, in effect, be counterproductive. In that regard, I note the observations of Garling J in State of New South Wales v Sturgeon [2019] NSWSC 559 (at [7]):

Once the Court reaches the requisite state of satisfaction at a preliminary hearing, there remains a discretion that enables the Court to refuse to make an order for an interim detention order (“IDO”) or an interim supervision order (“ISO”): Tillman at [32]. In addressing this discretionary exercise, it is open to a defendant to adduce evidence which addresses the exercise of the Court’s discretion. However, having regard to the nature of the HRO Act as protective legislation, and the stated primary object in s 3 of the HRO Act, “… to ensure the safety and protection of the community …”, it is difficult to see that the discretion to decline to make an IDO or ISO would arise other than in an exceptional case. (Emphasis in original.)

301. In State of New South Wales v Avakian (Preliminary) [2021] NSWSC 245, Davies J declined to make preliminary orders and went on to cite the above passage. His Honour noted that there was no evidence before him to show that it was an exceptional case and concluded by observing that had the State established the requirements under the Act, he would not have exercised the discretion against making an ISO. I would have adopted the same approach in the present case.

302. Finally, the supporting documentation was replete with material suggesting that one of the factors that has been detrimental to Mr Loveridge’s rehabilitation over the years has been the impact of the intense media scrutiny that this matter has attracted since 2012. By way of example, the OIMS notes reflect that shortly after he was released on parole, Mr Loveridge was photographed by the media having lunch with his nieces.

303. It seems to me that if Mr Loveridge can avoid any further contact with the criminal justice system in the future the public interest in reporting on him any further would be negligible.

Orders

304. Accordingly, I would make the following orders:

305. The summons is dismissed.

306. The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs on the ordinary basis.

307. Access to the Supreme Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.

*******