Stacey v State of Queensland

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 131

Adami v Maison de Lux Limited [1924] HCA 45; (1924) 35 CLR 143

Bakhash v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 362

Byrnes v Treloar [1997] NSWSC 629; (1997) 77 IR 332

Carr v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 210

Goodall v State of Queensland [2018] QSC 319

Johnston & Ors v Carroll (Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service) & Anor; Witthahn & Ors v Wakefield (Chief Executive of Hospital and Health Services and Director General of Queensland Health); Sutton & Ors v Carroll (Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service) [2024] QSC 2

Luna v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 419

North v TV Corp [1976] CthArbRp 1465; 11 ALR 599 JJ

Nuske v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 199

R v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd; Ex parte Halliday and Sullivan [1938] HCA 44; (1938) 60 CLR 601

Rossiter v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 25

Sankey v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 197

Stephens v Barrie Charles Holdings Pty Ltd 157 QGIG 138

Tilley v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 262

Winter v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 350

• [1] Mr Ralph Stacey is employed as an Educator/Teacher by the Department of Education ('the Department') at James Nash State High School in Gympie.

• [2] It is not controversial that Mr Stacey was an employee of the Department who was required to comply with the Department of Education Employment Direction 1/21 - COVID-19 Vaccinations ('the Direction'). It is further not controversial that Mr Stacey failed to comply with the Direction.

• [3] On or about 1 August 2022, following a formal show cause process, Mr Stacey was found to be liable for disciplinary action. The basis of the finding was that Mr Stacey had, without reasonable excuse, failed to comply with a lawful and reasonable direction namely, the Direction.

• [4] Mr Stacey was informed at that time that he had a right to appeal that finding. Mr Stacey did not appeal that finding.

• [5] In that same correspondence Mr Stacey was advised that the decision maker was contemplating a penalty of a reduction in remuneration for a period of 20 weeks and a reprimand. Mr Stacey was invited to show cause why this penalty should not be imposed.

• [6] Following receipt and consideration of Mr Stacey's response, a decision was issued on 22 August 2022 imposing a penalty of a reduction in remuneration for a period of 18 weeks and a reprimand ('the decision'). Mr Stacey now seeks to appeal the decision.

• [7] Following a lengthy adjournment of these proceedings, a mention was held before Vice President O'Connor on 18 April 2024. At that mention Mr Stacey was advised that consideration was being given by the Commission to not hearing his appeal pursuant to the discretion found at s 562A of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('IR Act').

• [8] Directions were issued pursuant to s 562A(3) of the IR Act requiring Mr Stacey to file written submissions as to why he says he has an arguable case. These reasons deal with the exercise of the discretion pursuant to s 562A of the IR Act.

• [9] Before considering s 562A of the IR Act, it is necessary to consider the jurisdictional context in which this appeal sits. Section 562B of the IR Act relevantly provides:

562B Public service appeal to commission is by way of review

(1) This section applies to a public service appeal made to the commission.

(2) The commission must decide the appeal by reviewing the decision appealed against.

(3) The purpose of the appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable.

• [10] A review of this type is not a re-hearing of the matter on the merits.[1] A review is limited to a consideration as to whether the decision under review is fair and reasonable.

• [11] The language of s 562B of the IR Act plainly establishes that a review is limited to a single decision.[2] In this instance, it is the decision to impose a penalty that is the subject of the review. The decision forming the basis for imposing the penalty preceded the decision under review. The Commission does not have jurisdiction in this matter to consider previous decisions that have been made in the preceding stages of the disciplinary process pertaining to Mr Stacey.

• [12] It is relevant to note that correspondence communicating the Department's earlier finding that Mr Stacey was liable to disciplinary action (the preceding decision) dated 1 August 2022 contained the following passage:

If you believe that my decision to find the allegation above is substantiated (disciplinary finding decision) is unfair and unreasonable, you may lodge a fair treatment appeal under the appeal provisions of the Public Service Act 2008. Alternatively, you may decide to wait until I have made a decision about the proposed disciplinary action and appeal both the disciplinary finding and the disciplinary action.

• [13] This passage purports to inform Mr Stacey of his appeal rights. It arguably misleads the reader in that it might give the impression that both decisions can be combined in the same appeal. It is a departure from the usual language found in such decisions and I see no good reason why such a potentially confusing alteration was made.

• [14] To the extent the passage purports to describe the jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to such appeals it is entirely at odds with s 562B of the IR Act. But despite the potential for confusion, on proper reading of the passage, it plainly distinguishes the appeals in respect of both decisions. Importantly, it also does not expressly or impliedly communicate a willingness to waive reliance on statutory time limits for either or both appeals.

• [15] Relevant to this appeal, to the extent that Mr Stacey might have been misled by the passage, he has expressly nominated the decision dated 22 August 2022 in his Appeal Notice and opens his submission (filed 11 June 2024) with the words "I am writing to appeal against the disciplinary action" (as opposed to the disciplinary finding).

• [16] Additionally, Mr Stacey's submissions contend that there should be no penalty imposed for his misconduct in that inter alia he contends his suspension without remuneration should be characterised as a financial penalty already imposed. It is plain therefore that Mr Stacey does not directly challenge the finding that he is liable to disciplinary action, and nor could he in this appeal. He has plainly elected to appeal the penalty decision only.

• [17] The singular issue in contention in this appeal is the penalty imposed.

• [18] It is important to be clear in stating that an employee who does not challenge a preceding decision that they are liable to disciplinary action may not later revisit that finding as a basis for challenging the penalty subsequently imposed by a separate, subsequent decision. While there may be need to examine the preceding finding to e.g., evaluate whether the appealed penalty is excessive, the fundamental finding of conduct liable to disciplinary action cannot be disturbed.

• [19] Section 562A of the IR Act relevantly provides:

562A Commission may decide not hear particular public service appeals

(3) The commission may decide it will not hear a public service appeal against a decision if -

(a) the appellant has made an application to a court or tribunal relating to the decision, whether or not the application has been fully decided; or

(b) the commission reasonably believes, after asking the appellant to establish by oral or written submissions that the appellant has an arguable case for the appeal, that the appeal -

(i) is frivolous or vexatious; or

(ii) is misconceived or lacks substance; or

(iii) should not be heard for another compelling reason.

• [20] Provided an appellant has been given an opportunity to make submissions on their 'arguable' case, the discretion of the Commission to decline to hear a public service appeal is broad.

• [21] Further, it is a unique feature of s 562A(3) of the IR Act that it only requires a submission from an appellant. This logically reflects the circumstances where the exercise of the discretion at s 562A of the IR Act is typically evoked i.e., where the Commission has already formed a preliminary view that it ought not deal with an appeal. In those circumstances, the submissions of a respondent to the appeal, while helpful in a peripheral way, will always be somewhat superfluous.

• [22] The parties were directed to file written submissions. The direction expressly stipulated the submissions should address why the Commission should decide not to hear the case pursuant to s 562A(3) of the IR Act.

• [23] Mr Stacey filed submissions on 11 June 2024 and the Department (through Crown Law) filed theirs on 2 July 2024. The directions allowed for Mr Stacey to file a Reply submission (if necessary), but he did not do so.

• [24] It should be noted that, in considering whether to exercise the discretion pursuant to s 562A of the IR Act, I am predominately concerned with the submissions filed by Mr Stacey on 11 June 2024 specifically addressing that consideration.

• [25] Mr Stacey's Appeal Notice was accompanied by a lengthy submission.[3] While an outline of the grounds of the appeal might be expected to aid in understanding whether there is an arguable case, I am not inclined to give much weight to the submissions accompanying his appeal. Those submissions are materially identical to submissions filed with multiple other appeals by employees of the Department who are in receipt of the same or similar penalties.[4] They were clearly prepared at a time when Mr Stacey and his colleagues were all represented by the same entity and very much in the style of a template submission.

• [26] In particular, they are in a different style to the submissions filed by Mr Stacey on 11 June 2024 and they seek to advance the appeal on wholly different grounds with respect to what are now said by Mr Stacey to be the matters forming the basis for his arguable case.

• [27] The impersonal and template nature of the submissions attached to the Appeal Notice renders them unreliable. To the extent that they (generically) contend that Mr Stacey's circumstances were not taken into account, they do not stipulate what those circumstances were or how they might justify a different (or no) penalty. Unhelpfully, Mr Stacey does not expand on this in his submissions filed on 11 June 2024.

• [28] To the extent they allege the decision was lacking in sufficient reasons and procedurally unfair, I reject that contention for the same reasons given by Gazenbeek IC in Sankey where he was dealing with the same template form of submissions and circumstances.[5]

• [29] While it is not open for me to make a finding as to the depth of knowledge and understanding Mr Stacey has of the submissions accompanying his Appeal Notice, I would not be surprised to learn that he did not draft them and perhaps was not even familiar with them given the very different grounds he now relies on to illustrate his arguable case.

• [30] In all of the circumstances I consider the submissions that most reliably reflect the views of Mr Stacey, and the grounds he relies on in his appeal, are those set out in his submissions filed on 11 June 2024.

• That he endured financial hardship while suspended which he considers to be punishment enough.

• That 'recent happenings' should be considered before enforcing the financial penalty and cites the statements made about the mandates by a Dr Nick Coatsworth as quoted in the Daily Mail news service.[6]

• He cites Johnston & Ors v Carroll (Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service) & Anor; Witthahn & Ors v Wakefield (Chief Executive of the Hospital and Health Services and Director General of Queensland Health); Sutton and Ors v Carroll (Commissioner of the Queensland police Service) ('Johnston').[7] He relies on the finding that the mandates in that matter were found to be unlawful.

• He makes comparisons (without relevant particulars) with unidentified employees of Queensland Health (and also with his wife) suggesting they were subject to lesser or no penalty for the same or effectively the same contravention.

• He appears to challenge the safety of 'some' vaccinations and cites the alleged 'withdrawal' of AstraZeneca's covid vaccine as an example.

• He describes 'this' as an evolving situation and sites an (unsubstantiated) figure of 1024 people he alleges have died from covid vaccines and a further (also unsubstantiated) figure of 140512 people who he alleges have reported adverse reactions from covid vaccines.[8]

• [32] The salient portions of the Department's submissions are contained between paragraphs 11 to 15 of their submissions filed on 2 July 2024. In essence they submit that there was no denial of procedural fairness as alleged, or at all. Additionally, they submit that the matters raised by Mr Stacey as to why he would not be vaccinated etc are all matters that have already been dealt with and dismissed by the Commission on multiple previous occasions.

• [33] Mr Stacey's appeal is wholly misconceived. It is misconceived as a whole, but it is equally misconceived by reference to the individual grounds relied on by Mr Stacey. In order to explain this conclusion, it is necessary to address the overall decision and also each of the matters raised by Mr Stacey's submissions.

• [34] It is important to revisit my comments made earlier in these reasons i.e. that it is not controversial that Mr Stacey has failed to comply with a lawful and reasonable direction. It is further not controversial that a finding that Mr Stacey was liable to disciplinary action was not challenged.

• [35] In general terms, a failure by an employee to comply with a lawful and reasonable direction is a form of misconduct with which courts and tribunals dealing with industrial matters are very familiar. It is a form of misconduct that almost always attracts a penalty of termination of employment, and properly so.

• [36] At the very essence of every employment relationship is the fundamental notion of subordination. An employer must have the ability (within lawful and reasonable bounds) to direct employees in the manner they consider best or necessary for the overall functioning of the enterprise they own or manage. Moreover, an employer must be able to feel confident an employee will comply with those directions. It follows that insubordination is a most grievous injury to that relationship in that, it undermines the trust an employer must be able to have in an employee to perform their duties as directed.

• [37] It is well established that a failure to follow a lawful and reasonable instruction is serious misconduct within the ordinary meaning of that phrase.[9] While a comprehensive and robust system of recognising and protecting the rights of employees is essential to maintain healthy industrial relations, it should not obscure the fundamental feature of subordination in the relationship between employer and employee. Employees enjoy many rights, but their obligations to their employer are equally important to the employment relationship.

• [38] An employee who fails to comply with a lawful and reasonable direction must expect that a consequence of that choice will, in all likelihood, be the termination of their employment.[10] There is a lengthy history of authority making this proposition indisputable. These authorities establish that dismissal is justified when an employee wilfully or deliberately disregards an important condition of the contract of employment, or disobeys a lawful instruction, or engages in acts of insubordination which go to the heart of the employment relationship.[11]

• [39] In this matter Mr Stacey has avoided the termination of his employment notwithstanding that he has flagrantly disobeyed a lawful and reasonable direction. Indeed, his submissions of 11 June 2024 demonstrate that he continues to be wholly unapologetic for his misconduct and he continues to assert his conduct was justified by inter alia his ill-informed opinions about the safety of covid vaccines.

• [40] Relevantly, Mr Stacey also appears to be utterly devoid of insight into just how fortunate he has been to avoid being dismissed.

• [41] The purpose of the Directive was, first and foremost, the protection of the health and safety of staff and pupils, including those at the school where Mr Stacey taught. His noncompliance had the potential to place those persons at risk of infection with a highly contagious and (in some cases) deadly virus. It is difficult to imagine a greater aggravating factor for an act of misconduct than one where the health and safety of school aged children is disregarded. It is therefore nothing short of astonishing that Mr Stacey remains employed by the Department.

• [42] Despite Mr Stacey's subjective views about the penalty, an 18-week reduction in wages and a reprimand is objectively very generous in these circumstances. To the extent it is necessary to speculate as to why the Department imposed such a disproportionate penalty, the obvious explanation is that that the collective disobedience of numerous other teachers in similar circumstances most likely caused the Department to refrain from terminating them, lest their absence through dismissal give rise to shortfalls in the delivery of essential teaching services, especially in regional areas. While this unique situation has worked to Mr Stacey's benefit, it in no way detracts from the serious nature of his misconduct.

• [43] On all the facts available, I have no difficulty concluding there was a valid and compelling reason to terminate Mr Stacey's employment. An employee who, without good reason, wilfully and deliberately disregards a lawful and reasonable direction given for the safety of others represents a serious and continuing risk of further serious disobedience and with that, a risk to the health and safety of others (including children). Given his continued defiance and lack of insight into his obligation to follow lawful and reasonable directions, there is no predicting what directions Mr Stacey might choose to disregard in the future.

• [44] It is not within my powers in an appeal of this type to displace what I consider to be a manifestly inadequate penalty. But in circumstances where Mr Stacey's undisputed conduct is objectively serious, and where the penalty is so patently disproportionate by comparison, it is open to conclude that his appeal is wholly misconceived.

• [45] On that basis alone, I decline to hear this appeal. My alternative reasons now follow.

• [46] The other misconception afflicting Mr Stacey is that he conflates the consequences of his decision not to get vaccinated with the consequences now being imposed on him by the Department for his proven misconduct.

• [47] In his submissions Mr Stacey talks at some length about the hardship he and his family suffered while he was on suspension for a period of approximately 6 months. He talks about the alternative employment he engaged in, and about the fact that the loss of income caused him to cease paying his daughter's school fees. He talks about how his pensioner mother-in-law was required to pay those fees instead.

• [48] Mr Stacey seeks to characterise all of this suffering as somehow having been imposed by the Department. But all of this was exclusively a consequence of his choice not to be vaccinated. Mr Stacey's inability to enter Department premises and perform work was entirely a feature of the health directive in place at the time. It prohibited inter alia unvaccinated employees from attending schools.[12]

• [49] All of the hardship detailed in Mr Stacey's submissions was not a penalty imposed by the Department for noncompliance. It was hardship that he imposed on himself and his family through his choice to not be vaccinated. Mr Stacey was entirely free to have made that choice, but the consequences of that choice are his responsibility.

• [50] By contrast, the penalty imposed by the decision is not a penalty for being unvaccinated. That fact is merely part of the particulars of the misconduct giving rise to the penalty. The penalty is imposed because Mr Stacey failed to comply with a lawful and reasonable direction.

• [51] So, to the extent that Mr Stacey asserts he has already been punished for his misconduct, he is incorrect.

• [52] Mr Stacey additionally relies on a variety of other grounds which are collectively and individually either irrelevant or erroneous (or both). Mr Stacey fails to appreciate that the penalty relates to his conduct at a specific point in time, and it is the conditions prevailing at that time that determine the characterisation of his conduct as misconduct. Subsequent unrelated or independent events, even if they had some relevance, will rarely have the effect of displacing a finding of misconduct.

• [53] Again, it appears Mr Stacey misunderstands that his non-compliance with the Direction to be vaccinated against Covid is merely a particular of his misconduct. The misconduct itself was the failure to comply with a lawful and reasonable direction.

• [54] Even if it were the case that legal and medical sentiments had shifted away from their endorsement of mandates and vaccines in the years following his act of misconduct (which they have not), the only effect that would have on Mr Stacey is that it might serve to mitigate his conduct, albeit retrospectively. Given this is a review of a decision made in August 2022, it is an evaluation of the fairness or reasonableness of the decision at that time. Subsequent events or opinions are not relevant.

• [55] Mr Stacey's penalty is a consequence of his failure to comply with a reasonable and lawful direction at a specific point in time when there was (and still is) no question as to the lawfulness and reasonableness of the Direction. It is that act, at that time, that warrants the penalty.

• [56] For completeness, it ought to be noted that Mr Stacey misunderstands the effect of the decision in Johnston. The decision that the directives in that matter were unlawful was founded on what amounts to a quintessential technicality. In essence, those directives were inter alia unlawful only within the meaning of that term as prescribed by s 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).[13] Had either of the relevant decision makers in that matter complied with the procedural or legal prerequisites, the challenge to the directives in those matters would have likely failed.

• [57] But more importantly, the findings in Johnston relate to entirely different directives. The flaws that rendered them unlawful do not affect the Directive that was applicable to Mr Stacey.

• [58] Mr Stacey also relies on the media commentary of a Dr Nick Coatsworth, a former deputy chief medical officer. The comments reproduced in Mr Stacey's submissions are in the form of a precis, of an opinion, made unilaterally to a media group to which the doctor is contracted, without a contradictor, without context or examples, and largely as an abstract speculation about the way to deal with future pandemics. The comments (said to have been made on the Today Show) are in no way authoritative or reliable. Moreover, they run contrary to current expert opinion.[14]

• [59] But again, the opinion of one doctor in February 2024 has no relevance to the finding of misconduct of Mr Stacey in 2022. This is especially so when one considers that the prevailing view of the medical and scientific community at that time (and now) was that covid vaccines are safe.

• [60] Mr Stacey also cites examples of unnamed public sector employees who he alleges received lessor or no penalties. Such examples are entirely useless as comparisons in the absence of full particulars. Even the reference by Mr Stacey to his wife as a comparator is absent of critically important comparative data such as where she worked, how she was able to access 27 months of leave, and what were the circumstances of her return to work. The information provided by Mr Stacey is woefully inadequate and unpersuasive.

• [61] Finally, Mr Stacey closes his submissions with the more familiar 'anti-vaccine' rhetoric. He alludes to 'vaccines being pulled from the market'. This is a plain reference to the false narrative that covid vaccines have been harmful in some significant way.[15] It is a statement that reveals the true depths of Mr Stacey's continuing recalcitrance.

• [62] Mr Stacey also goes on to quote unsourced figures alleging over 1000 people have died from covid vaccines. As I have noted above (with an accompanying reliable source reference), this statement is simply false. Mr Stacey continues to 'beat the drum' that has been repeatedly silenced by this Commission and countless other courts around the country. His submissions reveal no arguable case.

• [63] For all of these additional reasons, I decline to hear this appeal.

• [64] In Tilley v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) ('Tilley') I made the following observation:[16]

[33] The Commission's resources must be reserved for matters of genuine controversy. They ought not to be made available to unreasonable individuals who, despite overwhelming legal precedent and accepted mainstream medical and scientific opinions, insist on arguing (and re-arguing) the same tedious points in a vain attempt to have their baseless views affirmed, or to delay the inevitable sanctions awaiting them for their non-compliance with a lawful direction.

• [65] My observations in Tilley are even more pertinent one year on.

• [66] The pandemic produced unique and surreal experiences for everyone, in every aspect of life. One of the more unusual experiences was the requirement to mandate vaccines for employees throughout large sections of the public sector. The imposition of such an intrusive requirement was not undertaken whimsically and was a well-considered response to manage the potentially harmful and even deadly effects of Covid-19. There can be no suggestion that mandates were anything but controversial. They represent a personal and physical intrusion unprecedent in the lives of all affected. For many people, mandates were anxiety inducing and traumatic.

• [67] But the vast majority of the employees affected (not to mention the general population) willingly complied and were vaccinated. Often this was not because they knew or believed vaccines were effective (or even safe). For the most part, people unqualified to understand the science complied because their sense of responsibility to the society in which they live was such that they were prepared to put aside their objections and their personal concerns for the greater good of the community.

• [68] No doubt this would reflect the approach of many of Mr Stacey's colleagues who complied. And it would be a gross injustice to those employees if their reprobate peers went unpunished.

• [69] For that reason, there is something deeply repugnant about the continued abuse of the Commission's resources by individuals who have refused, without good cause, to comply with a lawful and reasonable direction, and who continually seek to avoid responsibility for their choices. Despite the freely available and innumerable decisions from this Commission dismissing the same spurious arguments that he now advances, Mr Stacey insists on pressing arguments that are plainly doomed to fail for all of the same reasons.

• [70] A common feature of litigants in such matters is that their submissions are entirely devoid of any evidence that they have read and considered the relevant authorities, or made any attempt to objectively evaluate the merits of their appeals. Instead, they press ahead with their ill-informed arguments and, in doing so, deprive genuine litigants the opportunity to have their matters dealt with by the Commission in a timelier manner. A greater abuse of the Commission's resources is hard to imagine.

• [71] The conduct of such litigants both collectively and individually is an affront to the administration of justice. For over two years now the Commission has been dismissing these matters and repeatedly citing its earlier decisions explaining why. Yet these appeals keep coming because the appellants in most instances refuse to read or accept anything that does not assist their cause.

• [72] The extent to which such matters have diverted and drained the resources of the Commission, and the continued pattern of persistent obstinance demonstrated by such litigants is such that there is, in my view, clear justification to depart from the usual practice of giving extensive reasons for decision. Despite the discretion afforded by s 562A of the IR Act, the drain on resources to simply explain why appeals will not be heard is just as significant as hearing them.

• [73] Mr Stacey can consider himself fortunate. Fortunate in that he has escaped a proper penalty for his misconduct. Fortunate in that he can continue with his career. And now, fortunate that he was given the valuable time of the Commission to prepare these extensive reasons at the expense of other litigants awaiting their opportunity to have their genuine controversies determined.

• [74] To the extent Mr Stacey's employment is rendered more tenuous by virtue of the reprimand now on his record, that is a small price to pay for an employee who has demonstrated no insight and no remorse for wilfully refusing to comply with a lawful and reasonable direction.

• [75] In the circumstances I intend to exercise my discretion to not hear his appeal.

Pursuant to s 562A of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) I decline to hear the appeal.

[1] Goodall v State of Queensland [2018] QSC 319, 5.

[2] Carr v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 210.

[3] Appeal Notice filed 12 September 2024, sch 1.

[4] See for example Sankey v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 197; Carr v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 210. See also Radanovic v State of Queensland (Department of Education) delivered ex tempore on 30 August 2024 (unreported at the time of publication of these reasons).

[5] [2024] QIRC 197, [39]-[41]. See also Nuske v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 199.

[6] Dr Coatsworth was formerly a deputy chief medical officer and is now employed as a doctor in Canberra. He is contracted to the Nine-Fairfax channel and newspapers. See .

[7] [2024] QSC 2.

[8] The link included in the submission (daen.tga.gov.au) was broken. Further attempts to verify the submission revealed the total number of vaccine related deaths (out of 69 million doses issued) up to October 2023 is 14.

See Australian Government (Department of Health and Aged Care) Covid-19 vaccine safety report 19-10-2023 (Web Page) .

[9] Adami v Maison de Lux Limited [1924] HCA 45; (1924) 35 CLR 143; R v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd; Ex parte Halliday and Sullivan [1938] HCA 44; (1938) 60 CLR 601, 621-2.

[10] Rossiter v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 25, [22]; Bakhash v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 362, [27]; Carr v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 210, [47].

[11] North v TV Corp [1976] CthArbRp 1465; 11 ALR 599, 609 per Smithers and Evatt JJ; Stephens v Barrie Charles Holdings Pty Ltd 157 QGIG 138, 143; Byrnes v Treloar [1997] NSWSC 629; (1997) 77 IR 332, 336 per Stein J.

[12] Winter v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 350; Luna v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 419.

[13] Johnston & Ors v Carroll (Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service) & Anor; Witthahn & Ors v Wakefield (Chief Executive of Hospital and Health Services and Director General of Queensland Health); Sutton & Ors v Carroll (Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service) [2024] QSC 2, [138]-[139], [224]-[225], [266]-[267].

[14] Australian Government (Department of Health and Aged Care) Covid-19 vaccine advice and recommendations for 2024 (Web Page) .

[15] Australian Government (Department of Health and Aged Care) Is it true? Get the facts on Covid-19 vaccines (Web Page) .

[16] [2023] QIRC 262.