Squash Vision Pty Ltd ATF Londy Family T/A Mayfair Dry Cleaners v Carroll [2025] QCATA 84

(a) the jacket was examined for areas of discolouration. There is no evidence of heat or chemical damage. The discolouration is the result of flattening of the fibres on the fabric.

(b) the surface of the fabric has been exposed to excess pressure during pressing.

• [8] The report explained that precautions must be taken when pressing the type of fabric from which the jacket was made because excessive steam and pressure will alter its appearance by causing impressions to form in the fabric. The report further stated that this adverse condition usually develops if excess pressure is applied during pressing or if the fabric is vacuumed while the press head is down. The condition may also develop if the press pads are not in good condition.

• [9] The respondent filed an application for a minor civil dispute - consumer dispute in the Tribunal which proceeded to a hearing before an adjudicator on 30 August 2023. Mr Emmanuel Londy is the owner of the applicant business and appeared on its behalf at the hearing.
• [10] At the hearing Mr Londy emphasised the importance of ITAL physically inspecting the jacket rather than forming an opinion based on photographs alone.[1] He argued that fusing glues within the inner layers of the jacket may have caused the changes to its colour and appearance.
• [11] To assuage Mr Londy's concerns, the Tribunal made an order requiring the respondent to deliver the jacket to the applicant so it could be sent to ITAL for a further expert opinion about the cause of the damage.
• [12] When the matter returned to the to the Tribunal for a second day of hearing on 9 January 2024, it became apparent that the applicant had not complied with the Tribunal's orders to send the jacket to ITAL. Instead, Mr Londy took it upon himself to dry clean the jacket, purportedly because the ITAL report suggested that the damage could be improved by heavily steaming the affected areas then brushing fabric using no head pressure. Additionally, Mr Londy claimed that after drycleaning the jacket it exhibited no shine.
• [13] At the hearing the applicant also relied on an email from Howard Duffy who is purportedly a Technical Officer at DIA. In that email, Mr Duffy opined that the applicant did not damage the jacket, that the jacket was not new and that if was new, it had a "fair bit of wear". He attributed the areas of discolouration on the garment to abrasion, which he opined could not be caused by the dry-cleaning process.
• [14] The Tribunal ultimately found in the respondent's favour. It ordered the applicant to pay the respondent the sum of $7,890.60 within 14 days. It further ordered that the respondent deliver the jacket to the applicant upon the applicant paying that sum.
• [15] In reaching the above decision, the Tribunal placed significant weight on the ITAL report. The Tribunal preferred the respondent's evidence over that of Mr Londy because the learned Adjudicator opined that she gave her evidence in a "straightforward and truthful manner" and "was able to answer questions along the way".[2] In contrast, the Tribunal found that Mr Londy obfuscated, wasn't upfront and was attempting to avoid responsibility for the damage.[3] The Tribunal rejected Mr Londy's explanation for not sending the jacket to ITAL.

• [16] The applicant's grounds of appeal are imprecisely articulated in its application for leave to appeal or appeal, but doing my best to decipher that document I deduce that the applicant contends the following:

(a) Ground 1 - the learned adjudicator failed to take into account that after the applicant dry cleaned the jacket a second time it exhibited no shine and was therefore undamaged.

(b) Ground 2 - when calculating damages, the learned adjudicator failed to apply a discount for betterment which she ought to have done because of the jacket's age.

(c) Ground 3 - the learned adjudicator erroneously reversed the onus of proof by requiring the applicant to prove that the damage was caused by a defect in the jacket's materials or the manufacturer's cleaning instructions.

(d) Ground 4 - the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness by deciding the matter without first sending the jacket to ITAL for analysis.

• [17] This is an appeal from a minor civil dispute proceeding. Therefore, the applicant is required to obtain the Tribunal's leave to appeal.[4] Leave may be granted where:

(a) there is an important point of law or question of general public importance.[5]

(b) where an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice to the applicant and there is a reasonable argument that there is an error to be corrected.[6]

• [18] I do not consider that this appeal raises an important point of law or question of general importance. It raises conventional questions that are commonly encountered in the Tribunal's minor civil dispute jurisdiction. Further, I do not consider that the appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice to the applicant, or that there is an error to be corrected, for the following reasons.
• [19] Concerning the first ground of appeal, aside from Mr Londy's assertions, the applicant did not put before the Tribunal below any persuasive evidence that the jacket was undamaged after it was cleaned a second time. In the absence of such evidence, the learned adjudicator was entitled to conclude that the jacket remained damaged on the date of the final hearing.
• [20] Secondly, there is no substance to the applicant's contention that the learned adjudicator failed to account for the age of the jacket. The learned adjudicator plainly accepted the applicant's evidence that she only wore the jacket twice before entrusting it to the respondent. That factual finding by the Tribunal below should not be disturbed unless "it is demonstrated to be wrong" by "incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony", or it is "glaringly improbable" or "contrary to compelling inferences".[7] Here, the applicant did not put before the Tribunal any evidence that the jacket was not almost new or that it had depreciated in value. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal below merely placed the respondent in the same position as if the applicant had not damaged the jacket.
• [21] Concerning the third ground of appeal. Although the learned adjudicator did not refer to any specific provision of the Australian Consumer Law in her decision, it is implicit that the Tribunal below was satisfied that the respondent discharged the evidentiary burden of proving that the applicant had not taken reasonable steps to avoid causing loss or damage when providing a service. There was sufficient probative evidence before the Tribunal below, in the form of the initial ITAL report, for it to make such a finding. At that point, the onus shifted to the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that an alternative probable cause for the damage existed. Plainly, it failed to do. There is no substance to the applicant's contentions that the learned adjudicator reversed the onus of proof.
• [22] Lastly, there is no merit to the applicant's contentions that the Tribunal denied it procedural fairness by deciding the matter without sending the jacket to ITAL for further testing. To the contrary, the learned adjudicator adjourned the hearing to afford the applicant the opportunity to take such a step. Upon the matter returning to the Tribunal, the applicant provided no plausible reason for failing to do so.
• [23] It has been said that "the requirement of leave effectively represents no more than a means of efficiently disposing of prospective appeals which would obviously fail".[8] The present appeal aptly satisfies that criterion. For the reasons above, I am not persuaded that there is a reasonable argument that there is an error to be corrected. Accordingly, leave to appeal is refused.

[1] Hearing Transcript (30.08.23), p 13 line 15, p 21 line 13.

[2] Hearing Transcript (09.01.24), p 6 line 40.

[3] Hearing Transcript (09.01.24), p 5 line 20.

[4] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 142(3)(a)(i).

[5] Younan v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCA 1.

[6] Smith v Ash [2010] QCA 112, [50]; Costigan v Marshall [2010] QCA 344.

[7] Robinson Helicopter Company Incorporated v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; (2016) 90 ALJR 679, [43] (French CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

[8] Coulter v R (1988) 164 CLR 350 (Deane and Gaudron JJ).