austlii:nsw/NSWPIC/2025/337
General information, not legal advice.
NSWPIC
2025-07-15
Original judgment source is linked above.
Skarlis v Southford Pty Ltd [2025] NSWPIC 337
WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workers Compensation Act 1987 (1987 Act) (1998 Act); worker at fish farm suffered a serious laceration to her thigh in 2018 which became infected; consequential back and right hip injuries; worker returned to work and suffered a further injury in 2021 when she lost her balance and fell, aggravating the injury to her back and leading to surgery; permanent impairment claim; only one assessment of permanent impairment sought; , , and ; remitted for referral to Medical Assessor with 2018 date of injury.
Body parts/system: lumbar spine; nervous system; right lower extremity (thigh and hip), and scarring (TEMSKI).
(a) the Application to Resolve a Dispute;
(b) the Reply;
(c) Ms Skarlis' Application to Lodge Additional Documents dated 6 June 2025, and
(d) this Certificate of Determination.
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE PERSONAL INJURY COMMISSION
(a) Application to Resolve a Dispute and attached documents (ARD);
(b) Reply, and
(c) Ms Skarlis' Application to Lodge Additional Documents dated 6 June 2025.
"...Bilateral facet joint arthrosis at L5/Sl, L4/5, 13/4 particularly on the left.
At L3/4, left bony foraminal narrowing due to facet joint hypertrophy and disc bulging into left foramen. No disc protrusion. No disc degeneration.
At L4/5, bilateral facet joint hypertrophy and bony foraminal narrowing and generalised disc bulging with foraminal narrowing Mild central canal stenosis.
At L5/Sl, no foraminal narrowing. No disc protrusion.
Facet joint arthrosis in lower lumbar spine as described.
Bilateral bony foraminal narrowing at L13/4 and L4/5, being most marked on the left at L3/4. This is associated with the most advanced facet joint arthrosis on the left at L3/4.
Back pain will most likely related to the facet joint arthrosis."
"in distress due to threatening calls from case manager that she must work 3 days/week, although it is written that she has incapacity due to walking on pontoons with leg injury."
"...discussed her leg, as he was asked only to look at capacity with her leg but in the end he agreed to mention if she is incapacitated by the other injury she still can't do job seeking."
"..sustained two injuries at work as per your letter dated 23 March 2023. I believe that Mrs Skarlis injured her back when she fell through the pontoon at work on 7 February 2018. Unfortunately, she had a distracting injury, which was the significant injury to the right leg, and thereby the back injury was not significantly noted at the time, but obviously would have been further exacerbated by the second injury on 25 March 2021. Apparently, Mrs Skarlis had complained of significant back pain prior to the second injury, that is, after the first injury, but this complaint had not been acted upon."
"Ms Skarlis told me of an injury which occurred in 2018 when she fell from a height onto milk crates, with the development of a serious laceration in her right anterior thigh and development of low back pain. She developed an infection in the laceration and required a considerable amount of management before the wound was healed and she has been left with residual hypoaesthesia and sensitivity to touch in the area of the wound. The low back pain which developed at the time of the injury in 2018 continued but was not of such severity that she was not able to return to her work on the farm.
She was undertaking full-time, full duties at the time of the second injury that occurred in March 2021 at Hongrong [sic]. She fell backwards on a pontoon, having lost her balance, and landed with one leg extending between the pontoons and her back landing on the pontoon. She had an increase in low back pain.
The back pain became more of a problem after the 2018 injury when her walking was affected as she recovered from the laceration of the right thigh. It was the events of 2021 with the fall on the pontoon that significantly aggravated her back. She has not been able to work since that time."
"On 25 March 2021 while walking on the floating pontoon, carrying a bucket and fishnet in her hands, she lost balance on her injured right leg, 'the pontoon was uneven, had a depression in it' she recalled."
"reported linear intra-substance tear and a small narrow posterior full thickness tear of the gluteus minimus tendon, probably a narrow linear tear of the gluteus medius, increased uptake at the right greater trochanter suggestive of active bursitis."
"Significant ongoing back pain and pain at the right hip had recently resulted in the MRI scan of the hip which suggested pathology that would relate to the gluteal muscles and right trochanteric bursitis for which she should have attention from an Orthopaedic Surgeon."
"Doctor compiled all WPIs at 19% and did not distinguish between impact of the 2 injuries. It is not clear why the 2 were accumulated, noting that there were 2 separate injuries."
"Right Hip. Tender greater trochanter. Limp. Full movement. Difficult ambulation. No sciatic symptoms."
"I found evidence of trochanteric bursitis, difficult to relate it to one or the other injury. My impression is that it is more likely to be linked to the first. The second was complicated by sciatic symptoms from the spine. The direct injury to the right thigh is more likely to be causing trochanteric bursitis."
"I did not find evidence of lumbar spine injury continuing. Healed, 0% WPI."
"In Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington at [84] I said (Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing) that '[a] court should not act upon an expert opinion the basis for which is not explained by the witness expressing it_'._ In so saying, I referred with approval (inter alia) to Heydon JA's analysis of the admissibility of expert evidence in Makita (Australia) Pty Limited v Sprowles (at [59] - [82]). In that case (at [59]) Heydon JA cited with apparent approval Lord President Cooper's statement in Davie v The Lord Provost, Magistrates and Councillors of the City of Edinburgh (1953) SC 34 at 39-40 that:
'... the bare ipse dixit of a scientist, however eminent, upon the issue in controversy, will normally carry little weight, for it cannot be tested by cross-examination nor independently appraised, and the parties have invoked the decision of a judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement by an expert.'
This statement is apposite in the context of Commission hearings, and, indeed, is implicitly recognised in r 70. While it must be recognised that '[t]here is no legal right to cross-examine an applicant or other witness in the Workers Compensation Commission and decisions whether to allow cross-examination or to limit it are discretionary' (Aluminium Louvres & Ceilings Pty Limited v Xue Qin Zheng [2006] NSWCA 34 at [37]), the fact that cross-examination of an expert witness may be permitted indicates the desirability of expert reports conforming as far as possible to common law standards of admissibility designed to ensure they have probative value. Even if that is too stringent an approach in the face of s 354, as the rules recognise, evidence must be 'logical and probative' and 'unqualified opinions are unacceptable'.
In my view Dr Rivett's statement that 'in general all the problems are work-related' which the Arbitrator accepted in concluding that the respondent's duties were sufficient to cause her injury (apparently within the meaning of s 16) amounted to a bare ipse dixit. It was not probative of the issue before the Arbitrator."
"The result of the cases is that each case where causation is in issue in a workers' compensation claim, must be determined on its own facts. Whether death or incapacity results from a relevant work injury is a question of fact. The importation of notions of proximate cause by the use of the phrase 'results from', is not now accepted. By the same token, the mere proof that certain events occurred which predisposed a worker to subsequent injury or death, will not, of itself, be sufficient to establish that such incapacity or death 'results from' a work injury. What is required is a commonsense evaluation of the causal chain. As the early cases demonstrate, the mere passage of time between a work incident and subsequent incapacity or death, is not determinative of the entitlement to compensation. In each case, the question whether the incapacity or death 'results from' the impugned work injury (or in the event of a disease, the relevant aggravation of the disease), is a question of fact to be determined on the basis of the evidence, including, where applicable, expert opinions. Applying the second principle which Hart and Honoré identify, a point will sometimes be reached where the link in the chain of causation becomes so attenuated that, for legal purposes, it will be held that the causative connection has been snapped. This may be explained in terms of the happening of a novus actus. Or it may be explained in terms of want of sufficient connection. But in each case, the judge deciding the matter, will do well to return, as McHugh JA advised, to the statutory formula and to ask the question whether the disputed incapacity or death 'resulted from' the work injury which is impugned."
(1) The assessment of the degree of permanent impairment of an injured worker for the purposes of the Workers Compensation Acts is to be made in accordance with Workers Compensation Guidelines (as in force at the time the assessment is made) issued for that purpose.
(2) Impairments that result from the same injury are to be assessed together to assess the degree of permanent impairment of the injured worker.
(3) Impairments that result from more than one injury arising out of the same incident are to be assessed together to assess the degree of permanent impairment of the injured worker.
"The word 'injury', as used in the 1987 Act, can have two, possibly three meanings: the injurious event, the pathology and, possibly, injury meaning 'condition' (Holdlen Pty Ltd v Walsh [2000] NSWCA 87 at [33]). The sense in which the term 'injury' is used will depend on its context (Georgopoulos v Silaforts Painting Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 179 at [73]). In a claim for lump sum compensation under s 66, the context is a claim for lump sum compensation for the whole person impairment that has resulted from the relevant pathology that has resulted from the particular work incident upon which the worker has sued. The authorities are clear that, in context, the relevant 'injury' in s 66 is the pathology.
As was explained by Giles JA (Hodgson JA and Brownie AJA agreeing) in Wyong Shire Council v Paterson [2005] NSWCA 74 at [38], the description of how the injury was received, for example, due to a frank injury or due to repetitive activities (often, though unhelpfully, referred to as a 'nature and conditions claim') 'are descriptions of mechanisms for suffering an injury'. In other words, an 'incident' (an injurious event) is only a mechanism for suffering an injury and is not itself a s 4 injury. The relevant 'injury' in s 4 is therefore the pathology that has arisen out of or been received in the course of the employment.
Gleeson CJ and Kirby J in Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska [2000] HCA 45; 200 CLR 286 held that a 'personal injury' is 'a sudden and ascertainable or dramatic physiological change or disturbance of the normal physiological state'. The cause of the injury (the injurious event) is "not the important matter" (Latham CJ in Ward v Corrimal-Balgownie Collieries Ltd [1938] HCA 70; 61 CLR 120 at 129) in determining the compensation payable. (Obviously, however, the cause of the injury, and the circumstances in which it is received, will be important in determining if the injury was received in circumstances giving rise to an entitlement to compensation under the legislation. His Honour was saying that the important matter is the consequence of the injury, both in terms of pathology and in terms of the economic consequences.)"
"... the appellant invoked, and placed heavy reliance on, the decision of Malcolm CJ in State Government Insurance Commission v Oakley (1990) 10 MVR 570; [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-003. In that case, the Chief Justice identified three categories where the issue of causation involves consideration of the effect or impact of a subsequent injury on the determination of the cause of an earlier injury (or, perhaps more accurately, the assessment of damages consequential upon an earlier injury). The observations were made in the context of proceedings at common law in which negligence is alleged, but are equally applicable to the assessment of the degree of permanent impairment resulting from injury under no-fault legislation such as the WC Act. His Honour identified the three categories as:
'(1) where the further injury results from a subsequent accident, which would not have occurred had the plaintiff not been in the physical condition caused by the defendant's negligence, the added damage should be treated as caused by that negligence;
(2) where the further injury results from a subsequent accident, which would have occurred had the plaintiff been in normal health, but the damage sustained is greater because of aggravation of the earlier injury, the additional damage resulting from the aggravated injury should be treated as caused by the defendant's negligence; and
(3) where the further injury results from a subsequent accident which would have occurred had the plaintiff been in normal health and the damage sustained include no element of aggravation of the earlier injury, the subsequent accident and further injury should be regarded as causally independent of the first.' "
"Two causation tests are involved in a medical assessment of permanent impairment under Pt 7 of Ch 7 of the Management Act. The first test arises from the provisions of ss 9 and 9A of Compensation Act. That is to say, it must be shown that the injury that gave rise to the impairment in question arose out of or in the course of employment that and that the employment was a substantial contributing factor to the injury. The second test arises from the provisions of ss 319(c) and 326(1)(a) of the Management Act. That is to say, it must be shown that the permanent impairment is as a result of the injury.
The phrase 'the degree of permanent impairment of the person as a result of an injury' appears in both ss 319(c) and s 326(1)(a) of the Management Act. That composite phrase requires an enquiry as to the causal connection between the degree, or percentage, of assessed permanent impairment of a worker, on the one hand, and the compensable injury, on the other. That is to say, it was necessary for the AMS and the Appeal Panel to assess the degree, or percentage, of whole person impairment of the Worker that was caused by or is attributable to the First Injury. In doing so, common law principles of causation in tort are to be applied.' "
"First, Ms Ozcan submitted that the Deputy President was correct to add the WPI percentages referable to the thoracic and lumbar spine injuries suffered in the second and third incidents to those suffered in the first incident because those subsequent injuries were materially contributed to by the spinal injuries suffered in the first incident. As the Deputy President held (at [129]-[130]), this causal connection placed the injuries in the second category described in State Government Insurance Commission v Oakley (1990) 10 MVR 570 at 573. That second category was identified in Oakley as one 'where the further injury results from a subsequent accident, which would have occurred had the plaintiff been in normal health, but the damage sustained is greater because of aggravation of the earlier injury [with the result that] the additional damage resulting from the aggravated injury should be treated as caused by the defendant's negligence'(at 573). This approach is simply an application of s 65(1) of the 1987 Act that describes the degree of permanent impairment for which compensation is payable as that which 'results' from the injury in question and s 65(2) which requires injuries 'arising out of the same incident ... to be treated as one injury ...'.
Secondly Ms Ozcan argued that, in these circumstances, it was clear that both the right shoulder injury and the thoracic and lumbar spinal injuries 'resulted from' and 'arose out of' the first incident: the first spinal injuries and the shoulder injury admittedly did so and the effect of the first step in Ms Ozcan's argument (see [14] above) was that the spinal injuries suffered in the second and third incidents also did so. In consequence, they should all have been "treated as one injury" and "assessed together", as directed by s 65(2) of the 1987 Act and s 322(3) of the 1998 Act, leading to a 15% WPI finding.
The Deputy President reached a different conclusion because she found that the right shoulder injury 'did not materially contribute to the impairments of the lumbar or thoracic spine and was not the same injury (pathology)' (see [145] and [150] quoted in [11] above). This was not however, with respect, the issue that needed to be addressed. The relevant question was whether the later spinal injuries resulted from those suffered on the first date. If they did, s 322(3) of the 1998 Act required them to be assessed with the impairment arising out of the right shoulder injury because the injuries all arose out of the same incident, that is, that of 14 November 2011."
"Section 65(2) of the 1987 Act is to the same effect as s 322(3) of the 1998 Act - under the former, injuries arising out of the same incident are to be treated as one injury and under the latter, impairments resulting from more than one injury arising out of the same incident are to be assessed together."
[1] (1994) 35 NSWLR 452; (1994) 10 NSWCCR 796 at [461G].
[4] Mason v Demasi [2009] NSWCA 227 at [2].
[5] [2007] NSWCA 16 at [130]- [132].
Skarlis
Southford Pty Ltd [2025] NSWPIC 337;
(1990) 10 MVR 570
(1994) 35 NSWLR 452
(1994) 10 NSWCCR 796