Singleton v Direct Personnel Services Pty Ltd & Anor

Mr B Charrington KC with Dr K Roche for the plaintiff

Mr M Hickey OAM KC with Ms A Crawford for the second defendant

• [1] This is the costs decision following the decision given in Singleton v Direct Personnel Services and Anor.[1]
• [2] On 13 October 2025, the Court ordered:

(a) Judgment for the plaintiff against the first defendant in the sum of $433,056.28 (inclusive of the Workcover refund of $81,276.60).

(b) Judgment for the plaintiff against the second defendant in the sum of $490,429.05 (inclusive of the Workcover refund of $81,276.60).

(c) Pursuant to section 6(c) of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), the first defendant recover contribution from the second defendant in the sum of $324,792.21, being 75% of the judgment against the first defendant.

• [3] On 3 December 2021, the plaintiff and the first defendant made a mandatory final offer to the second defendant to settle the claim for $500,000 inclusive of the Workcover refund and other statutory refunds but plus costs and outlays. The first defendant offered to contribute $110,000 inclusive of the Workcover refund to the combined sum. The second defendant offered nil to the plaintiff and nil to the first defendant.

• [4] The plaintiff submits that as regards the first defendant, the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (WCRA) operates as a code regarding costs. The common law principles apply to the second defendant, subject to any statutory modification under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (PIPA) or the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR).
• [5] The plaintiff and first defendant made a joint mandatory final offer of $500,000 to the second defendant on 3 December 2021. The second defendant's offer was nil. It is submitted the plaintiff was required to pursue both defendants at trial by reason of the second defendant's denial of liability and offer of nil. It is submitted the second defendant should pay the plaintiff's costs on the standard basis and the costs of pursuing the first defendant on the standard basis. The employment of two counsel was reasonable in the circumstances of the trial.

• [6] The first defendant is not seeking costs against the plaintiff or the second defendant.

• [7] The second defendant submits that the plaintiff's costs should be awarded against it on the District Court scale and that two counsel were not necessary. It is submitted that acceptance of the joint offer would have required a payment by the second defendant of $380,000 and the judgment sum is less than the joint offer. The quantum of damages here was within the jurisdiction of the District Court and therefore costs should be awarded on the District Court scale. The second defendant should not be ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs associated with the claim against the first defendant because it was not necessary for the plaintiff to pursue its claim against the first defendant. It could have accepted the offer of $110,000. It was also reasonable for the second defendant to pursue its defence given the plaintiff's credit issues; the fact the plaintiff was not forthcoming at trial concerning his international travel and the pursuit of the third-party claim.

• [8] The plaintiff's entitlement to costs in this case as against the first defendant is regulated by the provisions of the WCRA.[2] The award of costs against the second defendant is subject to common law principles; subject of course to any regulation by PIPA[3] or the UCPR.
• [9] Rule 681 UCPR provides that the usual rule is that costs follow the event. In this particular case, there is no reason why the plaintiff should not have his costs as against the second defendant. The fact is the second defendant made no offer to resolve this case and the plaintiff was forced to pursue the second defendant at trial.
• [10] However, r 697 UCPR provides:

(3) Subrule (4) applies if the only relief obtained by a plaintiff in a proceeding in the Supreme Court is relief that, when the proceeding began, could have been given by the District Court, but not a Magistrates Court.

(4) The costs the plaintiff may recover must be assessed as if the proceeding had been started in the District Court, unless the court orders otherwise."

• [11] I accept the second defendant's submission that the costs should be awarded on the District Court scale. The amount recovered was well under an award which could have been made by the District Court at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. Also, one must bear in mind that the plaintiff was not forthcoming prior to trial about his international travel and gym work.
• [12] The next issue is whether the costs for two counsel should be recovered.
• [13] Rule 702(2) UCPR provides that a costs assessor must allow all costs necessary or proper for the attainment of justice.
• [14] In Wiesac Pty Ltd v Insurance Australia Ltd (No 3)[4], Flanagan J noted with reference to Stanley v Phillips[5] that the question is whether the presentation of a case to ensure a just determination reasonably requires the services of more than one counsel. It is the nature and circumstances of the case that are to be considered. Relevant circumstances are:

(a) The volume of material.

(b) The number or character of witnesses.

(c) The nature and extent of the cross examination.

(d) The anticipated length of the case.

(e) The complexity of the issues of fact and law.

(f) The extent of preparation.

(g) The involvement of charges of fraud or other serious imputations.

(h) The complexity of the required presentation.

• [15] I accept the plaintiff's submissions that costs should be recovered for two counsel.
• [16] The following factors are present here:

(a) The plaintiff, the second defendant and the first third party[6] had both senior and junior counsel. It may be inferred that the case was thought to be of sufficient complexity to require two counsel.

(b) Originally there were two third parties.[7]

(c) The trial took eight days.

(d) The case was reasonably complex as to the issues of liability, quantum, contribution and indemnity. The indemnity issues were said to be complex, involving not only the issue of contract but also damages for pure economic loss.[8]

(e) The cross examination of the plaintiff was extensive and occurred over two days.

(f) A number of other witnesses were called, including several medical experts.

(g) I accept there was a division of labour between senior and junior counsel in terms of preparation.

(h) The final submissions of the plaintiff were 29 pages, the first defendant 28 pages and the second defendant 64 pages.

• [17] I consider the employment of two counsel was necessary for the attainment of justice in this case.
• [18] The final issue is whether the second defendant should pay the plaintiff's costs of pursing the first defendant.
• [19] The plaintiff has referred to a number of single judge decisions regarding this but of course, each case depends on its own facts. It is a discretionary matter.
• [20] It is to be noted that the Court of Appeal has held that the WCRA does not preclude an order that a host employer defendant pay the plaintiff's unrecoverable costs relating to his proceeding against the employer defendant.[9]
• [21] Similarly, McMeekin J in Paskins v Hail Creek Coal Pty Ltd & Anor (No 2)[10] held that s 316 of the WCRA did not operate as against a party, other than the employer, and ordered the non-employer to pay the costs the plaintiff incurred in pursuing the employer.[11]
• [22] I accept the plaintiff's submissions. By reason of the defences of the second defendant[12] and the second defendant's offer of settlement of nil, the plaintiff was required to pursue both defendants in the present litigation. This position is to be contrasted with the first defendant's position, which was to agree to making a joint offer with the plaintiff, marginally in excess of the judgment ordered against the second defendant.
• [23] The plaintiff was put to the onus and expense of pursuing both defendants to judgment. This was because of the approach to the litigation taken by the second defendant.
• [24] One can understand why the plaintiff did not accept the first defendant's offer and proceed to trial only against the second defendant, in light of the allegations made by the second defendant against the first defendant.
• [25] The expense to which the plaintiff was put in pursing the first defendant employer is an expense that properly falls to be compensated by way of an order against the second defendant for costs.

• [26] In all of the circumstances I make the following orders:
  1. The second defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of and incidental to the proceedings on a standard basis on the District Court scale to be agreed or assessed.
  2. The second defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of and incidental to pursuing the first defendant in the proceedings on a standard basis on the District Court scale to be agreed or assessed.
  3. The plaintiff's costs be assessed on the basis that the fees of two counsel (senior and junior counsel) should be regarded as costs necessary and proper for the trial and the preparation for the trial.

[1] [2025] QSC 259.

[3] s 56.

[4] [2021] QSC 69; (2021) 7 QR 642 at [15]- [17].

[5] [1966] HCA 24; (1966) 115 CLR 470 at pages 478-480.

[6] Claim against the first third party was discontinued during the trial.

[7] Claim against the second third party was discontinued prior to the commencement of the trial.

[8] Submission of Mr Campbell KC transcript day 4 page 60.

[9] Hays Specialist Recruitment (Australia) Pty Ltd & Anor v Carey Schofield [2025] QCA 161 at [279].

[10] [2017] QSC 213; [2018] 2 Qd R 518 at [14], [15], [19].

[11] Also note- this reasoning was approved by Applegarth J in Thomson v State of Queensland & Anor (No 2) [2019] QSC 115; [2019] 3 Qd R 514 at [16]- [19].

[12] See paragraphs 5, 8(b)(iii), 11, 15(g)(iv), 15(i)(i)(B), 15 (j), 15(k), 15(l)(iii), 15(u)(iii), 15(w)(iii),15(z)(v) of the second defendant's defence.