Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 258

(General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to

r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law)

1. This decision is about whether the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made a jurisdictional error when it affirmed a decision of a delegate of then Minister for Home Affairs (Delegate), to cancel the Applicant's Temporary Work (Skilled) (class UC) (subclass 457) visa (Work Visa).
2. For the reasons that follow, this Court has determined that no jurisdictional error arises from the Tribunal's decision.
3. Consequently, the application for judicial review must be dismissed.

1. The background to this matter is derived from the submissions of the parties and, unless otherwise indicated, does not appear to be in dispute.

1. The Applicant is a citizen of India who was granted a Work Visa on 17 May 2016, due to cease on 17 May 2020.[1]The Applicant was sponsored by Moj Malik Pty Ltd (Sponsor); this nomination was approved on the same day that the Work Visa was granted.[2]
2. On 12 February 2019, a delegate of the then Minister for Home Affairs (Delegate) sent the Applicant notice of the Minister's intention to consider cancellation of the Work Visa (NOICC).6 The NOICC was issued because the Department became aware that the Applicant appeared not to have complied with Condition 8107 (specifically, subclause (3)(b)) of his visa.[3] Subclause 8107(3)(b) states that if the visa holder ceases employment, the period during which they cease employment must not exceed 90 consecutive days. The Department received written notification from the Sponsor advising that the Applicant had ceased employment with them effective 22 May 2018. This period exceeded 90 consecutive days.[4]
3. The Applicant was required to provide a response to the NOICC within five working days of receipt, addressing why the visa should not be cancelled and providing evidence in relation to the impugned breach identified in the NOICC.[5]
4. On 13 February 2019, the Applicant responded to the NOICC.[6] The response is reproduced as follows:

...

This restaurant is owned by Mandeep chillar. he is running this business. He offered me a nomination of cook for sponsorship in 2016 in his restaurant. When i just complete my study of hospitality and commercial cookery certificate 4. I applied my 457 visa as cook was issued in 17/05/2016.

And i left this restaurant in 22/05/2018.

Somewhere the grounds does not exists for cancellation and should not cancel my visa because:-

The reason i give you in these 3 points

1. During these two years time period, I forced by Mandeep chillar to work for up to 56-70 hrs a week. My guaranteed annual earning was $54000.

$849.27 a week but Mandeep chillar force me to give him $400 returns as cash in hand every single week for continuously 2 years. which was illegal. i was getting only $450 working after 65-70 hrs a week.

2. Hardly i got 3 weeks holidays in 2 year time period to see my family, no personal leaves(49.54 hrs),no annual leaves (41.08 hrs).

3. I been through mentally harassment by him every single day on work place.

He threatened me to report to cancel my visa Otherwise demanded $30,000 cash in hand which is again highly illegal.

Overall, my employer break all the rules and condition illegally for 457 visa just for money. He did create such type of situations for me to left the business.

Still am looking for other cook nomination, whenever, i found will report it to immigration to update my visa status.

1. On 5 March 2019, the visa was cancelled by the Delegate. This power is conferred on the Minister (and their Delegates by extension)[7] by s 116(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).[8]
2. The reasons for the Delegate's exercise of discretion to cancel the visa were as follows:

(a) subclause 8107(3)(b) states that if the visa holder ceases employment, the period during which they cease employment must not exceed 90 consecutive days;

(b) the Department received written notification from the Sponsor advising the Applicant ceased employment with them effective 22 May 2018;

(c) the Applicant agreed to this information in his response to the NOICC;

(d) there was no evidence before the Department that indicated that since the cessation of his employment, the visa holder had been nominated by an approved sponsor to work for them in a nominated position;

(e) based on this information the visa holder had ceased employment with the sponsor for a period exceeding 90 consecutive days; and

(f) therefore visa holder's subclass 457 visa was liable for cancellation under paragraph 116(1)(b) as the visa holder had not complied with subclause (3)(b) of Condition 8107.[9]

1. By operation the Act, this Court has no power to review the decision of the Delegate.[10]

1. On 8 March 2019, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision. The Applicant was assisted by a registered migration agent from Slight Edge Migration.[11]
2. On 12 June 2019, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend a hearing scheduled for 1 August 2019.[12]
3. On 15 July 2019, the Applicant's representative wrote to the Tribunal, requesting an adjournment in order to gather evidence in support of the allegations the Applicant had made about the Sponsor. The Applicant's representative also informed the Tribunal that the Applicant had been in contact with Fair Work and the 457 Sponsoring Monitoring Unit.[13]
4. On 17 July 2019, the Tribunal refused the adjournment request.[14]
5. On 23 July 2019, the Applicant's representative provided written submissions and evidence in the form of 13 attachments.[15] The submissions can be summarised as follows:

(a) the Applicant was subjected to illegal working conditions and underpayment by the Sponsor;

(b) he was threatened by the Sponsor (including threatened with harm if he returned to India) and forced to pay the Sponsor back half his salary;

(c) the Applicant's working conditions forced him to terminate his employment with the Sponsor;

(d) the Applicant made complaints to Fair Work and the Immigration authorities (and had an interview scheduled at Fair Work);

(e) the Applicant conceded he did not comply with Condition 8107, however made efforts to secure another sponsor; and

(f) the Applicant requested that the Tribunal exercise their discretion to quash the Department's cancellation decision and reinstate his visa.

1. The Applicant's evidence was as follows:[16]

(1) correspondence from QLD Program Integrity Unit;

(2) an email from Fair Work;

(3) contract letter and documents;

(4) financials;

(5) payslips;

(6) a summary of the Applicant's complaint;

(7) time sheets;

(8) medical history;

(9) Whatsapp chat history from Aamaaya Restaurant; and

(10) three news articles detailing the exploitation of migrant workers in Australia.

1. On 1 August 2019, the Applicant attended the scheduled hearing with his representative.[17] At the hearing, the Applicant handed up evidence including telephone records, and a Court Order issued against the Applicant, in response to him being convicted of using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence to the Sponsor.[18]
2. On 2 August 2019, the Applicant's representative provided post-hearing submissions (including attachments), which can be summarised as follows:[19]

(a) the Applicant conceded that the Court Order was not shared previously with the Department or the Tribunal, however he did refer to it in his complaint to the QLD Sponsoring Monitoring Unit on 25 June 2019, and made amends by providing it at the hearing;

(b) the Applicant accepted his wrongdoing, but argued that this should not negate the acts done by his former employer;

(c) the Applicant stated he had separated from his wife, Khushdeep Kaur; the Department was evidently aware of this from the NOICC letter;

(d) that the Applicant had (when still together) assisted Ms Kaur when she was a victim of domestic violence from her first husband;

(e) the Applicant alleged that Ms Kaur and the Sponsor were working together to remove the Applicant from Australia;

(f) provided attachments including:

(i) a Protection Order against Ms Kaur's first husband, with Ms Kaur being the aggrieved person and the Applicant named as a "relative of the aggrieved";

(ii) Ms Kaur's first marriage certificate;

(iii) the first page of the NOICC identifying the Applicant's marital status; and

(iv) Ms Kaur's visa grant notice.

1. On 6 August 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision to cancel the Applicant's Work Visa.[20] The Applicant was notified of the decision on 8 August 2019.[21]

1. The Tribunal's decision is 15 pages long and spans 76 paragraphs.
2. The Minister's representative summarised the Tribunal's reasons at paragraphs 34 to 44 of their outline of submissions filed on 13 November 2025. The Court as presently constituted has carefully read the Tribunal's reasons and accept the Minister's summary as comprehensive, fair and properly referenced. The Court adopts it for the purposes of this judgment (reproduced without citations):

34. The Tribunal outlined the following considerations:

a. the applicant has not worked in Australia for an approved sponsor since 22 May 2018 and he has not searched for work as a cook since departing sponsored employment. This was a matter of significance;

b. the applicant has had a lengthy period of time to seek an alternative nomination and pursue other visa options offshore. It is inconsistent with the purpose of the Subclass 457 visa to allow him to remain in Australia to work as a taxi driver whilst he awaits the outcome of his Fair Work Ombudsman complaint;

c. the Tribunal preferred the applicant's initial spontaneous evidence indicating that he did not wish to work as a cook again because of his fear of abuse and exploitation instead of his post facto attempt to advise that he wished to pursue that career. The Tribunal formed the view that the applicant lacks credibility;

d. the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant has been unable to find sponsored work as a cook because of his outstanding complaint with the Fair Work Ombudsman or that the applicant is precluded from providing further assistance offshore if his visa is cancelled, nor is he precluded from receiving unpaid wages offshore;

e. the Tribunal accepted that the applicant was suffering from depression, however was not satisfied that this circumstance accounted for him not having obtained a new approved sponsor 14 months after his cessation of employment with the original approved sponsor. This was also supported by the fact that the applicant was able to obtain a job as a taxi driver in June 2018;

35. The Tribunal considered that the factors outlined above weighed strongly in favour of cancelling the applicant's visa.

36. The Tribunal found that the applicant had breached condition 8107(3)(b) as he had ceased employment with an approved sponsor for more than 90 consecutive days, as well as condition 8107(3)(a) by working in the taxi industry from mid-2018 to March 2019 without a Bridging Visa. The Tribunal was of the view that the extent of the applicant's compliance with the visa conditions weighed strongly in favour of cancelling his visa.

37. The Tribunal also gave moderate weight to the circumstances surrounding the applicant's former wife, who maintained a Subclass 457 visa as a secondary applicant for a considerable amount of time following her separation from the applicant as the applicant did not bring this to the first respondent's attention until around the time of the NOICC.

38. The Tribunal made no finding as to the veracity of the applicant's claims against the owner of the sponsorship business but accepted that the ground for visa cancellation did not arise due to the actions of the applicant. The Tribunal found that the circumstance in which the ground for visa cancellation arose weighs moderately against cancelling the applicant's visa.

39. The Tribunal considered whether there was a compelling need for the applicant to remain in Australia and concluded that there was not, as it was satisfied that the Applicant would not lose his career or be unable to find work and re-establish himself in India. The Tribunal also considered the applicant's claim that he needed to repay debts, and was not satisfied that demonstrated a compelling need to remain in Australia as that was not the purpose of the Subclass 457 visa.

40. Addressing the applicant's claim that he needed to remain in Australia until the decision of the Fair Work Ombudsman, the Tribunal was not satisfied as the applicant had already been interviewed by an officer of the Ombudsman. Further, the applicant can maintain contact with the Ombudsman and receive unpaid wages from offshore. The Tribunal was not satisfied that there will be any prejudice to the progress of the applicant's investigations if his visa was cancelled.

41. The Tribunal accepted that visa cancellation might cause some hardship to the applicant, but was not satisfied that there was a compelling need for him to remain in Australia. The Tribunal noted that this consideration weighed neither in favour nor against cancelling his visa.

42. The Tribunal accepted that if the Tribunal affirmed the cancellation decision, the applicant's bridging visa would cease, and he would not have authority to remain in Australia. The Tribunal noted that visa cancellation may result in detention or removal. The Tribunal found the cancellation would unlikely attract the application of PIC 4013 and 4014 if the applicant applied for a temporary visa offshore given his circumstances, including that he obtained a Bridging Visa E shortly after his Subclass 457 visa was cancelled. On balance the Tribunal determined that this consideration weighed neither in favour nor against cancelling his visa.

43. Finally, the Tribunal considered Australia's international obligations. In doing so, it did not accept the veracity of the applicant's claims regarding purported threats made by the owner of the sponsorship business to him, including threats to harm him in India. The Tribunal found that the threats were not particularised by the applicant, he had never made a police report, he was the one found guilty of an offence against the owner of the sponsorship business and there were significant credibility concerns regarding the applicant. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant would suffer significant harm from the owner of the sponsorship business or from anyone else if his visa was cancelled. The Tribunal noted that this consideration weighed neither in favour nor against cancelling his visa.

44. On balance, the Tribunal found the matters favouring cancelling the visa outweighed all the various matters favouring not cancelling.

1. Based on the findings made by the Tribunal it affirmed the Delegate's decision to cancel the Work Visa.

1. On 3 September 2019, the Applicant applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision (Originating Application).
2. The Originating Application is brought pursuant to section 476 of the Act, which confers upon this court, in relation to migration decisions, the "same original jurisdiction as the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution". That is, the Court may undertake judicial review, in respect of matters "where a writ of mandamus or prohibition, or an injunction, is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth."[22]
3. The Originating Application was brought within the 35-day time limit prescribed by section 477(1) of the Act.
4. The Originating Application sought only to quash the decision of the Tribunal (writ of certiorari). The Originating Application was therefore deficient in not seeking a writ of mandamus. This Court invited the Applicant to amend his Originating Application. He accepted the invitation. The Minister did not oppose amendment. Consequently, at the hearing, to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, the following Order was made:

The application for judicial review, filed 3 September 2019, is amended to include a final order that a writ of mandamus be directed to the Tribunal requiring them to determine the Applicant's application according to law. Pursuant to r 1.10 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth), the procedures for amending an originating application enumerated in Division 8.3 be dispensed with.

1. The Originating Application contained two unparticularised grounds of review:
   1. Jurisdictional error
   2. Written affidavit explain the Jurisdictional error
2. On 3 September 2026 the Applicant also filed an Affidavit (3 September 2019 Affidavit). The 3 September 2019 Affidavit contains 39 paragraphs and 17 Annexures. In fairness to the Applicant the 3 September 2019 Affidavit is to be read as containing some of the Applicant's grounds of review. The 3 September 2019 Affidavit is addressed below.

1. On 19 September 2019, the First Respondent (Minister) filed its response opposing the orders sought by the Applicant. The Minister submitted that the Originating Application failed to articulate or establish any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
2. On 25 November 2022, the Minister filed a bundle of relevant documents (Court Book).
3. On 25 October 2024, the matter was ordered to be listed for final hearing. Further, a Registrar of this Court issued an Order (Registrar's Order) directing the:

(a) Applicant to file any amended application with proper particulars, written submissions and further evidence at least 28 days before the hearing; and

(b) Minister to file any written submissions and further evidence in reply at least 14 days before the hearing.

1. The Applicant did not, by the due date, file an amended application nor did he provide further particulars of the grounds for judicial review (other than the already filed 3 September 2019 Affidavit).
2. On 13 November 2025, the Minister complied with the Registrar's Order by filing written submissions.
3. On 24 November 2025, the Applicant was given leave to file submissions, which contained four particularised grounds. The additional grounds of review are addressed below.
4. On 6 February 2026, an Affidavit was provided to the Court by the Minister, containing confidential information and annexures (which before the Tribunal were the subject of the non-disclosure certificate).
5. Therefore, the materials before the Court are as follows:

(a) the Originating Application for judicial review filed 3 September 2019 (amended on 13 February 2026);

(b) the 3 September 2019 Affidavit (marked as Exhibit A1);

(c) a Court Book numbering 519 pages filed 25 November 2022 (marked as Exhibit R1);

(d) Written submissions filed by the Minister on 13 November 2025;

(e) Written submissions filed by the Applicant on 24 November 2025 (continuing additional grounds for review); and

(f) Affidavit filed by the Minister's representative on 6 February 2026.

(a) allocated to the Court as presently constituted on 13 October 2025; and

(b) heard on 13 February 2026 (via Webex).

1. At the hearing, the Applicant appeared before the Court without legal representation. He was assisted by a Hindi Interpreter. The Minister was represented by Jonathan Barrington of counsel, instructed by Mills Oakley.
2. The Court confirmed with the Applicant that he had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions.
3. To assist the Applicant, the Court explained that this Court can only turn its attention to the issue of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The Court explained that the possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap. For migration decisions of this sort, however, they most commonly include (but are not limited to) the following categories:

(1) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question;[23]

(2) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material;[24]

(3) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material;[25]

(4) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures;[26]

(5) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias;[27] and

(6) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable.[28]

1. It was also explained to the Applicant that this Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal's decision or grant the Applicant the visa they seek. Rather, the role of the Court is restricted to determining if the Tribunal made a material error in arriving at the decision it arrived at.[29]
2. The explanations provided to the Applicant were interpreted. Based on the Applicant's responses the Court is confident he properly comprehended the scope and purpose of the hearing.
3. Noting that the Applicant was unrepresented, the Court gave the Applicant an opportunity to elaborate on his grounds of review and to outline any other concerns he might have with the Tribunal's decision. This is now the standard procedure in this Court following the decision in Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection.[30]
4. Before this Court, the Applicant made submissions in support of the grounds set out in his application. Those submissions are considered below.
5. The Minister made submissions consistent with the outline of written submissions filed on 13 November 2025.
6. After the Minister made their submissions, the Court invited the Applicant to respond to what the Minister's representative had said. The Applicant made further submissions also considered below.

THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

1. In Bhasker v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[31] his Honour Judge Fary (as he was then known) summarised the role of the Court in judicial review proceedings:
   1. Section 476 of the Migration Act provides that the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under s 75(v) of the Constitution.
   2. Section 75(v) of the Constitution provides that the High Court has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Thus, subject to the statutory exceptions provided for in s 476 of the Migration Act, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Further, s 474 of the Migration Act does not preclude judicial review of decisions under the Migration Act where jurisdictional error is alleged.[32]
   3. "The task of the Court [in an application for judicial review] is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it." The court neither consider the merits of the decision nor remakes it.[33]
   4. The Court may grant relief if it is satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error.[34] Jurisdictional error by a statutory decision maker may manifest itself in a variety of ways. Recognised categories of jurisdictional error include "misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness".[35] Different kinds of error may overlap.[36] The categories are not closed.[37] The critical question is whether the decision maker has exceeded the authority or power conferred by the statute.[38]
   5. In most but not all cases, for an error to be jurisdictional, the error must be material to the decision being challenged. The test is whether there is a "realistic possibility" that the decision that was made "could" have been different, but for the error.[39] This is to be determined as "a matter of reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts that have been determined".[40] It has been described as an "undemanding" standard.[41]
2. The Court as presently constituted respectfully adopts his Honour's summary of the task before it.
3. Further, disagreement with a decision, even emphatic disagreement, does not of itself give rise to jurisdictional error.[42]

1. The Applicant's grounds of review are to be found in the 3 September 2019 Affidavit and his submissions filed on 21 November 2025.
2. At the hearing before the Court, the Applicant was invited to make further submissions about:

(a) why he believes the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error; and

(b) each of the grounds of review.

1. Starting with the 3 September 2019 Affidavit which ostensibly explains why jurisdictional error arose from the Tribunal's decision. The 39 paragraphs are reproduced below (without alteration):
   1. This matter relates to the cancellation of my Temporary Work (Skilled) (subclass 457) visa granted on 17 May 2016.
   2. I received a Notice of Intention to consider cancellation on 12 February 2019 and provided a response on 13 February 2019.
   3. My visa was cancelled on 5 March 2019.under section 116 of the Migration Act as it was found that I had not complied with subclause 8107(3)(b) of condition 8107 attached to my visa, but I was forced to do that.
   4. I came to Australia as an International student in January 2014 and during my time as an International student, I complied with all the conditions of my visa. After completion of my studies I started looking for options to gain work experience.
   5. The business sponsor who nominated my visa is Maj Malik Pty Ltd ATF Maj Malik Investments Trust trading as Aamaya Indian Restaurant (the sponsor). I got in touch with my employer as a response an advertisement he had placed. He asked me to come for an interview which I did and after that he took practical test as well. After all these formalities, he told me that he was happy to employ me and will sponsor me on a 457 visa.
   6. My nomination was approved and subsequently my 457 visa was granted on 17 May 2016 for the position of Cook (Australia and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations code: 351411 ).
   7. Once the visa was granted, my sponsor attitude changed immediately and he started treating me as bonded labour. He told me that if I did not do as I was told; he will cancel my visa.
   8. I was tormented, made to work extra hours without compensation, denied proper leave, was required to work on holidays on a fixed pay.
   9. Over and above working almost double the working hours. I was also forced to handover almost half of the money paid to me back to the owner. I did as what he was told. I had to return AUD 400 to him every week out of the fixed salary I got every week. I also had to borrow money from my father to pay my employer.
   10. I did not know how to address this issue and everyone I went to advised me that he had no hope. My employer took advantage of the fact that I was on a 457 visa and has threatened him that he will make sure that I am returned to India and he will get even with him in India.
   11. I was unable to take this torture and left work. I went through psychological problems as I was ridiculed in front of other staff members. I am still coping with that as I am not the same person I was. I feel depressed, ridiculed.
   12. My decision to leave my employer was forced upon me by my Employer who made life hell for me. In spite of working for about 55-70 hours a week instead of 38 hours, I was forced to borrow from my friends to make both ends meet. Even fifty percent of the money he paid me was taken back from him.
   13. After leaving him, I was unable to find another employer in 90 days and that closed all doors for him.
   14. My owner ref used to take any calls from me to sort this issue I wanted to ask him to pay me back all that was due. I tried to even do that after leaving him, but that did not help, and in my frustration I used foul language in a message. My owner then took me to court for that. I accepted that I used foul language and explained why I did that, but I was found guilty. This added to my problems and has put a mark on my character.
   15. My employer is also a man with a very bad character and he takes advantage of female staff.
   16. When my visa was cancelled, I took professional advice and was told that in my circumstances, I have avenues of reporting my situation to Immigration and fair work. I was also told that if I wanted to do that, I must collect documents to prove my story and I started doing that.
   17. I started collecting as many documents possible and contacted Immigration as well as Fairwork and in both places, am waiting for answers.
   18. My MT hearing was scheduled quickly which is out of the ordinary. I feel that my employer is trying to get me out of Australia.
   19. I requested my Migration agent to request MT for postponement of the hearing to give the two authorities (Immigration and Fairwork) time to address the issues. However, that was refused,
   20. My interview with Fairwork was scheduled on 22 July 2019 with Fairwork. However that was postponed by the Officer, and it finally took place on 25 July 2019.As of today, the matter is pending. The immigration authorities asked me to provide documentation to prove my allegations and I have provided documentation to them.
   21. My agent requested AA T to postpone the hearing to give me time to deal with Fairwork and Immigration, but unfortunately that request was refused. Normally MT takes 2 years for a hearing, but mine opened very quickly.
   22. I have lost everything and the employer has destroyed my career. If I continued with the employer, I would have to work for a minimum of 55-60 hours a week for about $400. That is less than 7 dollars an hour. I was unable to meet my expenditure and was forced to borrow from friends. I have borrowed from my father as well.
   23. My father was very sick and hospitalised and I asked for leave for 4 weeks which was due, but that was refused. After literally begging, he approved the leave but I was told that I will have to be back within three weeks.
   24. When I received a Notice of Intention to consider cancellation on 12 February 2019, I provided a response on 13 February 2019 explaining my situation. The visa officer did not consider my situation and cancelled my visa. I totally agree that I breached one of the conditions, but I was forced to do that. I did not want to resign from his employment with the former sponsor but had no choice but to cease that employment due to my employer's atrocities. This situation considers was beyond my control.
   25. I understand that the court can only consider if there was a jurisdictional error in he dealing of the Visa Officer and AAT.
   26. I humbly submit that the decision to cancel my visa was not jurisdictionally correct as I was forced not to comply with the condition of the visa as my sponsor did not comply with all the conditions attached to him as a nominator.
   27. The Visa Officer's decision not to further investigate whether my sponsor violated the rules of 457 visa as a sponsor is legally unreasonable. The Department of Immigration expects the employee to comply with all the conditions, but this can only happen if the sponsor also complies with his obligations. The Visa Officer failed to exercise her discretion under s 116 of the Migration Act properly, in that she failed to consider whether the breaches of the condition were the consequence of and in furtherance of the fraudulent conduct of the my sponsoring employer towards the applicant
   28. After my visa was cancelled, enough documentation was provided to AAT to prove that my sponsor did not comply with his obligations and an earnest request was made to postpone the hearing and give me the right to address the issues. The Tribunal's decision not to adjourn the review until Fairwork and Immigration made checks is legally unreasonable. I did not really know how the law works in Australia. Instead he told me that if I do not follow him, he will cancel my visa and kick me out from the country.
   29. My circumstances today are such that even Immigration officer did not look into my plight and instead cancelled my visa. There are a lot of rules in paper to penalise the employers who do such things, but instead of considering my case, my visa was cancelled and in a way the employer was right in saying that he will kick me out of the country.
   30. I submit that the mandatory cancellation was not required and that the Visa officer had a discretion whether to cancel my visa or not based on all my circumstances. Being granted a 457 visa marked the start of a stressful period in my professional life and I am going through psychological and emotional pressure. I have let down my parents and have let myself down as well have let my employer take advantage of me.
   31. The Tribunal failed to exercise its discretion under section 116 of the Migration Act properly, in that it failed to consider whether the breaches of the condition were the consequence of and in furtherance of the fraudulent conduct of the applicant's sponsoring employer towards the applicant.
   32. Secondly,! submit that mandatory cancellation was not required and that the Tribunal has a discretion whether to cancel the visa or not. The tribunal should have given me a chance to settle my dues and let fairwork decide and take action against my employer.
   33. My employer has a personal vendetta against me and has left no stone unturned to make sure that I leave Australia and has even earned me that he will get even with me when I get back to India.
   34. I still owe money to my father and to my friends and the employer owes me close to AUD 100,000.1 am facing financial difficulties as well due to the conduct of my employer.
   35. If the court agrees with the decision of Immigration and AAT, I will be affected by section 48 of the Migration Act of the Act and will only be able to apply for limited types of visas onshore as provided for in regulation 2.12. None of the visas prescribed in regulation 2.12 appear to be relevant to my circumstances. If the visa is cancelled, I will not be able to apply for a Subclass 482 visa onshore
   36. My employer is a wealthy man with a lot of connections. He has warned me that he will harm me when I get back to India. I am also fearful and feel feels that the owner of the business has contacts in India and can cause harm to me when I get back to India.
   37. The facts mentioned above indicate that the 457 and other Employer-sponsored visas have been used by employers to rort the system and disadvantage workers and we humbly request a just decision where an Australian citizen should not be allowed to get away with his unacceptable behaviour and an employee is given another chance and is not penalised for saying NO to unacceptable behaviour from an Employer.
   38. Employees like me need help from the Department to ensure such employers are reprimanded. If I am forced to leave, it will advantage his employer as once I leaves, I will not be able to continue his fight against the sponsor and get paid for my work.
   39. I have attached the following documents:

1. Annexure 1-Passport copy

2. Annexure 2-Emaits from FAIRWORK

3. Annexure 3-Contract letter and documents

4. Annexure 4-Financials

5. Annexure 5-Payslips

6. Annexure 6-Complaint Summary

7. Annexure 7-Time Sheets

8. Annexure 8-Medical History of my father

1. At the hearing, the Applicant accepted that the first 25 paragraphs were just background information.[43]
2. The Applicant was then taken to paragraphs 26 and 27 of the Affidavit, and the Applicant accepted that these paragraphs were directed to the decision of the Delegate, and not the Tribunal.[44] As has been stated, the Court has no power to review the Delegate's decision.[45]
3. The Applicant was then taken to paragraph 28 of the Affidavit, the first ground of review.

_ After my visa was cancelled, enough documentation was provided to AAT to prove that my sponsor did not comply with his obligations and an earnest request was made to postpone the hearing and give me the right to address the issues. The Tribunal's decision not to adjourn the review until Fair work and Immigration made checks is legally unreasonable. I did not really know how the law works in Australia. Instead he told me that if I do not follow him, he will cancel my visa and kick me out from the country._*

1. The Applicant contended that it was legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to not adjourn the review until the complaints to the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) and Department were resolved.
2. Traditionally, the Courts have understood an administrative decision to be vitiated by jurisdictional error where "so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it"; this is commonly referred to as Wednesbury unreasonableness.[46]
3. Significantly, as the Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ plurality asserted in the High Court decision in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li, "Wednesbury is not the starting point for the standard of reasonableness, nor should it be considered the end point".[47] Indeed, as was asserted by the plurality:

[72] The more specific errors in decision-making, to which the courts often refer, may also be seen as encompassed by unreasonableness. This may be consistent with the observations of Lord Greene MR, that some decisions may be considered unreasonable in more than one sense and that "all these things run into one another". Further, in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd , Mason J considered that the preferred ground for setting aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to an irrelevant factor of no importance, is that the decision is "manifestly unreasonable". Whether a decision-maker be regarded, by reference to the scope and purpose of the statute, as having committed a particular error in reasoning, given disproportionate weight to some factor or reasoned illogically or irrationally, the final conclusion will in each case be that the decision-maker has been unreasonable in a legal sense.

1. Even according to this broader formulation, the Tribunal's decision not to adjourn pending complaints before other bodies was not unreasonable.
2. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.[48]
3. It is clear from the Tribunal's decision that it was cognisant that there was a complaint made to the FWO and the Department. The Tribunal carefully considered the evidence in relation to the complaints[49] without making any findings (because it was not its role to do so). The Tribunal acknowledged that the process of reviewing the merits of the Applicant's Visa and the other complaint processes could run parallel to each other. The Tribunal correctly observed that there was no requirement to adjourn the merits review process before it and nor was there a compelling need for the Applicant to remain in Australia until the FWO complaint was resolved.[50] At the hearing, the Applicant accepted that he could have continued to pursue the FWO complaint offshore.[51]
4. The decision to not to grant an adjournment was within the bounds of the Tribunal's decision-making freedom.[52] It was not legally unreasonable.
5. Ground One is dismissed.

31. The Tribunal failed to exercise its discretion under section 116 of the Migration Act properly, in that it failed to consider whether the breaches of the condition were the consequence of and in furtherance of the fraudulent conduct of the applicant's sponsoring employer towards the applicant.

1. Relevantly, section 116(1)(b) of the Migration Act provides that,

(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that:

.... (b) its holder has not complied with a condition of the visa ...

1. The Applicant's non-compliance arose out of him having ceased working as a cook for his approved nominated employer for a period exceeding 90 consecutive days. There is no dispute that the factual circumstance giving rise to the cancellation occurred. However, the Applicant argued, and continues to argue, that the factual circumstance arose out of the unlawful conduct of his former employer. He says he had no choice but to leave the employment. It is not necessary for this Court to make any finding about the conduct of the former employer.
2. The Applicant argued that the Tribunal did not have regard to his evidence about his poor working conditions and the fraudulent conduct of his employer which forced him to leave the Sponsor. The Court took the Applicant to paragraph 60 of the Tribunal decision. It bears setting out (below):

60. The Tribunal has also had regard to the circumstances of the visa cancellation. The applicant contends that he ceased employment with the sponsor as he had no option but to leave an abusive work environment, these allegations having been previously outlined. The Tribunal makes no finding as to the veracity of the applicant's claims against Mr Chhillar in terms of his treatment in the workplace, as these are matters subject to investigation by the Fair Work Ombudsman and the Department. However, the Tribunal is prepared to accept that the applicant felt that employment with the sponsor was not to his liking. Therefore, the Tribunal is also prepared to accept that the ground for visa cancellation did not arise due to the actions of the applicant. On balance, the Tribunal finds that the circumstances in which the ground for visa cancellation arose weighs moderately against cancelling the applicant's visa. In the circumstances of the present matter, however, the Tribunal is of the view that the circumstances of the visa cancellation must be balanced against other relevant factors in determining whether the applicant's Subclass 457 visa should be cancelled.

1. True it is that the Tribunal did not make any findings about the Applicant's former employer. It was not its role to do so. However, the Tribunal did consider the Applicant's evidence and went on to accept that the reason for cancellation was not the fault of the Applicant. The Tribunal weighed this evidence moderately in favour of the Applicant to not cancel the Work Visa. That is to say, even without making adverse findings against the Applicant's former employer, the Tribunal found the circumstances giving rise to the non-compliance were in the Applicant's favour. The Tribunal cannot be criticised for accepting a proposition in favour of the Applicant.
2. The Applicant further criticised the Tribunal for not considering other evidence such as bank statements, witness statements and the hardship on the Applicant. The Tribunal duly considered all the evidence before it,[53] and had regard to the hardship which the Tribunal weighed slightly against cancelling the Applicant's visa.[54] In any case the Tribunal did not need to fully consider or make findings about the former employer's conduct in circumstances were it was prepared to accept that the non-compliance was not the fault of the Applicant.
3. Ground Two is dismissed.

32. Secondly,! submit that mandatory cancellation was not required and that the Tribunal has a discretion whether to cancel the visa or not. The tribunal should have given me a chance to settle my dues and let Fair Work decide and take action against my employer

1. The Applicant contended at the hearing that the actions of the Tribunal lacked procedural fairness, as he was not provided the opportunity to represent himself in the "correct light" nor given sufficient time to put on further evidence.[55]
2. At the hearing the Minister's representative took the Court to paragraph six of the Tribunal's reasons and submitted that the Applicant did not, at the Tribunal hearing, seek an adjournment to put on further evidence, but rather because he made complaints to the FWO and Department about his employer. The Court agrees with the Minister's position that the Tribunal cannot be criticised for deciding not to adjourn for a reason not put to it.[56] The Tribunal clearly stated that any of these issues could be canvassed at the hearing,[57] and hence afforded the Applicant procedural fairness.
3. The contention that the Tribunal mandatorily cancelled the Applicant's Visa is wrong. The Tribunal was clearly alive to the fact that it had a discretion. At paragraph [12] the Tribunal noted that it, as the decision maker, "must proceed to consider whether the visa should be cancelled, having regard to all the relevant circumstances...".[58]
4. The Tribunal considered all the evidence before it, including voluminous evidence and submissions submitted before the hearing, the Applicant's oral evidence during the hearing and post-hearing submissions and evidence.
5. The Tribunal cannot be criticised. It accepted that the Applicant left his employment involuntarily. Delaying the review process to receive possible adverse findings from either the FWO or the Department would not have further assisted the Tribunal in reaching its decision. This is because the issue of why the Applicant left his employment was already considered by the Tribunal to weigh in favour of not cancelling the Visa. Additional findings against the former employer would not have taken the matter any further.
6. Ground Three is dismissed.

1. For completeness, paragraphs 33 to 39 of the 3 September 2019 Affidavit are not proper grounds of review and do not allege error by the Tribunal.

1. The Applicant's submissions filed on 21 November 2025 contain additional grounds of review. Although they cover much of the same territory as the 3 September 2019 Affidavit, for completeness and in fairness to the Applicant, they should be considered separately.

_ Error in Weighing Causation of Breach (Ground one)_*

1. By this ground the Applicant contends that the Tribunal "failed to give proper legal weight to the fact that the breach [of his Visa condition] was a direct consequence of the unlawful conduct by the sponsor."
2. This contention is not made out on the face of the Tribunal's decision. As already observed above the Tribunal weighed in favour of the Applicant the fact that he did not leave his employment voluntarily.
3. In any case the degree of weight to be given to evidence is a factual question for the decision-maker alone: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS.[59]
4. Under this additional Ground One the Applicant also contended that the Tribunal "did not apply the required trauma-informed approach to assessing credibility and failed to balance this against employer misconduct. In support of this contention the Applicant cited "the Gudin decision [2018] FCA 1096". The Court has undertaken efforts to find the case cited. It cannot not. The Court is left to wonder whether the citation is the product of an AI platform hallucination.
5. Additional Ground One is dismissed.

_ Failure to Wait for Fair Work Investigation (Ground two)_*

1. By this ground the Applicant contends that it was legally unreasonable for the Tribunal not to adjourn the hearing "pending the FWO investigation."
2. For the reasons set about above in relation to primary Ground One no error arises.
3. Additional Ground Two is dismissed.

_ Misapplication of Discretion (Ground Three)_*

1. By this ground the Applicant contends that the Tribunal "gave excessive weight to minor inconsistencies [in his evidence] and failed to consider that I was under psychiatric treatment. I was a victim of forced labour and threats."
2. Again, the weight to be given to evidence before the Tribunal is a factual matter for the Tribunal alone; the Tribunal noted this.[60]
3. The Tribunal accepted "that the Applicant is suffering from depression and takes medication as indicated in the submitted medical records."[61]
4. Additional Ground Three discloses no error. It is dismissed.

1. By this ground the Applicant contends that the "Tribunal relied on unseen documents but did not adequately disclose the nature and details of those materials."
2. This complaint is not made out on the record of the Tribunal's decision. The relevant sections are set out below:

35. During the review hearing the Tribunal conferred with the applicant and the representative regarding the existence of a certificate pursuant to s.376 of the Act. The Department file BCC2018/5625112 contains such a certificate dated 15 March 2019 which is signed by a delegate of the Minister and the Secretary. The certificate indicates that release of material attached to it at folios 5-7, 18, 23-27, 37-40, 43-44 and 46-48 of the Departmental file would be contrary to the public interest because 'the information included in the above folios pertains to a third party towards whom the visa holder had made threats. Disclosure of this material may place the third party at a risk of harm from the visa holder as evident from the documents. Furthermore, this may undermine Department's confidentiality principles and consequentially detract third parties from providing similar valuable information to the Department in the future.'

36. The Tribunal provided a copy of the certificate to the applicant and invited him to make any submissions on its validity if he wished to do so. The representative submitted that the certificate appears valid. The Tribunal advised that it also formed the view that the certificate is valid given that public interest grounds are stated. Following careful consideration, the Tribunal decided not to release the material in full to the applicant given the nature of the public interest grounds cited, but provided 'the gist' of the material to the applicant using the procedure in s.359AA of the Act:

a. The applicant ceased work with his approved sponsor on or around 22 May 2018. Since around the end of 2017 he separated from his wife Ms Kushdeep Kaur and he has lived separately from her. The applicant has made threats of harm to his wife and to his former employer and their family members. This included sending disgusting messages. The applicant threatened to ruin the business of his former employer. A Police complaint was made regarding some of these threats. The applicant has also been driving a Yellow Cab in Brisbane since leaving employment with the sponsor.

37. The Tribunal advised the applicant that the above information is relevant to the review as it tends to suggest that he ceased employment with his approved sponsor for a period exceeding 90 days, he breached the provisions of condition 8107 which was attached to his Subclass 457 visa, he lacks credibility regarding his claims in relation to his former employer and that discretion should be exercised to cancel his visa. The Tribunal indicated that if it was to rely upon this information it would be the reason or part of the reason to affirm the Subclass 457 visa cancellation decision. The applicant confirmed to the Tribunal that he understood why the information is relevant to the review. The applicant was whether he would like more time to comment on or respond to the information, however he chose to respond immediately.

38. The applicant advised the Tribunal in response to the s.359AA information that he 'gave some wrong voicemail messages' to Mr Chhillar. He advised that he attempted to contact Mr Chhillar to discuss the abusive environment in the workplace but he didn't wish to cooperate with the applicant. The applicant cited his frustration as the reason for the messages. He told the Tribunal that he had to face Court on 7 May 2019 and submitted a copy of a Court Order issued by the Magistrates Court at Holland Park indicating the applicant was convicted of 'Using a Carriage Service to Menace, Harass, or Cause Offence' and received a two year good behaviour bond. The applicant denied making any threats to Mr Chhillar and advised his conduct arose from fear and anger. The Tribunal has carefully considered the applicant's response to the s.359AA information.

39. Following submissions from the representative alleging unfairness in the Court process, the Tribunal outlined that it cannot look behind the Order of the Court and noted that the s.359AA information contained messages that were both threatening and disgusting. The applicant agreed his messages were disgusting in character. He then alleged that Mr Chhillar engaged in inappropriate conduct towards his former wife, the second named applicant, and he wondered what Mr Chhillar would feel having these things done to his female relatives. The Tribunal raised with the applicant that the Court Order and his late submission of it, which tended to suggest he was shielding the information from the Tribunal until presented with the s.359AA information, also tended to undermine the credibility of his claims pertaining to Mr Chhillar. The applicant was invited to comment and indicated he tried many times to contact Mr Chhillar and he submitted copies of his telephone records. He also maintained that he brought the Court Order and his telephone records to the review hearing 'if they were required.' The Tribunal notes that the applicant displayed an evasive demeanour during the provision of his evidence regarding the s.359AA information and the Court Order, and attempted to downplay the gravity of his own conduct in the manner he provided his oral evidence concerning these matters.

40. The applicant informed that Tribunal that what Mr Chhillar did to him was wrong and he lost financially and in terms of his employment. The applicant alleged that Mr Chhillar also did the wrong thing with other employees, although he conceded he did wrong by sending the messages. He advised that he has made the Fair Work Ombudsman and the Department aware of the Court Order against him.

1. The Tribunal provided the Applicant with "the gist" of the material before it. That was all it was required to do: NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.[62] The Tribunal fully complied with its legislative obligations.
2. Further, it is clear from the Applicant's response that he clearly understood what was in the material. He conceded that the message he sent "were disgusting in character" and that "he did wrong by sending the messages."
3. There was no unfairness in the Tribunal relying upon the documents the subject of the Non-disclosure Certificate.
4. Additional Ground Four discloses no error. It is dismissed.

1. Mindful of the Court's obligations towards unrepresented litigants as outlined in MZAI B at [59]-[77], [100] and [112]-[113], the Court has scrutinised the Originating Application, the materials before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's decision to identify any jurisdictional error. The Court also read the Applicant's grounds (contained in the 3 September 2019 Affidavit, and the Applicant's 21 November 2025 submissions) as broadly as possible and remained alive to the possibility of jurisdictional error on the Tribunal's part. The Court is sympathetic to the Applicant's plight and the fact that he involuntarily left his employment (and consequently, that caused the non-compliance with a visa condition). Nevertheless, the Court, as presently constituted, is of the view that error has not been disclosed on the Tribunal's part.
2. For the reasons set out above, this Court is satisfied that the Tribunal's reasons were not affected by jurisdictional error.
3. Accordingly, the application for judicial review must be dismissed. An order to that affect will be issued concurrently.
4. The Court will hear the parties on costs.

I certify that the preceding one hundred (100) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns.

[3] Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 8, condition 8107.

[7] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 496.

[10] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 338, 474, 476(2)(a), 476(4)(a).

[22] EDO19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 826, [64].

[23] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198.

[24] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198.

[25] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198.

[26] SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2005) HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294, [207]-[208].

[27] SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80, [2].

[28] Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, [131]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437, [44].

[29] Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272.

[30] [2019] FCA 600, [7].

[31] [2025] FedCFamC2G 620.

[32] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.

[33] Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21, [17] (Allson CJ, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ).

[34] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.

[35] LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 418 ALR 152, [3] ('LPDT').

[36] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 2006 CLR 323, [82].

[38] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351, [82].

[40] MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17; (2021) 273 CLR 506, [38] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ).

[41] Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80, [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ).

[42] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21, [40].

[43] Transcript of Proceedings, Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, Judge Johns, 13 February 2026) 6 line 44 ('Court Transcript').

[45] s 476(2)(a) Migration Act.

[46] Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1947] 2 All ER 680, 685.

[47] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 139 ALD 181, [68].

[52] King v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 152, 53-4.

[59] [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164, [33].

[62] [2004] FCAFC 160, [87].