austlii:cth/FedCFamC2G/2025/1655
General information, not legal advice.
FedCFamC2G
2025-10-15
Original judgment source is linked above.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 (Cth).
(a) email correspondence between the Department and Western Australian Police (WAPOL) regarding:[15]
(i) the status of the Applicant's pending charges;
(ii) the status of the Applicant's investigations, including possible further charges;
(iii) the Applicant's bail conditions; and
(iv) an allegation that the Applicant had breached his Visa conditions;
(b) statements of material facts in relation to the Applicant's charged offences;[16]
(c) email correspondence between the Department, WAPOL and WADT regarding the WADT investigation into the Applicant;[17] and
(d) an internal Department 'escalation template'.[18]
Section 116(1)(e) - risk to Australian community or individual
(a) the Application filed 17 June 2022; and
(b) Affidavit of the Applicant affirmed 16 June 2022 (Applicant's Affidavit); and
(c) supplementary submissions filed 6 October 2025.
(a) the response, filed 1 July 2022;
(b) outline of submissions filed 16 September 2025; and
(c) list of authorities filed 22 September 2025.
Particulars:
The department of immigration and border protection failed to consider the other relevant matter in support of my case and previous immigration history and compliance with the visa conditions was not considered.
- The applicant was not afforded natural justice. (Ground 2).
- Tribunal misconstrued s 116(1)(e)(i) of the Migration Act 1958. According to the tribunal, The Tribunal cannot be satisfied that the applicant's visa should not have been cancelled that is not true as I have provided evidence of the charges being dropped. (Ground 3).
- Particular:
The evidence by the tribunal that compelled them to make this decision is void and without base and facts. No evidence was provided why tribunal came to this conclusion. They refused the case on different basis. They only considered the departmental information and other relevant criteria was not assessed. No regard was given to the evidence provided. (Ground 4).
Despite of the repeated request the member did not provide any time to provide the documents. (Ground 5).
Member erred in dismissing the applicant's application without providing extra time without any basis in law and facts. (Ground 6).
The appellant's application clearly raises an arguable case, and the decision of the tribunal is short and void and must be overlooked again. (Ground 7).
Substantial justice was not provided and that's the reason I want to apply in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. (Ground 8).
(Words in bold added, otherwise as written)
(a) he said that a reference in the Tribunal Decision of an attempt to contact the airline to leave Australia was false;
(b) his deprivation of liberty charge had been dismissed;
(c) he only worked overtime during school holidays;
(d) his mental health was good; and
(e) he needed a chance to "happily stay in Australia with my family".
(a) understood that cancellation was a "two step" process. Namely, a ground for cancellation under s 116(1) was required and if established, the Tribunal was required to consider whether to cancel the Visa in the exercise of its discretion;
(b) accurately recorded the content of s 116(1)(e)(i) and case law on the meaning of this provision;[69] and
(c) did not misapply or misunderstand s 116(1(e)(i) in concluding that there was a ground for cancellation.
(a) it specifies a reason as to why disclosure is not in the public interest at common law or under s 130 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth);[74] and
(b) there is a probative, rational and logical basis for the identification of that reason.[75]
In any event, PAM3 is not a binding document. PAM3 is intended by its own terms to be nothing more than procedural and policy guidance to officers applying the Migration Act and the Migration Regulations. See Xie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 230; (2000) 61 ALD 641at [28]-[29] and Soegianto v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1612 at [15]- [16]. PAM3 does not have the effect of a direction pursuant to s 499 of the Migration Act, which would bind a person or body having functions or powers under the Migration Act as to the performance of those functions or the exercise of those powers. Because the PAM3 guidelines are not binding on a decision-maker, they cannot be relevant considerations, in the sense of considerations that the decision-maker is bound by legislation to take into account. See Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40 per Mason J, with whom Gibbs CJ and Dawson J agreed. A failure to apply the guidelines may have significance in establishing some error on the part of a decision-maker, but it is not of itself a jurisdictional error.
The Department made a procedural error by not correctly assessing information relevant to the applicant's particular circumstances.
Particulars:
The department of immigration and border protection failed to consider the other relevant matter in support of my case and previous immigration history and compliance with the visa condition was not considered.
The applicants were not afforded natural justice.
Particulars:
I believe that I wasn't provided a fair opportunity to provide the verbal evidences to the member. My legitimate expectation to seek review was denied by the Tribunal. AAT and Department of Home Affairs did not provide the decision record for their decision which clearly depicts an error.
(a) on 17 January 2022 via teleconference facility; and
(b) on 11 March 2022 via an internet-enabled audio-visual platform.
Tribunal misconstrued s 116(1)(e)(i) of the Migration Act 1958. According to the tribunal, The Tribunal cannot be satisfied that the applicant's visa should not have been cancelled that is not true as I have provided evidence of the charges being dropped.
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that:
...
(e) the presence of its holder in Australia is or may be, or would or might be, a risk to:
(i) the health, safety or good order of the Australian community or a segment of the Australian community; or
(ii) the health or safety of an individual or individuals; or
Under s 116 of the Act, the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that certain grounds specified in that provision are made out. Relevantly, to this case, these include the grounds set out in s 116(1)(e)(i). If satisfied that the ground for cancellation is made out, the decision maker must proceed to consider whether the visa should be cancelled, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, which may include matters of government policy.
The Tribunal notes that the applicant had another charge against him, involving the serious offence of depriving a person of her liberty, a female passenger, in a separate indecent pertaining to the conviction for sexual assault. This incident appears to be raised as one of the disqualifying behaviours identified by the relevant Department that led to suspension of the applicant's licence. The criminal charge was dropped in early 2022. The Tribunal places no weight on that discontinued charge as to whether the grounds for cancellation are made out in this matter.
There was also evidence about a charge of deprivation of liberty. This charge was later dismissed for want of prosecution on 2 February 2022, as evidenced by recent submissions from the applicant's criminal lawyer. The Tribunal accordingly places no weight on this matter when considering the circumstances in which the ground for cancellation arose or any other aspect of these below mentioned considerations. Similarly, given the informant's retraction of the adverse information put to the applicant under s 359AA, the Tribunal is compelled not to place any weight on this information either in favour or against this visa remaining cancelled.
Particular:
The evidence by the tribunal that compelled them to make this decision is void and without base and facts. No evidence was provided why tribunal came to this conclusion. They refused the case on different basis. They only considered the departmental information and other relevant criteria was not assessed. No regard was given to the evidence provided.
(a) first, the evidence relied upon by the Tribunal in making its decision was not "void" or "without base and facts". The Tribunal's Decision itself sets out the factual basis for the decision that was made in considerable detail;
(b) second, the allegation that "no regard was given to the evidence provided" has no substance. The evidence provided that was not considered is not identified. It is not apparent what "evidence provided" was given no regard; and
(c) third, the allegation that "relevant criteria was not assessed" has no substance. The "relevant criteria" that was not assessed is not identified. It is not apparent from the Tribunal's Decision that "relevant criteria" was not assessed.
Despite of the repeated request the member did not provide any time to provide the documents.
Member erred in dismissing the applicant's application without providing extra time without any basis in law and facts.
The appellant's application clearly raises an arguable case and the decision of the tribunal is short and void and must be overlooked again.
Substantial justice was not provided and that's the reason I want to apply in Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
I am writing this letter to the federal court, in my AAT Decision they mentioned that I try to be contacted to airline to leave Australia, but that was false allegation ,or misunderstanding I never contact to airline during my cases they didn't have any evidence which proofs it so, as my prospect it's not good .
After the resumed hearing, the applicant submitted a number of submissions, which include some specific comments about adverse information. In particular, the applicant pointed out that he contacted an airline to leave Australia, but he could not do so as the authorities confiscated his passport as part of his bail conditions. This was outlined in the applicant's statutory declaration dated 18 March 2022.
375A Certain information only to be disclosed to Tribunal
- This section applies to a document or information if the Minister:
- has certified, in writing, that the disclosure, otherwise than to the Tribunal, of any matter contained in the document, or of the information, would be contrary to the public interest for any reason specified in the certificate (other than a reason set out in paragraph 375(a) or (b)); and
- has included in the certificate a statement that the document or information must only be disclosed to the Tribunal.
- If, pursuant to a requirement of or under this Act, the Secretary gives to the Tribunal a document or information to which this section applies:
- the Secretary must notify the Tribunal in writing that this section applies to the document or information; and
- the Tribunal must do all things necessary to ensure that the document or information is not disclosed to any person other than a member of the Tribunal as constituted for the purposes of the particular review.
The reasons why disclosure was not in the public interest set out in the non-disclosure certificate are capable of grounding a claim for public interest immunity. However, save for folios CLD2020/40106377, CLD2020/40729368, CLD2021/3705590, CLD2021/4339963, and CLD2021/8534560 (which refer to ongoing investigations, seemingly unknown to the applicant at the time), the majority of the folios covered by the non-disclosure certificate do not provide a probative, rational and logical basis for a conclusion that their disclosure is not in the public interest for the reasons stated in the non-disclosure certificate. Accordingly, the non-disclosure certificate was invalidly issued, at least in respect of the folios not mentioned above.
Where materiality is put in issue in an application for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal, it is a question of fact in respect of which the applicant for judicial review bears the onus of proof. The Full Court was correct to hold in CQZ15 that evidence of the content of notified information can be relevant to the determination of materiality and can on that basis be admissible in such an application. The Full Court was also correct to find on the evidence adduced in BEG15 that the undisclosed and incorrect notification in that case was immaterial. The undisclosed and incorrect notification in SZMTA was similarly immaterial and did not result in jurisdictional error.
...
The precondition in s 438(1)(a) is met if the Minister, acting within the bounds of reasonableness and on a correct understanding of the law, has certified that the disclosure of any matter contained in the document, or the disclosure of the information, would be contrary to the public interest for a reason specified in the certificate. The reason so specified must be a reason (other than a reason which would permit certification under s 437) that could form the basis for a claim by the Executive Government of the Commonwealth in a court proceeding that the matter contained in the document, or the information, should not be disclosed. Where no ground of privilege or statutory immunity from disclosure is engaged, the reason specified in the certificate must therefore be a reason capable of grounding a claim for public interest immunity from disclosure at common law or under s 130 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
...
Because procedural fairness requires disclosure of the fact of notification, non-disclosure of the fact of notification constitutes, without more, a breach of the Tribunal's implied obligation of procedural fairness. For such a breach to constitute jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, however, the breach must give rise to a "practical injustice"[32]: the breach must result in a denial of an opportunity to make submissions and that denial must be material to the Tribunal's decision.
(Emphasis added)
I certify that the preceding one hundred and thirty-seven (137) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Fary.
[1] Orders made by Judge Fary on 23 September 2025, Order 1.
[15] Supplementary Court Book (SCB) 1-7 and 8-14, 18-25, 26, 28-36, 37-46, 47-56, 57-59, 60-69, 70-82, 98-108, 109-119, 127-137, 142-153, 165-175, 176-187.
[17] SCB 83-92 and 93-94, 95-97, 120-122, 123-126, 138-141, 154-158, 159-161, 162-164.
[49] See s 116(1)(e) of the Migration Act.
[61] CB 522-523 [119]-[121], [124]-[125].
[63] CB 517-518 [85]-[86], [91], [94].
[65] s 360(1) of the Migration Act.
[68] ss 127(3) and 368A(3) of the Migration Act. The Court also does not have jurisdiction to review the Delegate's Decision: ss 476(2)(a) and 476(4)(a) of the Migration Act.
[70] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272.
[74] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421 (SZMTA) at [19].
[75] Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 783 at [55].
[76] SZMTA at [4], [38]. See also LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 80 CLR 321 (LPDT) at [7].
[77] s 359A(4)(b) of the Migration Act; CB 248: the Delegate's Decision was given to the Tribunal for the purpose of the Review Application.
[79] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476 (Plaintiff S157/2002).
[80] Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 per Allson CJ, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ at [17].
[84] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 2006 CLR 323 at [82].
[87] MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506 per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [38].
[88] Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80 per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ at [33].
[91] See Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1381 at [61].
[92] CB 517 [85], [86], [91] and [95]-[98].
[94] ss 338(2) and 347(2) of the Migration Act.
[99] [2016] FCCA 561 at [41].
[107] Minister's outline of submissions filed 17 September 2025 [8]-[9].
[109] Minister's outline of submissions filed 17 September 2025 [42].
[117] Which includes the Delegate's Decision. CB 335-337.
[119] Noting the comments of Mortimer J (as her Honour was then) in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158 at [113].
[120] See Division 1 of Part 3 of Schedule 2 to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth). Compare Gehlert v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 129; (2024) 305 FCR 172 (Gehlert).
[121] Compare Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72.
Singh
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1655
El Ess and Another v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1038; (2004) 142 FCR 43
Gehlert v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 129; (2024) 305 FCR 172
Gong v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 561
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158
Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80
Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 783
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1381 Tien v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1552; (1998) 89 FCR 80
(2022) 289 FCR 21
(2004) 142 FCR 43
(2024) 305 FCR 172
(2019) 264 CLR 421
(1996) 185 CLR 259
(2001) 2006 CLR 323
(2015) 238 FCR 158
(1998) 193 CLR 72
(2003) 211 CLR 476
(1986) 162 CLR 24
(2024) 80 CLR 321
(2021) 273 CLR 506
(2022) 276 CLR 80
(1998) 89 FCR 80