Simpson v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2026] NSWCATAD 62;

"Detectives came to house and said all info including recordings would be provided I am requesting all info."

1. In the Decision, the Respondent decided to refuse access to the following documents:
   • Document 1 - Police Event report E82433437
   • Document 2 - Police case report C98366170
   • Document 3 - Chart diagrams
   • Document 4 - Child interview 00014
   • Document 5 Child interview 00015

1. Access to the Documents was refused based on the following public interest considerations against disclosure:

(a) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the supply to an agency of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of that agency's functions - clause (1)(d) of the Table in section 14 of the GIPA Act - Documents 2, 3, 4 and 5;

(b) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the effective exercise by an agency of the agency's functions - clause (1)(f) of the Table in section 14 of the GIPA Act - Documents 2, 3, 4 and 5;

(c) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the prevention, detection or investigation of a contravention or possible contravention of the law or prejudice the enforcement of the law - clause 2(b) of the Table in section 14 of the GIPA Act - Documents 4 and 5;

(d) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to reveal an individual's personal information - clause 3(a) of the Table in section 14 of the GIPA Act - Documents 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5;

(e) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to contravene an information protection principle under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) - clause 3(b) of the Table in section 14 of the GIPA Act - Documents 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5; and

(f) disclosure could reasonably be expected to have the effect of, in the case of the disclosure of personal information about a child-the disclosure of information that it would not be in the best interests of the child to have disclose - clause 3(g) of the Table in section 14 of the GIPA Act - Documents 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

1. The Respondent also relied on the conclusive presumption against disclosure in clause 10 of Schedule 1 to the GIPA Act - Documents 1 and 2.
2. On 8 March 2025, the Applicant lodged an external review application with the NSW Information Commissioner (IC). In its review report dated 10 April 2025, the IC was satisfied that the Respondent's Decision was justified, and no recommendations were made.
3. By an application to the Tribunal dated 14 May 2025, the Applicant sought review by the Tribunal of the Decision.

1. The GIPA Act gives members of the public an enforceable right to access government information, subject to the provisions of the GIPA Act. That right is given for the stated object of maintaining and advancing "a system of responsible and representative democratic Government that is open, accountable, fair and effective": s 3(1)(b) GIPA Act.
2. There is a presumption in favour of the disclosure of government information unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure: s 5 GIPA Act.
3. A person who applies for access to government information has a "legally enforceable right to be provided with access to the information": s 9(1) GIPA Act. Access applications are to be dealt with in accordance with Part 4 of the GIPA Act.
4. "Government information" is defined to mean "information contained in a record held by an agency": s 4(1) GIPA Act. The obligation of an agency to provide access to government information is limited to information held by the agency when the application is received, and the agency must undertake reasonable searches for the information: s 53(1) and (2) GIPA Act. If the information is not held by the agency, the agency may make a decision to that effect: s 58(1)(b) GIPA Act.
5. Section 12(1) of the GIPA Act provides that there is a general public interest in favour of the disclosure of government information. Section 12(2) further provides that nothing limits the considerations in favour of disclosure that may be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure.
6. Section 13 of the GIPA Act sets out the 'public interest test' for determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information, as follows:

Public interest test

There is an overriding public interest against disclosure of government information for the purposes of this Act if (and only if) there are public interest considerations against disclosure and, on balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure.

1. Section 14 of the GIPA Act deals with public interest considerations against disclosure. It provides that it is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of any of the government information described in Schedule 1 of the GIPA Act: s 14(1) GIPA Act.
2. Section 14(1) of the GIPA Act provides as follows:

Public interest considerations against disclosure

(1) It is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of any of the government information described in Schedule 1.

1. Clause 10 of Schedule 1 of the GIPA Act provides as follows:

Care and protection of children

It is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information contained in a report to which section 29 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 applies.

1. Section 29 of the Children and Young Persons Care and Protection Act 1998 (NSW) (Care and Protection Act) provides:

Protection of persons who make reports or provides certain information

(1) If, in relation to a child or young person or a class of children or young persons, a person makes a report in good faith to the Secretary or to a person who has the power or responsibility to protect the child or young person or the class of children or young persons--

(a) the making of the report does not constitute a breach of professional etiquette or ethics or a departure from accepted standards of professional conduct, and

(b) no liability for defamation is incurred because of the report, and

(c) the making of the report does not constitute a ground for civil or criminal liability against the person making the report, and

(d) the report, or evidence of its contents, is not admissible in any proceedings other than the following proceedings (and appeals arising from the following proceedings)--

(i) care proceedings in the Children's Court,

(ii) proceedings in relation to a child or young person under the Family Law Act 1975 of the Commonwealth,

(iii) proceedings in relation to a child or young person before the Supreme Court or the Civil and Administrative Tribunal,

(iv) proceedings before the Civil and Administrative Tribunal that are allocated to the Guardianship Division of the Tribunal or are commenced under the Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 ,

(v) proceedings under the Coroners Act 2009 , and

(e) a person cannot be compelled in any proceedings to produce the report or a copy of or extract from it or to disclose or give evidence of any of its contents, and

(f) the identity of the person who made the report, or information from which the identity of that person could be deduced, must not be disclosed by any person or body, except with--

(i) the consent of the person who made the report, or

(ii) the leave of a court or other body before which proceedings relating to the report are conducted,

and, unless that consent or leave is granted, a party or witness in any such proceedings must not be asked, and, if asked, cannot be required to answer, any question that cannot be answered without disclosing the identity or leading to the identification of that person.

1. Subsection 29(6) of the Care and Protection Act relevantly states that a "report" includes a report under sections 24, 25, 27, 120, 121 and 122.
2. The considerations listed in the Table under s 14 of the GIPA Act (Section 14 Table) are the only other considerations that may be taken into account in determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure: s 14(2) GIPA Act. It relevantly provides:

1 Responsible and effective government

There is a public interest consideration against disclosure of information if disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to have one or more of the following effects (whether in a particular case or generally) -

...

(d) prejudice the supply to an agency of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of that agency's functions

...

(f) prejudice the effective exercise by an agency of the agency's functions,

...

2 Law enforcement and security

There is a public interest consideration against disclosure of information if disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to have one or more of the following effects (whether in a particular case or generally) -

...

(b) prejudice the prevention, detection or investigation of a contravention or possible contravention of the law or prejudice the enforcement of the law,

...

3 Individual rights, judicial processes and natural justice

There is a public interest consideration against disclosure of information if disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to have one or more of the following effects -

(a) reveal an individual's personal information,

(b) contravene an information protection principle under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 or a Health Privacy Principle under the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002,

...

(g) in the case of the disclosure of personal information about a child-the disclosure of information that it would not be in the best interests of the child to have disclosed.

1. Information is subject to the balancing exercise required by s 13 of the GIPA Act, with reference to the principles set out in s 15 of the GIPA Act. Section 15 provides:

Principles that apply to public interest determination

A determination as to whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of government information is to be made in accordance with the following principles:

(a) Agencies must exercise their functions so as to promote the object of this Act.

(b) Agencies must have regard to any relevant guidelines issued by the Information Commissioner.

(c) The fact that disclosure of information might cause embarrassment to, or a loss of confidence in, the Government is irrelevant and must not be taken into account.

(d) The fact that disclosure of information might be misinterpreted or misunderstood by any person is irrelevant and must not be taken into account.

(e) In the case of disclosure in response to an access application, it is relevant to consider that disclosure cannot be made subject to any conditions on the use or disclosure of information.

1. Schedule 4, clause 4 of the GIPA Act contains the definition of "personal information" for the purposes of the Act. It relevantly provides:

Personal information

(1) In this Act, personal information means information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of a database and whether or not recorded in a material form) about an individual (whether living or dead) whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion.

(2) Personal information includes such things as an individual's fingerprints, retina prints, body samples or genetic characteristics.

(3) Personal information does not include any of the following:

...

(b) information about an individual (comprising the individual's name and non-personal contact details, including the individual's position title, public functions and the agency in which the individual works) that reveals nothing more than the fact that the person was engaged in the exercise of public functions,

...

1. Section 55(1) of the GIPA Act provides that personal factors of the applicant may be taken into account in balancing the public interests both in favour of and against disclosure. It provides:

(1) In determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information in response to an access application, an agency is entitled to take the following factors (the personal factors of the application) into account as provided by this section-

(a) the applicant's identity and relationship with any other person,

(b) the applicant's motives for making the access application,

(c) any other factors particular to the applicant.

(2) The personal factors of the application can also be taken into account as factors in favour of providing the applicant with access to the information.

(3) The personal factors of the application can be taken into account as factors against providing access if (and only to the extent that) those factors are relevant to the agency's consideration of whether the disclosure of the information concerned could reasonably be expected to have any of the effects referred to in clauses 2-5 (but not clause 1, 6 or 7) of the Table to section 14.

(4) An applicant is entitled to provide any evidence or information concerning the personal factors of the application that the applicant considers to be relevant to the determination of whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information applied for.

(5) An agency may, as a precondition to providing access to information to an applicant, require the applicant to provide evidence concerning any personal factors of the application that were relevant to a decision by the agency that there was not an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information and, for that purpose, require the applicant to take reasonable steps to provide proof of his or her identity.

(6) An agency is under no obligation to inquire into, or verify claims made by an access applicant or any other person about, the personal factors of the application but is entitled to have regard to evidence or information provided by the applicant or other person.

Note-

An agency is not entitled to impose any conditions on the use or disclosure of information when the agency provides access to the information in response to an access application. See section 73

1. Section 58 of the GIPA Act provides for how an agency decides an access application:

How applications are decided

(1) An agency decides an access application for government information by-

(a) deciding to provide access to the information, or

(b) deciding that the information is not held by the agency, or

(c) deciding that the information is already available to the applicant (see section 59), or

(d) deciding to refuse to provide access to the information because there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information, or

(e) deciding to refuse to deal with the application (see section 60), or

(f) deciding to refuse to confirm or deny that information is held by the agency because there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information confirming or denying that fact.

(2) More than one decision can be made in respect of a particular access application, so as to deal with the various items of information applied for.

(3) If an agency finds that information or additional information is held by the agency after deciding an access application, the agency can make a further decision that replaces or supplements the original decision, but cannot be required to make a further decision in such a case. The further decision can be made even if the period within which the application is required to be decided has expired.

1. Disclosure of information in response to an access application cannot be made subject to any conditions on the use or disclosure of the information: s 73 GIPA Act.

1. Part 5, Division 4 of the GIPA Act concerns administrative review of decisions by the Tribunal.
2. The power of the Tribunal to review a decision arises where a person is aggrieved by a "reviewable decision" of an agency. Such a person may apply to the Tribunal for administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) (ADR Act) of that decision: s 100(1) GIPA Act.
3. An "agency" is defined in s 4(1) of the GIPA Act to include a "public authority". A "public authority" is defined in Schedule 4 of the GIPA Act to include "the NSW Police Force".
4. The "reviewable decisions" of an "agency" are set out in s 80 of the GIPA Act. They include a decision to refuse to provide access to information in response to an access application: s 80(d) GIPA Act.
5. Section 105(1) of the GIPA Act provides, relevantly, that in any administrative review conducted by the Tribunal under Part 5, Division 4 of the GIPA Act concerning a decision made by an agency, the burden of establishing that the decision is justified rests with the agency, except as otherwise provided by the section.
6. Under s 63 of the ADR Act, the Tribunal is to determine the matter, based on the material before it, including any relevant factual material and any applicable written or unwritten law. It must decide what is the correct and preferable decision. It may decide to affirm, vary or set aside the decision and make a substitute decision, or set aside the decision and remit the matter to the agency in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal. In this review, the Tribunal must consider the applicable considerations for and against the disclosure of the information and make the correct and preferable determination as to access.

1. The matter was heard by the Tribunal on 3 October 2025. The Applicant appeared in person and Ms Tipene appeared for the Respondent.
2. The Respondent provided an open version of an affidavit of Detective Chief Inspector Courcoulos dated 25 August 2025 (Courcoulos Affidavit) and its written submissions dated 25 August 2025 (RS). The Respondent also made oral submissions at the hearing. Detective Chief Inspector Courcoulos gave oral evidence and was crossed examined by the Applicant at the hearing.
3. The Tribunal was also provided with full versions of the Courcoulos Affidavit and its written submissions, as well as the Documents on a confidential basis.
4. In his Affidavit, Detective Chief Inspector Courcoulos deposes that the information the subject of the Access Application was provided to NSWPF on a voluntary, confidential basis. It is highly sensitive in nature and relates to alleged crime against a minor.[3] He states that in his opinion, the disclosure of this information would or could reasonably be expected to:[4]

(a) Reveal information which NSWPF has gathered in the course of confidential investigations;

(b) Prejudice current or future investigations relating to the allegations or person's named in the allegations;

(c) Prejudice current or future prosecution of criminal offences;

(d) Expose police investigation methodology and information gathering techniques;

(e) Disclose the sensitive personal information of third parties, that would otherwise be protected by privacy legislation; and

(f) Deter members of the public from participating in similar investigations in the future.

1. In his application for review, the Applicant stated:

"I was told by officers attending I would be provided this info. I need this info as child is now in trauma from incident and want to provide to Doctors and Phsyc (sic) and also I have still be (sic) not provided with any info."

1. At the hearing, the Applicant told the Tribunal that he wishes to have access to the Documents as the Child remains traumatised by the questioning of her by investigators, and he has not been informed whether there is an ongoing investigation into the matters about which the Child was questioned.

1. In its written submissions dated 25 August 2025 and oral submissions at the hearing, the Respondent submitted that it made the correct and preferable decision, and that the Decision should be affirmed by the Tribunal. In summary, the Respondent contends:

(a) The conclusive presumption of overriding public interest against disclosure in clause 10 of Schedule 1 to the GIPA Act applies to Documents 1 and 2;[5]

(b) The public interest considerations against disclosure in clause 1(d) and clause 1(f) of the Table in section 14(2) of the GIPA Act apply to Documents 2, 3, 4 and 5;[6]

(c) The public interest considerations against disclosure in clause 2(b) of the Table in section 14(2) of the GIPA Act apply to Documents 4 and 5;[7]

(d) The public interest considerations against disclosure in clause 3(a) and clause 3(b) of the Table in section 14(2) of the GIPA Act applies to Documents 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5;[8]

(e) The public interest considerations against disclosure in clause 3(g) of the Table in section 14(2) of the GIPA Act applies to Documents 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5;[9]

(f) The Respondent accepts that the following public interest considerations weigh in favour of disclosing the withheld information:[10]

(i) some of the documents in issue contain information which relates to the Applicant (although most of the information is intertwined with personal information about third parties) or which is known to the Applicant;

(ii) the public has a general right to access government information held by agencies.

1. The decision under review is a reviewable decision in accordance with s 80(d) of the GIPA Act. The Tribunal's jurisdiction is enlivened by s 100 of the GIPA Act.

1. The correct approach to be adopted by the Tribunal to s 14 and the surrounding provisions in Part 2 Division 2 of the GIPA Act is the two-step approach outlined by the Appeal Panel in Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force v Camilleri (GD)[11] (Camilleri) at [24] - [25]. This can be summarised as follows:

(a) Putting aside cases where a conclusive presumption under Schedule 1 applies, the GIPA Act envisages a two-step approach.

(b) The agency's case for refusal must rely on one or more of the Section 14 Table considerations. The Tribunal's task is then to weigh that case against the factors favouring disclosure (s 13), mindful of the injunctions that appear in both ss 12 and 15 of the GIPA Act.

(c) As the Section 14 Table considerations are concerned with systemic features of the operation of government, they need to be examined at a broader operational level, with specific aspects of the case being more relevant to weight.

1. In Flack v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police (Flack)[12] at [19], the Tribunal confirmed that in all cases other than those falling under the terms of Schedule 1, the public interest test under the GIPA Act involves the following:

(a) identifying the public interest in favour of disclosure;

(b) identifying the public interest against disclosure (with reference to the Table); and

(c) determining where the balance lies.

The balancing of considerations under the GIPA Act

1. In conducting the balancing analysis under s 13 of the GIPA Act, the Tribunal is to have regard to the following:[13]

(1) the objects of the legislation contained in s 3;

(2) the presumption in favour of disclosure of government information as provided by, in particular, s 5 and s 12 - those considerations to be given significant weight;

(3) the considerations in s 14 against disclosure; and

(4) the principles set out in s 15

to determine whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure or whether the presumption in favour of disclosure prevails.

1. In Hurst v Wagga Wagga City Council (Hurst),[14] the Tribunal stated at [94] that when weighing the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure against those against disclosure, the balancing of competing interests "is a question of fact and degree, requiring the weighing of competing matters, and is a task that is not amenable to mathematical calculation". That is, a decision-maker must simply balance the competing public interest factors for and against disclosure in each specific case, rather than apply some other test for determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information: see further Battin v University of New England[15] at [74]. The process "requires a broad value judgment to be made, having regard to the objects of the legislation, the general presumption in favour of disclosure of government information, and the principles set out in the GIPA Act, s 15": O'Grady v Sutherland Shire Council (No 2)[16] (O'Grady) at [58] citing Transport for NSW v Searle (Searle) at [104].

Public interest considerations in favour of disclosure

1. There is a presumption in favour of disclosure of government information unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure: s 5 GIPA Act. A person who makes a valid application for access to government information has a legally enforceable right to be provided with access to that information unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure: s 9(1) GIPA Act. The presumption in s 5 and the right created in s 9 of the GIPA Act give effect to the object stated at s 3(1)(c) GIPA Act, which provides that access to government information should only be restricted where there is an overriding public interest against disclosure.
2. The operation of s 5 and s 12 of the GIPA Act, recognise the significance of the presumption in favour of disclosure which applies without limitation, in every case. Such consideration should be accorded "significant weight" when determining whether access to information should be granted: Selby v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force[17] at [89]; Camilleri at [48].
3. In accordance with the presumption in favour of disclosure of information recognised in ss 5 and 12 and the objectives in s 3 of the GIPA Act, I find the following weigh in favour of the disclosure of the information:

(a) The release of the information could reasonably be expected to promote accountability and transparency of the Respondent;

(b) Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to inform the public about the operations of the Respondent and, in particular, its policies and practices for dealing with members of the public;

(c) Disclosure of the information is expected to facilitate procedural fairness and the administration of justice;

(d) The information includes the Applicant's personal information and it is in the public interest for individuals to have access to government information held about them by government agencies;

(e) The disclosure of the information will assist the Applicant to understand the investigator's findings and promote accountability of police investigations and actions.

Public interest considerations against disclosure

Conclusive presumption of overriding public interest against disclosure

1. The provisions in clause 10 of Schedule 1 of the GIPA protect the disclosure of information contained in a report to which s 29 of the Care and Protection Act applies. Section 29(6) of the Care and Protection Act provides that a report includes a report made under sections 24, 25, 27, 120, 121 and 122.
2. In Dewhirst v Department of Family and Community Services (Dewhirst),[18] the Tribunal described its task in determining whether the disclosure of information is protected under the clause 10 conclusive presumption against disclosure at [41]:

"... the Tribunal's task in determining whether the disclosure of the information, sought to be protected under the clause 10 conclusive presumption against disclosure, is to decide whether the 'characteristics' of the information in issue is of a kind described in that clause. That is, the question is whether the information in issue can be characterised as a report which section 29 of the Care Act applies - namely, a report made under section 24, 5, 27, 120, 121 and 122 of the Care Act..."

1. Section 24 of the Care and Protection Act provides:

Report concerning child or young person at risk of significant harm

A person who has reasonable grounds to suspect that a child or young person is, or that a class of children or young persons are, at risk of significant harm may make a report to the Secretary.

1. In Dewhirst, the Tribunal explained at [42] that the onus is on the agency to establish that the "characteristics" of the information under consideration is of a kind described in s 29 of the Care and Protection Act:

"The agency must nevertheless place sufficient material before the Tribunal to justifies (sic) its decision that the 'characteristics' of the information in issue is of a kind described in section 29 of the Care Act. This can be done in a number of ways. For example, by placing evidence before the Tribunal of the systems it has in place for collecting and retaining information of the kind in issue and evidence that the information in issue was collected and continues to be retained by the agency as being a report to which section 29 of the Care Act applies. Whether such evidence is sufficient to discharge the respondent's onus will depend on the circumstances of each case."

1. Reports to which s 29 of the Care and Protection Act applies must first be made "in relation to a child or young person or a class of children or young persons". Secondly, the report must relevantly be made to the Secretary or a person "who has the power or responsibility to protect the child or young person or the class of children or young persons". Thirdly, the report must be made in "good faith": s 29(1) Care and Protection Act.
2. To the extent that Documents 1 and 2 relate to the Child, they satisfy the first part of the description of reports within s 29, that is, they are in relation to a child or young person or a class of children or young persons. The recipient of the report must be the Secretary or a person who has the power or responsibility to protect the child or young person or the relevant class of children or young persons. There is no dispute that the Respondent is such a person. To the extent that the report in question was made to the Respondent, it is therefore made to a person identified in s 29. The third requirement is that the report must have been made in "good faith". Relevantly, in Dewhirst[19] the Tribunal said at [41]:

"...In my view, the Tribunal is not also tasked with conducting an inquiry as to the motivations of the reporter(s) at the time he/she made his/her report. If it was accepted by the respondent as having been made in good faith this should be accepted by the Tribunal, unless there is evidence of a contrary finding by a court or another relevant body."

1. The evidence before the Tribunal is that the report was made by an anonymous person, and it was accepted by the Respondent as having been made in good faith. As recognised by the Tribunal in Dewhirst, in these circumstances it is not for the Tribunal to inquire into the motivations of the reporter. As there is no evidence of a contrary finding by a court or another relevant body, I am satisfied that the report was made in good faith. As the Tribunal explained in FZC & FYX v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice[20] at [54] the determination of whether a report was made in good faith, does not require that the conclusions in the report be substantiated, nor does it require that the factual material in the report be proven under the applicable standard of proof, following any subsequent investigation or proceedings.
2. On this basis, I am satisfied that there is a conclusive presumption of overriding public interest against the disclosure of the information in Documents 1 and 2.
3. I note that the Tribunal has recognised that the effect of a conclusive presumption of an overriding public interest against disclosure is that the agency (and the Tribunal) is not required to engage in the balancing exercise under s 13 of the GIPA Act: see Yee v Medical Council of New South Wales[21] at [41].

1. The public interest considerations against disclosure set out in the Section 14 Table depend on whether disclosure could "reasonably be expected" to have the nominated effect. This phrase has been the subject of extensive judicial consideration. In Attorney General's Department v Cockcroft, (Cockcroft)[22] Bowen CJ and Beaumont J held at [29] that the phrase:

"... require a judgment to be made by the decision-maker as to whether it is reasonable, as distinct from something that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous, to expect that those who would otherwise supply information of the prescribed kind to the Commonwealth or any agency would decline to do so if the document in question were disclosed under the Act. It is undesirable to attempt any paraphrase of these words. In particular, it is undesirable to consider the operation of the provision in terms of probabilities or possibilities or the like."

1. The phrase could "reasonably be expected" has been held to require "something which is more than a mere possibility, risk or a chance. It must be based on real and substantial grounds, and it must not be purely speculative, fanciful, imaginary or contrived": Leech v Sydney Water Corporation[23] at [25] adopted in Flack at [41]-[42] and cited in Roy v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force[24] at [32]. While it must be a "real" risk, the chance of it materialising need not be more probable than not_: Neary v State Rail Authority_[25] at [35]-[36].
2. In Hall v Department of Premier and Cabinet (NSW)[26] the Administrative Decisions Tribunal stated at [45] that the phrase:

"'simply calls for an objective assessment', on the evidence before the Tribunal, as to whether the claimed effects could be expected to arise, from the standpoint of a reasonable administrator. Ultimately, it is of course a question of fact."

1. In Newcastle City Council v Newcastle East Residents Action Group Inc[27] the Appeal Panel considered the evidence required to establish that disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to have a particular effect. After referring to various authorities, the Appeal Panel stated at [59]:

"Based on these authorities when considering the evidence on which it is asserted that disclosure "could reasonably be expected" to have a particular effect, the following principles should be kept in mind:

(1) a mere statement that disclosure could reasonably be expected to have a particular effect is insufficient;

(2) there must be real and substantial grounds supporting an opinion that disclosure could reasonably be expected to have a particular effect;

(3) prominence should be given to inferences capable of being drawn from established facts, rather than on the subjective views of witnesses."

1. The public interest considerations in clauses 1(d), 1(f) and 2(b) require there to be some relevant 'prejudice' to the agency. In Hurst at [60], the Tribunal accepted that the "term 'prejudice' is to be given its ordinary meaning, that is, to cause detriment or disadvantage, or to impede or derogate from".[28] See also South Dural Residents and Ratepayers Group Inc. v Roads and Maritime Services[29] at [47].

Clause 1(d) - prejudice the supply to an agency of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of that agency's functions

Clause 1(f) - prejudice the effective exercise by an agency of the agency's functions

1. The Respondent submits that the public interest considerations against disclosure in clause 1(d) of the Section 14 Table apply to Documents 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Documents.
2. In Collins v Department Finance, Services & Innovation,[30] the Tribunal made the following observations in relation to clause 1(d) of the Section 14 Table at [63]-[64]:

"... the Tribunal is to engage in a relatively abstract analysis. The Tribunal is to ask whether, as a matter of reasonable expectation, if material of the kind sought to be protected were released, could it prejudice the supply of similar material to government in the future. In this context the word 'prejudice' is to be given its ordinary meaning, namely: 'to cause detriment or disadvantage'. It is not necessary that the decision-maker be satisfied that the release of the information will in fact prejudice the future supply of information.

The Tribunal is to consider the nature of the material sought to be protected, the extent to which material of that kind can only reasonably be obtained by confidential communication and the extent to which guarantees of confidentiality may be necessary. That is, would disclosure of the information sought damage the ability of the agency to obtain similar information in future? The agency's evidence is examined in regard to the conditions under which it conducts the service within which the information was received and the extent to which the information in issue facilitates the effective exercise of that agency's functions. The experience of the witnesses who expressed the relevant opinions is a significance (sic) factor."

1. In Camilleri, the Appeal Panel outlined the general approach to determining whether information is "confidential" at [33]:

"In our view, the question of whether the information supplied is 'confidential information' must be examined, primarily at least, by reference to the agency's evidence as to the conditions under which it conducts the service within which the information was received. The agency's case is that all information received by the triple zero service at the point of receipt is treated as confidential. The agency's case is that members of the community expected the triple zero service to be a confidential service."

1. The Appeal Panel emphasised at [34] that the enquiry "should focus on the point of receipt, and the administrative standards and community understandings which surrounded it".
2. In Simring v Commissioner of Police (NSW),[31] the Supreme Court recognised at [68] that when a person speaks with police in relation to a criminal offence and reveals sensitive matters, that person expects that statements made will only be used for the purpose of court proceedings, and not otherwise. The Tribunal also has recognised the confidentiality of information provided to the police when considering applications to access information. In Eggleton v Commissioner of Police (NSW)[32] at [60], the Tribunal stated:

"...Witnesses and other persons who provide information to police trust that it will be kept confidential unless it is used for the purpose of court proceedings, or on their authority. If confidential information is disclosed under the GIPA Act, people will lose trust in police. If that trust is breached, the flow of information to police officers could dry up, which would severely impact on the agency's crime investigation function..."

1. On the basis of the authorities cited above and the evidence before the Tribunal, I am satisfied that the information provided in Documents 3, 4 and 5 is confidential on the basis that it was provided to the Respondent to facilitate an investigation into an alleged breach of the law.
2. Clause 1(d) is concerned with the future supply of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of the agency's functions. In Jones v NSW Department of Education[33], the Tribunal said at [60]:

"In determining whether disclosure would prejudice the supply of information, the test is not whether this complainant would in future refuse to supply that information but whether information of the kind in question facilitates the exercise of the Department's functions and, whether the disclosure of such information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the supply of such information: Flack v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2011] NSWADT 286 at paragraph [52]."

1. In Medlyn v Commissioner of Police (Medlyn),[34] the Tribunal accepted that confidentiality ordinarily attaches to voluntary communications and any investigations following so as to ensure that members of the public continue to voluntarily provide information to police.[35] The Tribunal found that voluntary and confidential supply of information from the public is required for the effective exercise of the Commissioner's law enforcement and investigatory functions.[36]
2. Whether disclosure of information of a confidential nature could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of such information has been considered specifically in the context of reports of alleged abuse of children. In Saleam v Director General, Department of Community Services and ors,[37] the Administrative Decisions Tribunal made the following observations concerning child abuse notifications at [61]:

"... in principle it is clear that child abuse notifications and the like if disclosed might prejudice the future supply of such information, by inhibiting people from coming forward for fear of being identified and then harassed or sued by the carer adversely affected by the notification. Ordinarily disclosure of such material would be contrary to the public interest."

1. Based on the evidence before the Tribunal and having regard to the authorities cited above, I am satisfied that disclosure of the information contained in Documents 3, 4, and 5 could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of confidential information to the police that would facilitate the Respondent's ability to prevent, detect, and investigate allegations of harm against children. I am also satisfied that the disclosure of the information contained in Documents 3, 4, and 5 could reasonably be expected to prejudice the effective exercise of the Respondent's investigatory functions in relation to allegations of harm against children.
2. I am satisfied the public interest considerations against disclosure in clause 1(d) and clause 1(f) of the Section 14 Table are engaged in relation to the information in Documents 3, 4 and 5, and I give them substantial weight.

Clause 2(b) - prejudice the prevention, detection or investigation of a contravention or possible contravention of the law or prejudice the enforcement of the law

1. The Respondent submits that the disclosure of Documents 4 and 5 could reasonably be expected to prejudice the prevention, detection or investigation of a contravention or possible contravention of the law or prejudice the enforcement of the law. Documents 4 and 5 are video footage of a forensic interview between investigators of the Respondent and the Child. It contains interview techniques and template questions that are specific to child interviewees.
2. In Clancy v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force[38] at [65], the Tribunal provided the following guidance on the application of clause 2(b):

"The public interest consideration against disclosure set out in clause 2(b) of the Table to GIPA Act, s 14 is to protect the effectiveness of methods used by law enforcement agencies in preventing, investigating or dealing with contraventions of the law including possible or alleged contraventions. The consideration is directed to preserving the integrity of policing methods. It is uncontroversial that there exists a public interest in law enforcement agencies being able to maintain the integrity of their investigatory methods: UC v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2005] NSWADT 272 at [32]; Desmond v Commissioner of Police, New. South Wales Police Service [2003] NSWADT 231."

1. Based on the evidence before the Tribunal, specifically the evidence given by Detective Chief Inspector Courcoulos, I find that the interviewing techniques and template questions used by the Respondent's investigators, particularly those that are used for the purposes of interviewing a child, are essential to the Respondent's ability to effectively prevent and detect alleged breaches of the law and should remain confidential to maintain their investigative value. I am satisfied that the release of information revealing interviewing methods and questions techniques could reasonably be expected to prejudice the effectiveness of these interview methods and questions used by the Respondent when conducting investigations or in its attempts to detect contraventions of the law.
2. I am satisfied the public interest considerations against disclosure in clause 2(b) of the Section 14 Table are engaged in relation to the information in Documents 4 and 5 and I give them substantial weight.

Clause 3(a) - reveal an individual's personal information

Clause 3(b) - contravene an information protection principle under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 or a Health Privacy Principle under the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002

1. The Respondent relies on clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Section 14 Table and contends it can be reasonably expected that disclosure of the Documents will reveal an individual's personal information (clause 3(a)),[39] or contravene an information protection principle (IPP) under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) (PPIP Act) (clause 3(b)).[40]
2. The phrase "personal information" is defined in clause 4 of Schedule 4 to the GIPA Act (see [22] above). The term "personal information" is defined in s 4 of the PPIP Act as follows:

Definition of "Personal Information"

(1) In this Act, "personal information" means information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of a database and whether or not recorded in a material form) about an individual whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion.

...

1. In Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force v Field,[41] the Appeal Panel observed at [67] that "personal information" has a wide definition and is "not defined by reference to matters that have occurred in private. It is concerned with information 'about an individual'."
2. Section 15(b) of the GIPA Act states that agencies must have regard to any relevant guidelines issued by the Information Commissioner when determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure. In accordance with the Information Access Guideline 4: Personal Information as a public interest consideration under the GIPA Act (Guidelines), a person's name, information about a person's family life, and photographs or audio or video recordings which identifies individuals is personal information. The definition of personal information also includes opinions about individuals.
3. The term "reveal" is defined in clause 1 of Schedule 4 to the GIPA Act:

Reveal information means to disclose information that has not already been publicly disclosed (otherwise than by unlawful means of disclosure).

1. The Documents contain personal information of individuals as defined by the GIPA Act, the PPIP Act and the Guidelines. The Respondent accepts that some of the Documents contain the Applicant's personal information and acknowledges that there is a public interest consideration in favour of disclosure in circumstances where the information is personal information of the person to whom it is to be disclosed.[42] However, the Respondent submits that the Applicant's personal information is intertwined with other people's personal information, such that disclosure of the Applicant's personal information would reveal personal information about a third party. The release of the personal information of individuals contained in the Documents would result in the information being "revealed" for the first time.[43] In GTY v Secretary, Department of Education[44] at [89], the Tribunal was satisfied that:

"the fact that some of the information about the children may be known to the Applicant does not affect whether release of the information under the GIPA Act would reveal their personal information. The requested information has not been disclosed to the general public".

1. The IPP contained in section 18 of the PPIP Act prohibits the Respondent from disclosing personal information to a person (other than the individual to whom the information relates) or other body unless:

(a) the disclosure is directly related to the purpose for which the information was collected, and the agency disclosing the information has no reason to believe that the individual concerned would object to the disclosure; or

(b) the individual concerned is reasonably likely to have been aware, or has been made aware in accordance with section 10 of the PPIP Act, that information of that kind is usually disclosed to that other person or body; or

(c) the agency believes on reasonable grounds that the disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the life or health of the individual concerned or another person.

1. The Respondent submits, and I accept, that none of the exceptions to section 18 of the PPIP Act authorise the disclosure of personal information of individuals contained in the Documents.
2. Based on the evidence before the Tribunal, I find that personal information of individuals contained in the Documents has not been publicly disclosed, and it is therefore capable of being "revealed" for the purposes of clause 3(a) of the Section 14 Table. Further, I find that for the purposes of clause 3(b) of the Section 14 Table and s 18 of the PPIP Act, the information was not collected for the purpose of being disclosed to the Applicant.[45]
3. I am satisfied that the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a) and 3(b) of the Section 14 Table are applicable to the personal information of individuals contained in the Documents. The public interest in protecting and controlling the disclosure of personal information of individuals should be afforded significant weight, particularly given that the release of such information under the GIPA Act is unconditional. I give significant weight to these public interest considerations against disclosure of the personal information and find that these outweigh the public interest consideration in favour of disclosure in circumstances where the information is personal information of the person to whom it is to be disclosed, namely the Applicant.

Clause 3(g) - In the case of the disclosure of personal information about a child-the disclosure of information that it would not be in the best interests of the child to have disclosed

1. The Respondent submits that the public interest consideration against disclosure in clause 3(g) of the Section 14 Table applies to all the Documents.[46]
2. The Documents contain personal information about a person under eighteen years of age. The Tribunal has recognised that children are a particularly vulnerable class of individuals and require protection against risks of significant harm: Medlyn at [117], citing Mansfield v Department of Family and Community Services[47] at [35] - [44].
3. In EHW v Secretary, Department of Education[48] the Tribunal noted at [169] that clause 3(g) "is concerned with the interests or more broadly, the rights of the child in a generic sense and not in the context of a particular child to which the information relates", citing Medlyn at [115]-[116] and Commissioner of Police v DYD[49] at [61]. In Miskelly v Secretary, Department of Education[50] at [127], the Tribunal found that it is "difficult to see any circumstances in which the best interests of a child could be served by disclosure of their personal information in response to a GIPA Act application."
4. Having regard to the authorities cited above and the evidence before the Tribunal, I find that the disclosure of personal information about a child contained in the Documents would not be in the best interests of the Child.
5. I am satisfied that the public interest consideration against disclosure in clause 3(g) of the Section 14 Table is applicable to the personal information of a child contained in the Documents, and I give this consideration significant weight.

Consideration of personal factors of applicant - s 55 of the GIPA Act

1. Under section 55 of the GIPA Act, in determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information, an agency (and therefore the Tribunal) is entitled to take into account personal factors of the applicant which includes the applicant's identity and relationship with any other person, the applicant's motives for making the access application, and any other factors particular to the applicant. These personal factors can be taken into account as factors both in favour of and against providing access. Personal factors under s 55 of the GIPA Act may coincide with or highlight a public interest in favour of disclosure, but do not of themselves constitute a public interest: see Snape v Commissioner of Police No 2,[51] at [56] citing JY v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police[52] at [55].
2. In considering the personal factors of the Applicant, I have had regard to the following reasons the Applicant has given for seeking access to the Documents:
   • he is the father of the Child who was questioned by the investigators;
   • he was told by detectives that he would be provided with all information including recordings;
   • the Child is "now in trauma from [the] incident" and he wants to provide the information to doctors and psychologists;
   • he has not been informed whether there is an ongoing investigation.
3. I accept that as the father of the Child who was questioned by the investigators, the Applicant has genuine motives for seeking access to the Documents, and I find that these personal factors weigh in favour of disclosure.

1. For the reasons stated at [50]-[57] above, I am satisfied there is a conclusive presumption of an overriding public interest against disclosure of Documents 1 and 2, the effect of which is that the Tribunal is not required to engage in the balancing exercise under s 13 of the GIPA Act.
2. In relation to Documents 3, 4 and 5, for the reasons outlined at [64]-[74] above, I am satisfied that the public interest considerations against disclosure in clause 1(d) and clause 1(f) of the Section 14 Table are engaged, as disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the supply of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of the Respondent's functions and/or prejudice the effective exercise by the Respondent's functions more generally. I am also satisfied that the public interest considerations against disclosure in clause 2(b) the Section 14 Table are engaged as the disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the prevention, detection or investigation of a contravention or possible contravention of the law or prejudice the enforcement of the law. I find that the public interest considerations in clauses 1(d), 1(f) and 2(d) weigh heavily against the disclosure of the information contained in Documents 3, 4, and 5 as disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the effective exercise of the Respondent's investigatory functions in relation to allegations of harm against children.
3. I am also satisfied for the reasons outlined at [79]-[93] above that the public interest considerations against disclosure in clauses 3(a), 3(b) and 3(g) of the Section 14 Table are engaged in relation to Documents 3, 4 and 5 as the disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to reveal an individual's personal information, contravene an IPP, or in the case of disclosure of personal information about a child, it would not be in the best interests of the child to have disclosed. I find these public interest considerations weigh heavily against the disclosure of Documents 3, 4 and 5.
4. I am satisfied that having regard to the presumption in favour of disclosure of information recognised in ss 5 and 12 and the objectives in s 3 of the GIPA Act that the factors listed above at [46] weigh in favour of disclosure of Documents 3, 4, and 5. Further, some of the information in the Documents is information personal to the Applicant which weighs in favour of disclosure, as do the personal factors of the Applicant in relation to the Child listed above at [95]. However, these do not outweigh the public interest considerations against disclosure that are engaged and that weigh heavily against disclosure of Documents 3, 4 and 5.

(a) Documents 1 and 2 engage the conclusive presumption against disclosure under clause 10 of Schedule 1 of the GIPA Act; and

(b) having regard to public interest considerations in the Section 14 Table and the weight attributed to them, and balancing these considerations in the context of the public interest test under s 13 of the GIPA Act, the public interest considerations against disclosure outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure, and therefore there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information contained in Documents 3, 4 and 5.

1. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the correct and preferable decision is to affirm the decision under review.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

[1] Open Affidavit of Detective Chief Inspector Sotirios (Sam) Courcoulos dated 25 August 2025, [6].

[2] Open Affidavit of Detective Chief Inspector Sotirios (Sam) Courcoulos dated 25 August 2025, [7].

[3] Open Affidavit of Detective Chief Inspector Sotirios (Sam) Courcoulos dated 25 August 2025, [10].

[4] Open Affidavit of Detective Chief Inspector Sotirios (Sam) Courcoulos dated 25 August 2025, [11].

[11] [2012] NSWADTAP 19.

[12] [2011] NSWADT 286.

[13] O'Grady v Sutherland Shire Council (No 2) [2022] NSWCATAD 125 (O'Grady) at [57].

[14] [2011] NSWADT 307.

[15] [2013] NSWADT 73.

[16] [2022] NSWCATAD 125.

[17] [2013] NSWADT 61.

[18] [2015] NSWCATAD 13.

[19] [2015] NSWCATAD 13.

[20] [2024] NSWCATAD 318.

[21] [2017] NSWCATAD 370.

[22] [1986] FCA 35; (1986) 10 FCR 180.

[23] [2010] NSWADT 298.

[24] [2012] NSWADT 120.

[25] [1999] NSWADT 107.

[26] [2012] NSWADT 46.

[27] [2018] NSWCATAP 254.

[28] Cited in Betzis v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAD 71 at [50].

[29] [2019] NSWCATAD 83.

[30] [2018] NSWCATAD 60.

[31] [2009] NSWSC 270.

[32] [2022] NSWCATAD 218.

[33] [2017] NSWCATAD 51.

[34] [2020] NSWCATAD 125.

[35] Medlyn v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAD 125 (Medlyn) at [91], citing Camilleri at [40], Fisher v NSW Police [2002] NSWADT 267, at [34]; AEZ v Commissioner of Police [2009] NSWADT 90, at [65] to [72] and Simring v Commissioner of Police [2009] NSWSC 270 at [69].

[37] [2002] NSWADT 41.

[38] [2022] NSWCATAD 204.

[41] [2016] NSWCATAP 59.

[47] [2014] NSWCATAD 43.

[48] [2022] NSWCATAD 140.

[49] [2020] NSWCATAP 224.

[50] [2019] NSWCATAD 48.

[51] [2022] NSWCATAP 63.

[52] [2008] NSWADT 306.