Simpson Design Associates Pty Ltd v Inspector Ching
[2011] NSWIRComm 7
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Industrial Relations Commission (NSW)
Decision date
2010-11-05
Before
Boland P, Marks J, Kavanagh J, Haylen J, Boland J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (20 paragraphs)
Background facts 8Haylen J set out the facts of the matter at [6] noting that they were substantially agreed. The appellant also helpfully submitted a summary of the facts. It is unnecessary to repeat all of those facts so, at this stage, we shall only refer to those that are necessary to understand the context in which this appeal is taking place: (a) Hannas Civil Engineering Pty Ltd (" Hannas ") was appointed as the project manager for the construction of the concrete batching plant. Mr Peter Twomey was the project manager from August 2001 onwards. Mr Twomey was employed by LSM Projects Pty Ltd (" LSM" ), but in practice represented Hannas as a result of a contract between LSM and Hannas under which LSM contracted with Hannas to provide services to Hannas to enable it to carry out its construction management role. (b) The construction of the plant included three sets of bi-sliding metal gates on Coward Street: one on the eastern side, one on the western side and a centre gate in the middle between the east gate and the west gate ("the gates"). Part of Hannas' duties included acting as the project manager for the design, construction and installation of the steel gates located on Coward Street. (c) Each set of gates consisted of two gate leaves that opened in opposite directions along a track through the tunnel of the support portals. The gates were fitted with motorised driving units with switches to open and close the gates. The gates could also be operated manually. The west gate was the largest of the three gates and each gate leaf of the west gate weighed approximately 1340 kilograms. The appellant notes that the gates were not constructed to be operated manually and were locked in position once the motor was installed, although the motor could be disengaged for manual operation. (d) The brief from Hy-Tec in accordance with condition 102 of the Development Consent was: "Provide a steel bi-fold gate system that can be opened and closed via digital key pads adjacent to the gate or overridden from the control room together with electronic eyes for closure". (e) By letter dated 23 March 2001 the appellant originally tendered to Hannas to provide structural design engineering services for the concrete batching plant. The gates were not part of the initial work for which the appellant was contracted as set out in the letter dated 23 March 2001. (f) Damian Hadley, an associate director of the appellant, was employed by the appellant as a structural engineer to perform structural design and to co-ordinate the day-to-day activities of the appellant. Mr Hadley was a chartered professional engineer. Mr Hadley was answerable to Andrew Simpson a director of the appellant. Mr Hadley was the structural engineer who did most of the initial work. (g) The structural design for the steel gates and steel frames that supported the gate was carried out later pursuant to an oral brief together with some drawings and written instructions from Mr Twomey. Mr Twomey says the design brief was for the design to be in accordance with the DA conditions and to do the structural design for an electrically operated gate system. Mr Hadley said that the design brief was to provide structural engineering services for the design and documentation of the gates. There was no specific brief to the appellant for manual operation, a backup system or stops. Mr Hadley said that the brief did not include the mode of operation of the gate. However there was no express prohibition on operating the gates manually. (h) On 3 September 2001 SDA issued a further "fee proposal" for additional works at the concrete batching plant, including "structural steel gate design". On about 12 November 2001, shortly after another meeting on 9 November 2001 at which the gates had been discussed, Mr Hadley sent a fax to Mr Twomey in which he stated, in part: With this in mind I propose to proceed with the structural design and specify the track and rollers as proprietary items. (i) Mr Hadley provided his first sketch of the structural elements of the gates on 13 November 2001. Following a further sketch and comments from Mr Twomey, Revision A of the 'Miscellaneous Steelwork drawings' was issued to Mr Twomey on about 19 December 2001. That drawing showed, in addition to some steelwork unrelated to the gates, the structural elements of the gates. (j) Thereafter Mr Hadley provided further revisions of the same "Miscellaneous Steelwork drawings", including Revisions D and E, which were the focus of the charge. Each revision of the drawing included the same structural elements of the gates. Mr Hadley supervised, approved and checked the drawings. Mr Twomey provided some comments and alterations in respect of SDA's drawings. Revision E was issued to Mr Twomey on about 24 June 2002, that being the end of the period to which the charge related. These structural drawings contain the design that it is alleged was unsafe. (k) Gate stops were not incorporated in those drawings. No provision was made in the design for the gates to be operated manually or in the case of mechanical failure. The design shown on SDA's Miscellaneous Steelwork drawings does not address the issue of mode of operation of the gates. The only reference to the mode of operation of the gates is the note on the drawings, which refers to the need for coordination with the manufacturer of the gate motor. (l) The design and construction of the gates ultimately involved the work of a number of separate entities, appointed and acting under the coordination and direction of Hannas and in particular Mr Twomey. The following entities were responsible for the design, supply and installation of the major components of the gates: (i) SDA provided the structural design. (ii) Lejah trading as Sunstate Consulting & Engineering (" Sunstate "), the company which designed and supplied the mechanical equipment for the concrete batching plant generally, designed the wheels and rollers for the gates, prepared the fabrication drawings for the gates and supplied, delivered and at least partly installed the gate steelwork. (iii) Magic Door Industries Pty Ltd (" MDI ") supplied and installed the operating equipment for the gates, including determining the particular motor and other operating equipment to be used. (iv) Roofacade Pty Ltd (" Roofacade ") supplied and installed the cladding, which was placed on the gate leaves. (m) The fabrication drawings for the gates were completed by Sunstate by about 8 August 2002. Sunstate's fabrication drawings showed the specification of the type of wheels and type of rollers to be used in constructing the gates, the number and positioning of the wheels and rollers and the design of the brackets for each of the wheels and the rollers. Sunstate's fabrication drawings did not provided for gate stops. Sunstate followed the appellant's design in this respect. The appellant noted that Keith Rowe, the Estimator for Sunstate stated that SDA's Miscellaneous Steelwork drawings did not refer to stops, and Mr Rowe never discussed that matter with Mr Twomey. Mr Rowe refers to those drawings as only "structural" outline drawings. There was no evidence that Mr Rowe was required to follow SDA's Miscellaneous Steelwork drawings in this respect. (n) Sunstate then arranged for the fabrication of the steelwork for the gates, and for it to be delivered to the Mascot site. During October and November 2002 the gate steelwork was installed. (o) MDI commenced installing the gate operating equipment on 12 November 2002. On the afternoon of 12 November 2002 one of the gate leaves of the centre gate moved through its portal and fell, narrowly missing one of MDI's installers. (p) As a result of that incident it became apparent to Sunstate and Mr Twomey that physical stops were required on the gates. MDI said that they would not go back to the site until adequate stops were installed on the gate leaves. (q) On 14 November 2002, and again on 16 December 2002, MDI sent Mr Twomey a facsimile strongly recommending that physical stops be installed, on both occasions expressly referring to the possibility of a fatality if that did not occur. (r) Shortly after the near miss on 12 November 2002 some stops were fixed to some of the gate leaves, including apparently the bolted stop, which was on the western leaf of the west gate when it fell on 14 October 2003. SDA was not asked to, and accordingly did not, play any part in the specification, design or installation of the bolted stop. (s) By December 2002 the construction of the concrete batching plant was substantially finished and Hy-Tec had entered into possession of the premises. After this time the gates had to be operated manually at times. Throughout 2003, failures in the automatic electronic functioning of all the gates, but most frequently, the west gate, were a regular occurrence. Hy-Tec employees closed the gates manually frequently and this required more than one employee as the west gate in particular was heavy. The usual practice with the west gate was to close the eastern leaf first. (t) On 14 October 2003 a tragic incident occurred in which one of the gates fell on Melissa Maybury resulting in her death (fatal incident). Jason Sheath was the last employee of Hy-Tec present at the site and was responsible for closing the gates to the site. His friend Ms Maybury arrived at the concrete batching plant by car to transport him home. She had done this on previous occasions. (u) Mr Sheath was attempting to close the bi-sliding metal gate on the western side of the premises. Mr Sheath was initially attempting to close the west gate electronically. The electronic system used to close the gates failed. Mr Sheath rang his supervisor Mr Hanna to ask him for the pin code for the drivers' room because the drivers had forgotten to close the room gate and told Mr Hanna he was having problems closing the gate and that he would get back to Mr Hanna with how he went with closing the gate. (v) Mr Sheath disengaged the motor and commenced to close it manually. Mr Sheath initially tried to close the western leaf of the west gate. He experienced difficulty in moving the western leaf by himself. Mr Sheath had previously had assistance in closing the gate manually. Ms Maybury came to the assistance of Mr Sheath in manually closing the gates. (w) At the time that Mr Sheath was attempting to close the western leaf of the west gate, the eastern leaf was still in the open position. While Mr Sheath and Ms Maybury were attempting to close the western leaf manually, as they manoeuvred the western leaf, the front edge of the gate leaf passed the midpoint of the driveway. It moved out of the supporting portals and fell onto Ms Maybury and caused her fatal injuries. (x) The only available inference from the evidence is that there were only ever three stops attached to the six leaves of the gates at the concrete batching plant. The factual inspections made after the fatal incident show that no further stops were installed after November 2002 and that the western leaf of the west gate still had the bolted stop installed in November 2002. The bolted stop was grossly inadequate and incapable of providing the mechanical strength required to limit the travel of the gate, whether that travel was driven by the normal power system, electric motor and gear box that drove the gate, or through the manual operation of the gate leaf. (y) Subsequent to the fatal incident, Mr Hadley on behalf of SDA designed gate stops, which were approved by Andrew Simpson. The design drawings were forwarded to Mr Proctor of Hy-Tec by Mr Hadley from the appellant on 15 October 2003. The entire work of designing, fabricating and installing stops in both the opening and closing positions took just one day. Inspector Ching photographed these stops on 24 October 2003. The appellant noted that there was no evidence of how long was required for those stops to be fabricated and installed. (z) In designing the stops after the fatal incident, Mr Hadley was able to undertake relevant calculations to undertake the task such as the calculation of the load. As the gates could be operated manually as well as electronically, Mr Hadley determined the load that someone could push on the door manually and from that he allocated the velocity and calculated an impact load.