The idea of cause and consequence is a necessary element in law, especially in the law of crime and tort. And it is, it seems to me, neither surprising nor perhaps undesirable that some phrases long used to expound its significance and application should continue to be used. Some of them have a long history: the expression "efficient cause" for example goes back at least to scholastic theology. St. Thomas Aquinas spoke of " causa efficiens omnium entium " (Summa Theologiae Q. XLIV). But if Latin distinctions are thought to be useful, then it seems important to avoid cross divisions. Causa causans and causa causata refer to different occurrences in a causal sequence. Causa proxima and causa remota are contrasted in another way. Causa causans may be and often is used to mean the cause or "real cause", being that to which legal responsibility attaches, as distinct from a causa sine qua non, a matter that in the particular case does not attract legal responsibility. But causa causans and causa sine qua non are not mutually exclusive expressions: and remarks by Lord Bramwell in the course of his speech in Wilson Sons & Co. v. The Xantho [1] ought not, it seems to me, to be read as suggesting the contrary. Lord Wright in Smith Hogg & Co. v. Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance Co. [2] said: " " Causa causans " is supposed to mean a cause which causes, while " causa sine qua non " means, I suppose, a cause which does not, in the sense material to the particular case, cause, but is merely an incident which precedes in the history or narrative of events, but as a cause is not in at the death, and hence is irrelevant" [3] . But it may be permissible to doubt whether when pressed to a final analysis this distinction is as real or as helpful as its frequent repetition, especially in connexion with negligence and contributory negligence, might suggest. The judgment of Pigott B. in Bradburn's Case [4] shows that these doubts are not removed when English instead of Latin words are used to denote causal relationships. He said of the plaintiff's having received the proceeds of an accident policy: "He does not receive that sum of money because of the accident, but because he has made a contract providing for the contingency; an accident must occur to entitle him to it, but it is not the accident, but his contract, which is the cause of his receiving it" [5] . This statement may be examined without canvassing the decision in the case. The contractual right of an insured person to be paid by the insurer the sum assured by the contract arises when the event insured against happens, and not unless it does happen. An insurance policy and an accident were both necessary for Bradburn to get the money. Why then was one the cause and the other not? The selection of one causal factor rather than another as that on which legal responsibility depends seems to me very different from asserting, for quite another purpose, that money is received under a contract because the contract was made and not because it was performed according to its terms. The statement has been often quoted. But to me it and some cases in which it has been relied upon seem to provide some justification for Dr. Glanville Williams' generalization (in Modern Law Review (1954) 17pp. 68, 69) that "a vague doctrine like that of legal causation is a convenient formula for purporting to justify an opinion which in fact proceeds from an intuitive sense of justice applied to the case as a whole". Moreover, if Latin labels be at all useful for these purposes - which I greatly doubt - then it seems it would be proper to say that the accident was the causa causans of the receipt of the money by Bradburn. That would accord with what is, I consider, the correct use of this expression, as Lord Lindley, then Lindley L.J., used it in Cullerne v. London & Suburban Building Society [1] . Speaking of an illegal resolution by directors of a building society authorizing advances to members and of a loss incurred when the directors relying on the resolution made an advance, he said: "It probably is true that if no such resolutions had been passed no such advances as they authorized would have been made; but the real cause of the loss sustained by the society is the improper advance; the resolution was not the causa causans of the loss, but only a causa sine qua non. If the resolution alone had been passed nothing would have happened; it would have had no result. A new wrongful act by independent persons was the real cause of the loss. The resolution, therefore, was not the real cause, not the causa causans ". An accident is not the consequence of effecting an insurance against accident. Both must occur for the policy holder to be paid: but they are not "causes of causes impulsions one of another".