Sidhu v Sidhu

1. The appellant is Mr Paramjit Sidhu ("Paramjit"). He was the lessee of two agricultural properties in Woolgoolga NSW under 5 year leases. One property was owned by each of the respondents, being:

(1) Mr Major Sidhu, the first respondent ("Major"); and

(2) Ms Tijen Sidhu, the second respondent ("Tijen").

1. There were four applications before the Consumer and Commercial Division which were determined on 30 June 2025 following a hearing held on 8 May 2025:
   • 2024/00427584 Paramjit Sidhu v Major Sidhu ("Proceedings 584");
   • 2024/00446907 Tijen Sidhu v Paramjit Sidhu ("Proceedings 907");
   • 2025/0006825 Paramjit Sidhu v Major Sidhu ("Proceedings 825"); and
   • 2025/00022027 Major Sidhu v Paramjit Sidhu ("Proceedings 027").
2. Written reasons were published ("Primary Reasons" or "PR"), comprising 51 paragraphs and 14 pages.
3. The applications were dealt with together and the evidence lodged in each proceeding was read as evidence in all other proceedings.
4. Prior to the substantive hearing on 8 May 2025, the Tribunal had made termination orders on 11 December 2024 by consent in relation to both properties in other proceedings (2024/00426701). The appellant was to vacate the properties by 8 January 2025, to remove structures and other items from each property and to make good any damage suffered. The lessors obtained possession of both farms on 28 February 2025: PR [8]-[9]. Those proceedings are not the subject of this appeal.
5. In summary, the claims by Paramjit (the appellant/lessee) in the proceedings the subject of this appeal were all dismissed:

(1) In Proceedings 584 (against Major as lessor): Paramjit claimed $10,000 damages for breach of quiet enjoyment of the farm and (added at the hearing) $130,000 for loss of income from bananas and blueberries. Both claims were dismissed by the Tribunal. The quiet enjoyment claim was dismissed following consideration and rejection of Paramjit's evidence and a finding that his claim was not proved. This included (at PR [13]) the Tribunal putting "no weight on the statements provided by Paramjit". The claim for economic loss was rejected on the basis that the lease was terminated following Paramjit's own breach (PR[16]).

(2) In Proceedings 825 (against Major as lessor): Paramjit claimed compensation of $146,500 for entry without notice, comprising damages as compensation for resulting loss of sub-tenant rent 2.5 years $80,000, $16,500 for stolen equipment, $50,000 lost income from his planting of 2000 bananas and lost benefits of installing power on property;

(3) Dealt with at PR [37] as claims by Paramjit in Proceedings 907 (in opposition to claims by Tijen as lessor): a claim for $210,000 as compensation, comprising $90,000 as lost income from subletting the hothouses and $120,000 for loss of income from bananas. Paramjit's claim against Tijen for lost income from subletting was dismissed. The Tribunal found (PR [49]) that clause 6 of the lease forbade subletting without consent, there was no evidence of consent and consent was denied by Tijen.

1. The Tribunal considered the following claims by the lessors against the appellant (lessee):

(1) In Proceedings 027: Major claimed (a) $120,000 for rent from 1 October 2024 to the end of the tenancy, and (b) $438,628 compensation to replace infrastructure the lessee removed. The Tribunal did not accept all of the claims, finding as follows:

(a) $25,000 rent to be paid by the lessee from 1 October 2024 to 28 February 2025 (the date of vacant possession) at $5,000 per month;

(b) the claims for rent from the date of vacant possession to the end of the lease term (28 February 2027) were dismissed since there was no evidence of re-rental attempts as required by clause 10(a) of the lease;

(c) the Tribunal did not accept that Paramjit had an arrangement with Major to offset the cost of growbags and coco beans which Major had bought from him against the rent owing for October and November 2024, finding it "inconsistent" with the documents before the Tribunal (at PR [20]-[21]); and

(d) the claims for infrastructure replacement were dismissed for lack of evidence - the equipment removed was said to be past its useful life and was removed with the landlord's knowledge and consent (the latter being disputed); there was no ingoing or outgoing condition report or evidence of the value of the farm at the commencement or end of the tenancy, and no evidence of the decrease in value of the farm (if any) as a result of the alleged termination; and accordingly no compensation for deterioration would be awarded under s 19A of the AT Act (at PR [30]-[35]).

(2) In respect of Proceedings 907, Tijen claimed (as adjusted) $280,470.31 comprising (a) $124,713 for rent to the end of the tenancy, (b) $378.92 legal costs, (c) $1,580.64 interest to 26 March 2025 (and continuing), (d) $111,297.75 for deterioration of the farm (including amounts for slashing, rubbish removal and electrical hardware), and (e) $42,500 to replace 8,500 blueberry plants removed by Paramjit. Of the total claim, only $28,353.27 was awarded by the Tribunal (plus interest to be calculated). As with Major, the rent was allowed only until the date of vacation. The amount claimed for deterioration of value was not awarded for the same reasons noted, except that part of the claim was awarded for a qualified electrician to make good the removal of electrical works per Tribunal orders made 11 December 2024, since there was "no evidence" to support the lessee's submission that he did so, and for skip bins, rubbish removal and slashing grass. The claim for the blueberry plants was also rejected. (at PR [47]-[48]).

"(1) The claims by Paramjit Sidhu 2024/00427584 and 2025/00006825 are dismissed.

(2) On file 2025/00022027, Paramjit Sidhu is to pay Major Sidhu the sum of $25,000.00 immediately.

Details of money order

Rent from 1 October 2024 to 28 February 2025 $25,000.00

(3) On file 2024/00446907, Paramjit Sidhu is to pay Tijen Sidhu the sum of $28,353.27 immediately.

Details of money order

Rent from 1 October 2024 to 28 February 2025 with $3000 in hand $15,335.00

Balance legal fees of lease $378.92

Interest on late rent payments to 1 October 2024 $539.35

Electrical works $1100.00

Removal of rubbish and slash property $11,000.00

(4) Paramjit Sidhu is also to pay interest on the rent owing at order 3, and for that purpose Tijen Sidhu is by 14 June 2025 to submit to the Tribunal a calculation of the interest claimed to the date of these orders."

Principles governing appeals from the Consumer and Commercial Division

1. Section 80(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) ("NCAT Act") states:

Any internal appeal may be made:

(a) in the case of an interlocutory decision of the Tribunal at first instance - with the leave of the Appeal Panel, and

(b) in the case of any other kind of decision (including an ancillary decision) of the Tribunal at first instance - as of right on any question of law, or with the leave of the Appeal Panel, on any other grounds.

1. In summary, internal appeals may generally be made as of right on a question of law, and otherwise with leave (that is, the permission) of the Appeal Panel.
2. In Unique Commercial Group Pty Ltd v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204 ("Cusumano") at [25]-[40] esp. at [30]-[32], the Appeal Panel revisited non-exclusive instances of errors on questions of law. At [33] the Appeal Panel that the categories of questions of law are "not closed" and at [37] stated:

"37. What constitutes a question of law is vexed and context dependent in the sense that the distinction between matters of fact and of law may turn on the circumstances in which the question arises: Targeted Property Investments Pty Ltd v Look Up Technologies Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 416 at [33(4)], citing Thomas and Naaz [2023] NSWCA 40 at [52] and Da Costa v The Queen [1968] HCA 51; (1968) 118 CLR 186 at 194; [1968] HCA 51."

1. Relevantly, a ground of appeal that alleges that the Tribunal failed to afford procedural fairness raises a question of law.
2. If no question of law is raised, leave to appeal is required.
3. The circumstances in which the Appeal Panel may grant leave to appeal from decisions made in the Consumer and Commercial Division are limited by cl 12(1) of Schedule 4 to the NCAT Act, which provides:

An Appeal Panel may grant leave under section 80(2)(b) of this Act for an internal appeal against a Division decision only if the Appeal Panel is satisfied the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice because:

(a) the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable, or

(b) the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was against the weight of evidence, or

(c) significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with).

1. A Division decision is a primary decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division. The primary decision here is such a decision.
2. In Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17, the Appeal Panel stated at [76] and [79] that a substantial miscarriage of justice for the purposes of cl 12(1) in Sch 4 to the NCAT Act may have been suffered where:

"[76] ...there was a "significant possibility" or a "chance which was fairly open" that a different and more favourable result would have been achieved for the appellant had the relevant circumstance in para (a) or (b) not occurred or if the fresh evidence under para (c) had been before the Tribunal at first instance. ...

[79] In order to show that a party has been deprived of a "significant possibility" or a "chance which was fairly open" of achieving a different and more favourable result because of one of the circumstances referred to in cl 12(1)(a), (b) or (c), it will be generally be necessary for the party to explain what its case would have been and show that it was fairly arguable. If the party fails to do this then, even if there has been a denial of procedural fairness, the Appeal Panel may conclude that it is not satisfied that any substantial miscarriage of justice may have occurred - see the general discussion in Kyriakou v Long [2013] NSWSC 1890 at [32] and following concerning the corresponding provisions of the [statutory predecessor to CATA (s 68 of the Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act)] and especially at [46] and [55]."

1. Even if an appellant from a decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division has satisfied the requirements of cl 12(1) of Sch 4 to the NCAT Act, the Appeal Panel must still consider whether it should exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal under s 80(2)(b): Pholi v Wearne [2014] NSWCATAP 78 at [32]. In Collins v Urban, the Appeal Panel stated at [84] that ordinarily it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal only in matters that involve:

"(a) issues of principle;

(b) questions of public importance or matters of administration or policy which might have general application; or

(c) an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision and not merely peripheral, so that it would be unjust to allow the finding to stand;

(d) a factual error that was unreasonably arrived at and clearly mistaken; or

(e) the Tribunal having gone about the fact finding process in such an unorthodox manner or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result so that it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed."

1. Turning to the specific grounds in cl 12(1)(a) and (b) of Sch 4 to the NCAT Act, in Collins v Urban the Appeal Panel said:

"[77] As to the particular grounds in cl 12(1)(a) and (b), without seeking to be exhaustive in any way, the authorities establish that:

1 If there has been a denial of procedural fairness the decision under appeal can be said to have been "not fair and equitable" - Hutchings v CTTT [2008] NSWSC 717 at [35], Atkinson v Crowley [2011] NSWCA 194 at [12].

2 The decision under appeal can be said to be "against the weight of evidence" (which is an expression also used to describe a ground upon which a jury verdict can be set aside) where the evidence in its totality preponderates so strongly against the conclusion found by the tribunal at first instance that it can be said that the conclusion was not one that a reasonable tribunal member could reach - Calin v The Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 23; (1991) 173 CLR 33 at 41-42, Mainteck Services Pty Limited v Stein Heurtey SA [2013] NSWSC 266 at [153]."

The question of what constitutes significant new evidence not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with under the ground in para 12(1)(c) of Sch 4 to the NCAT Act was considered by an Appeal Panel in Owen v Kim [2017] NSWCATAP 26. There the Appeal Panel stated at [37]-[39]:

"[37] In Owners - SP 76269 v Draybi Bros Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 29 the Appeal Panel stated at [109] in connection with cl 12(1)(c) of Schedule 4 to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act:

'In order to fall within this paragraph the appellant must be able to point to evidence which:

(1) is significant; and

(2) has arisen and is new in the sense that it was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings below were being heard.'

[38] In Leisure Brothers Pty Ltd v Smith [2017] NSWCATAP 11 the Appeal Panel stated at [40 ]:

'The meaning of this clause was considered by the Appeal Panel in Al-Daouk v Mr Pine Pty Ltd t/as Furnco Bankstown [2015] NSWCATAP 111. At [23] - [24] the Appeal Panel said:

'23 Unlike the WIM Act, the expression "reasonably available" is not qualified by the words "to the party". This difference suggests that the test of whether evidence is reasonably available is not to be considered by reference to any subjective explanation from the party seeking leave but, rather, by applying an objective test and considering whether the evidence in question was unavailable because no person could have reasonably obtained the evidence. For example, in Owners SP 76269 v Draybi Bros [2014] NSWCATAP 20 at [114] the Appeal Panel refused leave because, although the appellant may not have been aware of the evidence (being an email), it could have obtained the evidence by summons. In Prestige Auto Centre Pty Ltd v Apurva Mishra [2014] NSWCATAP 81 at [17] the Appeal Panel granted leave because the respondent to the appeal had fraudulently altered evidence. The party seeking leave under cl 12(1)(c) could not reasonably have had available to them the evidence that the report in question had been fraudulently altered at the time the proceedings were being dealt with by the Tribunal. That fact was not known to the appellant at the time of the hearing and could not reasonably be known due to fraud.

24 Each of these cases illustrates that something more than a party's incapacity to procure evidence is necessary to satisfy the requirements of cl 12(1)(c).'

[39] As stated at [27] in Al-Daouk v Mr Pine Pty Ltd t/as Furnco Bankstown:

'the issue is whether, objectively, the evidence has arisen since the hearing and was "not reasonably available" at the time of the hearing.'"

1. In Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 the Appeal Panel stated at [10]:

"An appeal does not provide a losing party with the opportunity to run their case again except in the narrow circumstances which we have described. Mr Ryan has not satisfied us that those circumstances apply to his case and we refuse permission for him to appeal."

1. The appellant filed the Notice of Appeal ("NOA") on 29 July 2025. Since these were not residential tenancy proceedings, this was within the prescribed time period of 28 days under rule 25(4)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW).
2. The appellant said (Item 2 of the NOA) that he was appealing against three of the decisions - being in respect of Proceedings 825, 907 and 584. Yet the orders challenged on appeal were listed in the NOA (at Item 5A) as:

"Non enjoyment of farming

payment of rent to Major Sidhu

payment of rent to Tijen SIDHU"

1. We observe that the second entry "payment of rent to Major Sidhu" appears to have challenged Order 2, which was made in respect of Proceedings 027.
2. At Item 5B of the NOA ("Grounds of Appeal"), the appellant wrote (errors as in the original):

"My evidence was dismissed as the other party lied on oath. My witnesses were denied a opportunity to have a say in the hearing. The hearing was fast track as the matter should have taken longer. the member has contradicted herself in some parts. The sound record will prove this. The other party never submitted any submissions so I could set my defense but proved statuary Declaration well after the application. The other party never provided no Statement on the first date. I believe my evidence out weight other parties."

"order should support non enjoyment of farming.

order that rent should be up to 1 december 2024

orders for loss of income as the money spent was to increase income"

1. The appellant said (NOA Item 6) that he was asking for leave to appeal. He said, inter alia:

(1) He needed time to collect further evidence in the case;

(2) He needed to go through the sound recording to show where the Tribunal member contradicted herself, and where Danny had lied to the Senior Member;

(3) The decision was not fair and equitable because the Tribunal believed Danny (who lied) and did not use statutory declarations of two witnesses;

(4) The decision was against the weight of evidence because:

(a) Danny said the appellant had threatened one of his witnesses and "because Danny Sidhu lied the senior Member dismissed my two key witness as the Third was in Italy".

(b) the Tribunal should have given more weight to the evidence he provided in "submission, my witness statements and my text msg";

(5) He sought to produce the following evidence:

(a) New (signed) statutory declarations from two witnesses;

(b) Text messages from Major purportedly asking for termination of the lease on 1 December 2024.

1. Three stay applications were lodged by the appellant. They were all considered, and dismissed, by the Appeal Panel (differently constituted) prior to our hearing of this appeal:

(1) The first was lodged on 28 July 2025, at the same time as the NOA. It was heard, and dismissed, on 8 August 2025.

(2) The second was lodged on 25 August 2025. It was heard, and dismissed, on 5 September 2025.

(3) The third was lodged on 16 September 2025. It was heard, and dismissed, on 8 October 2025.

1. At a directions hearing on 8 August 2025 the Appeal Panel made the following orders with notes (inter alia, as corrected on 18 August 2025):

"2. The Appellant is to lodge with the Appeal Registry and give to the Respondent by 26 September 2025:

...

(d) If oral reasons were given and/or what happened at the hearing at first instance is being relied on by the Appellant in the appeal, a typed transcript of the relevant parts of the hearing, together with the sound recording of the entire hearing.

3. The Respondent is to lodge with the Appeal Registry and give to the Appellant by 07 November 2025:

......

(d) If oral reasons were given and/or what happened at the hearing at first instance is being relied on by the Respondent in the appeal, a typed transcript of the relevant parts of the hearing (extent to the extent already provided by the Appellant), together with the sound recording of the entire hearing (unless already provided by the Appellant).

...

7 NOTES

(1) If a party does not lodge with the Appeal Registry and give to the other parties documents, sound recordings and submissions as directed above, that party may not be allowed to rely on those documents, sound recordings and submissions at the hearing of the appeal.

(2) If any party wishes to make an application for costs of the appeal, that party is to lodge with the Appeal Registry and give to the other party any submissions on costs at the same time as their submissions in relation to the appeal.

...

(4) If a party wishes to rely on a sound recording of a hearing, the party must identify to the Appeal Panel which parts of the sound recording are relied [on] in their written submissions.

...."

1. On 20 August 2025 the Tribunal made an order granting leave for Mr Danny Sidhu ("Danny") to represent Major at the hearing of the appeal. Danny is the son of Major, and the husband of Tijen.

1. The appeal was heard on 4 December 2025.
2. The appellant, Paramjit, appeared by audio-visual link. Initial sound difficulties were resolved by re-connection. Danny (representing Major) and Tijen appeared by phone. All confirmed they were content to proceed on the basis of using their first names.

1. The parties confirmed that applications, evidence and submissions lodged in respect of the three stay applications (already dealt with and dismissed) were not relied on in the hearing. We have proceeded on that basis.
2. The appellant had also lodged the following materials:

(1) Notice of Appeal lodged on 28 July 2025;

(2) Submissions and accompanying documents lodged on 1 August 2025 (marked "A2" by the Registry); and

(3) Submissions in reply and accompanying documents lodged on 17 November 2025 ("A10").

1. However, the appellant said that all documents he relied on were contained in the 17 November 2025 "response to submission" ("A10").
2. The respondents relied upon the following materials:

(1) Reply to Appeal lodged on 6 August 2025 ("Reply");

(2) Bundle of submissions and accompanying attachments in opposition to the appeal application lodged on 7 November 2025 ("R9").

1. We have had regard to those materials and note that the respondents' submissions (R9) were stated to be "a joint response from Tijen Sidhu and Danny Sidhu (as the authorised representative for Major Sidhu)".
2. No transcript of the hearing below was provided. The Notice of Appeal had a copy of a request for sound recording attached to it, but no sound recording was provided. The appellant made some references to the sound recording in his submissions, but confirmed to us that he had not provided it.
3. The parties did not provide a comprehensive bundle of the evidence that was put before the Tribunal.
4. The appellant provided (A10 p46) a copy of his affidavit with a date of 10 March 2025. There were no exhibits or annexures to it; rather, it comprised a series of statements referring to general discussions, undated events, sub-leases and other facts with no reference to specific supporting evidence or documents.

1. Each party identified at the hearing the following evidence put before the Appeal Panel that had not been put before the Tribunal below, although it was clear that most if not all of such material was reasonably available at time of the primary hearing:

(1) for the appellant - A10 pages 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 17, 22-28, 53 and the unnumbered final page. This new material included;

(a) (page 53) a legible copy of the invoice in the 2024 email chain at p11, being a handwritten invoice dated "14/9/24" from "P Sidhu" to "M Sidhu" for $10,435 stating "please pay or deduct from rent";

(b) statutory declarations, attested post the Tribunal hearing date, but some (e.g. p 10) said to have been originally rejected as not having been properly attested (but the original versions were not provided); and

(c) photographs which (although undated) the appellant said were all taken prior to the Tribunal hearing - he explained that he thought he had given enough evidence to prove his points but, when the proceedings were dismissed, he needed to show the photos to prove that Major took the green bags and agreed to offset the value of those against the rent.

(2) for the respondents (excluding Appeal Panel orders before us on our file) - R9 pages 11-12, 14-15 and 30-32. The respondents submitted the new material was provided only in response to allegations raised by the appellant in this appeal. This new material included:

(a) text messages from 10-17 February (said to be 2025) with an electrician regarding the quote received; and

(b) A Notice of Non levy addressed to Major from the NSW Sheriff's Office regarding attempts to enforce the judgment debt against the appellant.

1. As noted above, the appellant relied on his written submissions lodged on 17 November 2025 (A10, pp1-5).
2. We need not opine on matters raised in the submissions which are not relevant to our consideration of this appeal. Such matters include:

(1) a complaint of non-receipt of materials from the respondents at the time of writing, alleging they were due on 26 September 2025; however, that was the date the appellant's evidence and submissions were due per the orders set out above; and

(2) issues with the appellant's health and other concerns arising from purported actions and lies of Tijen and Danny leading to further legal actions being considered against them.

1. Paragraph 4 of the submissions queried orders for electrical quotes and rubbish removal, making statements regarding additional facts and the appellant's understanding of the position. No supporting documents for this paragraph were provided - as acknowledged at the hearing.
2. The tone of the submissions was one of seeking to disprove evidence that had been presented to the Tribunal by the respondents. This included submissions regarding the subletting and submissions regarding conversations with Danny; most factual statements were unsupported and some appeared to be reliant upon statutory declarations included in the "new" evidence, for example:

"9) I have provided a Statutory Declaration in which Kopila Dami states that no conversation happened between the family. Due to this reason, I believe everything from Danny Sidhu and Tijen Sidhu holds no value in this case. Danny fabricated a story to suit his benefit."

1. There were references to additional improvements the appellant made to the property, and other work he did which increased the value of the properties which had benefited the landlords.
2. There were references to the sound recording seeking to impugn the actions of the Tribunal.
3. To the extent that supporting documents were provided, they were not clearly referenced to any particular finding of the Tribunal, paragraph of the reasons, or claim made by the appellant.
4. At the hearing, the appellant said (inter alia):

(1) The Tribunal did not listen to the affidavits that told the story of what happened on the property. It was unjust for the Tribunal to not listen to his affidavits or statutory declarations and the primary member rejected them just because Danny questioned them.

(2) He suffered from mental health issues from an accident and has good days and bad days.

(3) In reference to the reasons at PR [20]-[23], he sought to demonstrate - by reference to the "new" evidence including his $10,435 invoice to Major dated 14 September 2024 (R9, p53) sent by text to Major on 18 November 2024), in conjunction with other text messages - that there had been an offset agreement on the rental invoice from Major of 7 November 2024 in respect of the grow bags, saying that this matter was disputed in the hearing by Danny (who said they never took the grow bags) and not before, and that Danny's disputation was incorrect. It was pointed out to the appellant that he wrote a request for credit or payment on the 14 September 2024 invoice ("please pay or deduct from rent") and that such was not sufficient to constitute an agreement for an offset to be applied. Further, we observe that the text messages we were taken to (some of which had been before the Tribunal below) were vague or difficult to understand, and some of the chains were incomplete.

1. We also observe that many of the documents referred to in the various submissions from the appellant were not before us at the appeal hearing.

1. The respondents' written submissions were filed on 7 November 2025 and included a statement to the effect that they had not (at that time) received submissions or other documents from the appellant required to be lodged by 26 September 2025.
2. At the hearing, Tijen stated that inconsistencies in the signatures in the witness statements had been raised with the appellant prior to the hearing, as had the vagueness of the content in the appellant's statutory declarations. In respect of the new evidence sought to be adduced, the respondents' position was that it had no correlation to issues of rent and deterioration of the farm and contained no evidence which disproved the invoices that the respondents had presented. Tijen said that she was not aware that the witnesses were available at the primary hearing (as claimed by the appellant); in the absence of the sound recording, her recollection was that the appellant did not say they were available.
3. Danny (representing Major) told the Appeal Panel that the issues came down to whether there was a breach of the tenancy agreement. There had been no compliance by the appellant with orders made by the Tribunal including for appeal submissions and transcripts to be provided by 26 September as required. In the absence of the required materials, he asked that the matter be put to an end.
4. Turning to the respondents' written submissions (and other materials), we need not deal with matters regarding the NSW Sheriff's Office. That is not pertinent to our consideration of this appeal.
5. Key relevant themes were that no transcript or sound recording was provided, the witnesses had not been present at the hearing (per PR [13] of the reasons) and the evidence had been appropriately considered and weighed, noting that the Tribunal placed no weight on the statutory declarations and statements lodged by the appellant due to "a number of inconsistencies". The appellant had also not provided evidence demonstrating any substantial miscarriage of justice in the event that leave to appeal was required to be granted.
6. The respondents referred to the appellant raising the claim for non-enjoyment of farming and noted the following, saying no specification of the claim was made as ordered (R9 p3):

"Non-enjoyment of farming has no correlation to the money orders made. This is a separate matter which the appellant raises. In her orders dated 11 December 2024 Snr Member Ross gives opportunity for the appellant to quantify his claim of non-enjoyment. She states in point 2 "Leave is granted to the applicant to amend the application in relation to the alleged breach of quiet enjoyment. The application must specify the order being sought in relation to that issue and the quantum of any claim."

1. The respondents also opposed the introduction of the appellant's new evidence, stating it was all reasonably available as at the time of the hearing.
2. When asked at the hearing about their own new evidence, they said that it was only filed in response to the claims made by the appellant in respect of the electricity quote in his appeal documents. Page 33 was a copy of the 11 December 2024 orders referenced above.
3. Finally, we observe that references in the respondents' submissions as to what occurred at the hearing are also unable to be corroborated as the respondents also did not provide a transcript or sound recording.

1. The appellant is a self-represented party and English is not his first language. Therefore some latitude is to be given in interpreting the grounds of appeal he has raised, although this Appeal Panel is not required "to analyse lengthy, unstructured assertions and misconceptions to ensure that a self-represented party has not missed an arguable point": see McNeill v Clarence Valley Council [2025] NSWCATAP 184 at [185], [188]-[189].
2. From the documents and submissions before us, the following grounds were raised:

(1) the Tribunal conducted the proceedings in a way that was procedurally unfair;

(2) the Tribunal accepted oral evidence from Danny which was uncorroborated and untrue; and

(3) the Tribunal did not deal with the evidence presented by the appellant's witnesses and notably ignored the statutory declarations.

1. An assertion of breach of procedural fairness requirements will typically raise a question of law.
2. We are satisfied that the first ground raises an alleged error on a question of law and leave is not required: see Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 at [13(4)]; FVA v Commissioner for Police, NSW Police Force [2024] NSWCATAP 127 at [83]- [84].
3. However, neither party provided a transcript or sound recording of the hearing on 8 May 2025. This is despite the Appeal Panel making clear directions to each of the parties on 8 August 2025, along with clear explanatory notes. Without those materials, we cannot understand or review how the hearing on 8 May 2025 was conducted, nor what exchanges with the parties occurred.
4. The Appeal Panel therefore does not have the evidence to make a properly-informed decision regarding the claims by the appellant that the Tribunal did not accord procedural fairness to the appellant or its witnesses in the form of allegations that the Tribunal dismissed evidence on an incorrect basis, inappropriately "fast tracked' the hearing which should have taken longer, or otherwise. The appellant raised no specific issue in respect of the comments of the Tribunal in the written reasons, including the Tribunal's statement at PR [13] that the deponents were not available for cross-examination, indicating they were not present at the hearing at all.
5. The appellant has not made out the first ground of appeal.
6. In respect of the remaining grounds of appeal, the appellant makes various allegations which are expanded upon in his written submissions. However, the majority of the allegations - for example, that Danny lied in giving oral evidence to the Tribunal, that the appellant's witnesses were on standby but not permitted to attend, and that certain events occurred during the hearing (e.g. "at one hour 22 minutes", A10, p3 at point 11) - are again unable to be proved to our satisfaction without the transcript or recording of the Tribunal hearing.
7. In light of the Appeal Panel's orders of 8 August 2025, there was no cogent explanation why the transcript or recording were not provided, despite the appellant's submissions referring to the sound recording which he had clearly listened to.
8. On the material provided to us and in the absence of the transcript of sound recording, the written reasons of the Tribunal reveal no error.

(1) The evidence was not ignored. Rather, some of the evidence was considered and given no weight. The Tribunal clearly focused on the issues and provided reasons for accepting or not accepting evidence.

(2) The failure (or reduction) of various parties' claims made was due to the Tribunal's assessment of and concerns regarding the veracity of the evidence provided.

(3) The Tribunal said, for example:

(a) in respect of the evidence as a whole, at PR [6]:

"The parties had each lodged the documents on which they relied at the hearing. However, there are major shortcomings in the evidence, an issue which will be dealt with below."

(b) in respect of the veracity of evidence before it (in addition to the matters noted at [9] of these appeal reasons):

"13. Danny, representing Major, has pointed out a number of inconsistencies in statutory declarations lodged by Paramjit in support of his claim. I accept those submissions. I place no weight on the statements provided by Paramjit. The deponents were not available for cross examination, and the issues raised by Danny (for example, that the deponent was not in the country at the time the declaration is said to have been made) cast doubt on the authenticity of the statements.

14. Paramjit has the onus of proving the allegations which he makes. His evidence is non-specific as to when the alleged breaches occurred. He did not issue any breach notices during the terms of the lease, depriving Major of any opportunity to remedy the alleged breaches. He did not issue a termination notice for any such alleged breaches.

15. I cannot be satisfied that Paramjit has proven any breach of his quiet enjoyment such as to justify termination of the lease agreement." (at PR[14]-[15])."

...

"20. Paramjit did not dispute that rent had not been paid from October 2024 but said that he had an arrangement with Major to offset the cost of growbags and coco beans which Major had bought from him, against the rent owing for October and November 2024. Danny disputed that any such arrangement had been made.

21. The arrangement alleged by Paramjit is inconsistent with the invoice issued by Major on 7 November 2024 and the email dated 17 November 2024. It is also inconsistent with Paramjit's text message (undated) asking for leniency until 2 December 2024. There is no mention in that text message of any agreement to offset monies allegedly owing by Major against the rent claimed.

22. Whilst there is no evidence before the Tribunal from Major in the form of a statement, statutory declaration or affidavit, and Major did not attend the hearing, I do not accept Paramjit's evidence which is inconsistent with the evidence referred to above."

(4) We fail to see any inconsistency in the written reasons as alleged by the appellant. During the hearing we asked him to take us to the particular passages of concern, and he took us to PR [21], but there was nothing that he pointed to which made good his allegations. It appeared from his oral submissions that he was saying that inconsistencies in the evidence referred to by the Tribunal at PR [13] had now been fixed up (pointing to the lack of signatures and one deponent not being in the country when he said they could witness the signature remotely, based on advice he received). There was no real answer to the question what was wrong with the decision-making process on the material before the primary member even if someone else might come to a different decision. In our view, the member engaged in the proper process of weighing the evidence, the appellant did not like the result, and he now is seeking to re-agitate and present the case for a second time. That is not the purpose of or procedure on this appeal: see [22] above per Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd.

1. Ultimately, the facts are to be proved on the balance of probabilities by the relevant claimant. In this case, the Tribunal found that the evidence presented by all of the parties was problematic. The Tribunal did not accept the evidence of the appellant and dismissed in full all claims made by him. But it was strict on all the parties; the Tribunal also did not accept that the respondents had proved all of their claims. Although Paramjit was ordered to make payments to them, the Tribunal made orders in amounts that were significantly less than the claims made by them - as set out above at [10] of these reasons.
2. It is trite to say it, but the filing of statements or affidavits with the Tribunal does not mean they are to be believed and accepted without question (even if sworn). It is also common for the Tribunal to have to contend with opposing parties each claiming that the other is lying. It is for this reason that both sides are treated with caution, and the Tribunal is left with the unenviable task of making findings of fact on the balance of probabilities.
3. And that is what the Tribunal has done in this case.
4. Regarding the appellant's claims in relation to offsetting the rent, this was dealt with at PR [20]-[23]. We have already indicated that the new evidence being the invoice and offset request allegedly presented by the appellant of itself does not establish an agreement to offset the invoiced amount against the rent. In any event, we agree with the respondents' submission that such evidence was reasonably available at the time of the hearing, and is precluded under cl 12(1)(c) of Sch 4 to the NCAT Act.
5. Regarding the appellant's claims for compensation for "non-enjoyment of farming", we agree with the respondents' submissions that no particularisation of such claims was made, despite orders being made by the Tribunal to do so.
6. Regarding the appellant's claims concerning subletting, the Tribunal member stated that there was "no dispute" regarding the ledger presented by Tijen at the hearing and we understood the appellant to say that the NAB statements showing payments of rent in names of other persons (A10 at pp59-62) were not "new evidence" (i.e. they were evidence placed before the Tribunal at first instance by Tijen).
7. Even if the appellant had established a path for one of the gateways in cl 12(1) of Sch 4 to the NCAT Act, we doubt that we could be satisfied on the incomplete facts before us that there was any real prospect of a different outcome, or any substantial miscarriage of justice in the proceedings below, or that any error was sufficiently serious for exercise of discretion to grant leave to appeal.
8. The appellant therefore also fails on his other grounds of appeal that require leave.

1. For the above reasons we are not satisfied that any of the appeal grounds are made out.
2. For completeness, we note that no application for costs was made by any party, which were due to be lodged with their submissions (refer Note 7(2) of the orders set out at [30] of these reasons).

(1) Leave to appeal not granted.

(2) Appeal dismissed.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.