Shrestha v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 401

1. The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (as it was) (Tribunal). The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the applicant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa (student visa).
2. For the following reasons, the application before the Court must be dismissed.

1. The applicant applied for the student visa that is the subject of this review on 30 August 2019.
2. On 17 January 2020, the Delegate refused to grant the applicant's student visa application. The Delegate was not satisfied that the applicant intended genuinely to remain in Australia temporarily. The Delegate accordingly found that the applicant was unable to meet cl 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations).
3. On 6 February 2020, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision.
4. On 11 May 2022, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision.

1. The criterion at issue before the Tribunal was cl 500.212 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations, which provided:

500.212

The applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student because:

(a) the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, having regard to:

(i) the applicant's circumstances; and

(ii) the applicant's immigration history; and

(iii) if the applicant is a minor - the intentions of a parent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and

(iv) any other relevant matter; and

(b) the applicant intends to comply with any conditions subject to which the visa is granted, having regard to:

(i) the applicant's record of compliance with any condition of a visa previously held by the applicant (if any); and

(ii) the applicant's stated intention to comply with any conditions to which the visa may be subject; and

1. In considering whether the applicant satisfied cl 500.212(a), the Tribunal was required to have regard to Direction No. 69 - Assessing the genuine temporary entrant criterion for Student visa and Student Guardian visa applications (Direction No. 69), which was made under s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). Direction No. 69 required the Tribunal to have regard to a number of factors relating to:

(a) the applicant's circumstances in his home country, potential circumstances in Australia and the value of the course to his future;

(b) the applicant's immigration history; and

(c) any other relevant information.

1. Direction No. 69 indicated that it was not to be used as a checklist, but stated that the "listed factors are intended only to guide decision makers when considering the applicant's circumstances as a whole, in reaching a finding about whether the applicant satisfies the genuine temporary entrant criterion".

1. The Tribunal summarised the background to the matter, the criterion in issue, the material before it and its approach to the matter at [1]-[34] of its decision.
2. At [5], the Tribunal expressed that it did not consider that the applicant had engaged with the review process or provided an acceptable explanation for not having done so. At [6]-[16], the Tribunal considered that it had sent the applicant, via his agent, a request for information pursuant to s 359 of the Act. Although the agent had requested an extension of time in this regard, that request had only been made after the deadline had expired. In these circumstances, the applicant had been notified of the loss of his right to appear before the Tribunal. The applicant had been advised that his request for an extension of time had been refused, but that he ought to provide any information he wished to provide as soon as possible. Limited documents had been provided in response. In these circumstances, the Tribunal decided to proceed to a decision on the review.
3. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was enrolled in a course of study (at [21]).
4. At [30], the Tribunal considered that apart from academic records, the applicant's entire case on the issue of whether he was a genuine temporary entrant was contained within a 2019 Statement of Purpose.
5. At [35]-[46], the Tribunal reasoned:
   1. Although the Tribunal is prepared to accept at face value the applicant's evidence in the 2019 SOP regarding his academic study and other educational history in Nepal, such as it is, and is of course prepared to accept his documentary case that he has completed the CIII and is now well progressed in the Diploma, it is not prepared to accept his assertion in the 2019 SOP that he wants or needs to complete this course for the reasons he has given, nor does it accept his assertion in that document, if indeed there be any, that he intends to return to Nepal once he does so.
   2. The Tribunal is quite unable to accept at face value self-serving assertions of this kind in the overall circumstances of this case because, apart from the fact they were made a long time ago, the applicant has led no further or fresh evidence to support them of the kind sought in the Response Form, has led no other evidence to explain what, if anything, he did during the 8 years after he left school, and has not satisfactorily explained to the Tribunal why he has not done so.
   3. The Tribunal is quite unable to accept at face value bland assertions in this document regarding the applicant's motives and intentions in circumstances where they are largely historical and where that document fails to address significant aspects of his case on the GTE issue.
   4. The absence of any fresh evidence from him in relation to that issue, despite having more than a reasonable opportunity to provide it, and in circumstances where the delegate expressed concerns about these very aspects of his case 2.5 years ago, makes his case on this issue quite flimsy and, for that reason, ultimately unconvincing. The Tribunal is in these circumstances left in the position where it would have to speculate on significant aspects of his case and this the Tribunal is simply unable to do.
   5. More particularly, the Tribunal is in these circumstances unable to accept that the applicant wants and needs to complete the Diploma for the reasons he has given in the 2019 SOP, nor can it be satisfied on the available evidence that he intends to return to Nepal to begin a career in the Hospitality sector once he completes that course. Indeed, it is very difficult if not impossible for the Tribunal to glean from the 2019 SOP any unequivocal evidence from him to this effect.
   6. The Tribunal is unable to accept at face value assertions regarding the applicant's motives and intentions when they are contained in a document as historical as the 2019 SOP and in circumstances where that document fails to address significant aspects of his personal history and is otherwise deficient in material respects in relation to the GTE issue. As can be seen from the on-line Response Form, there is a good deal of information sought in that Form about which the applicant in this case has said absolutely nothing.
   7. This being so the Tribunal is not prepared to find that completion of the Diploma will add value to the applicant's future in Nepal and is not prepared to find that he has a significant incentive to return to that country on completion of that course. These are obviously very weighty considerations in the overall circumstances of this case
   8. There is nothing in his immigration history of any concern but, of course, in the absence of any or any sufficient evidence from him in relation to this factor, the Tribunal gives it little weight.
   9. In addition to those matters, the applicant has failed to respond to the Tribunal's requests for information in a timely manner and has failed to adequately explain why he has not done so. These are very relevant matters in the context of this case.
   10. The Tribunal does not accept the agent's assertion in the form it takes in his 5 September email that COVID has somehow prevented or hindered the applicant from providing the requested information in a timely manner. The agent sought in that email an additional 3 weeks to provide what he described as "all relevant documents" and, despite being given a further opportunity to provide them, has failed to do so beyond eventually providing, again without explanation, two formal records which the applicant had apparently obtained from AITE some 7 months earlier. This is unhelpful advocacy and is, in any event, of marginal benefit to the applicant on the GTE issue.
   11. If the agent has been at fault here, the applicant has a remedy in damages and other avenues which he can pursue in other forums. If, on the other hand, the applicant has been un-cooperative or dilatory in providing instructions to his agent, he is the author of his own harm. Either way, his failure to adequately explain his position gives rise to an inference that any evidence on this topic would not have assisted him.
   12. The Tribunal regards these additional aspects to be very relevant matters for the Tribunal to consider and, indeed, it gives them not inconsiderable weight in the overall circumstances of this case.
6. At [47]-[51], the Tribunal reasoned as follows (under the heading "Summary and conclusion"):
   1. The applicant is currently enrolled in the Diploma, that much is clear, but he has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that he is at the time of this decision a genuine student who intends to stay in Australia until such time as he completes it.
   2. Due weight must in this case be given to the fact that he has only a short time left before he completes this course but, in the overall circumstances of this case. the Tribunal does not consider this factor to be determinative of the outcome of the GTE issue.
   3. Apart from the significant documentary deficiencies in his case in relation to that issue, the applicant's failure to satisfactorily explain to the Tribunal why he has not provided any or any sufficient evidence in relation to key aspects of his case does nothing to assist him.
   4. Given the above findings, the Tribunal concludes that the criteria for the grant of a Subclass 500 (Student) visa contained in clause 500.212(a) of the Regulations are not met in this case.
   5. As the applicant does not claim to meet the criteria for a Subclass 590 (Student Guardian) visa, the decision under review must accordingly be affirmed.
7. On the basis of the above, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision (at [52]).

1. The applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision through an application filed on 31 May 2022. The matter remained in the central migration docket for some time before being allocated to my docket more recently and listed for hearing. The following grounds of review were stated in the application:

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal's decision on 11 May 2022 that affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa has erred in applying the relevant law and has comprised the following jurisdictional errors.

On paragraph 7, the Tribunal has mentioned that "On 5 September 2021 (a Sunday) the agent sent an email to the Tribunal in which he requested a three-week extension to provide the information. In this email no explanation was given to the Tribunal for this late request although the basis for the extension was said to be difficulties which the applicant was having in gathering "all the relevant documents" within the required time. These difficulties, it was said, arose from the lockdown which Sydney was then operating under because of the resurgence of the COVID pandemic here." However, the Tribunal has failed to consider it. It has also failed to offer an opportunity to make any comments or explain further, about this issue. This has raised the issue of natural justice.

On paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 the Tribunal has referred to the reasons mentioned on the Department's decision record. However, it has failed to consider it, assess it, and explain how it reached its conclusion. It has caused the decision to be an error of law. The Tribunal has no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision.

The Tribunal is bound to review the decision of the Department and conclude its own findings. However, in this matter, the Tribunal has not given a fresh assessment of the visa applicant. It has referred to the Delegate's decision and affirmed the decision with no fair consideration and explanation.

On paragraph 25, the Tribunal has mentioned that the Applicant cannot expect the Tribunal to investigate them to fill in the gaps, which is an incorrect application of the relevant law, and the Tribunal has failed in following procedural fairness and its legal obligation to review the entire matter fairly.

On paragraph 27, the Tribunal has accepted that the Applicant has only a few months left before he completes the Diploma. However, the Tribunal has failed to consider it as a genuine intention of the Applicant to stay temporarily in Australia. This fact is strong evidence for the Tribunal which it should have considered if the Applicant wanted to prolong his stay in Australian for an extended period of time or not.

On paragraph 35, the Tribunal states that it is not prepared to accept his assertion in the 2019 SOP that he wants or needs to complete this course for the reasons he has given, nor does it accept his assertion in that document, if indeed there be any, that he intends to return to Nepal once he does so. That is incorrect interpretation of Ministerial Direction No.69 and the cl.500.212 of the Regulation. Nonetheless, it has failed to satisfy the natural justice by not seeking further explanation or evidence before it reached its conclusion.

On paragraph 36, the Tribunal states that has not satisfactorily explained to the Tribunal why he has not done so. However, it has not explained why it is not satisfied with the explanation of the Applicant.

On paragraph 39, the Tribunal states that Indeed, it is very difficult if not impossible for the Tribunal to glean from the 2019 SOP any unequivocal evidence from him to this effect. It has accepted it is not IMPOSSIBLE to do so. It has accepted instead it is very difficult. That has raised the jurisdictional error of natural justice for not seeking any comments or further information from the Applicant before forming its conclusion. Hence the decision is flawed with biasness.

On paragraph 44, the Tribunal mentions that "This being so the Tribunal is not prepared to find that completion of the Diploma will add value to the applicant's future in Nepal and is not prepared to find that he has a significant incentive to return to that country on completion of that course. These are obviously very weighty considerations in the overall circumstances of this case." However, it has failed to given reasons on why it is not prepared to find that the Applicant has enough incentive to return and why the Diploma will add no value to his future.

On paragraph 48, the Tribunal has accepted that due weight must in this case be given to the fact that he has only a short time left before he completes this course but, in the overall circumstances of this case. the Tribunal does not consider this factor to be determinative of the outcome of the GTE issue. However, the Tribunal has not explained its position and reasoning on taking the view why it has in the overall circumstances of this case the Tribunal does not consider this factor to be determinative of the outcome of the GTE issue. That is unlawful.

Therefore, the Tribunal has erred in applying the relevant law cl. 500. 212(a) of the Regulations incorrectly.

1. The grounds raised an issue of natural justice in relation to paragraph 7 of the Tribunal's decision, in which it recorded its refusal of a requested extension of time for reply to its invitation to provide information.
2. I accept the Minister's submission that the approach taken by the Tribunal was lawfully available to it.
3. The Tribunal's procedural fairness obligations were limited under Division 5 of Part 5 of the Act: s 357A of the Act. As the Tribunal observed, the request for an extension of time had only been made after the period for compliance had expired. The consequence of this was that the Tribunal was prevented from affording the applicant the hearing provided for under s 360 of the Act: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 67; (2017) 251 FCR 110; at [53]-[57] per North, Bromberg and Bromwich JJ.
4. The Tribunal retained discretions to allow further time for the applicant to provide information (in writing), or to invite further explanation in support of his request. Such discretions were required to be exercised reasonably: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [63]- [76] per Hayne, Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) and Bell JJ and [91]-[113] per Gageler J (as his Honour then was).
5. I am not satisfied that the Tribunal's approach to those discretions was legally unreasonable. Such a ground has a high threshold. It will not be met simply because another decision maker may have exercised the discretion differently.
6. It was open to the Tribunal to have been concerned by the lack of explanation regarding the lateness of the request for an extension of time. It was also open to the Tribunal to have been unsatisfied by the explanation that was provided regarding why more time was said to have been required (i.e. general reference to "relevant documents" the applicant was said to have had difficulties gathering due to the COVID pandemic). Although the Tribunal could have sought further information from the applicant regarding his explanation, it was not obliged to do so. It is understandable why it may not have done so, in circumstances where the applicant was represented and had already been given (and taken) an opportunity to provide an explanation.
7. In the above circumstances, I am not persuaded that it was legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to have declined the extension requested, but nonetheless encouraged, as the Tribunal did, the applicant to provide any additional information he wished to have considered "as soon as possible" (and prior to the Tribunal's decision). This opportunity was, in fact, taken by the applicant - at least to some extent - through providing additional documents to the Tribunal. This was a number of weeks later. It was, ultimately, later than the 3-week extension that had been requested by the applicant.
8. It is apparent from [5]-[15] and [38]-[46] of the Tribunal's reasons that the Tribunal considered that the applicant had been given sufficient opportunity to present his case and yet, without apparent justification, had not advanced his case with reasonable diligence. The applicant, through his conduct (or that of his agent), was considered to have lost his entitlement to a hearing. These matters provided an intelligible justification for the Tribunal's exercise of discretion, noted at [15], to proceed to determine the review on the basis of the evidence that was before it.

1. The grounds also took issue with [17]-[19] of the Tribunal's decision, regarding its consideration of the Delegate's decision.
2. Although the Tribunal referred to the Delegate's reasons at [17]-[19] of its decision, I accept the Minister's submission that the Tribunal nonetheless went on to make its own decision. It gave its own reasoning for doing so, which was set out at [29]-[52] of its decision and is summarised above. Although there was some overlap in reasoning, the Tribunal's reasoning was not identical to the reasoning of the Delegate. I do not see any basis for finding that the Tribunal failed to give a "fresh assessment" to the application that was before it.
3. The Tribunal therefore performed its role through conducting a merits review of the matter that was before it. That review did not require the Tribunal to critique the Delegate's decision, but rather to come to its own conclusions and to set out its reasons for doing so. That is what the Tribunal did.
4. The evidence relied upon by the Tribunal in coming to those conclusions was set out in its reasons for decision. Essentially, the Tribunal's finding that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the genuine temporary entrant criterion in cl 500.212(a) was based upon the limitations that it identified in the evidence before it. This was in circumstances where the applicant had not provided the information it had requested, had lost his entitlement to a hearing and, in its view, provided insufficient information and evidence to satisfy it that the criterion in question was met. Such reasoning was not unintelligible. The Tribunal did not require further, positive, evidence to support its reasoning. The Tribunal's reasoning in this regard was based upon inadequacies it had identified in the applicant's own evidence.
5. I am therefore not persuaded that error has been demonstrated by the applicant in this regard.

1. In relation to [25] of the Tribunal's decision, the grounds contended that the Tribunal erred in considering that it was not obliged to investigate to "fill in the gaps". Relatedly, the grounds contended that the Tribunal failed in its obligations regarding fairness.
2. There was no error of law in the Tribunal's consideration that it was under no general obligation to investigate: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 259 ALR 429 at [1]- [25] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
3. I accept the Minister's submission that it is not apparent how this could be considered a rare and exceptional case in which error could be demonstrated on the basis of a failure to make inquiries. This is in circumstances where it is apparent that the Tribunal considered that the applicant had been given sufficient opportunity to advance his case, but had not done so with reasonable diligence.
4. Error has therefore not been demonstrated in relation to [25].

1. In relation to [27] of the Tribunal's decision, the grounds took issue with the Tribunal's "fail[ure]" to accept that the applicant met the genuine temporary entrant criterion, given its acceptance that the applicant had limited time before completion of his course. Relatedly, issue was taken in relation to [48] of the Tribunal's decision regarding why the Tribunal did not consider the limited time for course completion to be "determinative".
2. The Tribunal was not obliged to find that the limited time remaining in the applicant's course was determinative. Rather, it was required to assess whether the applicant met cl 500.212(a) by reference to the considerations identified in that provision and Direction No. 69.
3. It has not been demonstrated how it could be said that the Tribunal failed to undertake this task. The Tribunal considered the applicant's circumstances and immigration history in its reasons for decision. These included, but were not limited to, the duration of the applicant's course. Although weight was given to the limited time left for completion of the course, it is apparent that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant would depart Australia after its completion or that he otherwise intended to remain in Australia temporarily. This was considering what the Tribunal found to be significant limitations in the information and evidence that had been provided by the applicant in support of his claimed intentions.
4. I accept the Minister's submission that it was open to the Tribunal to have reasoned in this manner. This was in circumstances where the applicant had not provided the information that had been requested by the Tribunal regarding his intentions. It was in circumstances where the Tribunal was accordingly left with limited evidence available to it regarding the applicant's intentions (including some academic records and a statement that had been made by the applicant years earlier).
5. Although the applicant may disagree with the Tribunal's reasoning, this Court is unable to set aside the Tribunal's decision by reference to disagreement alone.

1. In relation to [35] of the Tribunal's decision, the grounds complained that the Tribunal's non-acceptance of the applicant's evidence in his 2019 Statement of Purpose demonstrated an incorrect interpretation of Direction No. 69 and cl 500.212. In relation to [36], the grounds complained that the Tribunal did not explain why it was not satisfied with the applicant's explanation for why he had not provided further or fresh evidence in support of his claims.
2. However, the Tribunal was not obliged to accept uncritically the evidence given in the 2019 Statement of Purpose. It was open to the Tribunal to have declined to have done so. This was in circumstances where the Tribunal considered that evidence to be both limited and dated, and considered that the applicant had been given sufficient opportunity to supplement the evidence. It is not apparent how the Tribunal's approach in this regard could be regarded as demonstrating an incorrect interpretation of Direction No. 69 or cl 500.212.
3. It is sufficiently apparent from the Tribunal's reasons why it was not satisfied by the applicant's explanation regarding why he had not provided additional evidence. As the Tribunal identified at [44] of its decision, the applicant's representative had only submitted that the pandemic had "somehow" impacted upon his ability to gather information or documents. From this, it may be understood that the Tribunal did not consider that sufficient information had been provided in this regard. Having considered the email in question, I am not persuaded that this reasoning was relevantly closed to the Tribunal.
4. In relation to [35] and [39], the applicant also took issue with the Tribunal not seeking further explanation or evidence. As explained above, the Tribunal was under no general obligation to do so. I am not persuaded that the Tribunal relevantly erred in not seeking such information. This is in circumstances where the Tribunal considered that sufficient opportunity had already been afforded to the applicant to provide such information as he wished to rely upon.
5. In relation to [39], bias was also suggested. Allegations of bias are serious allegations that must be "distinctly made and clearly proved": Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 (Jia Legeng) at [69] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J). Actual bias involves prejudgment in a manner so committed to a conclusion that it is "incapable of alteration", regardless of arguments or evidence: Jia Legeng at [72] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J). Apprehended bias is demonstrated if a "fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend" that a decision maker "might not bring an impartial mind" to determination of the matter: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [33] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
6. I accept the Minister's submission that that there is nothing on the face of the materials before the Court capable of demonstrating that the Tribunal's decision was affected by bias. I have found above that the Tribunal was under no obligation to seek further information from the applicant in support of his case. The fact that it did not do so, in the circumstances considered above, is not demonstrative of bias. I have also found above that the Tribunal's conclusions were open to it on the material before it. It is not apparent to me how an allegation of bias could be made out in the circumstances of this case.

1. In relation to [44], the grounds contended that the Tribunal failed to give reasons as to why it was not prepared to find that the applicant had enough incentive to return to his home country and why it considered that the Diploma would add no value to his future.
2. The Tribunal's reasoning in this regard was actually located at [41] of its decision. In that paragraph, the Tribunal found that it was not prepared to accept that the Diploma would add value to the applicant's future in Nepal or that the applicant had significant incentive to return to that country after completion of his course.
3. Contrary to the applicant's complaint in this regard, the Tribunal gave reasons for these findings at [29]-[40] of its decision. Essentially, the Tribunal was not prepared to accept that the value of the course, or significant incentive for return to Nepal, had been demonstrated because of deficiencies it had identified in the evidence that was before it. This was in circumstances where the applicant had not provided the information that had been requested by the Tribunal and the Tribunal was therefore left with limited documentation and a Statement of Purpose that had been made years previously. I have found above that such reasoning was relevantly open to the Tribunal.

1. At hearing, I queried language used in some parts of the Tribunal's decision in this case.
2. At [22], the Tribunal referred to the "GTE issue" in terms of whether the applicant was a "genuine temporary student in Australia". At [27], the Tribunal referred to its understanding that it needed to "be satisfied on the whole of the evidence that, at the time of [its] decision" the applicant was "a genuine student who intend[ed] to remain here temporarily". At [47], the Tribunal stated that the applicant had "failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that he [was] at the time of [its] decision a genuine student who intend[ed] to stay in Australia until such time as he complete[d]" his course.
3. As was found in Eros v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1061; (2020) 83 AAR 226, cl 500.212(a) is concerned "with the genuine intention as to length of stay, and nothing else" (at [13]). Satisfaction of (a) is a precondition to the requirement in the chapeau that the applicant be "a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student". The reverse does not apply - one does not need to be a genuine student to satisfy cl 500.212(a).
4. I accept the Minister's submission that, despite some looseness in language, there is insufficient basis for finding that the Tribunal impermissibly imported an additional requirement into cl 500.212(a) in the present case. The reference in [27] appears to have been the Tribunal attempting to paraphrase the overall requirements of cl 500.212. In [22], it appears likely that the Tribunal's intended meaning was that the applicant needed to be a genuine temporary "entrant" rather than "student" in relation to the "GTE issue". This test, by reference to the Delegate's decision, had been correctly set out at [20] of the Tribunal's decision.
5. Although the language of "genuine student" was used in [47], this was in the context of a finding by the Tribunal that it was not satisfied that the applicant intended to stay in Australia (only) until completion of his degree. The balance of the Tribunal's reasoning appears to support a finding that the Tribunal was addressing the question of whether the applicant was a genuine temporary entrant.
6. On a fair reading, the Tribunal's decision appears to have been based upon what it found to have been insufficient evidence regarding the applicant's claimed intentions generally. Within this context, the Tribunal did not accept that the genuine temporary entrant criterion in 500.212(a) was met.
7. Having regard to the foregoing, I accept the Minister's submission that the language used by the Tribunal does not demonstrate jurisdictional error.

1. For the above reasons, the application before the Court must be dismissed.
2. I will hear from the parties in relation to costs.

I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Laing.