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[2026] NSWSC 1080
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-09-09
Sirtes J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Shreeve v Jourdan (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 1080
Hearing dates: 20 August 2026
Date of orders: 9 September 2026
Decision date: 09 September 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Sirtes J
Decision: See [29]
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE – where matter undefended – post-judgment interest – s 101 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) – interest to accrue from the day after the original judgments – objection to instalment order – order rescinded
COSTS – whether costs should follow the event – where complete victory for plaintiffs – costs to follow the event
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 56, 98, 101
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 37.2, 37.3, 42.1
Cases Cited: Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd v Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 219
In the matter of Australian Institute of Fitness (VIC & TAS) [2016] NSWSC 1143
Category: Consequential orders
Parties: Glenda Alice Shreeve (First Plaintiff)
Colin Bruce Shreeve (Second Plaintiff)
C&G Building Consultants Pty Ltd atf C&G Unit Trust (Third Plaintiff)
Malachi Corporation Pty Ltd (Fourth Plaintiff)
Raymond Brendan Jourdan (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
E Finnane (Plaintiffs)
Solicitors:
Uther Webster & Evans Pty Ltd (Plaintiffs)
File Number(s): 2018/00085463
These reasons concern three issues which arise from a consent judgment entered on 18 March 2026. Some brief background is necessary.
By a Statement of Claim filed on 16 March 2018, Glenda Alice Shreeve, Colin Bruce Shreeve, C&G Building Consultants Pty Ltd and Malachi Corporation Pty Ltd (collectively, the Plaintiffs) commenced proceedings against Raymond Brendan Jourdan, the Defendant. They sued on judgment debts obtained against the Defendant in the District Court on 20 March 2006. The relief claimed in the Statement of Claim was, relevantly, as follows:
“1 Judgment for the First and Second Plaintiffs for the sum of $167,446.71.
2 Judgment for the First and Second Plaintiffs for interest on the said sum of $167,446.71 pursuant to section 101 of the Civil Procedure Act, 2005, in the sum of $181,253.90 up to 15 March, 2018 and thereafter continuing at the rate of $34.41 per day until judgment herein.
3 Judgment for the Third Plaintiff for the sum of $134,530.36.
4 Judgment for the Third Plaintiff for interest on the said sum of $134,530.36 pursuant to section 101 of the Civil Procedure Act, 2005, in the sum of $145,623.40 up to 15 March, 2018 and thereafter continuing at the rate of $27.64 per day until judgment herein.
5 Judgment for the Fourth Plaintiff in the sum of $58,491.78.
6 Judgment for the Fourth Plaintiff for interest on the said sum of $58,491.78 pursuant to section 101 of the Civil Procedure Act, 2005, in the sum of $63,314.85 up to 15 March, 2018 and thereafter continuing at the rate of $12.02 per day until judgment herein.
7 Costs, including:
Filing fees $3,014.00
Service fees $110.00
Solicitors fees $1,099.00
TOTAL $4,223.00
8 Interest on costs pursuant to s. 101(4) and (5), including an order that interest on costs is to be calculated from the several dates on which the costs were paid.”
I pause to note the first of two curiosities. It is counterintuitive for the Plaintiffs to have commenced these proceedings in this Court rather than the District Court. The Plaintiffs’ original cause of action on which they sued in the District Court merged in the judgment and was extinguished. A judgment requiring the payment of money creates a cause of action on the judgment debt which may be pursued in any court of competent jurisdiction. Section 138 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (the CPA) provides that nothing in Pt 8 of the CPA limits the manner in which judgments of a court (including the District Court) may be enforced apart from the CPA. Thus, while the choice of forum remains a curiosity, nothing prevented the Plaintiffs from bringing the action in this Court rather than the District Court.
On 17 July 2018, the Plaintiffs obtained default judgment against the Defendant. The judgment debt was never satisfied. Little, if anything, occurred between July 2018 and 6 May 2024, when the Plaintiffs caused a bankruptcy notice to be issued in respect of the debt. Shortly thereafter, the parties identified an irregularity in the default judgment. The default judgment was set aside by consent, and the bankruptcy notice was withdrawn.
The second curiosity is that these proceedings have been marked by the Plaintiffs’ peculiar, and unexplained, delays. The Statement of Claim was filed four days before the expiry of the twelve-year limitation period for an action on the judgment debt. The Plaintiffs obtained default judgment relatively quickly after filing the Statement of Claim; however, the proceedings were left to hibernate for a further six years before the Plaintiffs caused the bankruptcy notice to be issued. Although they were not by this inaction disentitled to the relief sought, their reluctance to obtain that relief is passing strange.
The sole basis on which the Defendant denied the Plaintiffs’ entitlement to the relief sought was that these proceedings were an abuse of process. On 26 February 2025, on the Defendant’s motion, the proceedings were dismissed as an abuse of process. The Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeal set aside those orders on 28 October 2025.
On 18 March 2026, the parties consented to judgment in the following terms:
“1. Judgment for the first and second plaintiffs against the defendant on the principal part of their claim, in the sum of $167,446.71.
- Judgment for the third plaintiff against the defendant on the principal part of their claim, in the sum of $134,530.36.
- Judgment for the fourth plaintiff against the defendant on the principal part of their claim, in the sum of $58,491.78.
- The question of costs to date is reserved.
- Note that the judgment sums in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 are for principal sums only.”
The hearing before me was initially set down to deal with the questions of interest and costs.
On 17 April 2026, the Defendant filed a Notice of Motion seeking orders allowing him to pay the judgment sums by instalments pursuant to r 37.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (the UCPR). The instalment order was made by a Registrar of this Court on 6 May 2026. On 20 May 2026, the Plaintiffs, by Notice of Motion, filed an objection to the instalment order pursuant to r 37.3(3) of the UCPR. They sought to have the order rescinded or varied. On 9 June 2026, a Registrar of this Court ordered that the objection be heard together with the question of interest.
I am therefore required to determine three issues:
post-judgment interest;
the Defendant’s application for an instalment order; and
costs.
The parties were ordered to file evidence and submissions. Although the Defendant was ordered to file written submissions by 30 July 2026, he did not do so. The Plaintiffs filed written submissions, as ordered, on 6 August 2026.
The day before the hearing, I was informed that the Defendant had terminated his solicitors’ authority to act. In the circumstances, I did not require the solicitors to appear for the Defendant at the hearing.
On the morning of the hearing, the Defendant did not appear when the matter was called by my Associate; nor did he appear when my Tipstaff called the matter outside the courtroom. The hearing commenced undefended.
Mr Finnane, who appeared as Counsel for the Plaintiffs, read the following evidence at the hearing:
the affidavit of Michael Garvin, solicitor for the Plaintiffs, sworn 20 May 2026, with one exhibit;
the affidavit of Glenda Alice Shreeve, the First Plaintiff, sworn 3 July 2026, with three exhibits;
the affidavit of Colin Bruce Shreeve, the Second Plaintiff, sworn 3 July 2026; and
the affidavit of Michael Garvin, sworn 18 August 2026.
Although the Defendant filed affidavits concerning interest and the instalment application, they remained unread. The hearing proceeded without evidence, submissions or appearance from the Defendant.
101 Interest after judgment
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, interest is payable on so much of the amount of a judgment (exclusive of any order for costs) as is from time to time unpaid.
(2) Interest under subsection (1) is to be calculated, at the prescribed rate or at such other rate as the court may order, as from—
(a) the date on which the judgment takes effect, or
(b) such later date as the court may order.
…
(6) This section does not authorise the giving of interest on any interest payable under this section.
The Plaintiffs claim interest on a judgment of the District Court entered on, or shortly after, 20 March 2006. At that time, the relevant subsections of s 101 were in the same terms as those above. The Plaintiffs have a statutory entitlement to interest on the unpaid judgment debt. In the absence of any evidence or submissions from the Defendant, nothing before me displaces that statutory entitlement.
During the hearing, Mr Finnane handed up schedules containing the Plaintiffs’ calculations of interest on the judgment sums pursuant to s 101 of the CPA from 21 March 2006 up to and including 18 March 2026. Those calculations take into account the different regime in place before the prescribed rate was amended in 2010.
I accept the Plaintiffs’ calculations and will make the orders they seek for interest on the judgment sums pursuant to s 101 of the CPA.
The Plaintiffs also seek an order in the following terms:
“Order that the judgments for interest… shall take effect on 18 March 2026, to the intent that interest under Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 101 shall accrue on those sums… from that date.”
As noted above, the Defendant sought an instalment order pursuant to r 37.2 of the UCPR, which order was made by a Registrar on 6 May 2026. The Plaintiffs, by Notice of Motion, filed an objection pursuant to r 37.3(3).
An objection to an instalment order takes the form of a hearing de novo: In the matter of Australian Institute of Fitness (VIC & TAS*)* [2016] NSWSC 1143 (Australian Institute of Fitness) at [6] (Barrett AJA). The question in such an application is whether permitting the judgment debtor to pay the debt by instalments will enhance the prospects of full recovery by the judgment creditor: Australian Institute of Fitness at [11]. The Defendant, as the applicant for the instalment order, bears the onus of establishing that the order should be made: Australian Institute of Fitness at [25].
In the absence of evidence or submissions from the Defendant, I am not satisfied that permitting him to pay the judgment debt by instalments would enhance the Plaintiffs’ prospects of fully recovering that debt. He has not discharged his onus. I will rescind the 6 May 2026 instalment order pursuant to r 37.4(4)(a) of the UCPR.
The Plaintiffs seek an order that the Defendant pay their costs.
The Court’s discretion to order costs is conferred by s 98 of the CPA. In exercising its discretion, the Court must seek to give effect to the overriding purpose contained in s 56 of the CPA, being the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings. Costs generally follow the event unless it appears to the Court that some other order should be made: r 42.1 of the UCPR. The “event” is typically the practical result of a particular claim: Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd v Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 219 at [15] (Ward, Emmett and Gleeson JJA).
Apart from the issues the subject of this judgment, the terms of the consent judgment are substantially identical to the relief sought in the Statement of Claim. Despite the irenic conclusion of this claim, the practical result is a complete victory for the Plaintiffs.
I will order the Defendant to pay the Plaintiffs’ costs on the ordinary basis.
I make the following notation and orders:
The Court notes that, on 18 March 2026, the Court gave judgment for the Plaintiffs against the Defendant, on the principal components of the Plaintiffs’ respective claims, reserving costs and interest as follows:
(a) in favour of the First and Second Plaintiffs, in the sum of $167,446.71; (b) in favour of the Third Plaintiff, in the sum of $134,530.36; and (c) in favour of the Fourth Plaintiff, in the sum of $58,491.78.
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Shreeve
Jourdan (No 2)