1. The applicant, who is of Albanian background, was born in Montenegro in March 1964. He migrated to Australia in 1988, and married his former wife, Sadete Musovic ('Sadete'), in the following year. There were two children of the marriage, a son Arben, and Lindita, who was 25 years of age at the time of her death.
2. The applicant separated from Sadete in 2008 when she informed him that the marriage was over. She left the family home and Lindita also left to live with her. Arben remained residing with the applicant for some years before he also departed. In the meantime, the applicant was divorced from Sadete in 2009. In 2011, Sadete, Lindita (who was then 17 years of age) and Arben each obtained a Family Violence Intervention Order against the applicant. After Lindita obtained her order, she had no further contact with the applicant until the day on which she was murdered by him.
3. As a consequence, from 2011, the applicant was entirely estranged from his family. In the years preceding the offending, the applicant led an isolated and lonely life in rented premises in Altona. In 2013, he ceased work, due to an injury, and in 2016 he was diagnosed to suffer from depression. It was apparent, from the circumstances of the case, that the applicant harboured deep-seated anger and resentment towards Lindita and Veton.
4. Lindita and Veton were married on 28 December 2018. During the following year they resided with Veton's parents in Yarraville. Veton's two brothers, Lindor and Drilon, and Drilon's wife, Dijane Rexha, also resided at the same premises. Lindita and Veton were very close to each of them.

1. On Saturday 28 December 2019, Lindita and Veton checked into a hotel in the central business district, where they spent the following three nights celebrating their first wedding anniversary. On the morning of Tuesday 31 December 2019, they left the hotel and caught an Uber from the city to return home in Yarraville.
2. In the meantime, at 8:20 am, the applicant left his home in Altona and drove to the Musai family home in Salisbury Street, Yarraville, arriving there at 8:34 am. He had with him a loaded Smith & Wesson 38 calibre revolver which was unregistered. He also had additional ammunition in the vehicle and on his person.
3. Having arrived in Salisbury Street, the applicant drove around the surrounding streets, driving at least twice past the Musai family home. At about 8:51 am, he parked his vehicle outside a property near the house and waited there in his vehicle. One and a half hours later, at 10:23 am, Lindita and Veton arrived outside the house in Salisbury Street. They then walked to the front door and rang the doorbell. While they were waiting for the door to be opened, the applicant got out of his vehicle, and walked up close behind them holding the revolver. He then, from close range and in quick succession, shot Lindita in the side of the head, and Veton in the front of the head.
4. Dijane heard the gunshots and opened the door. There she saw Lindita and Veton lying on the front porch with wounds to the head, and the applicant about three metres away holding the gun. He then put the gun to his head. In response, Dijane slammed the door and called out to those inside.
5. The applicant then left, walking west along Salisbury Street and along other streets to an area of grassland. There he pointed the gun at the bottom of his chin and shot himself in the head, causing him to fall to the ground. He then stood up again, and shot himself in the head for a second time. Nearby residents, who observed the applicant's actions, telephoned the emergency number 000.
6. In the meantime, Lindita's family, who were present in the home in Salisbury Street, performed CPR on Lindita and Veton with the assistance of neighbours. Police and the ambulance arrived at the scene. Lindita was not able to be revived and she died at the scene at 10:42 am. Veton was conveyed by ambulance to the Alfred Hospital where he was placed on life support. He passed away at 8:40 pm on 1 January 2020.
7. The applicant was located by police in the grassland where he had shot himself. He was still holding the handgun in his left hand. He was arrested and the firearm was seized. The applicant was then conveyed by ambulance to the Alfred Hospital where he underwent surgery for the removal of the two projectiles from his head. The hospital records noted that he had sustained fractures to the right facial bone, as well as frontal and temporal subarachnoid haemorrhages and a right frontal lobe intracranial haematoma. He had also sustained a right eye rupture. The applicant remained at the Alfred Hospital until 17 February 2020. Upon his discharge, he was remanded in custody. While he was at the Alfred Hospital, police seized his clothing and found eight rounds of live ammunition in the front right pocket of his trousers.

1. On the plea, the prosecution filed victim impact statements of 28 family members and friends of Lindita and Veton. As the sentencing judge aptly noted, those victim impact statements:

... were of great assistance to the Court in fully understanding the almost unbearable trauma, loss, sadness and fear flowing directly from [the applicant's] crimes to their many victims. It is obvious that Lindita and Veton occupied a central and vital place in the hearts and minds and lives of their many friends and family. Their loss will be felt tragically and forever.[1]

1. By way of illustration, the judge quoted parts of the victim impact statements provided by Veton's brother Drilon and Drilon's wife Dijane.[2] It is also appropriate, on this application, to quote parts of the very moving victim impact statement prepared by Lindita's mother, Sadete, as follows:

I write this with a broken heart and tears streaming down my face as no mother should bury their children especially the way Lindita and Veton were senselessly and cruelly taken away from me ...

It has been only 15 months since they were both tragically taken from me but it only feels like yesterday. I am constantly crying, whether on my own or with my family relations and friends - the tears won't stop. I miss my daughter so much that the pain is so unbearable ...

Lindita was loving, kind, caring, respectful, humble, genuine, fun and hardworking. She was even more beautiful on the inside than out. She left a lasting impression on everyone that she met. She would light up any room with her smile and gracefulness. When Lindita and Veton started dating not only did I gain another son but Veton's family gained a daughter and sister. Lindita finally had the love of a father from Veton's dad and the love of another mother from Veton's mum. Our families couldn't be happier, we were over the moon.

I know I have beautiful memories, photos and videos of them that I will cherish for the rest of my life but it upsets and saddens me that the memories stop - they never get the chance to fulfil their hopes and dreams for their future. They never got the chance to become parents, move into their first home, never got the chance to experience life and embark on new adventures. I will never become a grandma to their children, never celebrate their birthdays or special occasions, never grow old together, never visit them in their home - instead I go to the cemetery every week to visit them there. I clean their headstone and water the garden - it is so heartbreaking but that's their home and that's where I feel close to them. The only peace I have is that they are together forever in God's paradise as they could never live without one another.

1. In referring to the victim impact statement of Sadete, and the other victim impact statements, we are mindful that it is not the task of the Court to address the issues raised on this application according to emotional considerations such as sympathy or retribution. However, in view of the issues raised on this application, it is appropriate to fully understand and acknowledge the enormity and impact of the very serious crimes that the applicant committed and for which he came to be sentenced.

1. The applicant is the youngest of six siblings. His father was very strict and resorted to physical force against him. He was educated in Montenegro to Year 12 level. Having left school, the applicant trained as a mechanic. His employment was interrupted for twelve months when he was required to perform military service.
2. After the applicant migrated to Australia in 1988, he obtained employment as a mechanic for the following five years. He then gained employment as a truck driver. In 2003, he sustained a lower back injury in the course of that employment. As a result he remained out of work for the following three or four years. The applicant then obtained further employment as a truck driver delivering parts for Ford and Toyota. In 2013, he was involved in a motorcycle accident which required him to be hospitalised. As a result of the injuries he sustained, he was unable to work again. In the ensuing period, he experienced chronic pain and associated depression.
3. It appears that the applicant had previously suffered an episode of depression following the death of his sister in the mid-1990s. In about 2004, he consulted a psychologist, Mr Karamanos, who noted him to present as depressed and anxious in connection with his financial and other problems. Mr Karamanos was of the opinion that the applicant suffered from moderate to moderately severe anxiety and depression, and he treated the applicant with a course of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy.
4. In March 2015, the applicant presented to his general practitioner suffering from depression, that was secondary to his chronic pain, and to his distress about his divorce and his alienation from his family. Mr Karamanos diagnosed the applicant to have a moderate to severe Major Depressive Disorder, chronic pain and some post-traumatic symptoms, which did not meet the criteria prescribed by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Fifth Edition) ('Diagnostic and Statistical Manual') for a Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.

Evidence concerning applicant's psychological condition

1. The principal issue on the plea was concerned with the applicant's psychological condition, both at the time at which he committed the offences, and at the time of sentencing.
2. The evidence, relevant to that issue, was principally directed to the issue whether the applicant was fit to plead, and whether he had available to him a defence of mental impairment pursuant to s 20 of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1997.
3. In summary, Dr Nina Zimmerman, who assessed the applicant on 22 May 2020, was of the opinion that, at the time of the offending, he suffered from a severe Major Depressive Disorder, as a result of which he was unable to reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure as to the wrongfulness of his behaviour. On the other hand, Professor James Ogloff, a clinical and forensic psychologist, who assessed the applicant by video link from Port Phillip Prison on 8 October and 4 November 2020, concluded that the applicant was fit to stand trial, and that he did not have a mental impairment defence available to him.
4. The judge, having considered the respective opinions of Dr Zimmerman and Professor Ogloff in some detail, was not satisfied that the view formed by Dr Zimmerman was correct, and his Honour preferred, and acted upon, the opinions of Professor Ogloff.[3] That conclusion by the judge is not the subject of any challenge on this application. Accordingly, it is only necessary to outline, in brief form, the views expressed by each of Dr Zimmerman and Professor Ogloff.
5. In her report, Dr Zimmerman set out in some detail the applicant's psychological history. She noted that after the applicant had become unable to work due to the injuries he sustained in the motorcycle accident in April 2013, he was diagnosed with a moderate to severe Major Depressive Disorder. In the following years he became isolated at home. His mental state deteriorated over the course of 2019, and his depression was aggravated further by the death of his mother later that year. Dr Zimmerman was of the view that the applicant then suffered a severe episode of Major Depressive Disorder. As the applicant was unable to recall the events that constituted the offending, she was unable to make any assessment as to whether, at the time of the offending, he was aware of the nature or quality of his conduct. However, she considered that because of the severity of his Major Depressive Disorder, he was unable to reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure as to the wrongfulness of his behaviour. She considered that there was a direct relationship between the applicant's major depression and his offending.
6. Professor Ogloff considered that, at the time of the offending, the applicant might have been experiencing symptoms of depression, and that he would appear to have then met the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual criteria for a chronic Mixed Adjustment Disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. However, there was a lack of evidence to suggest that the applicant was psychotic at the time of the offences, or that the level of his depression was sufficiently severe to explain his offending. On being interviewed by Professor Ogloff, the applicant admitted to being angry and sad about not having been invited to his daughter's wedding, and he was incensed by being disrespected by his son-in-law Veton. Professor Ogloff was of the view that two factors contributed to the offending. The first factor was the applicant's level of distress, including depressive symptoms, that he experienced as a result of his estrangement from his family. The second factor was a product of the applicant's controlling personality, and his continuing anger and outrage, at being rejected and disrespected by Veton.
7. As a consequence, Professor Ogloff concluded that at the time at which the applicant murdered Lindita and Veton, he knew the nature and quality of the act he was committing. Further, there was no independent evidence that the applicant suffered from a psychosis or psychotic depression at the time of the offending. While he might have been depressed, it is most unlikely that that condition deprived him of reason concerning his actions. Accordingly, Professor Ogloff concluded that, at the time at which the applicant committed the offences, he knew that his conduct was wrong, and he could then reason, with a moderate degree of sense and composure, about whether that conduct, as perceived by reasonable people, was wrong.
8. In addition to those reports, the judge also had before him a report of Mr Martin Jackson, a clinical neuropsychologist, who conducted an assessment of the applicant on 17 June 2020. Mr Jackson's report focussed on the extent to which the applicant's injuries affected his intellectual abilities. On the basis of the applicant's level of education and occupation history, Mr Jackson concluded that, before he sustained the gunshot injuries to the head, the applicant had been a man of average pre-morbid abilities. As a consequence of the brain injury, his verbal intellectual abilities were in the borderline range. He had retained an average strength in his attention to visual detail, while his visual logical thinking was borderline and his construction skills were extremely low. Most aspects of his working memory were in the low average range, including his immediate memory span, working memory span and sequencing span, but his mental arithmetic was in the extremely low range and inconsistent at single step calculations. In addition, the applicant's processing speed was consistently in the extremely low range.
9. Mr Jackson noted that the applicant's restricted cognitive functions would primarily impact his life within a prison environment in the areas of his processing speed and high level attention, because he was very slow to process information, and he had difficulty doing two things at the one time. In addition, he would also have difficulty initially learning or remembering information, but with constant repetition he could learn to a reasonable level. Mr Jackson considered that in view of the highly repetitious and routine nature of prison life, it might be that the applicant's intellectual impairments would be of lesser impact to him.

1. As noted, a substantial part of the plea, that was presented on behalf of the applicant, focussed on his mental state at the time of the offending. Counsel for the applicant submitted that as a consequence of the report of Dr Zimmerman, and aspects of the report of Professor Ogloff, the judge should accept that the applicant's mental state was relevant to sentencing in the first four limbs identified by this Court in The Queen v Verdins.[4] In particular, it was submitted that due to the applicant's mental condition at the time of the offending, his moral culpability was reduced, general deterrence and specific deterrence should be moderated as sentencing considerations, and the applicant's condition should have a bearing on the length of the sentence which would be imposed on him. It was also submitted, based on the reports of Dr Zimmerman and Mr Jackson, that the judge should conclude that the fifth limb identified in Verdins was enlivened, namely, that due to the applicant's mental condition, a sentence of imprisonment would weigh more heavily on him than on a person in normal health.
2. In addition, counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant's pleas of guilty had a high utilitarian value because they spared the witnesses, many of whom were affected family members, the ordeal of being required to give evidence concerning the tragic events involved in the case. It was also submitted that the pleas had additional utilitarian value in the current environment, in which court delays and backlogs of court listings had been occasioned by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

1. In sentencing the applicant, the judge set out, in some detail, the circumstances of the offences, and the applicant's personal history. As we have mentioned, the judge also considered, in detail, the evidence concerning the applicant's mental state at the time of offending and at the time of sentence. As noted, his Honour preferred and acted on the opinions expressed by Professor Ogloff. Specifically, his Honour considered that there was a lack of independent evidence which indicated that any state of depression, from which the applicant suffered at the time of the offences, was of such severity as to explain his offending, or to deprive him of reason regarding his actions.
2. In addition, the judge concluded that even if he had been satisfied that the applicant had suffered under a severe depressive state at the time of the offences, he would not have been satisfied that there was a necessary causal connection between that state and the applicant's offences. In that respect his Honour stated:

Significantly depressed you may possibly have been, but the well planned and premeditated crimes which you committed cannot be viewed as having been committed with anything less than a full appreciation of the wrongfulness of your conduct. You made the dreadful decision to murder your daughter and her husband. Having made the decision, you enacted your plan to chilling effect. This was a choice you made, for what could only have been the most powerful of reasons. The indications are that your feelings of resentment and anger towards Lindita and Veton, set against the background of your estrangement from your whole family and your sad and isolated state, were at the heart of your actions.[5]

1. For those reasons, the judge concluded that there was no reason why denunciation, general deterrence and specific deterrence should not be given full weight in the sentencing equation. With some hesitation, the judge did conclude that there was evidence that imprisonment would be more onerous for him than for a person who did not suffer the ongoing effects of a brain injury. However, that consideration would have little impact on the sentence, because the mental impairment from which the applicant now suffers, is not such as would render him a less appropriate vehicle for general deterrence.[6]
2. In assessing the nature and gravity of the offending, and the applicant's culpability, the judge noted that the offences were premeditated, and were carried out upon two members of the applicant's family who had done him no wrong. Having prepared himself to carry out the crimes, the applicant had lain in wait for their return. Upon their arrival home, he shot them in the head 'with a cold heart'. For those reasons, the judge concluded that the crimes committed by the applicant were a particularly grave example of the crime of murder, and the applicant's culpability was exceedingly high.[7]
3. The judge accepted that the plea of guilty made by the applicant, at the committal mention proceeding in May 2020, had been entered at an early opportunity, and that the plea thus was of significant utilitarian value. His Honour then noted in that respect:

I have accorded you a reduction in sentence for the significant utilitarian benefit of your pleas of guilty. The magnitude of this benefit will be apparent in the statement I will make pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 ('the Act').

I note, however, that whilst your pleas of guilty may be accepted as some evidence of remorse and the other subjective aspects of a plea of guilty spoken of by the Court of Appeal in Phillips v The Queen, there is no other evidence indicative of your being remorseful for your crimes. That may in part be due to the effects upon you of your self-inflicted brain injury. On the other hand, the absence of any real remorse accords with the cold hearted and shocking decision you reached to carry out these murders, and your callous conduct in the immediate aftermath of your crimes in remaining in the front yard until the emergence of Dijane, leaving your stricken daughter and her husband on the porch, and then immediately taking yourself to a location where you sought to end your life.[8]

1. The judge, having referred to the standard sentencing scheme established by s 5A(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act, concluded that, taking into account only the objective features, the applicant's crimes were very serious which fell 'well above' the middle range of seriousness for such offences.[9]
2. The judge referred to a table of previous sentencing decisions provided by the prosecution and noted that he had had regard to those sentences. In doing so, he observed that no individual sentence in any other case would be a precedent of the sentence imposed in the present case.[10] The judge also took into account the onerous conditions of incarceration affecting the applicant due to steps which had been taken to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus within the prison population.[11] His Honour then described the nature and gravity of the offences for which the applicant was to be sentenced in the following terms:

As I have already indicated, in my view your crimes are exceedingly serious instances of the crime of murder. Whilst of course it may be possible to contemplate even more heinous crimes, your crimes are clearly towards the very top end of the range of seriousness. Set against the background of your estrangement from Lindita and other members of your family, your depression and isolation, and your completely unwarranted feelings of resentment and anger towards Lindita and Veton, you settled upon an evil plan which almost defies belief. You decided to murder your daughter and her husband. You decided to do so with a handgun which for some unexplained reason you had access to. You determined to do so by surprising them on their return home from the weekend they had spent away celebrating their first wedding anniversary. You drove to the intended crime scene hours before the murders, casing the area and preparing yourself for action. You then lay in wait for the return of your victims. You had, at the least, some hours to seriously contemplate the awful plan you had fixed upon and to come to your senses and desist. You chose not to do so. I do not consider that the state of depression from which you may have suffered at that time had anything at all to do with driving your offending. This was no spur of the moment decision requiring a snap judgment. Nor was this a situation in which any condition from which you suffered could in any way have obscured from your embittered mind the enormity of what you were contemplating. What you planned was the cold-hearted, premeditated, vicious and cowardly murder of two defenceless people, one of them your own daughter. And those were the crimes you committed. There are no redeeming features at all to your offending.[12]

1. His Honour concluded that, while a sentence of life imprisonment is described as a dreadful sentence reserved for dreadful cases, nevertheless, in the present case, in view of the enormity of the applicant's offending, the only appropriate sentence to be imposed was one of life imprisonment in respect of each charge.[13]

1. In support of the application, counsel for the applicant submitted that while the offending in the present case was particularly serious, nevertheless, there were aspects relating to it which did not place it in the highest category of the offence of murder. In particular, he submitted that while there was a degree of planning, it would appear that that planning commenced 'only hours' before the killings. It was further contended that the planning was quite rudimentary. In addition, while the applicant was the father of Lindita, he was completely estranged from his family, and in that respect, the killing did not occur in the context of an ongoing paternal relationship between him and his daughter. It was further submitted that the applicant did not dismember or mistreat the bodies of the two victims, or otherwise engage in any post-offence conduct, which would have aggravated the offending.
2. Counsel particularly relied on the early plea of guilty by the applicant. In reliance on the decision of this Court in Worboyes v The Queen,[14] counsel submitted that the plea, which was made during the current COVID-19 pandemic, had additional and important utilitarian value which should have been reflected in the sentences imposed on the applicant. In addition, some of the period of the applicant's detention has been served during the pandemic, so that, as a result of restrictions that have been imposed in the prison system, the applicant's circumstances during that period have been more onerous than otherwise.
3. Counsel further relied on the matters that are personal to the applicant. In particular, the applicant does not have any previous convictions, and accordingly, his arrest on the current charges was the first occasion upon which the applicant has been held in custody. In addition, the judge accepted that, due to the injuries that the applicant sustained when he shot himself, the fifth limb of Verdins applied, so that it was relevant that the applicant's term of imprisonment would weigh more heavily on him than a person who did not suffer such injuries.
4. Counsel concluded by submitting that, particularly in view of the applicant's early plea of guilty and the additional utilitarian value of those pleas, the sentences of life imprisonment, imposed on the applicant, were manifestly excessive.
5. In response, counsel for the respondent submitted that the offending by the applicant was particularly grave. It involved a cold-blooded plan, premeditated and callous murder, by the applicant, of his daughter and his son-in-law. Counsel submitted that, in those circumstances, the applicant's plea of guilty did not preclude the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment in respect of both charges. In that respect, counsel noted that in Phillips v The Queen,[15] Redlich JA and Curtain AJA (with whom Maxwell P agreed) expressed the principle that, in exceptional cases, the degree of criminality of the offending may be so great that a sentence of life imprisonment is appropriate, notwithstanding the utilitarian value of the plea of guilty. In the present case, counsel submitted that the offending by the applicant was particularly grave, and that his moral culpability was exceedingly high. Accordingly, it was contended, the sentences of life imprisonment were well open to the judge.

1. In order to succeed on the ground, that the sentences imposed on the applicant were manifestly excessive, the applicant must demonstrate that the sentences were wholly outside the range of sentencing options available to the judge. In other words, it must be established that the sentences were so excessive as to bespeak error by the judge in the exercise of the sentencing discretion, notwithstanding that no specific error may be identified in his Honour's reasons for sentence.[16]
2. The starting point, for considering that ground, is that the offending in the present case constituted an extremely serious instance of the crime of murder. It is evident that the applicant must have thought about and planned the murders some time before he set out from his home. Having reached the decision to murder his daughter and son-in-law, he then armed himself with the revolver, either loaded it or ensured that it was loaded, and took with him a substantial quantity of ammunition to ensure that he would be able to complete his evil purpose. He then drove for fifteen minutes to the residence in which his daughter and son-in-law were then residing as their home. Having done so, he then drove past that residence on at least two occasions. He then waited outside for a period of more than one and a half hours.
3. During each of those parts of the sequence which preceded the murders, the applicant had a series of opportunities to reflect on the utterly appalling nature of his plan, and to resile from it. Instead of doing so, he lay furtively in wait for his two innocent victims to arrive home. After they did so, he callously approached them from behind, and, in cold blood, cruelly and viciously shot each of them in the head. In effect, he ambushed them. His daughter and his son-in-law were entirely defenceless and helpless.
4. The applicant's reason and motivation for the murders defy comprehension. He might have been offended or insulted by the fact that Lindita had married Veton without consulting him or seeking his 'permission'. Any such feeling was entirely self-centred, and under no circumstance could it provide any mitigation for perpetrating any act of violence against the two victims, let alone intentionally and cold-bloodedly taking their lives in the cowardly and evil manner in which he did so.
5. It is in those circumstances, and for those reasons, that the judge, with full justification, characterised the offences as 'exceedingly serious instances of the crime of murder', and as falling 'towards the very top end of the range of seriousness' of such crimes.[17] Equally, his Honour, correctly, concluded that the applicant's moral culpability - that is, his subjective responsibility - for the two murders was 'exceedingly high'.[18]
6. The principal mitigating circumstance available to the applicant was his early pleas of guilty. It is recognised, as did the judge, that those pleas, made in the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic, were of particular utilitarian value and were entitled to be accorded appropriate weight as such.[19] The judge appropriately acknowledged that consideration, and expressly noted that, but for the applicant's pleas of guilty, he would have sentenced the applicant to be imprisoned for life without a non-parole period.
7. It is well-recognised in the authorities that, notwithstanding the utilitarian value of a plea of guilty, nevertheless, in a case in which the offending is exceptionally serious, the only appropriate sentence for murder may be one of life imprisonment.
8. In Phillips v The Queen,[20] Redlich JA and Curtain AJA (with whom Maxwell P agreed) expressed that proposition in the following terms:

The mitigatory effect of the plea is a component of the instinctive synthesis, but the weight to be attached to it should be the result of specific and sound consideration. That is not to say that it will usually be necessary or desirable for the sentencing judge to deal separately in the sentencing remarks with the allowance to be made for the utilitarian benefits separate from the allowance for subjective criteria. But if there is to be some reduction in the discount to be allowed for the subjective criteria, then it should be so stated to make clear what part of the discount has been reduced.

...

The exceptional case arises where the gravity or aggravating features of the offending conduct are of such an order that even allowing the mitigatory effect of the plea, the maximum sentence remains appropriate. That is because the offender's criminality so outweighs any circumstances of mitigation that are present. For example, for the offence of murder, a sentence of life imprisonment is sometimes imposed, notwithstanding a plea of guilty, because of the degree of criminality of the offence. In such cases the enormity of the offender's criminality may be such as to require that, albeit exceptionally, the mitigatory effect of the utilitarian benefit yield to considerations of greater weight such as proper protection of the public, and the maintenance of the rule of law. The exception may also arise in the case of lesser offences where imposition of the maximum sentence for that offence is considered necessary notwithstanding the plea or other mitigatory factors.[21]

1. That proposition has been reflected in decisions of this Court, in which, notwithstanding a plea of guilty, the Court has upheld sentences of life imprisonment for murders which have involved particularly serious instances of the crime of murder.[22] In the most recent of those cases, Noori, the applicant pleaded guilty to one charge of murder, eleven charges of recklessly causing serious injury, and five charges of reckless conduct endangering life. He had driven his vehicle into the intersection of Flinders and Elizabeth Streets, Melbourne, against a red light and deliberately ran down a number of pedestrians who were crossing the road. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 30 years. His application for leave to appeal was refused, the Court stating as follows:

There was, of course, some mitigation to be found in the applicant's plea of guilty and in his mental condition. But neither of these things necessarily dictated that a sentence of something less than life imprisonment was warranted for the applicant's crime of murder. Indeed, we consider that both of those mitigatory features were given proper weight by the sentencing judge, resulting, as they did, first, in a non-parole period being imposed, and, secondly, its length.[23]

1. It has been properly acknowledged that a sentence of life imprisonment is truly a dreadful sentence, which, as such, should only be imposed in the most serious of cases.[24] However, for the reasons we have discussed, this case was properly described by the judge as involving offending that was exceptionally grave, and which was committed in circumstances in which the applicant's moral culpability could only be described as extraordinarily great.
2. It was in those circumstances that the judge was required to apply the relevant sentencing principles. In a case such as this, it was of particular importance that adequate weight be given, by the judge, to the sentencing purpose of condemnation and denunciation. Specifically, it was necessary that the sentence be sufficient to vindicate, unequivocally, the primary value that our society places on each individual human life. The two murders committed by the applicant in this case each constituted an abhorrent violation of that most fundamental value. In addition, it was of significant importance that the sentence be sufficiently severe in order to fulfil the sentencing purpose of general deterrence. In essence, it was necessary in order to maintain the rule of law that the judge impose a sentence that provided a clear and unequivocal message to other members of the community, who might be minded to redress their feelings of being offended or insulted in the manner in which the applicant saw fit, that such conduct will be met with a severe sentence, involving the deprivation of the offender's right to be at liberty in society for a very long period of time, if not for the whole of that offender's life.
3. In summary, then, the offending in this case was extremely grave. The applicant did plead guilty at an early stage, and that plea had utilitarian effect. He had no previous convictions, and the judge accepted that, as a result of his injuries, a term of imprisonment would be more heavily onerous for him than otherwise. However, notwithstanding the appropriate weight that is to be given to each of those mitigating circumstances, for the reasons that we have outlined, the offending by the applicant in this case was of such gravity that it could not be maintained that the sentences imposed by the judge were wholly outside the range of sentences available.
4. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal against sentence must be refused.

[1] R v Shaptafaj [2022] VSC 71, [74] ('Reasons').

[4] [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269, 276 [32] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA) ('Verdins').

[14] (2021) 96 MVR 344; [2021] VSCA 169 (Priest, Kaye and T Forrest JJA) ('Worboyes').

[15] [2012] VSCA 140; (2012) 37 VR 594, 603; [2012] VSCA 140 ('Phillips').

[16] Clarkson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 157; (2011) 32 VR 361, 364 [89] (Maxwell ACJ, Nettle, Neave, Redlich and Harper JJA); [2011] VSCA 157; DPP v Macarthur [2019] VSCA 71, [58] (Ferguson CJ, Kaye and Weinberg JJA).

[19] Worboyes [2021] VSCA 169; (2021) 96 MVR 344, [35].

[20] [2012] VSCA 140; (2012) 37 VR 594, [65].

[22] See, for example, R v Quarry (2005) 11 VR 337; [2005] VSCA 65 (Warren CJ, Batt and Eames JJA) ('Quarry'); Hunter v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 660; [2013] VSCA 385 (Maxwell P, Priest and Coghlan JJA); Cardamone v The Queen [2019] VSCA 190 (Ferguson CJ, Maxwell and Weinberg JA); Todd v The Queen [2020] VSCA 46 (Kyrou, Kaye and Emerton JJA); Noori v The Queen [2021] VSCA 46 (Priest, Niall and T Forrest JJA) ('Noori').

[23] Noori [2021] VSCA 46, [52].

[24] See, for example, R v DJH [1998] VSCA 108, [13] (Brooking JA); Quarry [2005] VSCA 65; (2005) 11 VR 337, [25] (Warren CJ).