43 Perhaps the least important of those utilitarian considerations in this case was the saving to the State of the cost of a trial. Much more important, in my opinion, was the fact that by his plea the appellant spared not only the family of the deceased child but also the jurors who would have served on the trial, and the wider community, from the trauma of what would have been a very distressing trial. Given the circumstances of Sharni's death a contested trial would have necessitated very close attention being focused upon the precise nature of the injuries suffered by the child and the circumstances and timing of death. It is, of course, true that those questions were examined in some detail both at the committal and on the plea, and in both hearings the pathologist, Dr Ransom, gave evidence about the precise nature of the injuries suffered by the child. At a trial, however, the evidence on these questions, both photographic and oral, would have been much more substantial and would have been of an even more distressing character than was the case on the other occasions, and the plea of guilty, whatever its motivation, avoided that.
44 That is not to say that the full horror of the crime should be hidden from public view, but it is to recognise that there is a public interest in reducing the depth and breadth of the exposure of the public to its horrific detail. There will be occasions where any mitigatory effect of the fact that a plea of guilty was entered must give way to the necessity that the crime be marked by the imposition of the maximum sentence, of life imprisonment. In my view, as bad as this case was, when all of the relevant circumstances were taken into account it did not call for a life sentence.
45 The learned sentencing judge accepted that the appellant had admitted his culpability from the outset and, apparently, accepted the submission of counsel for the appellant that he was remorseful. In addition, the crime was not premeditated. His Honour discounted the plea of guilty, however, by saying that the evidence was "so overwhelming and the crime so egregious" that the plea of guilty could not result in a sentence of less than the maximum.
46 The judge in this case had considerable experience in sentencing offenders convicted of murder. I do not lightly disagree with his assessment that this was a case which required the maximum head sentence allowed by law, since it is a conclusion derived not only from that extensive experience but also with the benefit of his Honour's opportunity to make a detailed review of the depositions and to hear submissions and evidence on the plea. Nonetheless, I have concluded that this was not a case that fell into what remains a very limited class of cases calling for a sentence of life imprisonment. I endorse the opinion of Coldrey, A.J.A. stated in R. v. Taing & Ly[37], and R. v. Ly & Others[38], with which Vincent, J.A. and Smith, A.J.A agreed, that, save in very limited cases, there is a significant pragmatic consideration in encouraging pleas of guilty. To that end, an offender who pleads guilty, after taking legal advice, should be able to discern that he or she thereby gained some amelioration of sentence.
47 A further factor which combines with the significance of the plea of guilty so as to draw me to conclude that a sentence less than the maximum should have been imposed relates to the findings made by his Honour as to the mental and intellectual status of the appellant. His Honour twice referred to this topic in his reasons, but he expressed his findings in slightly different terms. In par.[23] after referring to what he said were the various reports and letters of psychiatrist Dr I. Martin, covering his consultations with the appellant over the period from 1982 to 2002, his Honour said: "You suffer no psychiatric illness or intellectual disability. You are of moderate intelligence" (my emphasis). At par.[29] and after quoting what he said was the "principle" which emerged from his Honour's own judgment in DPP v. Williamson[39] - that the intentional killing of a child "without psychiatric illness or other significant mitigating factor" will ordinarily result in a sentence of life imprisonment - his Honour said, "That principle applies in your case, Mr Quarry. You suffer from no psychiatric illness or intellectual impairment."
48 His Honour discussed the history of the appellant's consultations with psychiatrists. He noted that the appellant's behavioural problems were first addressed at the age of twelve, when his mother took him to the Launceston psychiatrist, Dr Martin, with respect to behaviour which included assaulting his mother and siblings and damaging property. Thereafter, he regularly exhibited violence, especially when drunk, and by 2000 had eighty-four convictions sustained on twenty-four occasions. However, whilst the appellant had twelve convictions for violence, they were, as his Honour acknowledged, instances of "limited violence to the person".
49 In the history taken by psychiatrist, Dr A. Forrester, he recorded that from about grade 5 the appellant had commenced truanting on a regular basis, initially because he was being regularly physically abused by his father at home (approximately twice a week) and he did not want his school mates to see bruises on him. He was placed in a boys' home at a very early age because of his behavioural problems and was then transferred to a special school for "behaviourally disturbed adolescents". At age sixteen he was sent to another boys' home after he pushed his mother off a chair.
50 I do not underestimate the fact that this history suggests that the appellant is a danger to society. The sentence was bound to reflect that fact. Indeed, in a report by Dr Martin dated 30 June 1999 the appellant was described as "an explosive sociopath".
51 His Honour noted that Dr Martin had diagnosed the appellant as having a personality disorder, rather than a psychotic illness. That personality disorder was antisocial personality disorder, formerly known as sociopathy. His Honour also had a report by Dr Forrester who, in turn, had regard to the reports of Dr Martin in addition to examining the appellant himself. He diagnosed the appellant as having a mixed personality disorder with alcohol dependence.
52 As I have noted[40], the judge concluded that the appellant held no "intellectual disability" and that he was "of moderate intelligence". The words "moderate intelligence" do not appear in the reports of either psychiatrist. His Honour appears to have been basing his conclusion on the report of Dr Martin of 9 September 2002, from which he quoted, but it seems to me, with respect, that his Honour may have misread what Dr Martin actually wrote. The full passage in which Dr Martin gave his diagnosis reads as follows (with my emphasis):