Seek Justice Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales

Supreme Court of NSW|2024-08-09|Before: Schmidt AJ, Pty Ltd J

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69 Simmons v New South Wales Trustee and Guardian [2014] NSWCA 405 NSW v The Commonwealth (the Wheat Case) (1915) 20 CLR 54; [1915] HCA 17 Peterswald v Bartley (1904) 1 CLR 497; [1904] HCA 21 Union Steamship Company of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1; [1988] HCA 55 Commonwealth Constitution Spence v Queensland (2019) 268 CLR 355; [2019] HCA 15 BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400; [2004] HCA 61 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Seek Justice Pty Ltd (Plaintiff) State of New South Wales (First Defendant) Blue Mountains City Council (Second Defendant) Representation: Counsel: I Jeray (Plaintiff) (in person) A Sapienza (First Defendant) C Ireland (Second Defendant)

Solicitors: Crown Solicitors (First Defendant) Marsden Law Company (Second Defendant) File Number(s): 2024/42323 Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

Mr Ivan Jeray is the sole director and controlling mind of Seek Justice, which brought these proceedings in January 2024. It sees judicial review of various provisions of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), the Government Information (Public Access) Regulation 2018, the Council's Planetary Health Precinct Plan, its Parklands Precinct Plan and Katoomba Master Plan, all of which were claimed to be invalid.
Seek Justice seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), as well as orders requiring the Council to adhere to claimed mandatory requirements of the Public Access Act and Regulations with resulting public release of identified documents, including those of bodies established under provisions of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW). An interlocutory injunction prohibiting the Council from adopting its Katoomba Falls Reserve Precinct Plan is also sought.
The relief sought is resisted and Seek Justice's standing to pursue these claims has been put in issue.
This judgment deals with motions which the State and Council have filed, seeking various orders in relation to the named parties, the dismissal of Seek Justice's claims, as well as other relief, including orders as to security for costs. It also explains why Seek Justice's belated adjournment application was refused and Mr Jeray's ongoing complaints about its refusal, during the course of the hearing, were not accepted.
At the hearing Mr Jeray consented to the correction of the name of the first defendant, from the Information Commissioner of NSW to the State of NSW, but opposed the other orders sought.
Judgment on the motions has been delayed because, by consent, Seek Justice was given the opportunity to respond to the cases advanced for the Council and the State, in writing. That, however, turned out to be an opportunity which it did not avail itself of and so the judgment has been given without the benefit of its submissions, it having had a fair opportunity to advance its case.

Adjournment

Seek Justice was given leave to file an amended summons, but none has ever been filed. One had apparently been served, but despite having also been annexed to an affidavit Mr Jeray relied on, which he had sworn in April 2024, it has not been filed. Seek Justice was then inactive in the proceedings until shortly before the hearing of the motions, when it sent an email to my associate, requesting that the hearing be adjourned. That is not how an adjournment application may be made, as it was advised.
At the hearing Mr Jeray appeared to press for an adjournment, which was opposed and which I refused. These are the reasons for that decision.
The position then was that it was in March 2024 that Seek Justice had been given leave to file the amended summons and a timetable for the filing of the motions was fixed. The time for filing the amended summons was later extended until May, but still it was not filed. In May orders were made for the filing and service of evidence and submissions for the hearing of the motions. Seek Justice did not comply with them and did not appear at the further directions hearing in July, when it was given a further opportunity to put on its submissions, before the August hearing.
Seek Justice was informed of those orders, but also did not comply with them, nor did it respond to the Court's communications.
It was not until shortly before the hearing that Mr Jeray emailed my associate advising that Seek Justice was in no position to file evidence, submissions or a court book. But one had already been filed by the defendants, as had been ordered. He then sought a six-week adjournment.
Mr Jeray said that he and Seek Justice had been involved in other court and tribunal matters without legal representation, which had taken a considerable amount of his time and that they were at a significant disadvantage, having limited resources, legal knowledge or ability to prepare legal documents.
Even accepting what was so advanced, that communication provided no basis for the adjournment of the regularly fixed hearing of the motions. Seek Justice having failed to that point, without explanation, to comply with the Court's orders, did not support the grant of such an application.
The hearing of the motions had been fixed without opposition from Seek Justice either to the date or the orders made, which required it to put on its evidence and submissions. That it and Mr Jeray then prioritised other unexplained obligations, over the proceedings it had brought in this Court, provided no just basis for the adjournment of the hearing of the motions.
Contrary to Mr Jeray's observations, that the Registrar should not have presumed that "everybody can fit into one proforma timetable", the Registrar's orders were not unjust. They had not been opposed and gave Seek Justice a fair opportunity to prepare for and appear at the hearing of the motions, it not having appeared to disclose that it had any difficulties which it would have to manage. It not having appeared at the last directions hearing and despite having later been notified of the Court's orders, it also made no timely application to have them revisited, when it became apparent that they could not be complied with.
The adjournment application was not made in the usual way by motion, supported by an affidavit, in which the relevant circumstances had to be disclosed. Indeed Mr Jeray did not disclose what they were even at the hearing, other than that he had not had enough time to go through and respond to the documents he had received, noting that he was an unrepresented litigant and had received "lots of information".
That a litigant which has limited resources choses to commence proceedings, with the result that it is unrepresented, is not unusual. Nor is it unusual for a litigant to be involved in other proceedings at the same time as litigating in this Court. It may be accepted that this may put the litigant to disadvantage, but that does not relieve it of the obligation which falls on all litigants, to comply with the applicable requirements of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) and the Court's orders.
This means that timely application must be made to revisit such orders, if problems arise. Failing to do so cannot, without more, provide a just basis for the adjournment of a hearing.
Nor can a litigant's failure even to read documents which have been served upon it. In Seek Justice's case, documents served upon it as long ago as May not having been read in preparation for the hearing, as Mr Jeray later disclosed during the course of the hearing. In the circumstances, that it had not filed and served the evidence and submissions it wished to rely on in advance of the hearing of the motions or otherwise prepared for the hearing, did not provide a proper basis for the adjournment of the hearing.
Any resulting disadvantage it had suffered was because of steps it had chosen to take and not to take. That did not result in any relevant injustice when it pressed and was refused its belatedly made and unsupported adjournment application.
Still Seek Justice's resulting difficulties were addressed at the hearing by it being offered and seeking the opportunity, which the Council and the State accepted it should be given, to later respond to the cases they advanced. Still it also failed to take advantage of that opportunity, despite seeking and obtaining an extension of time to file its written submissions.
In the result there can be no question that Seek Justice has been given a fair opportunity to be heard on the motions which have to be decided. The Court cannot ensure that a party takes proper advantage of such an opportunity.

Conduct of the hearing

During the course of the hearing Mr Jeray objected to the way in which the proceedings were being conducted, making submissions consistent with allegations of bias, after I took an adjournment, so that he could compose himself, albeit making no recusal application.
I was well satisfied that what Mr Jeray complained about did not establish any bias and that the hearing was being conducted fairly, giving Seek Justice a fair opportunity to advance its case on the evidence which it had led.
The necessary consideration when bias is raised is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judicial officer might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question that he or she is required to decide.
This test requires first, identification of what it is said might lead the decision-maker to decide a question other than on the merits of that question; and, second, an articulation of the logical connection between the matter identified and the apprehended or feared deviation from the course of deciding the question other than on its merits: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 at [16].
This principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. But the bare assertion that a judge is biased, when a litigant disagrees with a decision made or step taken at a hearing, cannot of itself establish the existence of bias warranting recusal, no matter how strongly the litigant's opinion might be held.
All of the relevant circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether a proper basis for recusal for apprehended bias exists, the test having been applied. The relevant standard of assessment being that explained in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17 at [111] namely, that "in all the circumstances the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that [the decision maker] might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question involved in it".
While no recusal application was made, Mr Jeray's conduct of the proceedings exemplified that on occasions, judges must perform the duties of their office which, of their nature, may be painful and unrewarding, with courage and decisiveness, avoiding the relinquishment of their duties bearing in mind the costs, delay and inconvenience to parties who are otherwise entitled to have the hearing proceed and the decision falling to the judicial officer appointed to their case made.
Mr Jeray's ongoing objections were made while the hearing proceeded with some difficulty at certain points, after the refusal of his adjournment application.
Mr Jeray, for example, repeatedly interrupting and speaking over me to explain his disagreement with some of my decisions, which included not only the refusal of his adjournment application, but also asking him to read a short affidavit about service, and their perceived unfairness, despite my having asked him not to do so, given the difficulties this caused. They including the need for the transcript kept of the proceedings to be accurate.
Mr Jeray also explained his view that the Court had double standards and had dealt inconsistently with emails which he had sent to my associate seeking an adjournment, which I had originally marked for identification, when the hearing began. Later they were tendered by the Council and Mr Jeray objected, claiming he had earlier, unsuccessfully, sought to tender them. They were received, because I was satisfied that there was no proper basis on which they could be excluded, despite Mr Jeray considering that he was being tricked.
After Mr Jeray tendered his April 2024 affidavit and was asked if he had any other evidence that Seek Justice wished to rely on, he protested. He considered that it was unfair for the hearing to proceed, with it being denied the ability to put on further evidence.
Eventually I adjourned, in the hope that Mr Jeray could compose himself. On resumption, the following exchange occurred, before the hearing was able to continue: "HER HONOUR: Mr Jeray, I've indicated to you that I'm not going to continue the debate and you're not entitled to constantly keep interrupting me. Now Mr Ireland, please proceed. JERAY: I object to that. HER HONOUR: Mr Ireland. JERAY: I'm not interrupting. I'm explaining something that you do not wish to understand or accept. HER HONOUR: Mr Jeray, if you don't take your seat‑‑ JERAY: I didn't just storm out now of the Court room like you did. That's disrespectful to me and I'm offended by that. Well, I seek an apology from the Court for your storming out of the Court. HER HONOUR: Mr Jeray, I didn't storm out‑‑ JERAY: Yes, you did, you did. You didn't say anything. You walked out. HER HONOUR: Mr Jeray, sometimes it's necessary‑‑ JERAY: Why don't you explain to me why I shouldn't report that to members of Parliament about your conduct just now. HER HONOUR: Mr Jeray, that's a matter for you. Sometimes it's necessary to take an adjournment when a litigant can't compose themselves. JERAY: Well, I am composed. You choose to see it differently. HER HONOUR: I do see it differently. Please take a seat. Please take a seat. JERAY: I'm offended by your conduct. HER HONOUR: I note that. Please take a seat. Please take a seat. You're not entitled just to interrupt whenever something occurs to you. JERAY: I'm not interrupting. I'm trying to argue something that you do not wish to hear about. HER HONOUR: Mr Jeray, please take a seat. JERAY: You're taking advantage or exploiting my disadvantage. I'm offended by that. This has happened to me in another Court as well where the vulnerability of unrepresented litigants are being exploited by Courts and judges and registrars. HER HONOUR: Please take a seat. JERAY: The law is not for people. This law is so inaccessible, it doesn't even have any value any more. HER HONOUR: Please take a seat JERAY: It's only by rich barristers and rich litigants that can come to these places and where someone unrepresented who is disadvantaged can't, needs more time. You just say bugger you, we don't want to know about it. You can just keep going on like other parties. They can have the same amount of time to prepare. HER HONOUR: Mr Jeray, please take a seat. JERAY: This is unreasonable. It is unjust. It is unacceptable. HER HONOUR: Please take a seat. Please take a seat. JERAY: I'll take a seat ma'am, but I'm not happy with the way these proceedings are being conducted. HER HONOUR: Thank you. Please take a seat. JERAY: And I object to the way they are being conducted. HER HONOUR: Mr Ireland."
While Mr Jeray had plainly been angered by the rejection of Seek Justice's adjournment application and the continuation of the hearing over its objection, I was satisfied that his disagreement with my refusal of its application, my insistence that he not interrupt or speak over me or counsel, or his views about the inappropriateness of my adjourning to enable him to compose himself, did not establish the unfairness about which he complained, particularly as to the conduct of the hearing.
I had not stormed out of the courtroom and certainly owed him no apology for the short adjournment, when it became impossible for the hearing to continue in an orderly fashion, given the approach from which he refused to desist. On resumption, we were eventually able to proceed to the conclusion of the hearing, which was adjourned in order for Seek Justice to file its submissions. It has not done so.
In the circumstances I am satisfied that how the hearing was conducted was incapable of establishing a basis for Mr Jeray's ongoing complaints. To the contrary, I was well satisfied that any fair-minded lay observer could not reasonably have apprehended from what had unfolded, that I might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the questions that I was required to decide about the motions, or that the hearing was proceeding unfairly.

The motions must succeed

For the following reasons I am satisfied that orders pressed by the defendants must be made.

Does Seek Justice have the necessary standing?

In its summons Seek Justice invokes the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to ss 23, 65, 66, 69 and 75 of the Supreme Court Act, as well as part 59 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules.
Section 23 deals with the Court's general jurisdiction, "necessary for the administration of justice in New South Wales". Section 65 empowers the Court to "order any person to fulfil any duty in the fulfilment of which the person seeking the order is personally interested". Seek Justice does not seek such orders.
Section 66 empowers the Court to "restrain any threatened or apprehended breach of contract or other injury". But Seek Justice does not claim it has suffered any injury.
The orders Seek Justice pursues are: "1 A declaration that section 41 (1) (c), 41 (2), 51A, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 85, 87 and 127 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 and clause 10 of the Government Information (Public Access) Regulation 2018 are invalid. 2 An order requiring Blue Mountains City Council to perform the mandatory requirements of sections 8 and 16 (g) of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 and clause 1 (2) (b) and (c) of Schedule 1 and clause 4 (1) of the Government Information (Public Access) Regulation 2018 and publicly release the meeting agendas, business papers and minutes of all its committees, including panels, groups, councils and section 355 and section 377 committees of the Local Government Act 1993. 3 A declaration that Blue Mountains City Council's Planetary Health Precinct and Parklands Precinct Plan is invalid. 4 A declaration that Blue Mountains City Council's Katoomba Master Plan is invalid. 5 An interlocutory injunction that prohibits Blue Mountains City Council adopting the Katoomba Falls Reserve Precinct Plan. 6 The plaintiff's costs, including court filing fees and photocopying, printing, scanning, postage and the plaintiff's travelling costs associated with this judicial review."
The details given of the challenged decisions are: "1 The NSW legislature has made sections 41 (1) (c), 41 (2), 51A, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 85, 87 and 127 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 and clause 10 of the Government Information (Public Access) Regulation 2018 without jurisdiction. 2 Blue Mountains City Council has failed to perform the mandatory requirements of sections 8 and 16 (g) of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 and clause 1 (2) (b) and (c) of Schedule 1 and clause 4 (1) of the Government Information (Public Access) Regulation 2018. 3 Blue Mountains City Council has adopted the Planetary Health Precinct and Parklands Precinct Plan at its meeting of 31 October 2023 and the Katoomba Mater Plan at its meeting of 28 November 2023 without jurisdiction. Blue Mountains City Council is currently in the process of creating and adopting Katoomba Falls Reserve Precinct Plan without jurisdiction. 4 There are no terms of the decisions to be reviewed. 5 The plaintiff seeks relief from the above matters concerning jurisdictional errors."
Section 69 deals with the Court's judicial review powers, which permit it to grant declaratory relief. Section 75 precludes objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought and permits the Court to make binding declarations of right, whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed or not.
But unlike s 9.45 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), which permits any person to bring proceedings for an order to remedy or to restrain a breach of that Act, the Supreme Court Act does not permit judicial review proceedings to be brought by "any person". They can only be brought by a person who has the necessary standing.
That Seek Justice does not have such standing must be accepted.
Pursuit of relief claimed to be in the public interest is not sufficient to give Seek Justice the necessary standing to bring or pursue these judicial review proceedings. Declaratory relief requiring as it does the existence of an interest beyond that of any other member of the public: Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493; [1980] HCA 53.
On the evidence Mr Jeray has been in frequent communication with the Council about a range of matters and has sought and been provided with much, but not all of the information and documents which he has sought from time to time. In 2022 Seek Justice, which claims to be a not-for-profit organisation first incorporated in 2021, unsuccessfully pursued proceedings in the Land and Environment Court against the Council. It then sought to challenge the validity of a consent granted for a running event: Seek Justice Pty Ltd v Minister for Planning [2022] NSWLEC 127.
It may sensibly be accepted that Mr Jeray is a member of the Blue Mountains community and that he and Seek Justice, of which he is the controlling mind, have an intellectual interest in the matters raised by its summons.
But that Seek Justice has the necessary "real" or "sufficient" interest in obtaining the relief it seeks in these proceedings is not apparent: Unions NSW v New South Wales (2023) 277 CLR 627; [2023] HCA 4 at [16].
The evidence does not establish that the declarations sought, if made, will produce the required foreseeable consequences for Seek Justice itself. If it had sought declarations in respect of its own rights, legal interests, or liabilities, it would have had a real and sufficient interest, that giving it standing to bring these proceedings: Unions NSW at [21]. But it does not seek such relief and there is no evidence which establishes that it has such an interest in the matters it pursues.
When a litigant does not pursue personal rights, it will not have a sufficient interest unless it is "likely to gain some advantage, other than the satisfaction of righting a wrong, upholding a principle or winning a contest, if [their] action succeeds or to suffer some disadvantage, other than a sense of grievance or a debt for costs, if [their] action fails": Australian Conservation Foundation at 530. On Mr Jeray's evidence, Seek Justice has no personal rights which it wishes to pursue in these proceedings. Nor does it seek to gain any advantage from the proceedings.
What is required is that success in the proceedings confers some benefit or advantage greater than that conferred on an ordinary member of the community. There must thus be more than a mere intellectual or emotional concern and more than a belief, however strongly held, that the law or the Constitution should be upheld: Unions NSW at [22].
The grounds advanced in Seek Justice's summons include that the NSW legislature does not have jurisdiction to make identified provisions of the Public Access Act and Regulations; that the Council has breached specified provisions of that Act and the Regulations by failing to "proactively release" identified documents; that the Council had no jurisdiction to adopt the challenged Plans, given the proper construction of the legislative provisions and steps taken and not taken by the Council, before two of them were adopted and in the case of the Katoomba Falls Reserve Precinct Plan, the process being pursued before its creation and adoption.
These grounds do not suggest that Seek Justice itself has the required interest in the decisions with which the summons is concerned, or that the granting or refusal of the relief sought will have any consequences for it, other than potential costs consequences.
Seek Justice's summons thus does not disclose that it has the necessary interest in the declaratory relief it pursues, let alone that there will be any consequences for it, of the grant or refusal of the relief it pursues. While Seek Justice did appear at the hearing, when Mr Jeray tendered his April affidavit, it has advanced no submissions to support its case.
Further, in that affidavit Mr Jeray deposed that Seek Justice was a not-for-profit organisation that seeks to serve, protect and pursue the public interest without profit; that its "objective is to seek justice in the public interest for the benefit of the community without profit", and that neither it nor he would gain financially from the outcome of the proceedings. His opinions were not supported by any documents, but what he claimed did not establish that Seek Justice's success in the proceedings would confer some benefit or advantage on it greater than that conferred on an ordinary member of the community. To the contrary, his evidence was that it would not obtain such a benefit.
The affidavit also explained why an amended summons had not been filed, given orders made in March 2024, which restricted the amendments which could be made. But the position appears to be that while Seek Justice has attempted to revisit those orders, it has been unsuccessful before the Registrar, whose orders have not been appealed.
It follows that Seek Justice's approach to the conduct of these proceedings, in which it does not seek to pursue claimed personal rights, accords with it not having the required interest in the relief it seeks in the summons. On its pleadings and evidence it pursues matters it considers to be in the public interest, rather than because the relief it seeks will have any particular consequences for it.
It follows that it must be accepted that Seek Justice, not having either a real or sufficient interest in these proceedings, has no standing to pursue any of the relief it seeks.
These conclusions provide a sufficient basis for the orders which the State and the Council sought by their motions. As do the conclusions I have arrived at in relation to the claims for summary dismissal.

Security

Had I not reached that conclusion, I would have made the order for security sought.
That is because of the response Seek Justice gave to a subpoena the Council served. There it was disclosed that Seek Justice had no bank statements or tax returns to produce. Nor could it provide any list of its assets or property. That it does not have the means to fund this litigation, or to meet any costs order made against it, may thus sensibly be inferred.
That being the case and given its lack of personal interest in the proceedings, it would plainly have been in Seek Justice's interests and consistent with the requirements of s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), for it to either discontinue these proceedings, or to consent to the orders the defendants sought, rather than putting them to the time, trouble and expense of having to pursue their motions. Section 56 imposing as it does an obligation on the parties to assist the Court in furthering the overriding purpose of that Act, the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.
Security for costs orders are not routinely made in judicial review proceedings, it being the role of costs orders, ordinarily, to indemnify rather than punish a party: Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1988) 193 CLR 72; [1998] HCA 11 at [67]. But there is no question that the Court has power to make such an order: r 42.21 UCPR and s 1335 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The relevant considerations specified in r 42.21(1A) being: "(a) the prospects of success or merits of the proceedings, (b) the genuineness of the proceedings, (c) the impecuniosity of the plaintiff, (d) whether the plaintiff's impecuniosity is attributable to the defendant's conduct, (e) whether the plaintiff is effectively in the position of a defendant, (f) whether an order for security for costs would stifle the proceedings, (g) whether the proceedings involves a matter of public importance, (h) whether there has been an admission or payment in court, (i) whether delay by the plaintiff in commencing the proceedings has prejudiced the defendant, (j) the costs of the proceedings, (k) whether the security sought is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute, (l) the timing of the application for security for costs, ...".
While Seek Justice undoubtedly considers the matters it wishes to pursue to be of public importance, that cannot be decisive, especially given the problems with its standing. Its impecuniosity is not attributable to the defendants and they have made a timely application for security, in a case where the evidence is not only consistent with impecuniosity, but raises an obvious question about insolvent trading.
Seek Justice did not seek to resist such an order being made and led no evidence to establish that it has the means to fund any adverse costs order made in these proceedings. It follows that the relevant factors which have to be taken into account, favour the making of the order sought.
That the case Seek Justice seeks to advance raises any issue of discernible public importance, or is strong, is also not apparent. Still, costs of the proceedings are likely to be significant.
That Seek Justice is not legally represented can only reduce the efficiency with which any hearing is conducted. Still there is no evidence that it is likely to be able to fund the other parties' costs, if its case fails. It has not put on any evidence about its financial position or suggested that Mr Jeray or anyone else could fund the litigation it wishes to pursue. There is also no suggestion that anyone else who might conceivably benefit from the litigation, is prepared to fund it.
In the result, had I not concluded that Seek Justice has no standing and an order for summary dismissal has to be made, I would have made the order for security sought.

Summary dismissal

Summary dismissal may only be ordered under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules in the clearest of cases: r 13.4.
The Council and the State rely on the unchallenged affidavit evidence of Mr Farrugia, a solicitor employed in the office of the Crown Solicitor and Mr Langevad, the Council's Director Environment and Planning Services.
What Mr Langevad explained included how the Council had gone about meeting obligations imposed on it by the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act and other statutory and regulatory requirements. That included how it had prepared and reviewed challenged local strategic planning statements. He attached documents which evidenced decisions which had been made at Council meetings about their adoption, review and variation, including after public exhibition of drafts.
It is unnecessary to explain the detail of all of this unchallenged evidence.

The applicable principles

The principles applicable to a summary dismissal application are well settled and impose a high threshold for an applicant to meet. For summary dismissal to be ordered, there must be a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome, if the matter proceeded in the ordinary way: Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41 at [57] and Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27 at [46].
That will be met if the claims pleaded are so obviously untenable that they cannot possibly succeed or are manifestly groundless, so that going to trial would involve useless expense: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129-130; [1964] HCA 69.
I am satisfied that this test has been met by the State and the Council.

The statutory test has been met

Seek Justice finally did not dispute that these tests had been met. I have already discussed its lack of standing to pursue the relief it has pleaded, which it claims to be in the public interest. Despite its case having to be taken at its highest, I am satisfied that its claims must be summarily dismissed: Simmons v New South Wales Trustee and Guardian [2014] NSWCA 405 at [200].
Seek Justice has not been legally represented and did not put on any evidence or even any submissions directed to resisting the cases advanced against it. Being unrepresented helps explain obvious problems with its pleadings and the course it pursued, as does its financial circumstances.
But I am satisfied that the result is that it must also be accepted that the Council and the State have met the onus which falls on them to establish that summary dismissal must be ordered.
That is because Seek Justice's pleadings do not pay necessary regard to relevant statutory provisions, including of: 1. the Land and Environment Court Act, which gives the Land and Environment Court, rather than this one, jurisdiction in respect of some of the matters it pursues; 2. the Public Access Act, which, for example, authorises the release of government information after an informal request, but does not require it. Further, it permits releasing such information "subject to any reasonable conditions that the agency thinks fit to impose": s 8(2); 3. the Local Government Act, which establishes a planning and reporting framework for councils, as well as the guidelines they must comply with; and 4. the Environmental and Planning Assessment Act, which specifies plans which Councils are required to have.
It follows that even if Seek Justice did have standing, some of its claims are untenable, the Court not being empowered to grant the relief it wishes to pursue.
It is also relevant to the relief that Seek Justice wishes to pursue that it is settled that even a person who is given a statutory right to request information, or make a submission about a decision, is not thereby entitled to pursue a declaration that a decision is null and void, if the information is not provided or the opportunity is not given: Australian Conservation Foundation.
Seek Justice also seeks to attack the validity of aspects of legislative and regulatory schemes on the basis, for example, that they are "based on the false, misleading and deceptive premise that providing access to government information, which enables transparency and accountability of the NSW Government is a private expense". It must be accepted that this is also misconceived.
It has been settled for over a century that the Legislature's motive for legislating as it has is immaterial. "The question always is, what have they done?": NSW v The Commonwealth (the Wheat Case) (1915) 20 CLR 54 at 98; [1915] HCA 17.
The attack on the validity of Regulations is not advanced on the basis of any invalidity of the regulation making power provided by s 129 of the Public Access Act, "with respect to any matter that by this Act is required or permitted to be prescribed or that is necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act". It also expressly empowers regulations to be made in respect of "the circumstances in which and the extent to which an agency must or may waive, reduce or refund any fee or charge payable under this Act": s 129(2)(e).
What is sought to be attacked includes a scheme which imposes an application fee, processing charges and an internal review application fee. The setting of fees is dealt with in the applicable Regulations. It is long settled that a State has power to enact such legislation: Peterswald v Bartley (1904) 1 CLR 497; [1904] HCA 21. It follows that these claims are untenable.
Section 5 of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) empowers the State to make laws "for the peace, welfare and good government of the State". They are not words of limitation and the exercise of this legislative power by the Parliament is not susceptible to judicial review, even on the basis that a challenged provision does not promote or secure peace, welfare and good government: Union Steamship Company of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1; [1988] HCA 55.
That broad State power is confined by the Commonwealth Constitution in only limited ways. State laws may be inconsistent with a valid Commonwealth law made in respect of matters specified in s 51 of the Constitution, in which case inconsistency arises to be determined in accordance with s 109. But that is not what Seek Justice seeks to pursue.
Seek Justice rather relies on ss 51 and 118 to claim that the challenged provisions breach the Constitution. That is also untenable.
Section 51 deals with powers conferred on the Commonwealth which are concurrent with those of the States, but Seek Justice does not pursue any claimed inconsistency, which would have to be approached in accordance with Spence v Queensland (2019) 268 CLR 355; [2019] HCA 15.
Section 118 is concerned with States' recognition of the laws, public acts, records and judicial proceedings of other States: BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400; [2004] HCA 61. It has nothing to say about a State's power to legislate, including by imposing fees and charges in respect of public access to documents in the State.
That the summons thus discloses no reasonable cause of action in relation to the various challenged Acts and Regulations, must be accepted.
In the result, I am satisfied that this is one of those clear cases, where summary dismissal may justly be ordered at this early stage of these proceedings, given the problems with the relief Seek Justice wishes to pursue, which it must be accepted appear to be doomed to fail and its lack of standing to pursue it.

Costs

The usual order under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules is that costs follow the event. In this case that is an order that Seek Justice bear the defendants' costs, as agreed or assessed.
The State and the Council sought a gross sum costs order, which Seek Justice indicated it would oppose. The parties should confer and if costs are not agreed, the State and the Council should provide short written submissions about the proposed costs order, within 7 days and Seek Justice should file and serve any submissions it wishes to advance, within a further 7 days.

Orders

For these reasons I order that: 1. The first defendant is renamed "the State of NSW"; 2. The summons is dismissed; and 3. The parties should confer and if costs are not agreed, the State and the Council should provide short written submissions about the proposed costs order within 7 days and Seek Justice should file and serve any submissions it wishes to advance, within a further 7 days.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 30 October 2024

At a glance

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Judgment (14 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (8)

Cases Cited (28)

Cited By (1)