Ryan and NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE AGENCY (NDIS) [2026] ARTA 121 | Case summary

Respondent: NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE AGENCY

Ryan and NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE AGENCY (NDIS) [2026] ARTA 121 | Case summary | Zoe

[24]

This is a review of a decision by a delegate of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the National Disability Insurance Agency (the Agency) to reject an application by Mr Ryan to become a participant in the National Disability Insurance Scheme (the Scheme).
Mr Ryan is a 56-year-old man currently living with his son and daughter-in-law (and family) in his employment related home.
Mr Ryan applied for access to the Scheme by access request form dated 18 January 2023. His access request was made on the basis of impairments attributable to previous strokes secondary to embolic events from a patent foramen ovale.[1]
On 13 June 2024 a delegate of the CEO decided Mr Ryan did not meet the access requirements in subsection 21(1)(c) of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (the NDIS Act).
On 1 July 2024 Mr Ryan applied for an internal review of this decision and on 23 July 2024 another delegate of the CEO affirmed the decision (the decision under review).
On 18 August 2024 Mr Ryan applied to the Administrative Appeal Tribunal (the AAT) for review of this decision.
From 14 October 2024 the AAT became the Administrative Review Tribunal ('the Tribunal'). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (the Transitional Act), applications for review to the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are taken to be applications for review to the Tribunal. The Transitional Act gives the Tribunal the authority to continue and finalise any aspect of the review not already completed by the AAT.[2] This decision and statement of reasons is made by the Tribunal.
A hearing was held over three days on 3 to 5 December 2025 and was conducted via MS Teams video conference.
At the hearing the applicant was represented by his sister, Ms Bel Ryan. The Agency was represented by Ms Jo Battiste of Counsel instructed by Sparke Helmore Lawyers.
Documents considered included:
1. Joint tender hearing Bundle - This will be referred to as Exhibit 1 in these reasons;
2. Supplementary Tender Bundle - this will be referred to as Exhibit 2 in these reasons;
3. The Applicant's response to IME report of A Ploszaj with comments - this will be referred to as Exhibit 3 in these reasons.
The Tribunal heard oral evidence from:
- Mr Ryan, the applicant
- Ms Bel Ryan, the applicant's sister
- Ms Ebony Bright, the applicant's daughter-in-law
- Mr Ben Ryan, the applicant's son
- Mr Tom Butler, the applicant's employer
- Mr Jacob Ryan, the applicant's son
- Ms Alicia Ploszaj, occupational therapist
For the reasons set out below the Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

[26]

The development of the NDIS proceeded on the basis of a report of the Productivity Commission inquiry into disability care and support in Australia.[3]
In instituting the recommendations from the Productivity Commission's report, parliament sought to provide a Scheme which recognised the rights of persons with a disability to self-determination, dignity and the opportunity to live independently as fully participating citizens. This goal was to be balanced by the need to maintain the financial sustainability of the Scheme.[4]
The NDIS Act provided for the Agency whose role was to manage the Scheme and to:
1. Provide general services in the form of co-ordination, strategic or referral services or activities for people with a disability generally;[5]
2. Provide funding for persons or entities to enable them to assist people with a disability generally by way of information, building community capacity or by helping people to participate in economic or social life;[6]
3. Assist in developing the disability sector by facilitating innovation, research and best practice standards and to assist in building community awareness about disabilities;[7] and
4. Create individual plans providing funding for reasonable and necessary supports for those persons who meet the access criteria to become full participants in the Scheme.[8]
The Scheme was not intended to provide individualised plans and funding for reasonable and necessary supports to all persons with a disability. Instead, prospective participants must make an access request and only if the CEO was satisfied the prospective participant met the access requirements in sections 21 to 25 of the NDIS Act, would they become a Scheme participant.
The statutory provisions relevant to this review are:
1. the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 ('the NDIS Act') (as in place prior to 3 October 2024); and
2. the National Disability Insurance Scheme (Becoming a Participant) Rules 2016 (the Access Rules) made under Sections 27 and 209 of the NDIS Act for the purposes of section 24 and 25 of the NDIS Act**.**
The Agency also issues Operational Guidelines to assist staff in the administration of the NDIS Act. These are policy documents without legislative force. The guidelines relevant to this review are the NDIS- Applying to the NDIS Guidelines ('the Access Guidelines').
The Tribunal is not bound to follow the Access Guidelines and will not do so where they are inconsistent with the NDIS Act.
However, in Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No. 2)[9] Brennan J held that a Tribunal should take into account relevant government policy where it is not inconsistent with the provisions or objects of the legislation and does not lead to an unjust decision in the circumstances of a particular case. Therefore, to the extent that they are relevant to this review and not inconsistent with the legislation, the Tribunal will have regard to the Access Guidelines.
With the passage of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Getting the NDIS Back on Track No. 1) Act 2024 amendments were made to the NDIS Act, including to sections 24 and 25 of the NDIS Act which address access issues_._ This amending act commenced on 3 October 2024 and included transitional provisions applying to matters already on foot. Item 126 of Schedule 1 provided that amendments made to sections 24 and 25 of the NDIS Act only apply to applications made after 3 October 2024.
As Mr Ryan's application was made before 3 October 2024, the amendments to sections 24 and 25 will not apply to this application.
Subitem 126(3) also provides that the Access Rules as in force prior to the amendments will continue to apply to this application.

[54]

The decision under review advised Mr Ryan that in the delegate's view he did not meet the disability requirements in section 24 of the Act. Although the delegate accepted Mr Ryan had a permanent cognitive impairment attributable to cerebrovascular accident (stroke), the impairment:
1. the impairment did not result in substantially reduced functional capacity as required by section 24(1)(c);
2. the impairment did not affect Mr Ryan's capacity for social or economic participation as required by section24(1)(d); and
3. the delegate was not satisfied that Mr Ryan was likely to require lifetime support from the NDIS as required by section section 24(1)(e).
In relation to the early intervention requirements, the delegate was not satisfied that:
1. Supports would be likely to reduce the future support needs as required by section 25(1)(b);
2. Supports would be likely to improve Mr Ryan's capacity in any of the four ways included in section 25(1)(c) of the Act;
3. Or that the NDIS was the most appropriate support system available for Mr Ryan.
In their Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (SFIC) issued just before hearing, the respondent noted that Mr Ryan had also reported co-morbid depression and anxiety symptoms and emotional dysregulation issues which he did not rely on for his access request.
The respondent's SFIC maintained the position that Mr Ryan had a permanent cognitive impairment as a result of his strokes. It also identified a physical impairment attributable to Mr Ryan's strokes, but was of the view there was insufficient information available for the Tribunal to be satisfied the impairment was permanent.
The issues before the Tribunal then include:
1. What are Mr Ryan' impairments? (s24(1)(a));
2. Whether any of Mr Ryan's impairments are permanent or not (s24(1)(b));
3. Whether any permanent impairments result in substantially reduced functional capacity to undertake relevant activities (s24(1)(c)); and
4. Whether Mr Ryan is likely to require support under the NDIS for her lifetime (s24(1)(e)).
5. Whether Mr Ryan's circumstances meet the early intervention criteria (s25).

[57]

The primary consideration for access requests, therefore, is the concept of 'impairment'. It is:
1. the prospective participant's impairment which must be permanent (not the underlying medical condition); and
2. the severity of the impairment's impact on function which will determine whether the prospective participant may be eligible for access to the Scheme or not.
As discussed previously, an impairment is generally understood to involve 'the loss of or damage to a physical, sensory or mental function'.[23] This concept has been included in this form in the Access Guidelines.
Rule 5.4 of the Access Rules sets out matters to be considered in determining whether an identified impairment is permanent. Rule 5.4 provides that an impairment is likely to be permanent 'only if there are no known, available and appropriate evidence-based clinical, medical or other treatments that would be likely to remedy the impairment.'
In the matter of Davis v National Disability Insurance Agency (Davis)[24] Mortimer J considered that 'permanent', as used in the Act, should be understood to mean 'enduring', rather than 'irreversible' or 'longstanding'. In that context, to 'remedy' an impairment, should be understood to mean something approaching a removal or cure of the impairment, not just relief or improvement.[25]
In making a finding in relation to any particular matter before it, the Tribunal must reach the necessary degree of satisfaction on the basis of the evidence before it. While neither party bears any formal onus of proof in such a matter, each realistically does bear the practical onus of placing before the Tribunal, or pointing to material before the Tribunal, that can persuade it of that party's position.[26]
If there is insufficient evidence available about a particular issue, this will limit the Tribunal's ability to be satisfied to the requisite degree.
I will consider each of Mr Ryan's medical conditions with a view to addressing the nature and permanency of any resulting impairment on his function.

[59]

The medical evidence establishes that Mr Ryan was admitted to hospital in 2021 following onset of dizziness, ataxia and altered sensation in his right arm and leg. It was noted he was a smoker, had untreated diabetes and was non-compliant with anti-hypertensive medication. CT investigation suggested evidence of previous lacunar infarcts.
Mr Ryan was diagnosed with left multi-territory ischaemic strokes. After a period of inpatient treatment he was discharged with some right sided weakness, mild cognitive impairment, impaired balance and fatigue.[27]
An assessment by the Dr Cheruvu, Geriatrician, dated 10 February 2025 noted Mr Ryan was mobilising quite well, was still working on the farm and managing quite well. He was noted to be physically slower post stroke and to have ongoing memory issues which he reported did not impact his quality of life.
An assessment by Brain Injury SA on 13 November 2024 indicated that Mr Ryan was unable to complete the physically demanding tasks on the farm that he used to complete prior to the stroke. He was noted to experience severe fatigue, often requiring a sleep break during his lunch time each day. Fatigue also limited the distance Mr Ryan was confident in driving. The assessment identified an altered gait pattern which was thought to have arisen from reduced right leg strength post stroke.
A functional capacity assessment completed by Alicja Ploszaj on 20 January 2024 confirmed Mr Ryan experienced weakness in his right upper and lower limbs, experienced intermittent pain and fatigue and mild memory loss and cognitive difficulties when completing daily tasks.
On the basis of the medical evidence available I find Mr Ryan has physical and cognitive impairments attributable to his diagnosis of multiple CVAs.
Mr Ryan's CVAs occurred in 2021. Following his discharge from hospital he participated in the outpatient ambulatory rehabilitation program run by the hospital for some 6 months. This involved a multi-disciplinary approach including physiotherapy, occupational therapy and speech therapy. Mr Ryan was discharged from this program in December 2021 having achieved his physical, speech and fatigue management goals to the best of his abilities. He was noted to have made improvements in exercise tolerance, balance and dexterity. He continued to experience fatigue and cognitive impairment but was provided with strategies to address these and he was observed to have implemented these strategies.
I note the respondent concedes that Mr Ryan's cognitive impairment is permanent. The respondent does not accept there is sufficient evidence to support a similar finding in relation to Mr Ryan's physical impairment.
As noted above, Rule 5.4 of the Access Rules provides that an impairment is likely to be permanent for the purpose of the NDIS Act only if there are no known, available and appropriate evidence based clinical, medical or other treatments which are likely to remedy the impairment.
Per Davis (above),[28] the meaning of 'permanent' in this situation should be considered akin to 'enduring' and 'remedy' akin to 'removal' or 'cure' of the impairment.
I have considered the medical evidence on file and consider that given the length of time since Mr Ryan's CVAs, and his full participation in (and discharge from) the outpatient ambulatory rehabilitation program, both his cognitive and his physical impairments attributable to his CVAs are likely to be permanent. Although further treatment (physiotherapy or occupational therapy) may improve management of his physical impairments, it is very unlikely they will be 'cured' given these arose from an injury to the brain. The physical impairments include fatigue and right sided weakness.
Consequently, I find the disability criteria in section 24(1)(a) and (b) are met for both Mr Ryan's physical and his cognitive impairment.
I am aware from reading the medical records on this matter that Mr Ryan has also experienced depression and anxiety for which he has had treatment. I am informed that Mr Ryan does not seek access on the basis of a psychosocial disability. I consider there is insufficient evidence before the Tribunal to be satisfied that any attributable impairment is permanent.

[61]

Section 24(1)(c) requires that in order to meet the access criteria, a prospective participant's permanent impairments must result in substantially reduced functional capacity to undertake one or more of six identified activities. There is no definition in the NDIS Act in relation to the activities, but the Access Guidelines suggest the following:
1. Communicating - how you speak, write, or use sign language and gestures, to express yourself compared to other people your age. We also look at how well you understand people, and how others understand you.
2. Socialising - how you make and keep friends, or interact with the community, or how a young child plays with other children. We also look at your behaviour, and how you cope with feelings and emotions in social situations.
3. Learning - how you learn, understand and remember new things, and practise and use new skills.
4. Mobility, or moving around - how easily you move around your home and community, and how you get in and out of bed or a chair. We consider how you get out and about and use your arms or legs.
5. Self-care - personal care, hygiene, grooming, eating and drinking, and health. We consider how you get dressed, shower or bathe, eat or go to the toilet.
6. Self-management (if older than 6) - how you organise your life. We consider how you plan, make decisions, and look after yourself. This might include day-to-day tasks at home, how you solve problems, or manage your money. We consider your mental or cognitive ability to manage your life, not your physical ability to do these tasks.[29]
In Foster and NDIA[30] (Foster 2), SM French expressed the view that it was necessary, in determining whether a substantially reduced functional capacity existed, to regard the bundle of tasks that comprise each activity as 'designated and determinate, rather than infinitely variate and elastic.'
Thus, in the matter of Burrows and CEO, National Disability Insurance Agency[31] SM French gave consideration to what the specific content of the 6 nominated activities might involve. His conclusions reflected his assessment of the wording of the Act, and the expressed government policy reflected in the Access Guidelines. I adopt these descriptors as a useful tool in assessing functional capacity:

[73]

The necessary assessment was not considered to be a comparative exercise, assessing what one person could do against another, but rather a 'functional, practical assessment of what a person can and cannot do'. It is sufficient, for the purposes of the Act, for a person to have substantially reduced functional capacity in relation to one on the identified activities.[33]
In Davis Mortimer J clarified that her use of the term 'high degree of precision' was not intended to imply that there was a higher standard of proof or satisfaction required of the decision-maker, rather that the task was specific and required the decision-maker to consider all the matters set out in the NDIS Act.[34]
In National Disability Insurance Agency v Foster [2023] FCAFC 11 (Foster), the Full Court held that it was not sufficient that a person had difficulty with only one or two tasks that comprise a part of the activity, but rather the focus should be on whether they were unable to manage the whole or majority of the activity. The fact that a person may undertake an activity in a different manner to others, or more slowly, did not constitute an inability.[35]
In Garcia Albiol and NDIA (Albiol)[36] Senior Member Collins reflected that 'substantially reduced function' had a high threshold in the context of the Scheme given the NDIS was not intended to provide customised supports to everyone with a disability.[37]
Rule 5.8 of the Access Rules specifically addresses the issue of when an impairment may result in substantially reduced functional capacity to undertake relevant activities. In Mulligan, these were considered 'deeming provisions', such that if a prospective participant met the criteria in Rules 5.8(a), (b) or (c), the effect would be to mandatorily include them in the category of persons with substantially reduced functional capacity.[38] A shortcut to access.
However, that is not the end of the task. Consideration of the section 24(1)(c) criterion must be completed in two stages:
1. Firstly the Tribunal must consider whether the prospective participant's circumstances are captured by the deeming provisions in the Access Rules; and
2. Secondly, if the deeming provisions do not apply, the Tribunal must consider if the prospective participant has a substantially reduced functional capacity outside of those provisions. [39]
Rule 5.8 provides that:

[79]

The bundle of tasks in relation to the activity of communication is limited to tasks associated with expressive and receptive language.
In the BISA report at page 14 of Exhibit 1, the Abbreviated Life Skills Profile was completed by Mr Ryan's son, Jacob. In Mr Jacob Ryan's assessment Mr Ryan demonstrated moderate difficulty in conversational skills and a slight tendency to withdraw socially. Friendships were noted to be kept with difficulty. No details were provided. Mr Ryan was recorded as never demonstrating violent or offensive behaviours.
At pages 15 and 16 of the BISA report the La Trobe Communication Questionnaire which both Mr Ryan and Jacob Ryan completed. Jacob assessed his father's communication difficulties as greater than was reflected in Mr Ryan's self-assessment. Difficulties appear to be related to Mr Ryan's cognitive impairments in that he has difficulty with word finding at times, uses vague/empty words, needs more time to compose an answer in conversation (making it difficult to commence and maintain conversation) and needs others to repeat themselves at times. Conversation in a group setting was reported to be particularly difficult for Mr Ryan.
This was a functional area that all family members who gave oral evidence before the Tribunal felt reflected a particularly significant decline post stroke from Mr Ryan's previous level of function. From being an active and social community member, heavily involved in the local football club and poultry club, Mr Ryan was noted to have become withdrawn and avoidant of being out in public. Even at family events, such as a recent family wedding, Mr Ryan, who would usually be talking to everyone, was now observed to be withdrawn. It was reported he would engage in telephone conversations with family and friend, but these are kept very short.
Mr Ryan's son, Ben, confirmed that his dad does not like to speak on the phone much, keeping calls to a bare minimum. Before moving back into his home, Ben spoke with Mr Ryan by phone once or twice a week. At a recent family wedding Ben observed his dad speaking with people but much less than he previously would have.
It was the evidence of Ms Bel Ryan, Mr Ryan's sister, that Mr Ryan masks a lot of his difficulties because of fear of looking stupid. She felt his fatigue significantly impacted his capacity to engage socially. Her recollection of Mr Ryan at the recent family wedding was that Mr Ryan spent a lot of time withdrawn and staring off into space.
The evidence of Mr Jacob Ryan, another son of Mr Ryan, was that his dad had difficulty in following conversations and with word finding at times.
Every family member marked Mr Ryan's decline in function from pre-stroke to now and considered this decline to be significant.
I accept that this is likely a very true reflection of the family's experience of Mr Ryan's decline. I accept their grief at the loss of his abilities and of his decreased engagement with the community and with them. I note, however, that for the purpose of an NDIS access request this comparative test is not the relevant test to be applied. Rather the test is to simply assess what the person can and cannot do when undertaking any of the nominated activities. Are they able to or not? The threshold for a finding of 'substantially reduced functional capacity' is high given the NDIS was not intended to fund supports for everyone with a disability.[40]
Ms Ploszaj's report was completed on 26 February 2025. She recorded that Mr Ryan communicated verbally in English and responded to questions thoughtfully, respectfully and appropriately, following conventional conversation patterns.
In her oral evidence Ms Ploszaj observed that Mr Ryan agreed he socialised less than he used to. She was of the view Mr Ryan's avoidance of community interaction was closely related to his anxiety and lack of confidence about his lost capacity more than an inability. She suggested that psychological assistance in coming to terms with his different capacity might be of use. The Tribunal cannot take into account the impact of Mr Ryan's anxiety and depression on his function as there is insufficient evidence available to establish these conditions have been subject to all available treatment. As such it is not possible to say any impairment that arises is permanent.
Mr Tom Butler, Mr Ryan's employer, gave evidence under affirmation and confirmed that he gives Mr Ryan instructions at the start of the day, often by phone, and that Mr Ryan is able to understand and carry these out. Sometimes Mr Ryan accompanies Tom to saleyards when he is considering buying new livestock, and is involved in discussions with sellers about various animals.
Mr Ryan attended at the hearing and gave evidence on his own behalf via Teams audio. Mr Ryan was able to understand and appropriately respond to questions put to him about his work on the farm, the impact of his impairments on this work, his relationships with friends and family and his daily routines. On a few occasions Mr Ryan needed to ask for clarification about a question but was then able to provide a relevant response.
Mr Ryan described his typical work day to the Tribunal, which always involved him speaking with his boss, Tom, to find out what tasks needed to be completed that day. He may need to call again if he forgets a task but was otherwise able to understand what was required of him. Mr Ryan indicated that if he found a problem while doing his daily farm checks (such as water troughs needing to be refilled or a calving difficulty) he was able to call Tom to report it.
Mr Ryan also spoke about his hobby of raising poultry and attending a market three times a year to sell his chicks. This involved some paperwork as well as verbal communication. He stated he is not as involved with this as he used to be.
Mr Ryan explained he felt he got muddled when talking and rarely speaks on the phone. He has recently learned how to do text messaging. Mr Ryan stated that when he went into town, he was always anxious about speaking to people in case he forgot their name or was muddled with the words he wanted.
I have considered the documents provided in Exhibits 1 and 2 and note:
1. Mr Ryan's attendance at various assessments via telehealth consultations.
2. Recommendations from the occupational therapist that he minimise background distractions when engaging in conversations;
3. In the discharge letter from the ambulatory rehabilitation service the speech therapist identified mild expressive and receptive aphasia affected by cognitive deficits. Although communication had improved with treatment Mr Ryan was recognised to have residual communication difficulties and moderate executive functioning difficulties.
4. Mr Ryan has had a number of driving assessments which he has passed. These assessments involved a number of tests in which Mr Ryan had to follow written and verbal instructions and completed tasks within a certain time period.
There is no evidence that suggests Mr Ryan requires assistance from another person or assistive technology to communicate. I am satisfied the deeming provisions in Rule 5.8 do not apply.
On balance I am satisfied that although Mr Ryan's ability to communicate has certainly been affected by his post-stroke cognitive impairment and fatigue, this decline has not been significant enough to be considered a substantially reduced functional capacity to communicate for the purpose of the NDIS Act.
I find he does not meet the section 24(1)(c) criterion for the activity of communication.

[80]

The bundle of tasks in this activity is limited to tasks associated with making and keeping friends interacting with the community and managing emotions in social settings in acceptable ways.
In the Full Federal Court decision of NDIA v Lampard[41] the Court agreed with the reasoning of SM French in Foster and NDIA[42] to the extent that the s24(1)(c) requirement should be seen as 'concerned with the prospective participant's functional capacity to undertake' the nominated activities (ie what they can and cannot do) rather than whether they choose to undertake the activities or not.
It was Mr Ryan's evidence to the Tribunal that he worries about speaking to people in the community in case he forgets their name or has trouble remembering a word. He does not wish to appear foolish. He is, nevertheless, able to engage in social interaction while conducting sales of his chickens or discussing the sale of bulls for his employer. When he goes to town for shopping or banking he is able to interact with customer service people.
It was Mr Ryan's further evidence that generally he is so fatigued from his work days that he really doesn't want to do anything else but rest so he doesn't seek out social interaction.
Mr Ryan currently lives with his son and family and socially interacts with them on a daily basis. He also has demonstrated the capacity to interact with his extended family at a recent family wedding. I acknowledge his family's concern that his interaction is greatly diminished from his pre-stroke interactions.
In the BISA report Mr Ryan's social behaviour was noted to be appropriate, with no violent or offensive behaviours. He was, however, noted to have difficulty in maintaining friendships. No explanation was provided for this statement.
Ms Bel Ryan, in her oral evidence to the Tribunal, expressed the view that Mr Ryan simply did not have the organisational capacity to follow through with social interactions. She gave as an example Mr Ryan being unable to organise himself to travel to a friend's house to watch the football on television, or being unable to drive to another town to meet with her.
I note that Mr Ryan has frequently demonstrated the ability to drive to town to undertake shopping, banking and medical appointments. He has also been able to arrange and attend chicken sales. I suggest this demonstrates Mr Ryan has the ability to arrange activities for social interaction on occasion. His unwillingness to do so on other occasions does not constitute in inability to engage in social interaction itself.
Mr Jacob Ryan gave evidence that his father's depression and anxiety led to emotional dysregulation at times, particularly when Mr Ryan was focussed on his loss of function.
Ms Ploszaj, occupational therapist, agreed that Mr Ryan's psychological state impacted his willingness to undertake social activities. She felt that Mr Ryan would benefit from further psychological treatment. Mr Ryan was noted to avoid social interaction due to a lack of confidence. The Tribunal cannot take into account any impairment of function attributable to Mr Ryan's psychosocial conditions.
Having regard to the evidence before the Tribunal, I accept that the combination of Mr Ryan's loss of confidence, post-stroke fatigue and his cognitive impairments impact on his enjoyment of social interactions and impair his willingness to engage in these occasions.
However, I am not satisfied that the evidence establishes Mr Ryan has a significantly reduced capacity for social interaction, either by way of the deeming provisions or otherwise, once he has decided to engage socially. I therefore find that Mr Ryan does not meet the s24(1)(c) criterion in relation to the activity of social interaction.

[81]

The bundle of tasks within the learning activity is limited to acquiring knowledge, skills or understanding and application of memory.
There are clear indications in the medical record that Mr Ryan has experienced some deterioration in his memory post stroke.
In the BISA assessment Mr Ryan indicated having difficulty thinking clearly because of fatigue. This impacted his ability to organise his thoughts and to maintain focus. The BISA assessment also noted the contribution of Mr Ryan's moderate depression and extremely severe anxiety in exacerbating his difficulty in organising his thoughts.
The combination of Mr Ryan's fatigue, cognitive impairment and emotional distress were seen in the BISA report to create barriers to learning. It was thought he would require structured learning environments, task simplification strategies and emotional support to retain new information.
The Ploszaj report noted Mr Ryan's difficulty with memory and assessed him as having moderate difficulty with learning new tasks. Ms Ploszaj noted that Mr Ryan had instituted a white board to assist him with his memory, noting he intermittently uses this to record his medical and other appointments.
Ms Ploszaj reported that Mr Ryan had demonstrated an ability to learn how to use his oven as part of her assessment, with her checking his successful retention of this information twice during the assessment.
I note that it was Mr Ryan's evidence to the Tribunal that he no longer remembered how to use his oven.
Mr Ryan's work as a farm hand is something he has done for years, with tasks he is very familiar with. He has had limited need to engage in learning new activities so as to demonstrate his ability to do so. Mr Ryan did, however, advise the Tribunal that he had recently learned how to send text messages on his mobile phone. Although he could not recall who had taught him to do this, he did still retain the knowledge.
The Tribunal also notes that Mr Ryan learnt how to utilise a borrowed I-pad to participate in telehealth services during his rehabilitation program and has also had to learn how to manage his Type II diabetes (including daily testing) since his post-stroke diagnosis.
I acknowledge that Mr Ryan's cognitive impairments and fatigue do impair his ability to learn and remember. However, on balance I find the evidence demonstrates Mr Ryan does not have a substantially reduced functional capacity to undertake the activity of learning, either due to the deeming provisions or otherwise. As such he does not meet the section 24(1)(c) criterion with respect to the activity of learning.

[82]

The bundle of tasks associated with the mobility activity include tasks associated with moving around within the home, tasks associated with moving around within the community (how you get out and about), tasks associated with getting in and out of bed, and tasks associated with getting in and out of a chair.
The threshold requirement for achieving functional capacity in this activity has been held to be 'relatively modest'.[43]
The BISA assessment tested Mr Ryan's balance and risk of falls and assessed him as having impaired balance and increased risk of falls as a result of his stroke-related right leg weakness. He was noted to have difficulty in maintaining constant gait speed while turning his head, to have to adjust his steps when needing to step over an object and required the use of a rail when utilising stairs. His sit-to-stand test confirmed this falls risk. Fatigue was a significant factor in increased safety risk also.
The Ploszaj report recorded Mr Ryan as being independent with mobility indoors, albeit demonstrating an intermittent shuffle gait and occasional instability. He used surfaces to steady himself on occasion.
Outdoor mobility was also independent with no aids required. He was observed mobilising over even and slightly uneven surfaces. Mr Ryan reported preferring to walk short distances to minimise his fatigue. He was concerned about the risk of falling.
Transfers were observed to be independent from the edge of his bed, from his chair and from his toilet, although he was observed to utilise surfaces to push himself up due to leg weakness.
Mr Ryan is able to drive on the farm and in his local community. He notes that he is not confident to drive longer distances.
Mr Ryan's evidence to the Tribunal was that his job required him to be able to walk often. This included walking from his ute to a farm gate, opening the gate and returning to the ute and reversing the process once he had driven through the gate. He noted he was very cautious when walking in the cattle yards as the ground could be uneven and his balance was poor.
Mr Ryan noted that after work he has his own chickens to care for, including shovelling sand into and from a wheelbarrow, and changing water and feed. He also has his own small allotment with other livestock that he cares for.
Having regard to the totality of the evidence I find that for the purposes of the Act Mr Ryan does not have a substantially reduced functional capacity for the activity of mobility, whether with respect to the deeming provisions or otherwise. I find he does not meet the disability requirement in section 24(1)(c) for this activity.

[83]

The bundle of tasks associated with the activity of self-care includes tasks associated with personal care, including personal hygiene and grooming, tasks associated with eating and drinking, and tasks associated with health care.
It was Mr Ryan's evidence to the Tribunal that he was independent with his self-care. His daily activity included waking at 6am (noting that Mr Ryan sleeps in his recliner chair, not a bed, and has done since prior to his stroke),[44] checking his blood sugar levels, having breakfast and then heading off to work. He generally returned to the house at lunch and used the airfryer to make himself a pie or sandwich, following which he would need to sleep because of his fatigue. He would then return to work for the rest of the day. He used to get his own dinner before sleeping in his chair again.
At the moment, however, his son, daughter-in-law and grandchildren are living with him and his daughter-in-law has been doing all the cooking and cleaning.
Mr Ryan stated that he does not shower every day but is able to do so independently.
It was Ms Bright's evidence (the daughter-in-law) that there has been a significant decline in Mr Ryan's personal hygiene since his stroke. She states that Mr Ryan will go days without showering sometimes and takes no notice of her prompting.
She agrees that prior to their family moving into Mr Ryan's house he did live independently, but states that the condition of the house was not good.
Ben, Mr Ryan's son confirms this information. He feels his father is so worn out from the workday he does not have the energy to self-care or do home chores.
The BISA report undertook an Abbreviated Life Skills Profile assessment which Jacob, Mr Ryan's son completed. Jacob assessed Mr Ryan's self-care as poor with Mr Ryan presenting as extremely poorly groomed.
Again, the test for functional capacity in the activity of self-care is the ability of Mr Ryan to complete the task, not whether he chooses to do so or not.
Ms Ploszaj undertook an assessment of self-care activities with Mr Ryan in his own home. Mr Ryan reported he was independent in all self-care tasks of showering, dressing, grooming, toileting, medication management and feeding. Ms Ploszaj acknowledged Mr Ryan had challenges with the completion of these tasks because of his instability but noted that they were being completed independently and without aids.
Ms Ploszaj observed Mr Ryan simulate the showering activity and considered this was safely done. She was of the view he would be assisted by the provision of a shower chair. Mr Ryan was noted to be appropriately dressed and groomed at the time of Ms Ploszaj's assessment.
Ms Ploszaj also observed Mr Ryan preparing a light meal and completing basic laundry and domestic tasks independently. She was satisfied he had the capacity to complete these tasks safely, although he may have been assisted with other equipment (such as a light stick vacuum or laundry trolley). She felt he would need help with heavy tasks. I note that Ms Ploszaj's assessment occurred prior to Mr Ben Ryan and Ms Bright moving to live with Mr Ryan. In her view, at that time, the house was suitably clean.
I acknowledge Ms Bel Ryan's concern that Ms Ploszaj appeared to rely on Mr Ryan's self-report without checking this with other family members. They have significant concerns about Mr Ryan's performance of these tasks as his self-care and grooming were noted to have deteriorated significantly from prior to his stroke.
Again, while acknowledging the family's distress at Mr Ryan's post-stroke deterioration, this temporally comparative exercise is not the appropriate test.
In their evidence to the Tribunal neither Ms Bright nor Mr Ben Ryan indicated to the Tribunal that they needed to give Mr Ryan physical assistance with his self-care activities. Although Mr Ryan appeared to be reluctant to shower, there was no evidence presented that he was unable to.
Having regard to the totality of the evidence before the Tribunal I find that Mr Ryan does not have a substantially reduced functional capacity for the activity of self-care, whether with respect to the deeming provisions or otherwise.
I find Mr Ryan does not meet the disability requirement in section 24(1)(c) with respect to the activity of self-care.

[84]

The bundle of tasks that make up the activity of self-management include cognitive tasks associated with personal organisation, personal planning, personal decision-making, problem solving, and personal financial management. These are essentially cognitive tasks of life management.
It was Mr Ryan's evidence to the Tribunal that he manages his own household finances, and previously, before Ms Bright and Mr Ben Ryan took up residence with him, also managed his own shopping and food preparation.
He acknowledged that when he needed to go to Naracoorte for shopping or to pay his bills it could take him a while to get organised because he forgets things.
Mr Ryan also arranges his own appointments and makes sure he keeps those appointments by writing them on his white board. I acknowledge Ms Bel Ryan's concerns that on the day he has appointments Mr Ryan appears to be unable to manage any other activity, but this does not detract from the fact that he manages his own appointments.
Mr Ryan demonstrates the ability to manage his own diabetes care and medication. He otherwise relies on the routines of his life for his self-management. He attends work regularly and completes such tasks as are within his physical capacity. He and his employer both acknowledge he can't do as much as he used to do.
Mr Ryan continues to be involved in making decisions about his lease block and the livestock on that block. When he goes to market with his employer, he is also looking to buy animals for himself. His employer relies on his input about stock purchase also.
It is possible that if Mr Ryan was required to do something outside his usual routine activities, he may have difficulty in organising or planning to do this. Given his current routine, however, this does not arise.
It was Mr Ben Ryan's evidence to the Tribunal that Mr Ryan's routines continue to be the same as prior to his son's family moving in with him, its just that the house is now cleaner and the food is better.
I have considered the evidence before the Tribunal and find Mr Ryan does not have a substantially reduced functional capacity for the activity of self-management, whether in relation to the deeming provisions or otherwise.
I find that he does not meet the disability requirement in section 24(1)(c) for the activity of self-management.

[86]

Rules 6.4 to 6.7 of the Access Rules provide that the same considerations as to permanency apply for the early intervention requirements.
On that basis Mr Ryan has a relevant permanent physical and cognitive impairment attributable to his strokes.
Rule 6.9 of the Access Rules notes that in deciding whether early intervention supports may assist a prospective participant, it is expected the decision maker would consider the likely trajectory and impact of the person's impairment over time and the potential benefits of early intervention in relation to functional capacity and reducing the future need for supports.
In the Access Request form completed by Dr Gardner, GP, Dr Gardner indicated that early intervention supports were likely to reduce the applicant's future support needs by alleviating the impact on functional capacity, preventing deterioration of functional capacity, improving functional capacity and strengthening existing support. She identified occupational therapy assistance for assistance in improving fine motor tasks and changes to his home environment. The projected goal of this intervention was 'to assist Mr Ryan in being more efficient with day-to-day tasks and assist him with problem solving'.
It was Ms Ploszaj's assessment that Mr Ryan had intact fine motor skills with 'no concerns about completion of praxis or opposition tasks, including buttons and zippers'.[46]
Section 25 early intervention supports are intended to be utilised at an early stage of an impairment so as to reduce the impact of the impairment. This recognises that a person may need support to help minimise the impact of a disability from its earliest appearance, and that the provision of support may improve the person's functioning or prevent the progression of their disability over their lifetime.[47]
In the case of an acute medical condition, such as stroke, however, early intervention supports are likely to be more appropriately provided by the mainstream health services, and in Mr Ryan's case, were provided via the discharge ambulatory rehabilitation program.
Mr Ryan is now more than 4 years post CVA. He continues to work, both on the farm on which he is employed and on his own lease holding. He retains his independence in self-care. His impairments, weakness in his right leg and arm, cognitive impairment and post-stroke fatigue do not appear to be amenable to improvement, although they may be better managed with health-related input such as physiotherapy and/or occupational therapy.
The only assessment of the likely progress of Mr Ryan's condition is from Dr Cheruvu, Geriatrician, who assesses a high risk of Mr Ryan progressing to vascular dementia.[48] It is difficult to see how early intervention supports might interrupt this possible process.
I note that Dr Gardner has previously referred Mr Ryan to a community occupational therapist for assessment. The Tribunal has not been provided with any report from this assessment nor any evidence as to the likely trajectory of Mr Ryan's condition with the benefit of early intervention supports.
I have considered the evidence and find there is insufficient evidence before the Tribunal to support a finding early intervention supports will result in any reduction in Mr Ryan's requirement of future supports. To the extent that physiotherapy or psychological assistance may assist in improving Mr Ryan's balance or his mood, I find these are supports that are more appropriately funded or provided through the health service.
I find that Mr Ryan does not meet the early intervention requirements in section 25 of the NDIS Act.

Ryan and NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE AGENCY (NDIS) [2026] ARTA 121 (3 February 2026)

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Judgment (106 paragraphs)

Ryan and NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE AGENCY (NDIS) [2026] ARTA 121 (3 February 2026)

Legislation Cited (4)

Cases Cited (1)