Rowles v Repatriation Commission

1. In the principal proceeding, the applicant seeks judicial review of what are asserted to be decisions of the "Repatriation Commission (Department of Veterans' Affairs)" (the Commission) and the Veterans' Review Board (the Board), refusing to grant the applicant a pension and Gold Card under the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) and improperly reclassifying his claim under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-related Claims) Act 1988 (Cth).
2. The interlocutory application filed by the applicant on 27 August 2025 presently before the Court seeks the following order:

That Justice Rangiah recuse himself from further hearing or determination of this proceeding on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias.

1. The applicant is self-represented in the proceeding. He has sought an order that his application for recusal be determined on the papers because of his hearing impairment and tinnitus. The Commission consents to the determination of the application on the papers but opposes the application for recusal itself. The Board has entered a submitting notice.
2. I understand the applicant to rely on two grounds for my recusal, both stemming from the Commissions' legal representation by the Australian Government Solicitor (the AGS). The applicant asserts that a reasonable apprehension of bias arises from:

(a) an allegation that the Court engaged in an ex parte communication with Mr Watts, the solicitor with carriage of the matter within the AGS; and

(b) the employment of my daughter within the Brisbane office of the AGS.

1. The applicant and the Commission have each filed affidavits and written submissions concerning the application for recusal. Although a first case management hearing has not yet been conducted, the applicant has filed approximately 39 affidavits to date. I only propose to consider the applicant's affidavits insofar as they appear to be relevant to the recusal application.
2. For the reasons that follow, I find that no reasonable apprehension of bias arises. Accordingly, the applicant's interlocutory application must be dismissed.

1. The applicant commenced his proceeding by Originating Application filed on 11 July 2025.
2. On 30 July 2025, the Court's Registry sent an email to the applicant informing him that a case management hearing had been listed before me at 9.30 am on 7 August 2025. The email indicated that as the respondents had not filed any notices of address for service, the applicant was to ensure that the correspondence was served on the respondents. The email also stated that the parties should confer prior to the case management hearing with a view to seeing whether appropriate orders could be agreed.
3. On 30 July 2025, the applicant responded by email to the Registry requesting that, due to a hearing impairment and tinnitus, he be permitted to, "participate via written correspondence (email) rather than in-person, video or telephone attendance" (emphasis in original). He stated that he was, "unable to adequately engage through spoken formats".
4. On 31 July 2025, the applicant emailed my Associate attaching proposed draft orders and noting that the respondents had not filed any notices of address for service. The orders sought by the applicant included that:
   1. The applicant be permitted to appear by written submissions only, due to a medically recognised hearing impairment, pursuant to Rule 5.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
5. At my direction, on 1 August 2025, the Registry responded to the applicant's correspondence of 30 and 31 July 2025 advising that the courtrooms are equipped with hearing loops which had been used in the past to accommodate hearing-impaired parties. The applicant was asked to advise by close of business on 4 August 2025 which form of presentation he wished to use.
6. On 1 August 2025, the applicant forwarded to the Registry an email from the Department of Veterans' Affairs which acknowledged receipt of court documents. On 4 August 2025, the AGS lodged for filing a notice of address for service on behalf of the Commission, which was accepted for filing on 6 August 2025. The Board later filed a submitting notice on 14 August 2025.
7. On 5 August 2025, the applicant sent an email to the Registry "raising a formal complaint" concerning the conduct of Mr Watts. The email was in the following terms:

To the Federal Court of Australia,

Re: Formal Complaint - Jamie Watts (Australian Government Solicitor)

I write as a self-represented litigant in Federal Court matter QUD462/2025 under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). I am raising a formal complaint regarding inappropriate, misleading, and potentially unlawful conduct by Mr Jamie Watts of the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS), including improper communications and attempted interference with judicial process.

1. Improper and Unauthorised Contact:

Mr Watts issued direct correspondence to me via email dated 5 August 2024, purporting to clarify legal standing and submission timelines. This was not delivered through Court channels, nor accompanied by any Notice of Appearance, and lacked official court filing stamps.

2. Failure to Observe Procedural Rules:

Mr Watts' communication was not served in accordance with Rule 2.10 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, which requires proper service and notification of legal representation. As the respondent has not formally entered an appearance, Mr Watts' communication amounts to an informal approach, which is inconsistent with Rule 5.01 and the duties owed to the Court.

3. Evidence of Procedural Misconduct and Misrepresentation:

The email contains several material misstatements, including incorrect dates, reference to MRCA without foundation, and omission of crucial VRB determinations already on record. These are not minor errors; they represent a potential abuse of process and attempt to mislead or intimidate a self-represented litigant.

4. Breach of Professional Conduct:

Under the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), incorporated via Schedule 1 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (QLD), legal practitioners must act honestly, avoid misleading conduct, and refrain from communicating directly with represented parties unless authorised. I assert that Mr Watts' actions may constitute a breach of these duties.

5. My Right to Self-Representation and Judicial Oversight:

As a self-represented litigant, I rely on the Court's oversight and procedural integrity to protect against intimidation of procedural unfairness. Mr Watts' unsolicited and flawed email chain has the appearance of improper pressure or baiting. It has no standing unless filed formally, I respectfully request that it be struck from consideration unless validated through appropriate procedural means.

6. Notice of Subpoena - Jamie Watts:

Should this matter proceed to hearing, I intend to subpoena Mr Jamie Watts under section 36 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth.) to give evidence regarding this correspondence and the broader handling of my matter. He may be called to explain the basis of his claims and his reference to authority that does not exist in the public record.

7. Request for Direction:

I seek that the Court acknowledge this correspondence as a formal complaint and consider whether a direction or clarification is required regarding communications from opposing counsel who have not formally appeared. I also seek confirmation that no weight will be given to the correspondence unless properly filed.

Conclusion;

This matter has the potential to impact the integrity of Federal Court proceedings. I raise this complaint to protect the transparency, fairness, and lawful conduct of this case. I trust the Court will treat this matter with the seriousness it warrants.

(Emphasis in original.)

1. On 6 August 2025 at 1.34 pm, the Registry wrote to the parties at my direction indicating that the Court would consider any application the applicant filed concerning the alleged conduct of Mr Watts, but would not otherwise take any action in relation to the applicant's complaint. The email also attached orders that I had made adjourning the case management hearing scheduled for 7 August 2025 to 26 August 2025 and stating:

The Court cannot consider your application for the matter to be heard on the papers without hearing from the respondent as to its attitude regarding that course of action.

In view of your apparent inability to present your case in-person or via MS Teams, and the absence of any substantial attempts by the parties to agree appropriate procedural orders, the Court proposes to adjourn the case management hearing for approximately two weeks.

The expectation of the Court is that the parties should discuss and attempt to agree appropriate orders before the adjourned case management hearing.

...

Accordingly, tomorrow's listing has been vacated and the matter is now listed for case management hearing at 10.15 am on 26 August 2025 at the Federal Court in Brisbane.

(Emphasis in original.)

1. The email was sent at my direction because there did not seem to be any other feasible way of dealing with the impasse that had arisen concerning the conduct of the case management hearing listed for the following day. The applicant was seeking to have the case management hearing heard on the papers on the basis that there was no other possible way for him to participate in a hearing. The AGS had apparently contacted the applicant to discuss the orders to be made at the case management hearing, but the applicant had vehemently objected to that contact by making a "formal complaint". The AGS had not yet informed the Court whether the Commission consented to the case management hearing being heard on the papers and the Commission would have been denied procedural fairness if the Court had simply acceded to the applicant's request without giving it an opportunity to make submissions about that issue. In these circumstances, I considered that the only sensible course was to adjourn the case management hearing to see whether the parties were able to resolve the impasse.
2. There was no communication between the Court and the AGS concerning any adjournment before the Registry's email of 6 August 2025 was sent.
3. The applicant responded by email at 2.50 pm on 6 August 2025 stating, inter alia:

This correspondence serves as a formal Notice of Procedural Irregularity and a demand for disclosure relating to the sealed orders issued by the Court on 6 August 2025, vacating the scheduled proceeding and relisting it for 26 August 2025 at 10.15 AM, without notice or reason given to me.

• BACKGROUND - TIMELINE OF EVENTS
  1. I filed my Form 66 on time and correctly under s39B of the Judiciary Act 1903.
  2. The Court requested confirmation of my method of appearance by COB 4 August 2025.
  3. On 1 August 2025, I confirmed my appearance would be by written submissions under Rule 36.41 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, due to documented hearing loss and tinnitus.
  4. Tanya Barry, Legal Case Manager for the Court, acknowledged this on the record.
  5. On that basis, I was invited to submit draft orders, which I did.
  6. I also submitted a formal complaint on 5 August 2025 regarding misconduct by Mr Jamie Watts (AGS).
  7. Mr Watts has not filed a Notice of Appearance in the matter.
  8. No formal response has been received from AGS, DVA or any respondent party.
  9. On 6 August 2025, I was advised by phone that the matter had been adjourned. No prior notice or lawful basis was provided.
• NOTICE OF BREACH

If the Court acted on an unsolicited, unserved email from Mr Watts - a party who had no standing in this matter, is under formal complaint, and has not filed any appearance - then the Court has breached the following:

1. Rule 2.10 (communications must be through the registry and on record)

2. Rule 5.01 (notice must be given to parties)

3. Rule 36.41 (permitted appearance via email)

4. Principals of natural justice and procedural fairness

Furthermore, I did not fail to appear. My appearance was valid, on record, and accepted by the Court. My draft orders were submitted as requested, and I received no objection, appearance, or application from the Respondents.

I now formally request:

1. A copy of the originating request or document that led to the adjournment of this matter;

2. The full basis and jurisdictional justification for vacating a hearing where the Applicant has properly appeared and complied;

3. Confirmation of whether Mr Jamie Watts or the Australian Government Solicitor has filed a formal appearance in QUD462/2025;

4. The date and time of receipt of any correspondence used to justify the adjournment;

5. Clarification as to whether my complaint of 5 August 2025 was considered before orders were issued the following day.

I reserve all rights to escalate this matter should it become evident that the Court acted improperly, or that an unfiled communication from a party under misconduct complain was relied upon to interfere with the hearing.

(Emphasis in original.)

1. On 7 August 2025, the Registry emailed the applicant referring to his above email of 6 August 2025 and confirming that the case management hearing had been vacated and re-listed for the reasons set out in the Registry's email of 1.34 pm on 6 August 2025. The email also noted that the applicant had referred to some communication with the Registry by telephone and added that if he wished to attend the case management hearing by telephone, that could be arranged.
2. On 8 August 2025, the applicant also made an application under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) directed to the Court requesting, inter-alia, access to documents concerning communications with Mr Watts, the Department of Veterans' Affairs, the Veterans' Review Board and the Administrative Review Tribunal. It was said the request related to the applicant's concerns of procedural misconduct, disability discrimination and improper influence over a Federal Court matter by non-parties.
3. On 13 August 2025, the applicant wrote to the Court stating that it had been two weeks since he had served his draft order on the respondents and there had been no response to the question of whether the proceedings would be conducted on the papers or in person. The applicant asked the Court to address the issue as a matter of priority. The applicant also asserted that: he did not own a telephone and the telephone service referred to in any communications belonged to his wife; he resides in a remote bush location with no direct telephone service; he relies solely on a satellite internet connection via Wi-Fi, which is, "intermittent and prone to significant delay, echo, and poor quality"; and his hearing loss and tinnitus make telephone communication particularly difficult and anxiety-inducing.
4. On 14 August 2025, the applicant lodged an interlocutory application seeking orders including that:

The applicant be permitted to appear by written submissions only, due to a medically recognised hearing impairment, pursuant to r 5.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

1. At my direction, the Registry emailed the parties on 15 August 2025 asking that the AGS indicate whether the Commission agreed to the applicant's request for the matter to be heard on the papers and to provide the applicant with the draft orders sought by the Commission. The applicant was asked to indicate whether he agreed to the proposed orders or, if not, what different orders were being sought. No response was received from the parties to the email of 15 August 2025.
2. On 19 August 2025, the Registry, at my direction, emailed the parties indicating the applicant's interlocutory application would be accepted for filing by the Registry and asking that the Commission's legal representative indicate by reply email the respondent's position on the interlocutory orders being sought. The email also stated:

Justice Rangiah has asked that it be made it [sic] known to the parties that he has a daughter who is employed as a lawyer by the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS). She recently commenced working out of the Brisbane office of the AGS for a period of five months. She works within the Constitutional Litigation Unit of the AGS and, as such, has no involvement with matters such as this which do not have any constitutional component. It goes without saying that his Honour would not discuss this matter (or any other pending matter) with his daughter.

If any party wishes to object to the Justice Rangiah continuing in the matter, they are asked to notify the Court promptly by return email. His Honour would then make directions for the filing of an application for recusal, the filing of evidence and written submissions and a date for the hearing of the application.

1. On 27 August 2025, the applicant filed the present application seeking my recusal.

1. Having regard to the applicant's written submissions, I understand the application to be based on both an allegation that I engaged in improper conduct by engaging in or facilitating some ex parte communication with Mr Watts leading to an adjournment of the case management hearing listed for 7 August 2025 and, additionally, because of my daughter's employment with the AGS.
2. The Commission relies on an affidavit of Jennifer Davenport, a Senior Executive Lawyer and Team Leader within the Dispute Resolution Group of the AGS. Ms Davenport confirms that my daughter is employed as a junior lawyer within the Constitutional Litigation Unit in the Office of General Counsel (OGC).
3. Ms Davenport explains that the AGS' functions include representing the Commonwealth and its agencies in legal matters. She deposes that the AGS is one of Australia's largest national legal service providers, with an office in every capital city and over 500 lawyers that cover some 40 different areas of law related to government.
4. Ms Davenport explains that the AGS is structured into three practice groups, namely Commercial, Dispute Resolution and OGC, and that lawyers (other than those in professional leadership positions) are employed within a specific team in their practice group. She states that Mr Watts is one of approximately 354 lawyers employed within the Dispute Resolution practice group and that she was responsible for determining which lawyers would work on the applicant's proceeding. She states that no AGS lawyer outside the Dispute Resolution Group has been involved with the file or is anticipated to be involved in the conduct of this proceeding given the nature of the issues raised.
5. Ms Davenport deposes that OGC specialises in acting for the Commonwealth in constitutional litigation, coordinating the conduct of other cases involving constitutional issues and providing advice on constitutional and public law matters. She states that AGS lawyers within the Constitutional Litigation Unit are not involved in the conduct of the applicant's proceeding and have not been consulted on the conduct of the case.
6. Ms Davenport also deposes that the AGS did not request that the case management hearing listed for 7 August 2025 be vacated and that no email had been sent from the AGS to the Court requesting an adjournment. She deposes that Mr Watts has confirmed the only contact the AGS has had with the Court by telephone in relation to this proceeding was when a legal assistant contacted the Registry by telephone on 5 August 2025 to enquire when the Commission's notice of address for service would be sealed.

1. The principles concerning apprehended bias are well established and were recently summarised by Wigney J in Edwards v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited (No 9) [2025] FCA 1042 at [9]- [21], a case which, like the present case, dealt with an assertion of apprehended bias on the basis of the association of the judge with a lawyer for one of the parties.
2. In Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 (Ebner), the High Court held at [6] that apprehended bias will be established, "if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide": see also QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; (2023) 279 CLR 148 (QYFM) at [37]-[38].
3. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [2024] HCA 32; (2024) 98 ALJR 1163 at [92], citing QYFM at [38], the plurality held:

The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias requires: "(1) identification of the factor which it is said might lead a judge to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits; (2) articulation of the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding that question on its merits; and (3) assessment of the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer".

1. An apprehension of bias must be based upon a fair understanding of all the relevant circumstances: Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [53] (Kirby J).
2. In QYFM, Kiefel CJ and Gageler J at [47]-[48] summarised the characteristics attributable to the fair-minded lay observer as follows:

Being "fair-minded", the observer "is neither complacent nor unduly sensitive or suspicious". Yet the observer is cognisant of "human frailty" and is all too aware of the reality that the judge is human. The observer understands that "information [as well as attitudes] consciously and conscientiously discarded might still sometimes have a subconscious effect on even the most professional of decision-making".

Being "lay", the observer "is not to be assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or of the character or ability of a particular judge". Though the observer may be taken to understand that the judge, by reason of professional training and experience and fidelity to the judicial oath or affirmation, will have a greater capacity than most to discard "the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial" and to discharge the judicial function uninfluenced by past professional relationships, "the public perception of the judiciary is not advanced by attributing to the ... observer a knowledge of the law and an awareness of the judicial process that ordinary experience suggests not to be the case.

(Citations omitted.)

1. In Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342 at 352, Mason J observed:

... It needs to be said loudly and clearly that the ground of disqualification is a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer will not decide the case impartially or without prejudice, rather than that he will decide the case adversely to one party. ... Although it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.

1. An apprehension of bias should be "firmly established" and "should not be reached lightly": Re JRL; Ex parte CJL at 371; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; see also, Ex parte Epeabaka [2001] HCA 23; (2001) 206 CLR 128 at [90] (Kirby J). "Substantial grounds" are required for disqualification: Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; 195 ALR 225 at [36]. The possibility must be real and not remote: Ebner at [7]; QYFM at [37], [299].

1. The first factor identified by the applicant which it is said might lead me to resolve the proceeding on a basis other than its legal and factual merits is the allegation that I engaged in improper conduct by engaging in or facilitating an ex parte communication with Mr Watts, leading to the adjournment of the case management hearing listed for 7 August 2025, or possibly a suspicion that I may have engaged in such conduct.
2. However, as Ms Davenport's evidence establishes, there was no ex parte communication between the Court and the AGS concerning the adjournment of the case management hearing. Neither could any reasonable bystander have any suspicion that there was any such ex parte communication. It was my determination that there should be an adjournment of the case management hearing. I made that determination on my own initiative for the reasons set out in the email from the Registry to the parties on 6 August 2025 at 1.34 pm and explained earlier in these reasons.
3. As I have rejected the applicant's assertion that there was any ex parte communication between the Court with Mr Watts, or any reasonable basis for suspecting there was such a communication, the supposed communication could not form a basis of any reasonable apprehension of bias.
4. The second factor identified by the applicant which he contends might lead me to resolve the proceeding on a basis other than its legal and factual merits, is that my daughter is employed within the AGS as a junior lawyer.
5. The Guide to Judicial Conduct (Third Edition) (the Guide) published on behalf of the Council of Chief Justices of Australia and New Zealand provides the following guidance as to the circumstances in which a judicial officer ought to disqualify themselves by reason of their personal relationship with another person:

3.3.4 Personal relationships

There are many personal relationships to be considered. The most important relationships may be categorised for present purposes as:

First degree - parent, child, sibling, spouse, domestic partner or other person with whom an intimate relationship exists or has existed;

...

And such relevant relationships may exist with:

(i) Parties;

(ii) Legal advisers or representatives of parties;

(iii) Witnesses.

In addition to such relationships, friendships or past professional or other association with such persons needs to be considered in some situations. There are no hard and fast rules, but the following guidance is offered.

(a) A judge should not sit on a case in which the judge is in a relationship of the first, second or third degree to a party or the spouse or domestic partner of a party.

(b) Where the judge is in a relationship of the first or second degree to counsel or the solicitor having the actual conduct of the case, or the spouse or domestic partner of such counsel or solicitor, most judges would and should disqualify themselves. Ordinarily there is no need to do so if the matter is uncontested or is a relatively minor or procedural matter. Nor is there a need to do so merely because the person in question is a partner in, or employee of, a firm of solicitors or public authority acting for a party. In such cases, it is a matter of considering all the circumstances, including the nature and extent of the involvement in the matter of the person in question. Some judges may be aware of cases involving such a relationship when the judge has sat without objection, but current community expectations make such conduct undesirable.

1. In Viscariello v Tamasauskas (No 2) [2019] SASC 40 (Viscariello) at [67], Doyle J, citing Attorney-General (NT) v Director of Public Prosecutions, observed that while the Guide provides a useful framework and guidelines for a judge's consideration of whether there exists a disqualifying association, it does not have the status of rules that must be applied. Nevertheless, the advice given in the Guide that recusal is not required merely because the person with whom the judicial officer has a "first degree" relationship is a partner in or employee of a firm acting for a party in the proceeding, is consistent with the authorities that have considered that issue.
2. In Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (No 3) [2001] SASC 215, the appellants applied for the recusal of Doyle CJ on the basis that his son was employed by the solicitors for the respondent in the matter. His Honour had previously disclosed that his son had worked on the litigation without the appellant taking any objection, but the appellant later argued that changed circumstances meant the son might be called as a witness and also that his firm might be sued for negligence. His Honour found at [54] that the possibility of his son being called was very slight. However, his Honour considered at [59] that he should approach the application on the basis that a close relative possibly had an interest in the outcome of the application, that interest being a financial one and a personal one, in the sense of reputation.
3. Chief Justice Doyle noted at [64] that, on the other hand, a fair-minded observer must be taken to know that his Honour was already sitting on a case in which a close relative had a professional involvement and there was always a possibility of that involvement giving rise to a claim against that relative and some aspect of the relative's professional conduct having to be considered by the Court. His Honour held at [65] that a fair-minded lay observer would not regard it as a real possibility that he might not bring an impartial mind to the matter merely because of the slight possibility that the Court's decision might affect his son's financial and personal interests.
4. In Smits v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423, the claim of apprehended bias was based on the assertion that a judge's brother, who was the chairman of at least 80 partners at a law firm implicated in the proceedings, had an indirect financial interest in the outcome of the litigation between two other parties. The majority observed at [52] that the concept of interest (like the concept of association) is protean. The majority considered there was no apprehended bias, holding at [54] that the two-step process described in Ebner also applied where the assertion of apprehended bias is based on an association with somebody who is said to have an interest in the litigation. The majority emphasised the need for a logical connection between the matter complained of and the feared deviation by the judge from the course of impartially deciding the case on its merits.
5. In Willoughby City Council v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation [2008] NSWLEC 231, an objection was taken to a valuer, whose son was a partner in the firm of solicitors acting for the respondent, sitting as an Acting Commissioner with Lloyd J. His Honour found at [12] that the association was more tenuous than that in Smits v Roach and there was no basis for the disqualification of the Acting Commissioner. His Honour was reinforced in this view by the Guide.
6. In Dixon v Cargill Meat Processors Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 101, where the plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment, Schmidt AJ, trial judge, informed the parties that her husband was a partner in the firm of solicitors acting for the defendant in the proceeding. The argument appeared to be that because the defendant must be an important client of the firm, it was reasonable to infer that Schmidt JA had an interest in the outcome of the litigation as the result of her Honour's personal connection with that firm. Her Honour at [11]-[13] considered there was no reason to depart from the guidelines set out in the Guide which indicated there was no need to disqualify herself, "merely because the person in question is a partner in, or employee of, a firm of solicitors or public authority acting for a party".
7. In Attorney-General (NT) v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 166 NTR 1, a relieving magistrate was married to the Principal Legal Officer of the Central Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service (CAALAS). During the trial of a defendant represented by a lawyer employed by CAALAS, the prosecution applied for the recusal of the relieving magistrate on the basis of her association with her husband. The magistrate refused the application.
8. On appeal, Mildren ACJ and Blokland J (Kelly J generally agreeing) observed at [29] that most of the cases where an association was held to be sufficient for disqualification concerned the relationship between the judicial officer and a litigant, or between the judicial officer and a lawyer for a party, either appearing personally for a party or being directly involved in the particular case to be decided. Their Honours held at [31] that given the structure of CAALAS and the volume of its cases, there was no reason to infer that the magistrate's husband was acting for a particular client simply because he was the Principal Officer or because he held the unrestricted practising certificate for CAALAS. Their Honours said it was hard to imagine that the magistrate sitting in numerous cases could, consciously or unconsciously, be influenced by the fact that the lawyer representing a defendant was subject to the supervision of her husband. It was also observed that the husband had no personal interest, whether emotional or otherwise, in the outcome of the case, nor could the outcome of such a case affect his chances of personal advancement. Justice Kelly noted at [39] that no logical connection had been established between the actual case being heard, the magistrate's disclosed interest and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.
9. In Viscariello, an application was made for the recusal of Doyle J on the basis that his sister was one of four principals of the firm representing the defendant. His Honour observed at [81] that his sister was not the counsel or solicitor acting for the defendant and that she had no involvement in the conduct of the matter. There was no basis to think that the firm had any direct financial interest in the outcome of the proceedings since it was reasonable to assume they would be paid regardless of the outcome (at [83]). His Honour accepted at [84] that the barrister and solicitor with the conduct of a particular matter would have a professional interest in the outcome of that matter, in the sense they would prefer to "win" rather than "lose", where the outcome would have the potential to affect their professional standing. However, at [85] his Honour observed that the strength or intensity of the professional interest becomes "diluted" once one moves from the individual to the firm, and then to other individuals within that firm. His Honour considered at [86] that it was difficult to see how the outcome of the hearing could have materially impacted the relevant firm, let alone his sister. His Honour was not satisfied there was a sufficient logical connection between his familial association and his apprehended ability to bring an impartial mind to bear in the proceeding (at [87]).
10. In Adaz Nominees Pty Ltd v Castleway Pty Ltd (2022) 69 VR 329, Niall JA (as the Chief Justice then was) had been allocated the proceeding after the original judge became unavailable for the trial. His Honour disclosed to the parties that he was a friend of the chief executive officer of the firm of solicitors acting for the plaintiffs and had a long-standing arrangement to holiday with him at a time when judgment was likely to be reserved. His Honour considered at [24] that an association between the judge listed to hear the trial and a partner of a firm acting in the litigation for one of the parties, but who does not have conduct of the litigation, does not provide a proper foundation for a reasonable apprehension of bias. His Honour was not persuaded that the applicant had identified how the association might cause deviation from a neutral evaluation of the merits or that any apprehension that might arise to that effect is a reasonable one. His Honour observed at [25] that:

The notion that a judge would favour one party because they are represented by a firm of solicitors, and the judge is friends with a partner in that firm is not in itself logical. The notion that the judge might seek to favour one side because to do so might favour the judge's friend or relative who is a partner of the firm cannot be sustained.

1. The authorities have consistently taken the approach that in circumstances where a close relative is employed by or a partner in a law firm representing a party and the relative is not involved in the conduct of the litigation and has no financial interest in the outcome, a fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.
2. In the present case, the factor which it is said might lead me to resolve the proceeding other than on its legal and factual merits is that my daughter is employed within the AGS, the lawyers representing the Commission.
3. The applicant has not attempted to articulate any logical connection between that factor and the asserted apprehension that I might not decide the case on its merits. However, it may be assumed the applicant asserts that I might consciously or subconsciously favour the Commission because my daughter is employed by the Commission's lawyers, the AGS.
4. In the circumstances of the case, any such apprehension cannot be assessed as being reasonable from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer. The proceeding is being conducted in a practice group of the AGS that is not the one in which my daughter is employed. She has had no involvement in the proceeding to date, nor is there any realistic possibility that she will have any such involvement in the future. There is no suggestion that my daughter or the AGS have any financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding, nor is there any suggestion that she might somehow otherwise benefit from the outcome.
5. The AGS conducts a very large volume of litigation in the Federal Court. It is quite unrealistic to suppose that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceeding, merely because my daughter is one of over 500 lawyers employed by the AGS.
6. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that my relationship with my daughter and her employment with the AGS does not create any reasonable apprehension of bias.
7. The applicant's application for my recusal will be dismissed.

1. The applicant still has on foot his interlocutory application filed on 14 August 2025 for an order that he, "be permitted to appear by written submissions only, due to a medically recognised hearing impairment". I understand his application to be in respect of his appearance at all case management and other interlocutory hearings and at the trial.
2. It is necessary to emphasise that the applicant's application is unusual, and that it will be necessary for him to adduce evidence adequate to satisfy the Court that such a course is appropriate. It would obviously assist the applicant if he were able to persuade the Commission to consent to such a course, and such consent would be more likely if he were to cooperate with requests for information from the AGS that would assist the Commission to make a proper assessment of the application.
3. As I have indicated, a first case management hearing has not yet been held because of the impasse arising as to how it will be conducted. For the moment, and subject to hearing from the parties, I propose orders along the lines of the following:

(1) The applicant file and serve affidavits containing any evidence, including medical evidence, he wishes to rely upon in support of his interlocutory application filed on 14 August 2025 by 4.30 pm (AEST) on 24 January 2026.

(2) The first respondent file and serve affidavits containing any evidence, including medical evidence, it wishes to rely upon in respect of the interlocutory application by 4.30 pm (AEST) on 13 February 2026.

(3) The applicant file and serve written submissions in support of his interlocutory application (not exceeding ten pages) by 4.30 pm (AEST) on 27 February 2026.

(4) The first respondent file and serve written submissions in response (not exceeding ten pages) by 4.30 pm (AEST) on 13 March 2026.

(5) The applicant file and serve any written submissions in reply (not exceeding five pages) by 4.30 pm (AEST) on 20 March 2026.

(6) The applicant's interlocutory application be determined on the papers, subject to liberty to the first respondent to apply in respect of this order following service of the applicant's evidence.

1. The parties will be ordered to file written submissions (not exceeding five pages) by 4.30 pm (AEST) on 23 December 2025 indicating whether they agree with the proposed orders, or, if not, in what respects they disagree, and their reasons for that disagreement. I will determine the appropriate orders on the papers.

I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Rangiah.