Guardianship and Administration Act 2019 s 179; Civil Procedure Act 2010 ss 7(1), 9(1); Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987; Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B(1).

South Western Sydney Area Health Services v Edmonds [2007] NSWCA 16; Davies v The Queen [2019] VSCA 66, applied.

1. In 2017 Mr Ross began a proceeding against the Commonwealth of Australia for damages for injuries he alleged he sustained in relation to service in the Australian Army Reserve and as a Australian Army Commando Special Forces candidate. In the course of that proceeding, he sought legal assistance from Victoria Legal Aid ('VLA'). In August 2022 VLA refused to provide him with legal assistance. In September 2022 Mr Ross sought judicial review of that decision (the 'judicial review proceeding').
2. In September 2023, VLA sought summary dismissal of the judicial review proceeding and sought an order imposing an extended litigation restraint on Mr Ross. Mr Ross then filed various interlocutory applications. Several of those interlocutory applications were determined by Irving AsJ. Mr Ross then filed a notice of appeal in relation to Irving AsJ's decision. Two judicial registrars made timetabling orders in relation to that appeal. Mr Ross then appealed those decisions. Quigley J dismissed Mr Ross's appeals in November 2024.[1]
3. Mr Ross now seeks leave to appeal Quigley J's decision.
4. Mr Ross has also made an ancillary application in this Court for an order that he can file a notice of a constitutional matter, and order that various entities represent him in the proceeding on a 'no win, no fee' basis.
5. VLA's applications for summary dismissal and a vexatious litigation restraint have not yet been determined.
6. On 7 July 2025, the Registrar of the Court of Appeal referred Mr Ross's application for leave to appeal to me to determine pursuant to r 64.15 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (the 'Rules'). Having considered the materials filed by the parties, I have determined, pursuant to s 14D(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 and r 64.15(5)(iv) of the Rules, that the application for leave to appeal is totally without merit. The application must thus be refused. My reasons are set out below.

Background to this application for leave to appeal

1. In February 2024 Irving AsJ held a directions hearing to manage the judicial review proceeding to a hearing. In oral submissions Mr Ross claimed he did not have capacity to manage the proceeding and said that he should be referred for a mental health assessment. Irving AsJ made orders by consent staying the proceedings and referring Mr Ross to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for an assessment under s 179 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2019.[2]
2. Notwithstanding the stay of the judicial review proceeding, Mr Ross continued to file summonses in that proceeding. A further interlocutory hearing was held before Irving AsJ in June 2024. At that hearing Mr Ross submitted that the VCAT assessment would not be carried out properly. Irving AsJ was satisfied that Mr Ross had capacity to carry on with the proceeding. His Honour thus made orders revoking the February 2024 order and setting a timetable for the remaining summonses that both parties had filed, including VLA's application for summary dismissal and an extended litigation restraint (the 'Irving Order').[3] Mr Ross filed a notice of appeal against the Irving Order. I will refer to this Trial Division appeal as the 'Irving Appeal' (intending no disrespect to Irving AsJ).
3. In August 2024 Judicial Registrar Conidi made an order listing Mr Ross's appeal against the Irving Order for 31 October 2024 (the 'Conidi Order'). The Conidi order provided for Mr Ross to file an amended notice of appeal by 13 September 2024 and written submissions by 20 September, and for VLA to file submissions by 4 October 2024.
4. In September 2024 Mr Ross contacted the Court and requested an extension of time to comply with paragraph 3 of the Conidi Order. VLA did not oppose the extension. Judicial Registrar Lorenz made timetabling orders on the papers that provided each of the parties with a one-week extension to file their written submissions for the 31 October 2024 hearing (the 'Lorenz Order').
5. Mr Ross then filed a summons in relation to the Conidi Order and a notice of appeal in relation to the Lorenz Order. I will refer to these applications as the 'Conidi Appeal' and the 'Lorenz Appeal' (intending no disrespect to those judicial officers).

Mr Ross's submissions in the Irving Appeal and his additional applications

1. Mr Ross's amended notice of appeal in the Irving Appeal sought the following orders:

• Stay of orders of Judge Irving made on 25/06/2024.

• Order that this proceeding be discontinued.

• Order for the 'bundling' of multiple summons applications to be unlawful and proper and reasonable decision making to occur to 'triage' and 'order' these summons applications appropriately.
• Order that it is unlawful for a vexatious litigation order be sought in this proceeding.
• Order for stay to be granted for me to pursue a Notice of a Constitution Matter application pursuant to s78B in order for me to obtain Constitutional relief.
• Order for leave to be granted for me to sue to obtain legal representation ....

1. In his written submissions Mr Ross sought additional orders:

(a) an order that 'a mental health assessment be performed' as to whether he had capacity and, if he was found not to have capacity, an order for a solicitor to represent him;

(b) an order that all judicial offers of the Supreme Court should be recused from the proceeding due to actual bias; and

(c) an order that the proceeding be transferred to another court (the 'Transfer Application').

1. Mr Ross made the following submissions before Quigley J in relation to the Irving Appeal.[4]

(a) First, Mr Ross claimed that Irving AsJ erred in 'bundling' a series of summonses together, which he argued was based on a belief by Irving AsJ that Mr Ross's claim had 'zero prospect of success'.

(b) Secondly, Mr Ross claimed he was mentally incapacitated and not competent to run the proceedings on his own behalf. Further, he contended that VLA's application for an extended litigation restraint order would have a serious effect on his opportunity to represent himself in various legal proceedings that he has instituted. He said the Court should intervene by directing legal assistance to him.

(c) Thirdly, Mr Ross complained he had been unable to obtain a particular court file, which he claimed would assist him to demonstrate that legal assistance was available to litigants with his type of claim. He claimed that this particular court file would have assisted him to properly plead his earlier case and/or successfully appeal it to the Court of Appeal.

(d) Fourthly, Mr Ross complained that the numerous notices of a constitutional matter he had filed had not been acted upon. He claimed this was proof of bias against him.

(e) Fifthly, Mr Ross claimed that legal service agreements entered into between government (and supposedly VLA) to provide legal services by a private firm were unconstitutional. He also argued that a legal services agreement he claims to have signed two years ago contractually binds the Commonwealth Attorney-General and Veterans Affairs Minister to represent him in all his legal proceedings pertaining to his military service, including this proceeding.

(a) First, he applied to transfer the proceeding to another court on the basis that 'all judicial officers at the Supreme Court of Victoria' were impacted by 'actual or apprehended bias'.[5]

(b) Secondly, after oral submissions had concluded, Mr Ross sought to file further affidavit evidence on the matters he had referred to in the hearing, on the basis he had not had enough time to do so prior to the hearing.[6]

1. Mr Ross's summons challenging the Conidi Order sought 'to have heard first an interlocutory application for' three orders:

(a) an order Mr Ross undergo mental health assessment regarding his capacity to participate in the proceeding and appointing a solicitor to represent him;

(b) an order 'to recuse all Judicial Officers from Supreme Court in this proceeding'; and

(c) an order 'to cross vest this proceeding to another Court'.

1. Mr Ross's notice of appeal for the Lorenz Orders claimed the orders were 'made unlawfully, contrary to law and are an abuse of process' and that they 'are unconstitutional'. The notice of appeal also stated that Mr Ross had submitted two other interlocutory applications that he submitted ought to be determined first:

(a) an application to recuse all judicial officers of the Supreme Court, based on allegations of actual bias; and

(b) an application to obtain the court book from a different proceeding to which he was not a party, which he said was held by the Supreme Court Registry.

1. Quigley J heard the three appeals on 31 October 2024.
2. During the hearing Mr Ross agreed that the Conidi Appeal and the Lorenz Appeal related only to timetabling orders that were 'of no consequence given his primary concerns'. Mr Ross accepted that the appeal against the Irving AsJ Orders 'raised the relevant matters he wished to ventilate'. Her Honour indicated that the appropriate course would be to dismiss the Lorenz Appeal and Conidi Appeal. In response, Mr Ross conceded that the Lorenz Appeal 'probably is vexatious'. Quigley J made orders dismissing the Conidi Appeal and the Lorenz Appeal on the day of the hearing.[7]

1. Quigley J handed down her reasons for decision on 7 November 2024. The reasons are thorough and careful. Her Honour summarised as best she could Mr Ross's submissions in an intelligible way.
2. After setting out the facts giving rise to the appeal and the parties' submissions,[8] her Honour turned to the merits of the appeal against the Irving Orders. The judge noted that Mr Ross needed to demonstrate a legal or factual error to overturn the orders.[9] Her Honour found as follows.

(a) Mr Ross's submissions regarding the 'bundling' of summonses had no substance. Dealing with inter-related summonses in one timetable is efficient and sensible, and is consistent with the overarching obligations of the Civil Procedure Act 2010.[10]

(b) Irving AsJ did not err by reason of Mr Ross lacking mental capacity to conduct the proceeding. Mr Ross had conducted himself before Quigley J 'with logic and discipline and made his submissions in an orderly manner', even if the substance of his submissions were 'misguided and without lawful foundation'. Irving AsJ had made his own observations of Mr Ross in that regard.[11]

(c) Mr Ross's primary aim in appealing the June Irving AsJ orders was to relitigate, in an interlocutory application, his primary relief; namely, to obtain legal assistance from Victoria Legal Aid. An interlocutory application for such an order had been rejected by Forbes J in January 2023.[12] There was no error in Irving AsJ 'failing to make a positive order against any other entity who might provide legal assistance'.[13]

(d) There was no error in declining to refer a constitutional matter because no intelligible constitutional question had been identified.[14]

(e) Mr Ross's claims of bias were unfounded and without merit. The negative decisions made in relation to Mr Ross's other proceedings are 'not evidence of bias in the absence of specific evidence or something more than supposition and innuendo'.[15]

1. The judge concluded that Irving As J had not erred in revoking the orders he had made in February 2024 which had stayed the proceedings and referred Mr Ross to VCAT for a guardianship assessment. Mr Ross had since made multiple applications in contravention of the stay order and the 12 month delay had made it impossible to move the proceeding forward.[16]
2. The judge also refused the Transfer Application, noting Mr Ross's 'claims of bias, malfeasance and unlawful conspiracy between the judiciary and the registry staff [...] are unfounded, speculative and scandalous'. In any event, there was no justification to transfer the proceedings to another jurisdiction. The Court had jurisdiction to hear the proceeding and it concerned entities connected with Victoria.[17]
3. Finally, the judge refused the application to file new material on the basis Mr Ross 'had already had a significant amount of time to marshal his material' and that the material 'was not new or different to the submissions he had made'. Filing additional material would have had 'questionable utility'.[18]
4. On 7 November 2024 her Honour made final orders dismissing the three appeals, refusing the application to file further material and refusing the Transfer Application.[19]

The application for leave to appeal to this Court

1. Mr Ross's proposed grounds of appeal were lengthy and not always easy to follow. Assessing his material as best I can, I have treated his application as comprising six distinct grounds.

1. By proposed ground 1, Mr Ross contends that the judge's decision to refuse an adjournment in order for Mr Ross to file further material after the 31 October 2024 hearing was 'so unreasonable that no Judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria would make this decision'. Mr Ross cited the case of '[EH] v Commonwealth' in support of this. He contended that he needed to file a 'substantial' volume of material regarding two prior proceedings dating back to 2015, and said that this had not been possible on the timetable set by the Irving Order, the Conidi Order and the Lorenz Order. Mr Ross sought to 'forego' his consent to dismissing the Conidi Appeal and the Lorenz Appeal. He also argued that the judge's decision to refuse an adjournment was vitiated by 'error of law', for broadly similar reasons.
2. I reject Mr Ross's submissions.
3. The judge's decision to refuse Mr Ross's application to file further material in respect of the Irving AsJ Appeal (following the hearing) was a discretionary decision on a matter of practice and procedure. The standard of appellate review in House v The King applies to this Court's review of that decision, meaning Mr Ross must identify an error in the judge's exercise of discretion.[20]
4. The judge did not err in refusing Mr Ross's request to file further materials. Mr Ross did not explain how filing further material concerning two proceedings dating back to 2015 could possibly have had a bearing on his prospects in the Irving Appeal. In relation to the material now said to have been obtained after the 31 October 2024 hearing, Mr Ross has not explained what this material is or how it could be relevant.
5. Even if Mr Ross did have relevant material to file, I reject the submission that he had not had sufficient time to gather this material during the period prior to the hearing. More than 10 weeks had elapsed between Mr Ross making his initial application to appeal the Irving Order (on 9 July 2024) and the date for filing submissions set by the Conidi Order (13 September 2024). The Lorenz Order granted an extension of 7 days to this timetable, by consent. If Mr Ross wished to file material that has been available since 2015 he should have identified that material earlier than the day of the hearing.
6. It was plainly open for the judge to dismiss Mr Ross's application to file further material on the basis that this material would have questionable utility and on the basis that Mr Ross had already had enough time to file that material. That decision was consistent with the overarching purpose of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 in promoting a just, efficient, timely and cost effective resolution of the real issues in dispute.[21] There is no discernible error of law in the judge's decision. To the contrary, I consider that her Honour's decision was correct.
7. By proposed ground 1 Mr Ross also sought to set aside the judge's order dismissing the Conidi Appeal and the Lorenz Appeal.[22] Mr Ross did not advance any rational basis to seek different orders. In particular, none of his submissions engaged with the fact that the Conidi Order and the Lorenz Order were unremarkable timetabling orders, which programmed to hearing an appeal that Mr Ross himself had filed.
8. Mr Ross did not suggest that he had been prejudiced by the timetable. Indeed, the Lorenz Order was to Mr Ross's advantage because it allowed him additional time to file his written submissions. He had sought that order and it was made by consent. He admitted that the Lorenz Appeal 'probably is vexatious'.[23]
9. It was plainly open to the judge to dismiss the Conidi Appeal and Lorenz Appeal (by consent or otherwise) and affirm the original orders. Again, I consider her Honour's decision in this regard to have been correct.
10. Proposed ground 1 thus has no prospects of success.

1. By proposed ground 2 Mr Ross contended that the judge should have dismissed Supreme Court Proceeding S ECI 2022 05425, a separate personal injury proceeding that Mr Ross has brought, which he said was related to the present proceeding. He argued the other proceeding was unlawfully filed and sealed. He said that 'Further information pertaining to this become available after this hearing date' [sic]. Mr Ross contended that a decision not to dismiss the other proceeding amounted to an 'error of law' and was 'unconstitutional'. The consequence of this failure, he said, was that it was an error of law that any interlocutory application in the judicial review proceeding occurred.
2. It is not at all clear that Mr Ross raised the dismissal of proceeding S ECI 2022 05425 with the judge.[24] But, even assuming that he did so, Quigley J did not err in failing to dismiss that proceeding, given that it was a separate proceeding with a separate respondent. If Mr Ross considers that he has commenced a proceeding that has been unlawfully filed, he can withdraw that proceeding. It is not appropriate for this Court to consider on the appeal whether proceeding S ECI 2022 05425 is 'a lawful proceeding'.
3. In any case, Mr Ross has not explained how proceeding S ECI 2022 05425 was 'unlawfully filed an sealed', or why its 'unlawfulness' meant that it was unconstitutional for the interlocutory applications in the judicial review proceeding to occur.
4. Proposed ground 2 thus has no prospects of success.

1. By proposed ground 3 Mr Ross contended that the judge erred in failing to 'adhere to her Judicial Officer duty to comply with the requirements of the Judiciary Act 1903' in relation to a notice of constitutional matter that Mr Ross had filed in the proceeding below. That, he contended, required the proceeding to be stayed. Mr Ross said that the constitutional matter relates to his right to obtain legal services in connection with his military service. He made the same complaint in relation to the judge's decision not to 'have heard' two other proceedings which he says are related to the present proceeding.[25]
2. Mr Ross's submissions on ground 3 were directed to section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). That provision requires a court not to proceed with a cause that 'involves a matter arising under the Constitution' until a reasonable time after notice of the cause has been given to the Attorneys-General of the States and the Commonwealth.[26] A court may grant an adjournment for such time as it thinks fit for this purpose.[27]
3. Mr Ross, in written submissions below, said he had identified numerous constitutional matters[28] relating to his 'right' to legal representation, his being 'excluded from' the 'Plaintiff legal industry', VLA's application for summary judgment, his treatment as a self-represented litigant and VLA's application for a vexatious litigant restraint. In further written submissions dated 9 October 2024 Mr Ross submitted there was 'real actual bias that is exists in matters of me before this Court' [sic], which prevents him from enjoying his 'constitutional and human rights' to a 'fair trial'.
4. In written submissions dated 20 September 2024 Mr Ross also alleged that Supreme Court judicial officers and staff had violated the constitution in relation to his mental health assessment and access to court files. He also made allegations of 'collusion' between the Court and a private law firm. Mr Ross did not provide evidence to substantiate the allegations other than his written submissions in the court below.
5. The judge was correct to find that Mr Ross had not identified 'an intelligible constitutional question' in his submissions.[29] The Constitution confers no right of the kind claimed by Mr Ross. To the extent that Mr Ross's claims of bias might be said to raise a constitutional matter, Mr Ross did not articulate a basis for those claims.
6. Mr Ross's submissions in his application for leave to appeal broadly reflected the concerns he raised below. None of these submissions raised a constitutional 'matter' for determination.
7. Proposed ground 3 thus has no prospects of success.

1. By proposed ground 4, Mr Ross contended that the judge erred in refusing his Transfer Application.[30] He contended that it was 'not possible' for the judge to have made this decision on the material before her. He said that he would need to provide a 'substantial' volume of material, which was not achievable on the timeline set by the Irving Order, the Lorenz Order and the Conidi Order. Mr Ross said that he had obtained 'more material' since the hearing, which he provided to the registry on 31 October 2024.
2. The judge treated Mr Ross's transfer application as an application under cross-vesting legislation,[31] namely the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987. In summary, s 5 of that Act allows the Supreme Court to transfer a proceeding to the Federal Court, or to the Supreme Court of another State or Territory. Whether to make such an order turns on whether it appears to the Supreme Court that it is more appropriate that the proceeding be determined by another court.
3. The judge did not err in refusing the Transfer Application. The originating process for Mr Ross's proceeding is an application for judicial review regarding a decision of a Victorian entity (VLA) under a Victorian Act, namely the Legal Aid Act 1978. That is properly a matter within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Victoria.[32] There is no apparent connection with any other Court or any other proceeding in another Court. In so far as Mr Ross relied on complaints of bias as the basis for this application, those complaints were, as the judge said, 'unfounded, speculative and scandalous'.[33] The judge was thus correct not to transfer the proceeding to another court.
4. In so far as Mr Ross now says the judge lacked all the material relevant to the transfer issue, Mr Ross has not explained what that material is, or how further material might have assisted him. It was plainly open for the judge to decide not to transfer the proceeding on the material before her.
5. Proposed ground 4 thus has no prospects of success.

1. By proposed ground 5, Mr Ross contended that it was a violation of his human rights for the judge to hear the Irving Appeal, the Conidi Appeal and the Lorenz Appeal, including because the judge had 'an actual bias in proceedings pertaining to' him. Mr Ross said that this was because the judge has previously determined six applications he had made to review decisions of the Prothonotary not to accept documents for filing. He argued that the judge's decision was 'not a fresh exercise of power'.
2. It is a serious matter to accuse a judicial officer of bias, although unfortunately it is becoming all too common in proceedings brought by litigants in person. An allegation of actual bias must be clearly proved, and such a finding will not be made lightly. Cogent evidence is required.[34] In the present case, Mr Ross's contention was entirely unfounded and ought never to have been made.
3. Mr Ross's complaint of actual bias was based on the fact that Quigley J had made decision in six other applications made by Mr Ross relating various decisions by the Prothonotary not to accept documents for filing. Mr Ross stated that Quigley J 'would have known that she had no jurisdiction or legal authority to review a decision of the Prothonotary' and that, as a consequence, she was a person against whom he had a 'lawful civil law legal proceeding'. He stated that this was made known to Quigley J on 31 October 2024 and that she was then 'required to excuse herself' from the proceeding.
4. Mr Ross has provided no details of the six other applications he says Quigley J has previously heard, explained how those applications related to the present proceedings, or how explained how the judge's decisions in those applications could demonstrate that her Honour was affected by actual bias. More broadly, having examined the material relied on by Mr Ross in this application, there is simply no basis upon which this Court might conclude that there was any actual bias on the part of the judge. Mr Ross's assertions of bias are simply without foundation.
5. Proposed ground 5 thus has no prospects of success.

1. By proposed ground 6, Mr Ross contended that it was unlawful for the 'Judicial Review and Appeals List' not to list his application to obtain the other court book that he sought, from a different proceeding. He said that he requires this court book to use as supporting evidence for the 'civil law tort violations and wrongs' allegedly committed against him by judicial, registry and other officers of the Court.
2. Ground 6 is directed not to the judge's decision, but to the fact that the 'JRAL list'[35] did not list Mr Ross's application to obtain the court book for the proceeding he identified. Any such application does not appear to have been made as part of this proceeding or in relation to the three appeals heard by the judge below. Thus this ground provides no basis for an appeal against Quigley J's decision.
3. Proposed ground 6 thus has no prospects of success.

1. In his application for leave to appeal, Mr Ross stated:

I plead that I seek to make an application after judgement to provide further supporting material.

1. In so far as this might be an application to file further material in support of the application for leave to appeal. Mr Ross did not state what material he wished to adduce, or why. I will refuse this application.
2. In addition, by an application other than for leave to appeal or cross appeal, Mr Ross sought the following orders:

(a) an order 'that can file in this proceeding a Form 19A - Notice of A Constitution Matter which I filed on 16/07/2025'; and

(b) orders that various named entities represent him in the proceeding on a 'no win, no fee' basis.

1. The grounds of this ancillary application were as follows:

For Order 1: The legal need for me to submit a Form 19A in this proceeding.

For Order 2-7, inclusive: The legal need for me to obtain this relief on the legal grounds of equitable relief, pursuant to the legal basis that forms the basis of a Writ of Injunction. Much further information justifying this ground can only be provided at a later date.

1. Mr Ross did not file an affidavit in support of his ancillary application.
2. In so far as Mr Ross sought an order permitting him to file a Form 19A (ie a notice of a constitutional matter), I note that he had sought to file such a notice, but the Registrar had refused to accept the notice for filing. This aspect of his ancillary application can therefore be understood as a request for a judge to direct the Registrar to accept the document for filing under r 64.43(5) of the Rules.
3. In light of my conclusion about his application for leave to appeal, it is unnecessary to determine this aspect of his other application. However, for completeness I note that Mr Ross's proposed notice of a constitutional matter did not raise any intelligible constitutional issues. I thus would not have directed the Registrar to accept it for filing.
4. In so far as Mr Ross sought orders that named entities provide him with representation on a 'no win, no fee basis', the application is plainly hopeless and must be dismissed.

1. For the foregoing reasons, Mr Ross's application for leave to appeal has no prospects of success and leave to appeal must be refused. He has not identified a single ground of appeal which could provide a basis to set aside the decision of the judge below. Nor has he provided any basis for the other orders he seeks. Likewise, his other application is hopeless.
2. Pursuant to section 14D(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 I have determined that this application for leave to appeal is totally without merit.
3. I note and endorse the statement by the primary judge that at 'almost every stage, Mr Ross seeks to review or appeal the interlocutory steps taken' in the proceeding.[36] Mr Ross's behaviour has meant that VLA's summons seeking summary judgment and the imposition of an extended litigation restraint on Mr Ross has now been delayed for around two years. Mr Ross's behaviour has resulted in the expenditure of scarce public funds by VLA on further unmeritorious litigation.[37] In my view, it is desirable for VLA's application for summary dismissal to be listed for final hearing as soon as possible, subject to the operational constraints in the Trial Division.

[1] Ross v Victoria Legal Aid [2024] VSC 684 ('Reasons').

[2] Under s 179, VCAT may determine whether a person may be in need of a guardian, a supportive guardian, an administrator, or a supportive administrator.

[3] The order also programmed outstanding summonses filed on 11 July 2023, 22 August 2023, 10 February 2024 and 9 June 2024.

[4] The submissions are summarised at Reasons, [15]-[21].

[9] Reasons, [43]. Her Honour referred to One Capital Pty Ltd v Casada Holdings Pty Ltd [2024] VSC 520, [40]-[41] (Sloss J), citing Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172, 180 [23] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); [2000] HCA 40.

[12] Reasons, [51]. Forbes J refused Mr Ross's interlocutory application for a positive injunction requiring VLA to provide him with assistance: Ross v Victorian Legal Aid [2023] VSC 15.

[13] Reasons, [50]-[51]. During the hearing on 25 June 2024 Irving AsJ found that Mr Ross had capacity to manage the proceeding. Mr Ross told Irving AsJ throughout the hearing that he required legal representation, including for the purpose of filing submissions for the hearing on the remaining summonses. Irving AsJ informed Mr Ross that he would decline to make a referral to the pro bono scheme because it would not be an appropriate application ground in the context of that hearing.

[16] Reasons, [56]. In the 25 June 2024 hearing Irving AsJ decided, having regard to the overarching obligation in the Civil Procedure Act 2010 and absent concerns regarding Mr Ross's capacity, the Court should 'list all outstanding summonses for hearing and determination'.

[19] Quigley J's order also included some timetabling orders.

[20] (1936) 55 CLR 499, 505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ).

[21] Civil Procedure Act 2010 ss 7(1), 9(1).

[24] A party to an appeal is bound by the conduct of its case at first instance and may only raise a new argument in the 'most exceptional circumstances': Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1, 7-8 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ); [1986] HCA 33; Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd [1950] HCA 35; (1950) 81 CLR 418, 438 (Latham CJ, Williams and Fullagar JJ); [1950] HCA 35.

[25] Mr Ross referred to a 'proceeding that I have filed in both the Supreme Court of Victoria and the Federal Court of Australia against' the Commonwealth Attorney-General and Minister for Veterans' Affairs.

[26] Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B(1).

[27] Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B(2)(a).

[30] See above, [13], [15].

[32] See Reasons, [61]. Mr Ross's written submissions in the court below argued that the Commonwealth Minister for Veterans Affairs was somehow implicated in Mr Ross's right to legal aid. Even if this submission had any substance, it was a peripheral issue.

[34] See, eg, South Western Sydney Area Health Services v Edmonds [2007] NSWCA 16, [97] (Giles, Tobias and McColl JJA). The settled principles concerning bias applications are summarised in Davies v The Queen [2019] VSCA 66, [523] (Kaye, McLeish and T Forrest JJA).

[35] I infer that this is a reference to the Judicial Review and Appeals List in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court.

[37] The present proceeding is one of (at least) two applications for judicial review Mr Ross has made in relation to Victoria Legal Aid's decisions to refuse his requests for legal assistance. Another application was unsuccessful (Ross v Victoria Legal Aid [2022] VSC 473 (Keogh J)) and an appeal to this Court was refused: Ross v Victoria Legal Aid [2025] VSCA 107 (Beach and Kennedy JJA). Their Honours determined that there was 'no merit in Mr Ross's proposed appeal'.