1. At the commencement of his oral submissions, Mr Ross made multiple applications for an adjournment of the hearing of his application for an extension of time. The reasons given for needing an adjournment included Mr Ross's own mental health, a serious diagnosis that had recently been made in respect of Mr Ross's father, the need for Mr Ross to give a very complex notice of a constitutional matter or matters, the need for Mr Ross to continue investigating matters, and the possibility of Mr Ross producing a solicitor or solicitors who he alleged had previously provided him with advice and/or acted for him. Mr Ross did not produce any material in support of any of his adjournment applications, and there was no basis for any adjournment of the matter.
2. Upon each adjournment application being refused, Mr Ross made an oral application for leave to appeal that refusal, coupled with another adjournment application for the purposes of prosecuting an appeal from this Court's refusal of the adjournment application. We refused these applications as well on the grounds that there was no basis for any of them.
3. Following the refusal of his adjournment applications, Mr Ross commenced to make submissions along the lines of those made in the written material he had already filed in this Court. Essentially, his point was that, having regard to the complaints he has made, he (Mr Ross) would succeed in overturning the orders made by the judge 'on the basis of reasonability'.

1. Determining whether an applicant, whose application for leave to appeal to this Court is filed out of time, should be given an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal involves a consideration of the merits of the proposed appeal, the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay and the extent of any prejudice suffered by the respondent if an extension of time were to be granted.[35] We turn first to the merits of the proposed appeal.
2. In Daher,[36] after a comprehensive analysis of the authorities concerning the meaning of the expression 'special circumstances' in r 56.02(3), Derham AsJ summarised the relevant principles as follows:

(a) The rule requires the Court to be objectively satisfied that special circumstances exist;

(b) The existence of special circumstances is to be determined by reference to all the circumstances of a case;

(c) The factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion under Rule 56.03(2) include, but are not limited to:

(i) the period of the delay;

(ii) the reason for the delay;

(iii) whether the plaintiff has an arguable case;

(iv) the justice to both parties, including the prejudice to the parties; and

(v) the public interest in the finality of litigation.[37]

1. We gratefully adopt that summary, as well as his Honour's observation that the expression 'except in special circumstances' is 'discouraging rather than encouraging' because of 'its negative expression'.[38]
2. Mr Ross's application for an extension of time was made after a delay of some five years and eight months. The judge did not accept that the reasons given by Mr Ross for this delay were sufficient to establish special circumstances when one considered all of the circumstances of the case, including the merits of the proposed judicial review proceeding.
3. Having examined the voluminous amount of material filed in this application, we are unable to see any basis upon which this Court might conclude that, at any stage of the proceedings below, there was any ostensible or actual bias on the part of the judge. Mr Ross's assertions of bias are simply without foundation.
4. The same may be said in relation to Mr Ross's assertions of prejudice, procedural irregularities, and complaints that the judge disregarded matters of a constitutional nature and/or civil law procedures. Moreover, and contrary to Mr Ross's submissions, there is nothing in the material that suggests that the judge failed to look at or take into account relevant material in the conduct or determination of the judicial review proceeding.
5. An appeal to this Court is an appeal by way of rehearing. In an appeal by way of rehearing, this Court is bound to conduct a 'real review' of the evidence given at first instance and of the judge's reasons for judgment to determine whether the judge has erred in fact or law.[39] Notwithstanding the confused nature of the voluminous assertions made by Mr Ross in the material he has filed in this Court, we have reviewed all of that material and are unable to conclude that there is any arguable basis upon which this Court could find that the judge erred either in fact or law.
6. The delay in commencing the judicial review proceeding was, in the circumstances, extraordinary. Notwithstanding the multiple explanations given by Mr Ross for this delay, the delay was not well explained. On a proper analysis of the material, there was little reason why the judicial review proceeding could not have been commenced in 2016 - and even less reason why it could not have been commenced in 2018 after the VLA provided Mr Ross with the material it provided at that time.
7. When one couples the extraordinary (and largely unexplained) delay with the merits of the proposed judicial review proceeding, which were thin at best (if not non-existent), there was no realistic basis upon which a court could have concluded that special circumstances existed as required by r 56.02(3). In our view, the judge was plainly correct when he refused Mr Ross' application for an extension of time within which to commence the judicial review proceeding.
8. Mr Ross's proposed appeal to this Court having no prospects of success, it would be futile to grant him the extension of time he seeks within which to file his application for leave to appeal. In the circumstances, it is not necessary for us to consider the reasons given by him for his delay in this Court. For completeness, however, we would say that this delay (like the delay in the Trial Division) was not well explained. Medical reports relating to Mr Ross during the period 2017 to 2019 say little about his ability to file an application for leave to appeal to this Court at any time between September 2022 and September 2023. The other 'reasons' given by Mr Ross for his delay in this Court were not reasons which in any way explained that delay in any relevant sense.

1. There being no merit in Mr Ross's proposed appeal, his application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal must be refused.[40]

[1] Ross v Victoria Legal Aid Office [2022] VSC 473 ('Reasons').

[20] Including Garrett v Legal Services Commissioner [2015] VSC 465, [23] (Derham AsJ); and Daher v Bell [2020] VSC 346, [23] (Derham AsJ) ('Daher').

[32] S CI 2017 02005 is the Court file number of the Commonwealth proceeding.

[33] Rule 64.05 provides that an application for leave to appeal shall be filed within 42 days after the decision to which the application relates.

[34] See r 64.04(c)(i) and Sunshine Loans Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2025] FCAFC 34, [130]-[135] (Perram, Bromwich and Colvin JJ).

[35] See Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516, 521 (Brennan CJ and McHugh J); Trkulja v Dobrijevic [2015] VSCA 281, [27]; Beling v Victorian Legal Services Commissioner [2024] VSCA 49, [14].

[36] [2020] VSC 346.

[39] Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129, 148 [55] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Edelman JJ).

[40] Mr Ross also sought to file an Application other than for leave to appeal on 25 January 2024 which sought a range of orders as to the future conduct of his application, including that it be adjourned and/or stayed. Given that we have refused the applications for an adjournment as well as the application for an extension of time, it is unnecessary to consider this application.