Ross v Stewart [2025] FCA 1328

1. On 5 April 2024 the applicant sought to file various documents in the Court, by which the applicant sought to initiate an appeal from the orders of Goodman J in Ross v Attorney-General (Cth) [2024] FCA 180 (Ross v Attorney-General). Ross v Attorney-General itself involved an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from orders of the primary judge who had dismissed the underlying proceeding. Goodman J refused this application.
2. On 30 July 2024 a Registrar of the Court wrote to the applicant refusing to accept the documents for filing on the basis that the sought-after appeal was "doomed to fail", and as such, acceptance of the documents would constitute an abuse of process pursuant to r 2.26 of the Rules. By that correspondence the Registrar informed the applicant that, by rejecting the initial application for filing in Ross v Attorney General, Goodman J had exercised the appellate jurisdiction of the Court under s 25(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act). The Registrar also informed the applicant that no appeal lay to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court from a decision that itself exercised the appellate jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to s 24(1) of the FCA Act.
3. The originating application which is presently before the Court seeks judicial review of the Registrar's 30 July 2024 decision.
4. On 2 April 2025, the applicant sought to file an interlocutory application dated 2 April 2025, an affidavit of supporting material dated 24 April 2025, and a copy of the orders made on 28 March 2025. The interlocutory application dated 2 April 2025 sought, amongst other things, a stay or adjournment of the orders made on 28 March 2025, and a stay of the originating application.
5. On 8 May 2025, another Registrar of the Court wrote to the applicant refusing to accept for filing the documents which the applicant had sought to file on 2 April 2025. This refusal was on the basis that the application would be an abuse of the Court's process, and that it was, in part, groundlessly scandalous, and therefore frivolous, and, or alternatively, vexatious.
6. The applicant then filed the interlocutory application dated 8 May 2025 which is presently before the Court seeking judicial review of the second Registrar's decision, a stay of the underlying proceeding, and leave to file a further interlocutory application with supporting material.

1. The applicant's s 78B notice alleges two "elements" as the basis of the asserted constitutional matter. The elements are as follows (as written):

Element One:

1. That the Attorney Generals of the States and Territories of Australia and the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Australia is acting in violation of his duties as an Executive Officer pertaining to:

• Legal Aid
• The area of law of: 'civil law', and in particular, of personal injury and employment law.

Element Two:

1. That the Judiciary of the States and Territories of the Australia and the Commonwealth of Australia are unlawfully and unconstitutionally allowing this above stated matter to occur in violation of its lawful and constitutional legal duty.

1. The s 78B notice proceeds to make certain claims in support of the applicant's argument that the matter is one to which s 78B of the Judiciary Act applies. These claims defy easy summary and it is simplest to set them out in full as follows (as written):

Element One:

1. That a case in an area of law of 'civil law', and in particular, one that is personal injury and employment law-related, that would, and could, only be lawfully and constitutionally be legally represented in a lawful independent western nations legal system on a 'probono' basis or as a class action is being represented in Victoria and Australia on a 'No Win No Fee' basis due to the actions of the Attorney Generals of the States and Territories of Australia and the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Australia and the various entities that these Public Officials have executive power over.

2. That the pro-bono based legal system is being replaced with a 'No Win No Fee' legal system.

3. That the legal aid funded legal system is being replaced with a 'No Win No Fee' legal system.

4. That 'No Win No Fee' legal services contracts are actually legal aid funded contracts, whereby:

   1. the law firm or solicitor providing such a legal service contract is, in essence, performing a Government task and function, while being a private solicitor or law firm who has no legal association or relationship to a State or Territory of Australia or the Commonwealth of Australia,
   2. the financial merit assessment required by, and from, State and Territory and Commonwealth of Australia legal aid bodies is not required, nor being performed,
   3. the law firm or solicitor providing such a legal service contract does so without telling the client that this contract is funded by legal aid,
   4. the law firm or solicitor providing such as legal services contract does not incur a, or any, losses if the case losses,
   5. the law firm or solicitor providing such a legal service contract is being paid in total for this legal service contract by a third party, who is not the client, and who is a State or Territory of Australia or the Commonwealth of Australia, or an entity thereof,
   6. only a minor portion of law firms and solicitors in Victoria and Australia provide such legal services contracts, whereby:
      1. these law firms and solicitors monopolize this segment of the legal industry, and these legal service contracts,
      2. these law firms and solicitors award these contracts only to those who come to them via a third-party, who in most cases, is a State or Territories of Australia or the Commonwealth of Australia, or an entity thereof; namely, through an employee association or union; or another entity that has a strong association with the States and Territories of Australia or the Commonwealth of Australia.

5. That 'merit assessment' legal services contracts are actually legal aid funded contracts, whereby:

   1. the law firm or solicitor providing such a legal service contract is, in essence, performing a Government task and function, while being a private solicitor who has no legal association or relationship to a State or Territory of Australia or the Commonwealth of Australia,
   2. the law firm or solicitor providing such a legal service contract does so without telling the client that this contract is funded by legal aid,
   3. the law firm or solicitor providing such as legal services contract does not incur a, or any, losses if the merit assessment losses or is deemed 'failed' or 'negative merit assessment',
   4. the law firm or solicitor providing such a legal service contract is being paid in total for this legal service contract by a third party, who is not the client, and who is a State or Territory of Australia or the Commonwealth of Australia, or an entity thereof,
   5. only a minor portion of law firms and solicitors in Victoria and Australia provide such legal services contracts, whereby:
      1. these law firms and solicitors monopolize this segment of the legal industry,
      2. these law firms and solicitors award these contracts only to those who come to them via a third-party, who in most cases, is a State or Territories of Australia or the Commonwealth of Australia, or an entity thereof; namely, through an employee association or union; or another entity that has a strong association with the States and Territories of Australia or the Commonwealth of Australia.
   6. That State and Territory's of Australia Legal Aid bodies and the Commonwealth of Australia Legal Aid bodies declare that legal aid for civil law matter is solely available for 'Public Interest' matters without declaring, or providing any transparency regarding, what is a 'public interest' matter.
   7. That the Attorney Generals of the States and Territories of Australia and the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Australia have created a non-independent legal system.

6. That the Attorney Generals of the States and Territories of Australia and the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Australia have created an unlawful and unconstitutionally legal aid system whereby citizens of Australia, and its States, are deliberately and intentionally told that 'legal aid for civil law matters does not exist' when in truth it does through a vast, elaborate and complex system of various actions and entities, including:

   1. through the provision of 'free legal aid' that is providing by various Government run and funded 'private and independent' entities, such as employee unions/associations and the Federation of Australia Community Legal Centres,
   2. through the provision of 'mental health litigation schemes' in Courts,
   3. through the provision of 'Royal Commissions', and in particular, mental health based Royal Commissions,
   4. through the provision of various charities who act as a source of legal aid and a legal referral service, whereby:

      1. these charities are most significantly, if not wholly, funded by the Commonwealth of Australia and the States and Territories of Australia,

      2. these charities have their directors and decision makers chosen by the Commonwealth of Australia and the States and Territories of Australia.

Element Two:

1. That the Judiciary in Courts in the Commonwealth of Australia and the States and Territories of Australia are knowingly allowing the Commonwealth of Australia and the States and Territories of Australia, and it's entities therein, to use the 'mental health litigation scheme' as a way to fund plaintiff legal proceedings when the required medicolegal threshold is not meet.
   1. That this is being done, in particular, when a State or Territory of Australia or the Commonwealth of Australia, or entity therein, is a party in such a proceeding.
2. That the Judiciary in Courts in the Commonwealth of Australia and the States and Territories of Australia are knowingly allowing the Commonwealth of Australia and the States and Territories of Australia, and it's entities therein, to use the 'human rights act' as a way to fund plaintiff legal proceedings when there is no legal human rights violation that is occurring that allows legal financial aid or a legal referral service and legal representation to be used.
   1. That this is being done, in particular, when a State or Territory of Australia or the Commonwealth of Australia, or entity therein, is a party in such a proceeding.
3. That the existence of Judiciary members on Legal Aid Commissions in States and Territories in Australia has unlawfully and unconstitutionally led to 'the Judiciary approval' of actions of Legal Aid Commissions and Legal Aid bodies, such as:
   1. Merit assessment legal service contracts,
   2. No Win No Fee legal service contracts,
   3. 'Fixed Fee' legal service contracts,
   4. The practice of needing a referral by a third-party in order to obtain both legal aid and legal representation.
   5. The secrecy and fraudulent conduct regarding the existence and use of legal aid for civil law matters in Australia and its State and Territories.

1. The amicus is correct to submit that the trigger to provide a s 78B notice rises beyond the simple invocation of the Constitution itself: see Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1151; (1999) 95 FCR 292 at [13]- [14] (French J).
2. I accept the submissions of the amicus that the two "elements" articulated in the applicant's

s 78B notice are unsubstantiated, and that neither shows a constitutional matter arising "really and substantially" on the originating application. I also accept the submission that the s 78B notice should not, in and of itself, prevent the Court from resolving the interlocutory application. In this regard I note the observations of Wheelahan J in Fokas v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas [2019] FCA 1724 at [24]:

In order for a proceeding to involve a matter arising under the Constitution or its interpretation for the purposes of s 78B(1) of the Judiciary Act, the proceeding must "really and substantially" involve the matter: Amrit Lal Narain v Parnell [1986] FCA 89; (1986) 9 FCR 479 at p 489 (Burchett J), citing Re an Application by the Public Service Association of New South Wales [1947] HCA 31; (1947) 75 CLR 430 at p 433 (Williams J). Section 78B does not impose on the court a duty not to proceed pending the issue of a notice no matter how trivial, unarguable or concluded the constitutional point may be. If the asserted constitutional point is frivolous or vexatious or raised as an abuse of process it will not attach, to the matter in which it is raised, the character of a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1151; (1999) 95 FCR 292 at [13]-[14] (French J).

1. I am satisfied that no matter involving the Constitution or its interpretation really and substantially arises in this proceeding. The s 78B notice filed by the applicant makes various unsubstantiated allegations that do not support the existence of a constitutional matter in the sense contemplated by s 78B of the Judiciary Act. Accordingly, s 78B(1) of the Judiciary Act is not engaged, and it is unnecessary for the Court to concern itself with whether notice of a constitutional matter has been given to the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth and the States.

1. As has been mentioned, the applicant has not articulated the grounds upon which judicial review of the Registrar's decision of 8 May 2025 is sought. There has also been no attempt to substantiate the basis for the granting of a stay in this proceeding.
2. The affidavit the applicant filed on 5 June 2025 annexes a copy of an originating application for judicial review dated 28 May 2025. This originating application appears to be directed to the Registrar's decision of 8 May 2025. In this document the applicant advances a single ground of judicial review pursuant to the ADJR Act, although the section of the ADJR Act upon which he relies is not specified. The ground of review is said to be an "error of law" and is expressed in the following terms (as written):

GROUND 1: Error of law

1. I plead that this decision of the RESPONDENT is an error of law and one that is malicious and intentional.
2. I plead that this is a lawfully completed and filed interlocutory application and there is, and was, no reason for the RESPONDENT to refuse this for filing.
3. I plead that the RESPONDENT is intentionally not adhering to, and fulfilling, his legal, constitutional and statutory duties as the National Judicial Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia.
4. I plead that the RESPONDENT is unlawfully and unconstitutionally 'treating me as a vexatious litigant' when I am not.
5. I plead that the RESPONDENT is being directed by another party to intentionally and maliciously refused any, and all, documents that I file, up to this point in time, and to 'treat me as a vexatious litigant' now.

1. The amicus submits, and I accept, that the claims made by the applicant in ground one have not been substantiated. The applicant has failed to adduce evidence, or refer to any authority, in support of the error of law alleged. As the amicus submits, paragraphs 1, 3 and 5 of ground one are serious and significant, raising questions as to the legality and propriety of the Registrar's 8 May 2025 decision. I accept the submission of the amicus that, in the absence of any substantiating or supporting material, the applicant's allegations should not be considered by the Court.
2. As to the applicant's claim in paragraph 2 that there was "no reason" for the Registrar to refuse the documents for filing, I do not accept that this is so. In his decision the Registrar referred to Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2021] FCA 592 (White J) and Prior v South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation [2020] FCA 808 (McKerracher J), to contextualise and explain the meaning of the terms "vexatious" and "frivolous". The Registrar referred also to Re Young [2020] HCA 13; 376 ALR 567 (Gagaler J) in considering the term "abuse of process". I accept the submissions of the amicus that the Registrar's decision undertakes a proper analysis of the documents which the applicant sought to file in the context of these authorities, before ultimately deciding that the documents should not be permitted to be filed. I accept that while it is open for the applicant to challenge the process by which the Registrar arrived at his decision, the applicant's affidavit of 5 June 2025 fails to go beyond the mere assertion of error and does not articulate where the decision making process allegedly fell into error.
3. I also accept the submission of the amicus that no foundation has been provided by the applicant to support paragraph 4 of ground one. As the amicus submits, it has been repeatedly accepted by the Court that r 2.26 of the Rules permits the refusal of documents for filing on the basis that those documents are an abuse of process, frivolous, or vexatious. There is no authority which suggests that r 2.26 of the Rules lacks a constitutional foundation, and no such claim has been substantiated by the applicant. A mere reference to "unconstitutionality" is not sufficient to trigger review without further substantiation.
4. No error of law on the part of the Registrar has been disclosed, and the first of the orders sought by the applicant in the interlocutory application dated 8 May 2025 should be refused. Orders 2 and 3 of the orders sought in the interlocutory application fall away in these circumstances. There is no basis for a stay or an adjournment of the proceeding to enable a review of the 8 May 2025 decision of the Registrar.

1. In the originating application dated 12 September 2024 the applicant advances three grounds of review in respect of the Registrar's 30 July 2024 decision. Once again they defy easy summary and notwithstanding their length it is simplest to set them out in full (as written):

GROUND 1:

1. 5(1)(e) that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made;

(g) an exercise of a power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power;

• I believe that I have corrected submitted an appeal application of VID888/2023 with the correct forms, with the correct Court, with the correct pleadings, and material included in these appeal application documents to justify and substantiate the reasons for this appeal application.
• I believe that this decision by the Respondent is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power.
• This is because:
• A gross miscarriage of justice has occurred in both VID 555/2022 and VID 888/2023 where proper Court procedures have not been followed and my lawful rights have been violated. In particular:
  • Multiple Form 18 - Notice of a Constitutional Matter applications that I have lawfully submitted in both of these applications have not be heard and I have not been able to appeal them as interlocutory application appeals.
  • Multiple other interlocutory applications that I have lawfully submitted in both of these applications have not be heard and I have not been able to appeal them as interlocutory application appeals.
  • The presiding Judges in both of these cases, and in particular, VID 555/2022, determined that there is no grounds to succeed in a Judicial Review application of a Non-Statutory decision of a Commonwealth Executive Officer, and so hastily ruled in favor of a summary dismissal application.
• This is an error of law, as the original decision by the Commonwealth Financial Legal Aid Office specifically states I can appeal to the Federal Court of Australia pursuant to JUDICIARY ACT 1903 - SECT 39B. This is stated in point 42 of the original decision letter provided by the Commonwealth Financial Legal Aid Office.
• I have since found out that Commonwealth Legal Aid provides 'preliminary legal aid' for all ADF military service members and veterans, of which I am one, for the exact civil law proceeding that this original application relates to; this being:
  • Redress from abuse in the Defence Force.
• This information was provided to my via email on 15 May 2024 by the Defence and Veterans Legal Service.
• From this information I believe I have an equal Constitutional right to obtain this 'preliminary legal aid' from the Commonwealth Legal Aid Office, which is the defendant in the proceedings VID 555/2022 and VID 888/2023.
  • As such, I submit that I have a lawful claim for a Writ of Mandamus and Writ of Injunction to be ordered through this proceeding for 'preliminary legal aid' to be provided to me for my civil law proceeding that underpins this legal aid application, which is my:
  • Redress from abuse in the Defence Force, civil law proceeding.
  • Further, if the Commonwealth Legal Aid Office refuses to provide such relief to me - 'preliminary legal aid', I submit I have a lawful claim for a Writ of Injunction and Writ of Prohibition to be ordered through this proceeding for no 'preliminary legal aid' to be provided to any military service member or veteran for their civil law proceeding for:
  • Redress from abuse in the Defence Force.

• I am a defenseless mentally impaired military service veteran who is a self-represented litigant because, primarily, the RSL Victoria decided to prohibit me from using its RSL Victoria Legal Service, which I now submit, was a decision that was made 'upon orders' from the Commonwealth Department of Defence and/or another Commonwealth Executive Minister/Ministry.
• I have not, perhaps for the first time in this country's history, obtained the support of my union or employee association (the RSL Victoria, Commonwealth Veterans Affairs Minister, other veterans associations) for a legal proceeding against the entity that this union or employee association belongs to (Commonwealth Department of Defence, Commonwealth of Australia), whereby:

• I belong to a union or employee association and as such my employment law legal rights in this country rely on me obtaining the support of my union or employee association in order to obtain the services of a solicitor or law firm by way of that union or employee association's Legal Service role and function, in order for that solicitor or law firm to conduct a merits assessment that is paid for through Commonwealth Legal Aid and then, upon a positive merit assessment, for that solicitor and law firm to represent me in this legal proceeding.

• I believe my actions in submitting this appeal application of VID 888/2023 is reasonable and lawful and constitutional and I have a legal right to have the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia hear this appeal application that I have submitted.
• In not filing and sealing this appeal application the Respondent is failing to take into account reasonability, and in particular, the circumstances that pertain to:

• Who I am:

  • A mentally impaired military service veteran who is a self-represented litigant.
  • A plaintiff that has at all stages of this proceeding - in VID 555/2022 and VID 888/2023 identified the need, and then correctly and lawfully, submitted the application for, Constitutional relief by way of a Form 18 - Notice of a Constitutional application.

• What the underlying application that pertains to this decision relates to:

  • A decision by the Commonwealth Legal Aid Office, which I have now identified, is a decision that is in contrast/opposite to the same decision that this Commonwealth Legal Aid Office has given to hundreds, if not thousands, of military service members and veterans, who have not submitted their legal aid applications themselves, but have had their applications submitted for them by a solicitor that has been provided to them from a veterans organisation Legal Service or directly from the Commonwealth Veterans Affairs Minister.

• The merits of this decision and the underlying proceeding that this appeal application pertains to:

  • I submit I have real and reasonable prospects of success to obtain:
  • First, 'preliminary legal aid' from the Commonwealth Legal Aid Office, and then
  • Secondly, 'further grants of Commonwealth Legal aid' from the Commonwealth Legal Aid Office.

• The legal basis of this submission pertain to my Constitution law rights as a military service member/veteran.

  (j) any other exercise of a power in a way that constitutes abuse of the power.

• I believe both judges in VID 555/2022 and VID 888/2023 acted in a way that constituted an abuse of power by failing to adhere to their judicial obligations to hear my interlocutory applications and in particular my form 18 - Notice of a Constitution Matter application.

• I believe that both judges decisions in VID 555/2022 and VID 888/2023 to 'bundle a mass number of interlocutory applications together' was an abuse of power and unconstitutional and done solely because I am a defenseless self-represented litigant.

• I believe the decision of the Respondent to this application is similarly acting in a way that constitutes an exercise of a power in a way that constitutes abuse of the power by failing to adhere to his judicial obligations to file and seal this appeal application.

  (d) an exercise of a discretionary power in bad faith;

• I believe both judges in VID 555/2022 and VID 888/2023 acted in a way that constituted an exercise of a discretionary power in bad faith to hear my interlocutory applications and in particular my form 18 - Notice of a Constitution Matter application.

• I believe that both judges decisions in VID 555/2022 and VID 888/2023 to 'bundle a mass number of interlocutory applications together' was an exercise of a discretionary power in bad faith and unconstitutional and done solely because I am a defenseless self-represented litigant.

• I believe the decision of the Respondent to this application is similarly acting in a way that constitutes an exercise of a discretionary power in bad faith by failing to adhere to his judicial obligations to file and seal this appeal application.

  (b) failing to take a relevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power;

• I am a defenseless mentally impaired military service veteran who is a self-represented litigant because, primarily, the RSL Victoria decided to prohibit me from using its RSL Victoria Legal Service, which I now submit, was a decision that was made 'upon orders' from the Commonwealth Department of Defence and/or another Commonwealth Executive Minister/Ministry.

• I believe my actions in submitting this appeal application of VID 888/2023 is lawful and constitutional and I have a legal right to have the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia hear this appeal application that I have submitted.

• In not filing and sealing this appeal application the Respondent is failing to take into account the circumstances that pertain to:

  • Who I am:

  • A mentally impaired military service veteran who is a self-represented litigant.

  • A plaintiff that has at all stages of this proceeding - in VID 555/2022 and VID 888/2023 identified the need, and then correctly and lawfully, submitted the application for, Constitutional relief by way of a Form 18 - Notice of a Constitutional application.

  • What the underlying application that pertains to this decision relates to:

  • A decision by the Commonwealth Legal Aid Office, which I have now identified, is a decision that is in contrast/opposite to the same decision that this Commonwealth Legal Aid Office has given to hundreds, if not thousands, of military service members and veterans, who have not submitted their legal aid applications themselves, but have had their applications submitted for them by a solicitor that has been provided to them from a veterans organisation Legal Service or directly from the Commonwealth Veterans Affairs Minister.

  (f) an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case;

• I am a defenseless mentally impaired military service veteran who is a self-represented litigant because, primarily, the RSL Victoria decided to prohibit me from using its RSL Victoria Legal Service, which I now submit, was a decision that was made 'upon orders' from the Commonwealth Department of Defence and/or another Commonwealth Executive Minister/Ministry.

• I believe my actions in submitting this appeal application of VID 888/2023 is lawful and constitutional and I have a legal right to have the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia hear this appeal application that I have submitted.

• In not filing and sealing this appeal application the Respondent is failing to take into account the circumstances that pertain to:

  • Who I am:
  • A mentally impaired military service veteran who is a self-represented litigant.
  • A plaintiff that has at all stages of this proceeding - in VID 555/2022 and VID 888/2023 identified the need, and then correctly and lawfully, submitted the application for, Constitutional relief by way of a Form 18 - Notice of a Constitutional application.
  • What the underlying application that pertains to this decision relates to:
  • A decision by the Commonwealth Legal Aid Office, which I have now identified, is a decision that is in contrast/opposite to the same decision that this Commonwealth Legal Aid Office has given to hundreds, if not thousands, of military service members and veterans, who have not submitted their legal aid applications themselves, but have had their applications submitted for them by a solicitor that has been provided to them from a veterans organisation Legal Service or directly from the Commonwealth Veterans Affairs Minister.

GROUND 2:

1. The following pertains to pleadings in relation to the first stated reason provided by the Respondent in his letter to me dated 30 July 2024. This reason is:

In making the 7 March Decision his Honour was exercising as a single judge the appellate jurisdiction of the Court: see s 25(2), Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Act). No appeal lies to the appellate jurisdiction from the appellate jurisdiction of the Court: see s 24(1) of the Act

I. I plead that I have a lawful right to appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia and to make an application for the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia to hear this application. This is pursuant to:

A. FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 25(1)

1. Pertaining to this point:

1. I submit that I have a lawful right to exercise my appealant jurisdiction rights, which are provided in this legislation, to have the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia hear my appeal application of VID 888/2023.
2. I submit that I have obtain new information that give lawful basis for this appeal application to be filed, sealed, and heared in the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia.
   1. This pertains to the email I obtained from DAVLS on 15 May 2024 and from Victoria Legal Aid on 13 August 2024 that both stated that the Commonwealth Attorney General, by way of the Commonwealth Legal Aid Office, provides 'preliminary legal aid' for all Australian military service members and veterans for their:
      • Redress from abuse in the Defence Force, civil law proceeding.

B. FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 25(6)

1. Pertaining to this point:

1. I submit that I have a lawful right to exercise my appealant jurisdiction rights, which are provided in this legislation, to have the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia hear my appeal application of VID 888/2023.
2. I submit that I have obtain new information that give lawful basis for this appeal application to be filed, sealed, and heared in the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia.
   1. This pertains to the email I obtained from DAVLS on 15 May 2024 and from Victoria Legal Aid on 13 August 2024 that both stated that the Commonwealth Attorney General, by way of the Commonwealth Legal Aid Office, provides 'preliminary legal aid' for all Australian military service members and veterans for their:
      • Redress from abuse in the Defence Force, civil law proceeding.

C. FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 - SECT 24

1. 1C:

1. I submit that Judge Goodman in VID 888/2023 acted in Contempt of the Court and as such leave to appeal an interlocutory judgement is not required in this instance pursuant to 1A, SECT 24 when this involves a proceeding relating to contempt of the Court.

2. 1E(a) and 1E(b):

1. 1E(a): I have a lawful right to make an appeal application from a final judgement, that being the judgement of Judge Goodman in VID 888/2023, in the proceeding on the interlocutory judgement, these interlocutory judgements being:
   1. to refuse to rule in my favour of the interlocutory applications I made prior to the final judgement of Judge Goodman in VID 888/2023.
   2. in particular, to refuse to file and hear my Form 18 - Notice of a Constitutional Matter applications that I made in VID 888/2023.

GROUND 2: [sic]

1. Violation of Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901.
   1. I submit that the conduct of Judge Goodman in VID 888/2023 was such that my rights to a fair, constitional hearing before him and this Court in VID 888/2023 were violated and as such my constitutional rights were violated.
2. I submit that he solely act to:
   1. 'show off' as a Judicial Officer and 'back' some of the decision and actions that other Judicial Officers have done in other proceedings, notably, these being:
      1. Judge McElwaine in VID 555/2022, Federal Court of Australia.
      2. Judge Keogh in S CI 2017 02005 (Supreme Court of Victoria).
      3. Judge Keogh in S ECI 2022 02130 (Supreme Court of Victoria).
3. I submit that he did so as:
   1. I was a defenseless self-represented litigant, and one with 'high profile legal proceedings' that occur very rarely in this country; in particularly, before, I submit, the Commonwealth, by way of the two Executive Officers, the Commonwealth Attorney General and the Commonwealth Veterans Affairs Minister, decided to:
   2. 'reduce' and 'back away from' the 'CDDA scheme' as the way a soldier/veteran is to pursue his 'Redress from Abuse in the Defence Force' civil law legal proceeding, and
   3. 'send these matters' to Court; the Constitutional independent arm of the Constitution that is a separate power from the Commonwealth Government, and thus, the Commonwealth Department of Defence.
4. I submit that he did this by:
   1. Setting a timetable of orders, and orders, that was impossible for me to adhere to.
   2. Mass Bundling of interlocutory applications, in particular, including these on the 'trial day', so that I wouldn't even know in advance if the trial would occur on that day or not.
   3. Not adhering to his Judicial responsibilities to follow proper process with applications of a Constitutional nature, being my Form 18 - Notice of a Constitutional Matter applications.

1. Notwithstanding these three grounds of review advanced by the applicant, the reality is that no appeal pathway exists from the relevant orders of Goodman J in Ross v Attorney General because the orders were made by his Honour exercising the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. It is for this reason that the Registrar's refusal to permit the filing of the documents was correct, and the application for judicial review should be permanently stayed as an abuse of process.
2. As the Registrar explained to the applicant in his decision, the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is conferred by s 24 of the FCA Act. The Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a single judge exercising the Court's original jurisdiction pursuant to s 24(1)(a) of the FCA Act. However, pursuant to s 24(1A) of the FCA Act, an appeal may not be brought against an interlocutory judgment without leave.
3. Section 25(2) of the FCA Act requires an application for an extension of time to appeal to be heard and determined by a single judge, unless a judge directs the application to be heard and determined by the Full Court; or the application is in a proceeding that is already before the Full Court, and the Full Court considers it appropriate to hear the application: s 25(2)(b), (e)-(f) of the FCA Act.
4. As the amicus correctly submits, the Court has consistently held that, once an order has been made either granting or refusing an application for leave to appeal, no further appeal lies from that order: Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Pacific Holdings) Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1988) 18 FCR 424 at 431-433 (Bowen CJ, Lockhart and Sheppard JJ); Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) (2023) 416 ALR 24; [2023] FCAFC 174 at [97] (Wheelahan J, Wigney and Abraham JJ agreeing); Hurd v Zomojo Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 581 at [31] (Kenny J); Quach v Marks (No 2) [2022] FCA 1335 at [47] (Yates J).
5. The reasons of Goodman J in Ross v Attorney General make it clear that by that application the applicant had sought an extension of time and leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge (see at [2] and [36]). Justice Goodman's reasons for judgment considered the basis for the application in some detail, before ultimately dismissing it (see at [3], [41], [58]-[85]).
6. The appellate jurisdiction of the Court to dismiss the application pursuant to s 25(2) of the FCA Act having been exercised by Goodman J, there is no further avenue open to the applicant to appeal that decision in this Court. The decision of the Registrar to refuse to allow the documents initiating such an appeal to be filed on the basis that the appeal was doomed to fail and, as such, would constitute an abuse of process, was correct. It follows that the originating application is also an abuse of process, and it should be permanently stayed on that basis: see Luck v National Duty Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia (Permanent Stay) [2024] FCA 1257 at [33]- [37], [39] (Wheelahan J). No occasion arises for this application to be joined with an application for relief pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act, as the applicant also seeks.

1. There will be orders dismissing the interlocutory application and permanently staying the originating application as an abuse of process.
2. As the amicus has acted on a pro bono basis, it is not necessary to make any order as to costs. The Court is grateful for the assistance provided by the amicus.

I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McEvoy.