Robertson v McCann - [2023] NSWSC 159 - NSWSC 2023 case summary — Zoe

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Robertson v McCann

[2023] NSWSC 159

Supreme Court of NSW|2023-02-14|Before: Meek J, Young J, McLelland J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2023-02-14

Before

Meek J, Young J, McLelland J

Catchwords

[2018] NSWSC 1290 Chan v Chan [2016] NSWCA 222
(2015) 13 ASTLR 113 Porthouse v Bridge [2007] NSWSC 686 R v Moore
[1994] HCA 40 Slack v Rogan (2013) 85 NSWLR 253
[2013] NSWSC 522 Spata v Tumino (2018) 95 NSWLR 706

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

[2018] NSWSC 1290 Chan v Chan [2016] NSWCA 222(2015) 13 ASTLR 113 Porthouse v Bridge [2007] NSWSC 686 R v Moore[1994] HCA 40 Slack v Rogan (2013) 85 NSWLR 253[2013] NSWSC 522 Spata v Tumino (2018) 95 NSWLR 706[2018] NSWCA 17 Steinmetz v Shannon (2019) 99 NSWLR 687

Judgment (86 paragraphs)

[1]

) 17 NSWLR 1 Kingsland v McIndoe [1989] VR 273 Malco Engineering Pty Ltd v Ferreira (1994) 10 NSWCCR 117 Mallitt v Gow [2022] NSWSC 1012 Markulin v Drew (Supreme Court (NSW), Young J, 12 August 1993, unrep) Marshall v Carruthers; Marshall v Marshall [2002] NSWCA 47 Munro v Lake (Supreme Court (NSW), McLelland J, 8 February 1991, unrep) Petrohilos v Hunter (1991) 25 NSWLR 343 Poletti v Jones [2015] NSWCA 107; (2015) 13 ASTLR 113 Porthouse v Bridge [2007] NSWSC 686 R v Moore; ex parte Australian Workers' Union (1976) 11 ALR 449 Re Fulop (deceased) (1987) 8 NSWLR 679 Robinson v Tame [1994] NSWCA 266 Sadiq v NSW Trustee & Guardian [2015] NSWSC 716 Scott v Scott [2021] NSWSC 1619 Scott v Scott [2022] NSWCA 182 Sgro v Thompson [2017] NSWCA 326 Shymko v Lach [2022] NSWSC 1096 Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201; [1994] HCA 40 Slack v Rogan (2013) 85 NSWLR 253; [2013] NSWSC 522 Spata v Tumino (2018) 95 NSWLR 706; [2018] NSWCA 17 Steinmetz v Shannon (2019) 99 NSWLR 687; [2009] NSWCA 114 Strang v Steiner [2019] NSWCA 143 Yee v Yee [2017] NSWCA 305 Texts Cited: Bible - New Revised Standard Version, Anglicised Heydon JD and MJ Leeming, Jacobs' Law of Trusts in Australia (8th ed, 2016, LexisNexis) Category: Principal judgment Parties: Julie Linda Robertson (Plaintiff) Jason McCann as Executor of the Estate of Raymond Leslie Smith (Defendant) Representation: Counsel: I Davidson SC (Plaintiff) C Wood SC (Defendant)

[4]

The deceased

The deceased was born in June 1930 being one of two children of Leslie James Smith and Louise Mary Smith (albeit that some evidence refers to her as Louisa: CB 659).
The deceased lived for most of his life in a property at 384 Young Street, Annandale (the property). The precise genesis of that is unclear. The defendant's submissions suggest that the property has been in the Smith family for many decades, that the deceased was raised there by his parents in the 1930s and that he subsequently bought the property in the mid-1950s. I have not been able to find any specific evidence to clarify when the deceased acquired the property.
There is evidence that from the time of the plaintiff's birth in 1956 the deceased was living in the property at that time with her maternal grandparents: CB 132 [10].
It is nonetheless correct to say that various extended family members came into the property and left over the years: DOS [28].
The deceased married Joan Guthrie (Joan G) in 1969. Joan G died in 1972.
The deceased was a carriage builder (CB 77) and worked at least part of his life at Redfern Railways: CB 689, 690. The plaintiff indicates that he was a carpenter by trade: CB 56 [39].
The property appears to be a two-storey house with two bedrooms (circa 2018 CB 593), with front and back gardens and a back patio: CB 194 [74].
In January 2019, the house was described as having a main living area at street level with two internal steps from the hallway to a lounge room with a rail. There were 11 steps to a downstairs bathroom and laundry: CB 672.
The deceased commenced living in the property in or about 1935, when he was aged five: CB 690. He remained living in the property until approximately February 2020 when he entered a BUPA Aged Care Nursing Home in Ashfield (BUPA Nursing Home): CB 195 [79].
The deceased's health started to fail him in his final years. The defendant indicates he installed handrails to assist the deceased to access and use the house despite his mobility issues: CB 194 [74], 593.
In early 2020, he was admitted to Royal Prince Alfred Hospital (RPA) for chest pain, and it seems this was a precursor for the assessment that he needed to enter into a BUPA Nursing Home, which occurred later in 2020: CB 195 [78].

[14]

Status of administration

The property and the deceased's AMP shares both remain registered in the name of the deceased and have not been transmitted to the defendant as beneficiary: CB 215.
The BUPA invoice remains unpaid. It, apart from the costs of the proceedings, is the only unpaid liability of the estate.
The figure for funeral expenses is an amount which was paid in one third equal shares by each of the defendant, the plaintiff and Sharon. The defendant has indicated that he does not seek reimbursement of the funeral expenses paid by him. He states that he has not been informed by the plaintiff or Aunty Sharon that they seek reimbursement.
However, the defendant referred in his evidence to the fact that Aunty Sharon had in her affidavit stated that she and the plaintiff seek reimbursement of their contribution to funeral expenses: CB 168 [11]. The reference to that evidence is in fact to a paragraph of Aunty Sharon's affidavit which was not read: CB 146 [116].
Irrespective of the fact that the particular paragraph was not read, unless the plaintiff and Aunty Sharon have agreed otherwise (about which there is no evidence) they should be entitled to be refunded the portion of the funeral expenses that have been paid by them. It appears to be an amount of $2,384 each (being one third of $7,152).
The amount for the legal fees for probate expenses is an invoice paid by the defendant personally: CB 169 [19].
The defendant does not seek nor claim commission in relation to administration of the estate: CB 169 [20].
On 18 October 2021, Aunty Sharon and Glenn commenced family provision proceedings against the defendant in respect of the deceased's estate.
The amount of $30,000 relates to amounts paid by the defendant in respect of family provision proceedings brought by each of Aunty Sharon (2021/00296005) and Glenn (2021/00296008) (related proceedings).
On 12 July 2022, Francis Farmakidis (the plaintiff's solicitor) (Mr Farmakidis), who was acting for Aunty Sharon and Glenn in the related proceedings caused to be filed notices of discontinuance with the consent of the solicitor for the defendant which were signed and dated 14 July 2022.
On 19 July 2022, orders were made disposing of the related proceedings and noting the discontinuance on the basis that an ex gratia payment had been made in the sum of $15,000 to each of Aunty Sharon and Glenn: CB 216-217 [14], 229-234.
The effect of the above is that if the property is to be sold the net estate is $1,332,828.84 less: 1. $4,768 (if the plaintiff and Aunty Sharon are to be reimbursed for funeral expenses); 2. $48,156.25 (sale expenses); and 3. $148,000 (defendant's costs) Total: $1,131,904.59.
The defendant has provided alternate figures on the basis that he will not seek reimbursement from the estate of certain payments if he were to be able to retain the property. The amounts that he would not seek reimbursement for include property expenses ($14,509.44), his share of funeral expenses ($2,384), probate expenses ($6,297.67) and amounts to fund the settlements of the related proceedings ($30,000).
Additionally, on that scenario, there would be no sale expenses for the property and the defendant would absorb the cost of his legal expenses to retain the property.

[23]

Family deaths lead to plaintiff living with the deceased (1964-1973/74)

In about June 1964, Jack, who had earlier in that year contracted pneumonia and a golden staph infection whilst in hospital, deteriorated in health. Enid had kidney problems and jaundice and had also suffered a heart attack: CB 54.
At about this time, the plaintiff and Aunty Sharon moved in to live with the deceased in the property. At that stage, the deceased was residing with his mother.
In about July 1964, Jack died. The plaintiff was seven years of age at that time.
The plaintiff states that she and her siblings became "wards of the state". Subject to one matter I will come to the evidence leaves unexplained any detail regarding that.
The plaintiff indicates that she and Aunty Sharon continued to live with the deceased at the property whilst her mother Enid and brothers went to live with their paternal grandfather in Lane Cove.
In early May 1968, Enid died: CB 54; T 79.
The plaintiff was about 11 years old at that time and continued to live with the deceased. She states that the deceased and her grandmother provided everything to continue raising her and paying for her education.
In about 1969, the deceased married Joan G who moved into the property. The plaintiff says she has shared a bedroom with her grandmother.
In 1971, the plaintiff left school after completing year 10. The plaintiff indicates that after she left school the deceased took her for her first job interview with the Greater Union Theatre Organisation.
In about 1972, Joan G died.
In or about late June 1972, the plaintiff became pregnant. She states that as she was under the age of 18 the New South Wales Child Welfare Agency tried to remove her from living with the deceased. However, she says that he made an application for her to continue to live with him which was ultimately successful. During the plaintiff's pregnancy Wayne moved into the property to live: CB 54 [22].
In about July 1972, the plaintiff's grandmother died. The plaintiff indicates that she continued to live with the deceased after this time and took on additional household responsibilities including some general maintenance, cooking, cleaning laundry and grocery shopping: CB 54 [21].

[26]

The plaintiff progresses career, remarries and interacts with the deceased (1986-2009)

In about 1986, when the plaintiff was working at AMP Corporate, she suggested the deceased invest some of his superannuation with AMP. She states he did so: CB 56 [36].
In 1987 or 1988 the deceased spent 3 months living with the plaintiff at her home to recuperate from a kidney operation (first stay): CB 56 [37].
From about 1987 until 2015, the plaintiff took the deceased to all of his medical appointments including his eye and heart specialists and arranged for him to attend a podiatrist in Five Dock. She states that she was the primary contact for him for all his treating medical practitioners and for RPA: CB 58 [48].
From about 1987 onwards, the plaintiff held a power of attorney for the deceased: CB 58 [49].
In May 1988, the plaintiff married Greg and the deceased walked her down the aisle.
In 1989, the plaintiff and Greg bought a property at Kings Road, Five Dock (Five Dock property).
In 1990, the plaintiff organised a surprise birthday party at her home in Five Dock for the deceased to celebrate his 60th birthday: CB 55 [31].
In about 1994, whilst living with her, the deceased joined the Canada Bay Club which was around the corner from the plaintiff's Five Dock home. From this time for about 20 years (until about 2014) every Thursday night they would go to the club for dinner and join in the raffle draws: CB 57 [42].
In about 1995, the deceased became a member of the Sydney Harbour Casino (which the plaintiff indicates is now The Star Sydney) and for many years the deceased took her and Aunty Sharon there for lunch and to see shows: CB 57 [42].
In 1997, the deceased spent 2 months living with the plaintiff at her home to recuperate after the deceased had contracted hepatitis (second stay): CB 57 [45].
In 2000, the plaintiff organised a birthday party for the deceased at her home on his 70th birthday: CB 55 [31].
In 2007, the deceased spent 6 or 7 months living with the plaintiff at her home to recuperate after the deceased had open heart surgery (third stay): CB 57 [47].

[28]

The defendant commences living with the deceased (2014)

Following his 80th birthday and within the period of his early 80s there was a realignment of the deceased's relationship with the plaintiff and the defendant.
One aspect of this is that the defendant commenced living with the deceased.
The defendant had been living with his cousin Rachel for a period of about four years and says that he moved to live with the deceased in the property in 2012: CB 194 [70].
The plaintiff asserts that the permanent living arrangement for the defendant commenced from 2014. The defendant submits that nothing material turns upon the difference in the evidence: DOS [29].
In or about 2014, the plaintiff says (contrary to the defendant's evidence) that the defendant was living with herself and Greg at the Five Dock property.
The plaintiff indicates that at this time Greg was diagnosed with Stage IV cancer (the cancer being unidentified) and one day at about this time the defendant was intoxicated, and assaulted Greg and she told the defendant he would have to leave otherwise they would call the police. She says following this incident the defendant moved in with the deceased at the property: CB 62.
The defendant was cross-examined about the timing. He accepted that given his addictions as at 2014, he could not be too certain about when his move occurred: T 111. The plaintiff, on the other hand, referenced the move to the occasion of the defendant's behaviour impacting upon her then husband Mr McCann and her requesting the defendant to leave the Five Dock property in 2014.
Each of Aunty Sharon (CB 141 [79]) and Glenn also gave evidence to the effect that the defendant started living with the deceased from about 2014: CB 113 [53].
I accept the plaintiff's evidence, Aunty Sharon's evidence and Glenn's evidence that the timing of the defendant's move to live with the deceased was in 2014, or at least closer to 2014 than 2012.
A second aspect of the realignment is that in or about 2014 the deceased started to be more reluctant to leave the family home.
The plaintiff asserts that the deceased became frightened to go out at nighttime and that the reason the deceased limited his outings is, she believes, due to the defendant's struggles with drugs and alcohol: CB 57 [42], [45].
The plaintiff indicates that from about this time (2014) the deceased ceased to go out at night-time and stopped going to the races every Wednesday and Saturday (which he had been doing since he was 17): CB 57 [44].
In any event, whatever the precise reason, it seems undisputed that the deceased had such a reluctance to go out and the impression I have is that he spent more time in the company of the defendant and resultingly less time in the company of the plaintiff.
A third aspect of the realignment is that the defendant says that because of the plaintiff's conviction for perjury the deceased became somewhat less trusting of the plaintiff. I refer to this more particularly below.
The defendant's drug and alcohol issues persisted until about March 2017.

[29]

The deceased experiences health issues (January 2018)

On 5 January 2018, the deceased was admitted to RPA. He was discharged on 9 January 2018. He presented with symptoms of shaking: CB 584.
The note of the entry on 5 January 2018 indicates "nephew cognitive decline": CB 584.
There is reference in the progress notes (at CB 587) to: 3. Mild delirium on background of 12 months of cognitive decline Nephew (caerer [sic], lives with pt) gave history to team of cognitive decline - 12 months of decline - maybe slightly more confused now than usual - cognitively at present largely the same
Further, on 5 January 2018 or thereabouts, the deceased underwent a Mini Mental State Examination on which he scored 26/30: CB 589, 590.
The progress notes make reference to the deceased's nephew. There is no suggestion that Glenn or Mark were present with the deceased on his attendances at RPA.
The notes in particular have a number of references which identify the defendant as a nephew living with the deceased. Without being exhaustive, I note the entries "lives with nephew" (CB 587), "Jason lives with PT" (CB 593) and "Lives with Nephew Jason…": CB 593.
I proceed on the basis that the medical note references to a nephew are, unless context suggests otherwise, a reference to the defendant. Mr Davidson SC cross-examined on that basis and Mr Wood SC did not dispute that.
On 8 January 2018, the progress notes record the following (at CB 593): -Pt's family consists of his sister Julie? who lives in Five Dock, nephew Jason and a niece [sic] -Jason lives with pt and tends to all domestic AIDLs. Pt is (I) with personal care. Jason does not work and is on the DSP for epilepsy and is a recovering alcoholic. Jason reports he will care for pt at home for as long as possible as he does not plan on returning to work -Pt reports he catches the bus to the shops in Leichhardt but lately Jason has been doing most of the shopping -Pt's bedroom is upstairs and the bathroom is downstairs. Pt reports one fall down the stairs years ago but no issues since. As per pt and Jason, Jason has done a lot of maintenance to the house and is able to do minor mods if required -SW discussed process of accessing aged care services. Pt and Jason declined the need now but Jason was happy for SW to provide My Aged Care information for future reference Plan Nil further SW required, pt for d/c home with nephew Julia 80712
There is a more precise note in the medical records which refers to the deceased: "lives with grandnephew": CB 603.

[31]

The deceased's deteriorating health and move to a nursing home (October 2018-2020)

On 12 October 2018, the deceased was further admitted to RPA, having fallen several days prior, presenting with shaking of his upper limbs and with mild confusion reported: CB 603. There is specific reference in the notes to "grandnephew reports of having more ataxic gait and increase of confusion": CB 603.
On 22 January 2019, the deceased underwent an Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination: CB 623. He achieved a score of 66/100: CB 628.
The notes at the end of the page recording the scoring indicate normative results based on 63 controls of patients aged 52 to 75 and 172 dementia patients aged 46 to 86. Test result scores under 88 and 82 suggest a respective likelihood of, or certainty of, dementia: CB 628.
On 24 January 2019, the progress notes recall an interview with a trainee specialist prior to the deceased being admitted to Balmain Hospital. The notes indicate (at CB 629): Delightful 88M from home with nephew with general decline (reduced intake and reluctance to get out of bed, assoc with deconditioning), newly diagnosed cognitive decline (Addenbrookes 66/100), and carer stress (could do with more services)
It seems that the deceased was admitted to Balmain Hospital for a few days.
On 27 January 2019, the deceased self-discharged from Balmain Hospital: CB 663.
On 31 January 2019, there was an Aged Care Assessment Team (ACAT) Assessment: CB 660-675.
The ACAT notes redact reference to persons other than the deceased: CB 660-675.
The notes indicate that an unidentified person (name redacted) was spoken to in order to make the appointment, was present at the assessment and that most of the information collected came from that person: CB 662. The notes indicate that "Raymond enjoyed having a chat, but found it difficult to answer questions directly or reliably remember events and timings": CB 662.
Despite the name being redacted, having regard to the references on that page and the fact that there is no suggestion on the evidence that any person other than the defendant was living with the deceased at the time, it seems to me that the person who was present with the deceased for the ACAT Assessment and provided information to the assessor was the defendant.
The ACAT notes indicate that the deceased was admitted to RPA following a period of increased confusion and that his primary health condition was "Dementia in Alzheimer's disease": CB 670.
The notes further indicate that "Raymond experiences dementia. He was diagnosed around two years ago with a rapid decline reported over the past 3-6 months" and "Client has dementia, is confused and disoriented": CB 671.
In 2020, the deceased celebrated his 90th birthday at the BUPA Nursing Home during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiff indicates that during that period she visited him as often as she could at least once or twice a week: CB 55 [31].

[34]

Perjury

An issue which was raised in the affidavit evidence and in the pre-trial submissions and DCS related to the fact that the plaintiff had a conviction for perjury: DCS [26]-[29].
Neither counsel referred me to any particular caselaw to address what approach I should take in relation to assessing the evidence of such a witness.
Mr Wood SC ultimately indicated that where someone is demonstrated to have lied when they were under an obligation to tell the truth, the Court would be more cautious about accepting their uncorroborated evidence. He essentially indicated that that was a matter of general principle and consistent with the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (Evidence Act) provisions regarding cross-examination on credibility: T 155.
In Brown v Tavern Operator Pty Ltd (2018) 98 NSWLR 586; [2018] NSWSC 1290, Ward CJ in Eq (as her Honour then was) stated the following with respect to the Court's approach to the credibility of witnesses where their veracity is questioned: 305. At the outset I note that where the veracity of part of a witness' evidence is not accepted (or is in doubt), a careful assessment of the rest of that evidence is required in order to determine its honesty and reliability (per Handley JA in Malco Engineering Pty Ltd v Ferreira (1994) 10 NSWCCR 117 - that being a case where a finding of perjury had been made on one part of the evidence), though this does not mean that the balance of that witness' testimony can never be accepted without corroboration (Heydon JA, as his Honour then was, in Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705, at 719; [2001] NSWCA 305).
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Malco Engineering Pty Ltd v Ferreira (1994) 10 NSWCCR 117 (Malco) concerned a worker who had applied for compensation in respect of three injuries said to have been sustained while in employment of the appellant. In the application and at the hearing, the respondent falsely claimed that his wife was wholly dependent upon him and gave deliberately false evidence as to the nature and extent of the disabilities from which he suffered.
Malco is an extreme example of damage to a witness' credibility, given that the perjury was demonstrated to have occurred within the trial itself. This, of course, differs from the present case, where the damage to credibility consists of a historical conviction for perjury in unrelated criminal proceedings.
Nonetheless, I consider that Handley JA's mandate of "carefully" assessing the witness' evidence to determine its honesty and reliability is a prudent course in the present circumstances, involving a historical conviction for perjury.
The conviction for the plaintiff's perjury arose in the following circumstances.
The defendant gave evidence regarding the plaintiff's charge for perjury. His version was to the effect that in 2008, an acquaintance of the plaintiff was charged with possession of stolen goods worth approximately $300,000 and cash in the vicinity of $60,000. He says the plaintiff gave false evidence under oath during the hearing: CB 192 [51], [53].
The official records certainly revealed there was a charge of perjury. However, there were some material differences in the details.
According to the COPS records at CB 686: 1. In December 2005, the police executed a search warrant at premises and located a large amount of stolen property estimated to be over $100,000 in value. 2. Subsequently, [the accused] was charged with a number of offences and there was a hearing in September 2007 at the Downing Centre. 3. The plaintiff was called to give evidence for the defence. She made a false statement under oath knowing the statement to be false concerning a matter material to the proceedings, namely that on or about 23 November 2005, a withdrawal she made in the sum of approximately $17,597 from her Westpac account was in the form of a cheque for $10,500 and an amount of cash, of which she handed $7000 in cash to [redacted names]. 4. Witness accounts and bank statements proved the evidence was false. 5. On 20 May 2009, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with making a false statement on oath amounting to perjury.
It appears that on or about 7 July 2009, in a context of offering no evidence, the plaintiff was convicted of perjury (CB 677, 686) and was sentenced to 6 months of weekend detention: CB 192 [53]. I pause to note that the plaintiff was cross-examined briefly on the timing for the conviction. It was suggested to her and she accepted that the evidence that she had given in Jodie's proceedings was in May 2007 and her conviction was on 20 May 2009: T 62-63.
The precise timing is not important. Nonetheless, in light of the COPS records I find that the false evidence that she had given in Jodie's proceedings was in September 2007 and the date of 20 May 2009 was the date of her being charged rather than the date of her conviction.
The plaintiff gave an explanation both in her affidavit in respect of the charge and conviction for perjury. She stated (at CB 84 [22]): … I acknowledge that committing perjury was wrong and have now served the sentence for doing so. I pleaded guilty to the charge of perjury and was initially sentenced to six months of weekend detention. After about three months, I was permitted to serve the rest of my sentence by performing community service. I state that my intention at the time was to protect my niece from suffering a harsh sentence. I regret my actions and have learnt from this event in my life.
The defendant says that he observed that this conviction affected the deceased's relationship with the plaintiff stating the deceased did not seem as happy to see the plaintiff as he used to be. The defendant says that on more than one occasion, the deceased said to him words to the following effect (at CB 192 [54]): I don't believe what your mother tells me anymore, she can't be trusted.
Mr Wood SC cross-examined the plaintiff regarding the effect that the conviction for perjury had on her relationship with the deceased. The plaintiff denied that it had any effect on the relationship. Her evidence was as follows (T 63): Q. After your conviction for perjury, your relationship with Raymond became fractious, didn't it? A. Definitely not. My uncle was not my uncle, my uncle was my father, he raised me from the time I was seven years old. My uncle knew about that and it made no difference whatsoever to him. The only thing he said to me was that I should never have done it for Jodie. Q. Trust was an important aspect of your relationship with Raymond and vice versa, wasn't it? A. Absolutely. Q. Following your conviction for perjury, Raymond indicated that he felt there had been a breakdown in that trust, didn't he? A. Absolutely not. Q. What followed from your conviction of perjury was a breakdown in your relationship with Raymond, that's right, isn't it? A. No, that's incorrect. We continued having our Sunday bake, roast dinners every week at my home, I continued going to Canada Bay Club with my uncle every Thursday night for dinner, and I continued going when he would invite my sister and I to the casino. There was never ever a breakdown in the relationship between myself and my - and I will refer to him as my father.
I have scrutinised the plaintiff's evidence with care.
I accept that the plaintiff did continue to have dinners with the deceased and go out with him on occasions.
I am less convinced that there was no breakdown in trust.
Even on the plaintiff's own evidence she had conversations with the deceased about a number of topics in which he indicated that he did not believe what she had told him.
One instance was in 2014 in which she says that Greg and the deceased had not spoken since 2012. She states that the deceased did not remember that, and (in 2014) they had a conversation as follows (at CB 63 [81]): The Deceased: Greg is such a lovely fellow. I'm sad that Greg has cancer. Me: He had gambled a lot of our money away. The Deceased: No, that can't be right. I don't believe you.
Another instance is an occasion in May 2018 in which she says she had become aware that the deceased changed his Will, and she had a conversation with the deceased to the following effect (CB 61 [72]): Me: I've learned that you changed your will. The Deceased: Yes, I changed it because you, Sharon, and Glenn all own your own homes and don't have mortgages. I'm leaving you all my money though. Me: Uncle Ray, you must be confused. You've left everything to Jason such as the house and your AMP annuities and there's no money in the bank so you're not leaving us anything. We all still have mortgages on our houses. The Deceased: I don't believe you.
The tenor of the plaintiff's evidence in respect of these matters was that the explanation for the deceased's disbelief was that he had a failing memory and was affected by dementia.
I think the more likely explanation is that the deceased was, as he had mentioned to the defendant (which evidence I accept) more circumspect with and somewhat less trusting of the plaintiff in what she said to him at least in some instances.

[35]

Financial resources - home contents

Mr Wood SC submitted that the plaintiff failed to reveal her home contents as an asset: DCS [45]-[47]. None of the plaintiff's affidavits indicated any item or attributed value to home contents.
The plaintiff was cross-examined regarding home contents.
As at 5 October 2020, the plaintiff had building and contents insurance in relation to the Five Dock property.
That insurance was held with CommInsure covering an amount of $603,658 for building insurance and $201,220 for contents. The total annual premium was $2,316.10: CB 711.
The plaintiff was cross-examined about contents insurance and indicated that at the moment she had not got around to insuring either house or the contents: T 49.
When asked about the CommInsure policy that she had organised it was unclear how the figures had been allocated. She indicated that an insured could nominate the amount they wanted although qualified that by indicating that she probably would have gone off the policy from the year before in terms of nominating an amount: T 49-50.
When asked about her contents she indicated that she disposed of some furniture items (coffee tables, wall units and general decluttering): T 50-51.
However, when she purchased the Berkeley Vale property, she did purchase some furniture items: T 51.
When was put to her that she had not mentioned any figure in her initial affidavit in her schedule of assets for home contents she initially asserted "I wasn't aware that I had to" and then quickly responded "I assumed I would have included it in the house": T 51.
Her answer in this regard did not particularly impress me. She was further cross-examined regarding this, and it was evident that in the later affidavits the figure that she had put for the Berkeley Vale property was the purchase price of the property without any reference to including within that figure a figure for contents: T 52.
The plaintiff denied that she had in the witness box opportunistically sought to explain the absence of including any figure in her first affidavit for contents of her house by asserting that she had included it in the value of the Five Dock property and that it was false evidence: T 52.
However, she could not provide any answer as to why if that was the case, she had changed her practice when setting out her assets in her December 2022 affidavit in allocating the purchase price as being the value of the Berkeley Vale property without any reference to a figure for contents: T 53.
Ultimately, the effect of the evidence left me with a slight unease regarding the plaintiff's evidence.
Self-evidently, the plaintiff has home contents. Yet she did not appear to explain the lack of any mention of contents or a figure for it other than what I have described above.
Ultimately, it is clear that the plaintiff has some contents of value. Whether the value is in the order of $201,000 or some other figure is unclear.
Generally, home contents are not usually considered by the Court to be a significant financial resource available to a plaintiff. Of course, each case will depend upon its own facts.
Here the evidence leaves unclear whether there are any items of particular value that the plaintiff has in the home which might be a saleable resource to her.

[36]

Financial resources - inheritance from Joan R's estate

The plaintiff had available to her a financial resource in terms of an inheritance, that had not been disclosed by her in any affidavit evidence prior to trial. Mr Wood SC indicated that the plaintiff had misled the Court in this regard: DCS [49].
Counsel for the parties asked me to record as an agreed fact that the Court Book had been served on 7 February 2023: T 134.
The relevance of that is that incorporated within the Court Book was an exemplification of probate attained by the defendant's solicitors on his behalf on 27 January 2023 in respect of the estate of Joan R: CB 772.
That exemplification had been obtained on the defendant's behalf it seems (T 157) for the purposes of demonstrating that the plaintiff had not properly disclosed an inheritance from Joan R's estate as a financial resource available to the plaintiff.
The exemplification recorded that probate had been obtained of Joan R's Will dated 21 August 2015 (slightly in excess of six months after the date of Greg's death) by which Joan R appointed John Carrington and the plaintiff as executors of her Will: CB 775.
Joan R gifted the whole of her estate after payment of debts, funeral and testamentary expenses to the plaintiff: CB 775.
Probate of the Will was obtained on 10 August 2021 (well before the plaintiff's first affidavit in these proceedings).
The inventory of property of Joan R's estate disclosed the following assets: 1. Leasehold of a retirement village unit estimated $200,000; and 2. Westpac account savings $73,279.84.
Prior to the hearing, the plaintiff herself did not swear any affidavit addressing this inheritance.
John Carrington's affidavit indicates that he is the nephew of Joan R and since obtaining probate has on behalf of himself and the plaintiff been attempting to carry out the practical obligations of the estate and managing the estate on a day-to-day basis.
He refers to dealing with real estate agents in order to sell the leasehold interest in the Strathfield unit noting that it had not been able to be sold at that point.
The affidavit annexed a statement in relation to fees or charges incurred in respect of the unit.
The statement was dated 30 January 2023 and indicates that a total of $22,518.91 was then outstanding in respect of fees associated with the Strathfield unit. The statement appears to disclose monthly charges in the order of $865.13.
The plaintiff was cross-examined in relation to this asset.
When she was asked whether she took care to ensure that her initial affidavit covered all the relevant assets she agreed with that proposition: T 36. However, as the cross-examination developed from that point, she readily volunteered that she had another potential asset being what she described as "a claim to my late mother-in-law's estate": T 36.
The plaintiff disputed that it was likely to sell for about $250,000: T 36. She indicated that "we" (I take it herself and John Carrington) had tried to sell it for what Joan R had purchased it for namely $235,000: T 37.
She indicated that it had been on the market since Joan R had died (November 2020) and they had reduced it down to $200,000 and it still cannot be sold. She asserted that there are five units within the complex including Joan R's unit that cannot be sold: T 37. When asked about the fact that she had not taken steps to include reference to the inheritance in her initial affidavit the plaintiff said as follows (at T 37): Q. You knew as at 18 October 2021, when you prepared your main affidavit in these proceedings, that you would receive something from Joan's estate when it was fully administered, didn't you? A. I did, yes. Q. Yet you didn't take any steps to deal with that matter in your affidavit evidence, did you? A. That just slipped my mind. I have not been dealing with anything to do with the sale of the will. Q. You had a substantial inheritance coming your way, that's right, isn't it? A. Possibly. Q. The only thing that needed to happen was that the estate be administered and its assets sold and then you would get your money, that's right, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. That was the position as at 18 October 2021 when you sat down to do your affidavit, isn't it? A. Yes, yes. Q. I suggest to you it didn't slip your mind, you declined to include it because you thought it would not advance your case, do you agree with that? A. That's, that's incorrect.
During submissions, I attempted to clarify with Mr Davidson SC what value ought properly to be attributed to the inheritance.
He did not cavil with the proposition that I should assume that it was valued at less than $200,000: T 147. He asserted the monthly figures were approximately $900 a month (in fact $865). On a basic rough and ready calculation, assuming that it might take another year for the property to sell and having regard to existing outstanding charges and accumulating charges, Mr Davidson SC did not dispute that the inheritance would have a value in the order of approximately $240,000: T 148.

[38]

Credit and reliability of the plaintiff's other witnesses

Each of Elisha (T 72-74), Glenn (T 75-78), and Aunty Sharon (T 81-85) were cross-examined. My general impression was that each of them gave their evidence in a clear and straightforward way.
It was put to Elisha relevantly that the conversation she said that she had had with Rachel never took place and that she had made up the entire contents of that conversation. She denied that. Elisha was not otherwise challenged in cross-examination on her credit.
Mr Wood SC in his DCS submitted that Elisha had an incentive to lie because she was an obvious and natural subject of her mother's estate and noted that Rachel had called her a liar: DCS [25].
I do not regard the future possibility that Elisha might receive some benefit from her mother's estate as being a sound basis to find that she had an incentive to lie. In any event, as noted, I accept her evidence.
Glenn was asked about his conversations with the deceased in the mid-late 1970s. He accepted that during his lifetime the deceased stepped in and always helped all of the family members. He also accepted that the accommodation needs of members of the deceased's family changed between the mid-late 1970s when he had had conversations with the deceased: T 78. Glenn was not otherwise challenged as to his conversations with the defendant.
Aunty Sharon gave evidence as follows (at CB 144 [105]): In about February or March 2018, I recall having a conversation with my uncle where the words to the following effect were spoken: The Deceased: Jason is threatening to move out if I don't change my will and give him a good reason to stay. Me: Don't worry, Jason won't leave.
Mr Wood SC challenged this evidence: Q. You've set out in paragraph 105 there a conversation that you say took place in February or March 2018, do you see that? A. Yes. Q. You say that's your best attempt to recall a conversation that you had with your Uncle Raymond, do you? A. Yes. Q. I suggest to you that Jason has never threatened to move out in the event that Raymond didn't change his will, what do you say to that? A. When, when this is stated threatening, I don't mean in, as, as threatening. What Jason said was Uncle Ray had said that, he said, "What's the use of me staying here if, if you're not going to give me a good reason to stay here and change the will?" Q. Is that version of the conversation that you've just given likely to be closer to what was actually said in February or March 2018 than what you put in your affidavit? A. No. No. He, he, he did it in a threatening manner. He did it saying, saying to Uncle Ray that he would move out if he had no incentive to stay, but he, he, you know, he wasn't going to change his will in Jason's favour. Q. It's possible that when you came to prepare your affidavit in these proceedings, your recollection of events of February and March 2018 had faded, that's possible, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. It's possible that you're mistaken as to what Raymond said on that occasion, isn't it? A. No. Maybe, perhaps the wording itself but not, not the actual content of what he said. Q. I want to suggest to you that Raymond never said anything about Jason threatening to leave in the event that Raymond didn't change his will, that just never happened, did it? A. Yes, it did.
Aunty Sharon had given further evidence regarding a conversation which she had with the deceased which she identified as having taken place in late May 2018. She stated that the deceased said (at CB 145 [107]; T 83-84): Jason brought two ladies to the house a day or two before I signed the new will. I didn't know who they were or why they had come. They came back another day with a new will for me.
When asked whether she said anything to the deceased after he made that statement, Aunty Sharon stated that she did not remember: T 84.
Aunty Sharon agreed that she knew that in May 2018 the defendant had helped to arrange for the Will to be changed and that a solicitor had come and attended at the property on two occasions, and that the deceased had been requesting to change his Will for some months before that: T 84.
In light of that, when challenged as to whether she understood that the deceased's statement that he was making to her (as set out above) was wrong, she indicated that (at T 85): His dementia at that stage was in and out, at some stages he would recollect things incorrectly, he may not get things completely right, but yes.
Aunty Sharon accepted that she did not say to the deceased that what he had told her was incorrect: T 85. She denied that the conversation that she set out in her affidavit did not occur: T 85.
The evidence is somewhat curious.
There is other evidence - being a form of a file note - which suggests that Bronwen Ginges (Ms Ginges) attended at the house approximately a week before the Will was signed rather than a day or two before.
To the extent that the deceased stated that he did not know who the women were or why they had come to the house, that is a strange statement. However, it is immediately followed by a statement that they came back another day with a new Will for the deceased - which is correct.
Leaving aside the deceased's particular response, I accept that the conversation deposed to by Aunty Sharon did occur.
Aunty Sharon was not effectively challenged on any other matter as to credit.
Mr Davidson SC submitted that Glenn's evidence was straightforward and was not challenged regarding his conversation with the defendant. He submitted that Aunty Sharon's evidence was credible and persuasive, and that Elisha's evidence was highly credible and that I should unreservedly accept evidence of her discussions with the defendant: T 142.
I essentially agree with Mr Davidson SC's assessment of their evidence in this regard, and I generally accept their evidence.

[39]

Credit and reliability of the defendant

The defendant was cross-examined at T 103-130.
The defendant was reluctant to accept whether his "problems with alcohol and addictions" caused problems for the plaintiff: T 183-185.
The defendant says that from 2012 to 2017 he carried out works on the property including: painting the house both internally and externally; installing handrails; repairing the plumbing; replacing the laundry sinks; terracing the backyard; installing drainage and guttering the rear of the house; reroofing the back patio; replacing broken screen doors front and back and also replacing broken and dangerous light fixtures; treating rising damp and black mould issues throughout the house; installing a new washing machine; connecting and programming a new TV; planting the front and back gardens with plants; repairing the boundary fences and facilitating the delivery and filling of five 2-ton skip bins to remove accumulated and hoarded building material stored under the house which was termite infested: CB 194-195 [74].
The defendant denied that, from the time that he moved into live with the deceased (whether it be 2012 or 2014) whilst he was consuming drugs and alcohol, up until March 2017, he did little work to assist the deceased on the property: T 112.
It was suggested to the defendant in cross-examination that prior to April 2018, the main work that he did on the property was planting new plants in the front and back yards. He rejected the suggestion: T 112.
The defendant agreed that until March 2017 whilst he was consuming drugs and alcohol, it was primarily the deceased who was looking after him: T 112.
I accept that the defendant carried out the work that he describes as having done on the property albeit that in light of my earlier finding the work was in all likelihood carried out from 2014.
Subject to the following matters, I accept the defendant's evidence. The defendant had in his affidavit evidence effectively identified his mother's niece Jodie as an "acquaintance" of his mother: CB 100; T 109-110. Whilst the description is inaccurate, I do not regard the inaccuracy of the description as being of great moment.
The defendant denied that around 2017 the deceased started to suffer increased cognitive decline: T 112, 117.
My impression is that the defendant was somewhat reluctant to suggest that the deceased had any form of cognitive decline in 2018-2019 in circumstances where there was material suggestive that the defendant had been an informant to relevant health professionals of cognitive issues affecting the deceased.
There is some medical material which was included in the Court Book (Exhibit JP-1) would bore upon the deceased's cognition, including at CB 671.
At least initially, the defendant did not recall attending RPA on about 5 January 2018 and informing staff at that stage that the deceased had had a year of cognitive decline: T 112-113. It seems to me a distinct possibility that the defendant was the informing party.
The defendant denied that in or about March 2019, he informed the deceased's treating doctor that the deceased had been diagnosed about two years previously with dementia: CB 671.
The defendant disputed being able to recall assisting the deceased with a "myagedcare" home support assessment on 31 January 2019: CB 662, T 115. Nonetheless, it seems to me a distinct possibility that the defendant was present.
The defendant did not accept prior to the deceased being admitted to RPA in January 2019 that the deceased suffered or had been suffering increased confusion: T 116. Nonetheless, the defendant appeared to accept that towards the time of the deceased's death he had a period of increased confusion.
The defendant accepted that at some stage he had informed the plaintiff that the deceased wanted to make a new Will and that the plaintiff had informed him that the deceased already had a Will: T 119-120.
The defendant says that he became aware, through conversations between the plaintiff and Rachel, that the plaintiff, Aunty Sharon and Glenn were included in a Will of the deceased: T 121.
However, essentially, that is where agreement on these issues ceased.
The defendant asserted that when the deceased said he wanted to change his Will that he (the defendant) had no idea what the deceased was proposing to change it from: T 121.
The defendant denied that: 1. he ever spoke to the deceased about changing his Will so that the defendant could inherit the deceased's house: T 123; 2. he had ever told any of the "relevant people" who had given evidence in the proceedings that before the Will was executed (17 April 2018) that he had told them that he was going to get the deceased to change his Will: T 123; 3. he ever suggested to the deceased that it was not worth his while continuing to care for the deceased if the deceased did not give him some security that the deceased would leave the defendant the house: T 124; and 4. received a copy of the Will from Ms Ginges' office in April 2018 and says he was given a copy of the Will by the deceased to show to his mother: T 125.
Aunty Sharon gave evidence of a conversation with Rachel in or about 2014 to the effect that Rachel had told her that the defendant had spoken with her and said to her that he was going to get the deceased to let him move in with him and get him to change his will so that the defendant would get the deceased's house: CB 140 [77].
Rachel, in an affidavit which was read albeit that she was not able to be made available for cross-examination, disputed that she had a conversation with Aunty Sharon to that effect: CB 472 [5].
The defendant disputed that by early 2018 he knew the contents of the 2003 Will and knew that the deceased had left his estate by that Will entirely to the plaintiff, Aunty Sharon and Glenn: T 121.
Elisha gives evidence that in about early 2018, she and her partner were carrying out renovations to their home in Belmont and had a telephone conversation with the defendant asking whether he would assist them with her renovations. She places the conversation at being at a point of time when the defendant was unemployed but had recently become sober: CB 101.
She states that on a day that the defendant came to the house to assist them with the renovations he informed her that (at CB 102 [9b]): when Pop dies Mum, Sharon and Glenn get everything. We get nothing at all.
She says that the conversation went on in which he indicated that there was no way they (in context the plaintiff, Aunty Sharon and Glenn) would continue to permit him to live at the property and that he was: going to talk to Pop about it and tell him they will sell the place and kick me out and see if I can get him to change his will and leave the house to me. He listens to me now: CB 102 [9b].
The defendant denied having such a conversation with Elisha: T 122-124.
The defendant denied producing a copy of the Will to Elisha at that time: T 124.
I reject the defendant's evidence. I prefer the evidence of Elisha and accept that there was a conversation as she states, at about the time that she states, and that he produced a copy of the Will on that occasion.
Glenn gave evidence that on one occasion, in about 2017, he went to visit the deceased and that the defendant was at the house and he had a conversation with the defendant in which the defendant said to him (at CB 113 [53]): Your Uncle Ray is going to change his will and he is going to leave me the house.
Glenn states the defendant denied that the deceased had spoken to the defendant and the plaintiff about such a proposed change to his Will: CB 113 [53].
The defendant denies telling Glenn in 2017 that the deceased was going to change his Will and leave the defendant the deceased's house: T 121-122.
On that issue, I reject the defendant's evidence and prefer the evidence of Glenn.
Elisha gave evidence of a conversation she had with Rachel in early 2018 to the effect that the defendant was trying to get the deceased to change his will: CB 99 [6].
The evidence was admitted but with a limitation in relation to assertions regarding the deceased's dementia.
Rachel, in an affidavit, denied that she had had any such conversation with Elisha: CB 472-473 [6].
Rachel was not made available for cross-examination. Elisha was cross-examined and I accept her evidence in relation to that account.
Elisha gave further evidence that in or about late 2018 (at a point of time which could have been no more than two weeks after the date of the deceased's Will) she was at the plaintiff's Five Dock property having a conversation with Dylan. She states that at some point the defendant, who was present, came out onto the veranda and reached into the left inside breast pocket of his black jacket and produced a copy of the deceased's 2018 Will: CB 100 [7].
Elisha asserts that the defendant told her that he had left the solicitor's office with the deceased's new Will and that he had "got the house" and "got him to change his will and leave me pretty much everything": CB 100 [7].
The conversation was admitted subject to relevance but also with a limitation under s 136 Evidence Act as to the assertion regarding the deceased's dementia.
The defendant denies having any such conversation with Elisha: T 122.
Nonetheless, I was impressed by Elisha's evidence, and I accept her evidence that such a conversation did occur.
The defendant denied that he had any role in the deceased changing his will to leave the house to the defendant, apart from locating a solicitor for him: T 112.

[42]

Sale of Five Dock property and purchase of Berkeley Vale property

The plaintiff's home loan account statements (CB 857-869) relevantly showed that, as at 1 January 2021, her mortgage was just under $200,000 ($199,726.83): CB 858. There were fortnightly payments of $900 made by the plaintiff to reduce the balance of the mortgage.
On 20 July 2021, Balmoral Partners Pty Ltd, agents, prepared a Sales Inspection Report for the plaintiff in respect of the Five Dock property: CB 712-713. The document also combined an Auction Agency Agreement: CB 714-723.
On 22 July 2021, the plaintiff signed the report/agreement.
The agent's opinion as to the current estimated selling price of the property was nominated as being $3.2 million-$3.5 million. The agreement noted that the plaintiff had, as principal, instructed the agent to market the property at a price guide of $3.2 million-$3.52 million: CB 713.
The proposed auction date was 14 August 2021: CB 714. It appears there was some delay in the property being ultimately sold.
On 2 December 2021, the plaintiff entered into a contract for sale of the Five Dock property for a price of $3.07 million with a deposit to be paid of $307,000, leaving a balance of $2.763 million: CB 724.
Leo Muggleton, solicitor, acted for the plaintiff on the sale: CB 724.
The agent's fee totalled $34,100 with an invoice issued to that effect on the date of exchange of contracts (2 December 2021): CB 725.
On 30 March 2022, the sale was completed: CB 92. The plaintiff indicates that after payment of the mortgage (said to be approximately $185,000) she received the total sum of $2,884,581.24 (including interest on the deposit) from the sale: CB 92.
On 30 March 2022, the plaintiff received a payment into that account in the sum of $2,730,969.24 - which would appear to be funds directed to be paid to her on settlement of the sale of the Five Dock property.
On 30 March 2022, the plaintiff made a payment ($180,351.88) to discharge the mortgage/home loan: CB 869. From that point, the plaintiff was mortgage free.
On 31 March 2022, the plaintiff received an additional sum of $153,612 paid into the account - which appears to have been the agent (Balmoral Partners) accounting to her for the balance of the deposit monies due to her on sale of the Five Dock property: CB 849.
On at least three occasions during this period, the plaintiff made some significant payments directly from her CBA Pensioner Security Account (Pensioner Security Account).
On 25 May 2022, the plaintiff transferred to Elisha, seemingly directly from this account, the sum of $18,000 referable to payment for an operation she was undergoing: CB 851.
On or about 19 August 2022, the plaintiff exchanged contracts to purchase a new property at Berkeley Vale for $1.43 million: CB 92, 93.
On 19 August 2022, the plaintiff transferred to the agent for the Berkeley Vale property (Brand Property Sales Trust) an amount of $67,925 referable to the deposit on that property: CB 854.
The plaintiff states that she ultimately chose to purchase a property in that area in order to live closer to her daughter Elisha and her family, noting that Elisha and her two young children now visit her more regularly: CB 93 [14].
Further, on 20 September 2022, the plaintiff transferred out of the Pensioner Security Account (but not apparently to her CBA Complete Access Account (Complete Access Account)) the sum of $62,870: CB 855. That payment related to stamp duty for the purchase of the Berkeley Vale property: CB 93 [13].
On 23 September 2022, the plaintiff completed purchase of the Berkeley Vale property: CB 93 [13].
The plaintiff withdrew the sum of $1,362,425.21 from the Pensioner Security Account in order to complete that purchase: CB 855.

[43]

Financial and material circumstances

The plaintiff's financial circumstances changed in a relatively significant way as between the time the proceedings were commenced and the time of the hearing.
At the time the proceedings were commenced the plaintiff had the following assets: 1. Five Dock property estimated $2.3 million; 2. 2008 Holden HSV estimated $8000; 3. Australian Super superannuation estimated $374,716; and 4. bank account savings estimated $29,964. Total: $2,712,680.
The plaintiff's liabilities were as follows: 1. CBA mortgage on Five Dock property estimated $191,624; and 2. CBA MasterCard estimated $23,939; and Total: $215,563.
On 4 December 2022, the plaintiff affirmed an affidavit updating her financial position.
The plaintiff's financial circumstances had by that point changed significantly as a result of selling the Five Dock property and redeploying her assets.
The plaintiff indicates that in March 2022, she withdrew a total of $30,000 from her superannuation fund to assist her with living expenses: CB 92 [9]. On or about 25 May 2022, the plaintiff paid $18,000 for medical expenses for a gastro band operation for Elisha as it was not covered by Elisha's medical benefits fund: CB 93 [19].
The plaintiff's updated listing of assets and liabilities as at 4 December 2022 was stated be as follows.
The plaintiff's assets were: 1. The Berkeley Vale property estimated $1.43 million; 2. 2020 Hyundai Tucson estimated $32,000; 3. Australian Super Superannuation estimated $326,707; 4. CBA Pensioner Security Account estimated $1,160,863; and 5. CBA Complete Access Account estimated $12,831. Total: $2,962,401.
The plaintiff's liabilities (CB 95) were stated as being as follows: 1. CBA MasterCard estimated $11,000; and 2. Suncorp Bank Credit Card estimated $300. Total: $11,300.
At the time the proceedings were commenced, the plaintiff indicated that her monthly income was nil. In context that appeared to be an indication that she was simply not receiving any salary, as appeared to be confirmed by Mr Davidson SC in submissions: T 150. She indicated that she had no other income: CB 69.
She stated that she was presently living on savings: CB 59.
Her expenses as at the time of commencement of the hearing totalled $6993 per month.
Significant components of that expenditure related to mortgage payments of $1,800 per month and food and entertainment being $2000 per month.
In the plaintiff's updated financial position: 1. the plaintiff's monthly income was indicated as still being nil. She noted that she had not been employed since resigning and was still living on her savings: CB 92. 2. the plaintiff's monthly expenses had reduced to a figure of $4,724, the most significant amount was still a sum of $2,000 being for food and entertainment: CB 96.

[45]

Claim for provision

Of some significance is that the plaintiff's initial affidavit does not set out in a clear way her claim for provision.
What can be gleaned from the affidavit is that: 1. she could not access her superannuation; 2. was considering listing the Five Dock property for sale as she would not be able to continue meeting the mortgage payments: CB 60, 62; 3. the plaintiff intended to use funds she was entitled to from the deceased's estate to assist her in paying the mortgage if her home was not sold or to otherwise assist her in finding a new place; and 4. to assist her with living and healthcare expenses.
The plaintiff's updating affidavit gave details regarding the sale of the Five Dock property and purchase of the Berkeley Vale property: CB 92-93.
In the updating financial affidavit, the plaintiff does not expressly describe her claim for provision. Nonetheless, the plaintiff indicated the following: 1. she was currently in the process of arranging various renovations and other works to the Berkeley Vale property including constructing a swimming pool, installing pool fencing, landscaping, and sliding doors and she estimated that the construction and landscaping works would cost not less than $108,000; 2. at that stage she had estimated her expenses as she had not yet received an electricity bill and was yet to organise home and contents insurance; 3. she did not currently have private health insurance and was paying for all of her out-of-pocket medical expenses: CB 93.
The plaintiff indicated that she would provide the Court with a further update of her monthly expenditure closer to the hearing date: CB 93 [17]. That did not occur.
The plaintiff reaffirmed as stated in her earlier affidavit that she would use any provision from the estate that she receives to assist her with living and healthcare expenses as she ages and for her retirement: CB 93 [21].
The plaintiff's affidavit referred to an expected expense in relation to dental work: CB 93 [21]. That evidence was rejected as being inadmissible as to form.
During the hearing the plaintiff supplemented her evidence regarding the dental work she might require.
She indicated that she currently had stents on the bottom of her front teeth that needed to be replaced either with implants or a plate. She seemingly has a plate and crowns for her top teeth which are failing, requiring, she says, new dental work: T 33.
She further stated that she has osteoporosis and whether or not she can have implants will seemingly be dependent upon a bone density test: T 33.

[46]

Relationship with the deceased

The defendant lived with the deceased in the property for a period of about 15 months in or about 1982-1983 with the plaintiff when the defendant was aged about 9 or 10: CB 56 [33]-[34]; 189 [17]-[18].
The defendant did not disclose any particularly strong connection with the deceased thereafter until, on his version, about 2012 for what I find was more probably 2014 (CB 189 [17]-192 [55]), other than what might be inferred from his attendance at any family functions.
In 2014, the defendant moved in to live with the deceased in the property and their relationship grew in significance at that time persisting until the deceased's death.
There is considerable evidence in the proceedings directed to the alcohol and drug struggles that the defendant had, which struggles the defendant admits he had.
The defendant dates his alcohol addictions from about 1989 when he was 16 (CB 190 [26]-[27]) and indicates that these addictions persisted until approximately March 2017: CB 192 [59]; DOS [66].
In particular, the defendant says that between 2012 and August 2016 he continued to be addicted to alcohol and drugs despite attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings from 2014.
He describes this stage, at least up until 2017, as a very low and dark period of his life. He is grateful for and "will never forget" the help the deceased gave him by his support, encouragement and patience. He recognises that the deceased "endured" the consequences of the defendant's addictions: CB 194 [72].
He says, and I accept, that in August 2016 he entered Foundation House, Drug, Alcohol and Gambling Rehabilitation Facility (Foundation House) for the first time and was sober for approximately four months. In Christmas 2016, he had a relapse at his mother's house and used cocaine and alcohol with relatives.
In March 2017, he was again readmitted into Foundation House and he states that as a result of this second admission he has been sober and has not used drugs or alcohol since: CB 192 [56]-[59].
The defendant says that from about this time he attempted to contribute to the deceased's welfare in return: CB 194 [73]. He indicates he did this in a number of ways by contributing to repair and renovation of the property (CB 194 [74]) and becoming the deceased's primary carer, attending to all aspects of his personal cleaning and care, arranging and attending with him to all medical appointments and managing and carrying out the day-to-day running and maintenance of the property: CB [195].

[47]

Financial and material circumstances

In February 2020, the defendant started a Certificate IV in Community Services at TAFE New South Wales, Ultimo Campus.
In September 2020, he secured a placement at Foundation House up until November 2020 at which time he successfully completed his certificate.
Since November 2020, he has begun and been in paid employment at Foundation House: CB 192-193.
He is currently studying a Diploma of Counselling through the Australian Institute of Professional Counsellors: CB 193.
The defendant set out details of his financial circumstances in his initial affidavit (CB 197-198) and in his December 2021 affidavit: CB 237-240.
The defendant is currently employed by Foundation House and has been so employed since November 2020. He is employed on a permanent part-time basis and as such indicates he does not receive a salary, but he is on wages.
He is currently contracted to a minimum of 12 hours per week and averages approximately 24 hours per week.
His average weekly net wage is $811.69.
His taxable income for the 2020-2021 financial year was $34,737 and for the 2021-2022 financial year was $66,651.
Sharon works at AMBS Ecology & Heritage, and her weekly net income is $888.93.
The defendant has monthly expenses of his own in the amount of $550 and joint expenses with Sharon in the amount of $2902.
The defendant has the following assets: 1. CBUS superannuation $10,365.35; 2. CBA account $288; Total: $10,653.35.
He does not have, presently, any liabilities.
Ms Febers addressed her financial position as at 15 December 2021 (CB 335-336) and updated it as at 7 December 2022: CB 339-341.
She has monthly expenses totalling $1085.
She gives a slightly different estimate for her joint monthly expenses with the defendant, her figure being $2600: CB 340.
She has the following assets: 1. Volkswagen car $3000; 2. St George savings account $42.04; 3. ING Direct Account $10,122.24; and 4. Ing Direct Orange Account $293.22.
Ms Febers has the following liabilities: 1. St George Visa Card $5302.88; and 2. Ing Direct Visa Card $1412.04.
Ms Febers has superannuation through ANZ Smart Choice in the sum of $169,479 albeit that she cannot access that superannuation at this time: CB 341.

[49]

Competing claim to retain testamentary provision

The defendant lives with Ms Febers in the property which is his home and he wishes to continue to live there as he states that it provides him with a secure base and a sense of permanency and security.
Ideally, he would like to keep the property as a permanent family home. He has strong connection to the area, good relationships with his neighbours and memories associated with the property, in particular, memories of the deceased.
It is a good location for his and Ms Febers' work.
The defendant and Ms Febers try to live frugally, and he indicates that they are attempting to save as much as they can.
The plaintiff asserted that in about late-2017 to early-2018, the defendant was entitled to and had received the rights to stay in a one-bedroom housing commission unit in Northmead and after the deceased signed his Will on 17 April 2018, the defendant gave up his housing commission unit: CB 67 [96]-[98].
The defendant denied that he had a "Housing Commission Unit". He stated he had had private "Community Housing Provider" accommodation being a private lease agreement. As a DSP disability support pension recipient, he was put on the housing commission waiting list. He gave this unit up as he could not afford to keep it and moved to live with the deceased in the property: CB 203 [149].
The defendant and Ms Febers have carried out renovations and improvements to the property and he indicates that it would meet all their needs moving forward.
Of particular note is that the defendant indicates that he does not have the financial capacity or means to purchase alternative accommodation in the Annandale area nor the financial capacity or means to cover stamp duty, removalist costs and other costs and expenses associated with the purchase of a home.
He does not have any substantial borrowing capacity at this stage: CB 240.
He indicates that given the state of his savings and superannuation he does not have any buffer for unseen contingencies and, accordingly, if any major expenses did arise, he would not have the ability to meet these: CB 240.
The defendant states that if he is able to keep the property, he is hopeful that he and Ms Febers will be able to continue to build up their savings and superannuation so that they can have a more comfortable life moving forward.

[50]

Testamentary involvement submission

Mr Davidson SC submitted that another relevant consideration supporting the plaintiff's case was that the defendant played a part in persuading the deceased to change his Will (testamentary involvement submission).
The submissions were foreshadowed in the POS.
Mr Davidson SC submitted that the defendant "orchestrated" the 2018 Will, and referred to the defendant "boasting of his plan's success": POS [D4.3]-[4.4].
In particular, Mr Davidson SC refers to evidence suggesting that the deceased intended his estate to be distributed to assist the plaintiff, Aunty Sharon and Glenn with their mortgages and refers to the plaintiff's evidence that after the deceased made his 2018 Will there was a discussion about the mortgages. He asserted that the deceased was under a mistaken belief that none of the plaintiff, Aunty Sharon nor Glenn had mortgages: POS [D4.6].
In the plaintiff's conversation she said she had with the deceased in May 2018, the plaintiff stated to the deceased (at CB 61 [72]): Uncle Ray, you must be confused. You 've left everything to Jason such as the house and your AMP annuities and there's no money in the bank so you're not leaving us anything. We all still have mortgages on our houses.
Of note is that the plaintiff seemingly at that stage knew or asserted that the deceased had no money in his bank account or perhaps was asserting that there was minimal or negligible money such that there would be no effective provision for the plaintiff.
Mr Davidson SC referred to the conduct of the defendant in allegedly "[t]hreatening the deceased that he would lose his house or that the defendant would abandon him": POS [D5.2].
Mr Davidson SC, accepting that there was no claim to set aside the Will based on undue influence or suspicious circumstances, indicated that the role of the defendant in persuading the deceased to change the Will had relevance "in general terms, in the declining cognitive position of the deceased and the Court's assessment [of inadequacy of provision]" (asserting that the provision for the plaintiff was nominal or such a small sum that it could almost be put at nought): T 140.
I expressed to Mr Davidson SC that I could not really understand why on his case it was necessary for him to tie the uncontested fact that minimal (in dollar terms) provision had been made to the plaintiff to issues of the deceased's cognitive decline and the defendant's conduct (whether it be in seeking to persuade the deceased to change his Will or the withdrawal of monies from the deceased's S1 Account): T 140-141.
Mr Davidson SC referred to s 60(2)(n) and (j) Succession Act.
To say that the defendant's conduct is relevant under s 60(2)(n) and that evidence of testamentary intentions is relevant under s 60(2)(j) per se does not provide clarity around what if any weighting ought be given to such matters.
As I observed during submissions, it is legally permissible for a person to press their testamentary claims upon a deceased and in a sense, it only becomes impermissible at the point where the pressing of claims becomes undue influence. Mr Davidson SC accepted that: T 143.
Although Mr Davidson SC has asked me to weigh what he claims to be the defendant's conduct in the involvement of the deceased's Will making activity (T 143), I am not persuaded that it is a highly material matter to be weighed in the consideration of whether the plaintiff has been left with inadequate provision.
Mr Davidson SC made submissions regarding the withdrawal of monies from the deceased's bank account: T 143-145. Ultimately, his submission was as follows (at T 145): DAVIDSON: But I mean our short point is that at the time of the will, the legacy did not make sure that Jason's mother was taken care of, and at the time of your Honour making your assessment, it being a somewhat smaller amount, it again has not made sure that Jason's mother was also taken care of, and that to the extent that testamentary intention is relevant, we say this is a strong factor suggesting there would be an adjustment. Now the amount of the adjustment might be debatable.
As I have stated at the outset of these reasons, I accept that the smallness of the plaintiff's entitlement to a share of the balance of the bank accounts (no more than $900) per se is a material factor to take into account in assessing adequacy of provision. However, if that is the ultimate submission then I fail to see why time was taken in the pursuit of a finding that the defendant had inappropriately taken out funds from the deceased's bank account.
I reject the submission that the defendant inappropriately took funds from the deceased's accounts. I have no regard to any such alleged inappropriate conduct in assessing whether the plaintiff has been left with inadequate provision.

[51]

The statutory scheme

The Court may make a family provision order if it is satisfied that adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of the [applicant] has not been made [by either or both of the Will of the deceased or by operation of the rules of intestacy]: s 59(1)(c) Succession Act.
The Court must be so satisfied at the time when the Court is considering the application: s 59(1)(c) Succession Act.
For the purposes of Chapter 3 of the Succession Act, in determining whether any order can or should be made in the family provision claim, it has been said that the question of whether the two-stage approach outlined in Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201; [1994] HCA 40 (Singer v Berghouse) applies should be of no real significance, provided that the nature of the first stage of the inquiry is not misunderstood: Sgro v Thompson [2017] NSWCA 326 (Sgro v Thompson) at [68]-[69] per White JA (McColl JA at [1] and Payne JA at [4] agreeing).
A practical way of approaching the matter of whether any order can or should be made in a family provision claim is by considering the matter by reference to issues posed by s 60 to be determined by the Court. Section 60 provides categories of factors or "matters" which may be considered, namely (a) whether the applicant is an eligible person; (b) whether a family provision order should be made, and (c) the nature of any such order: Poletti v Jones [2015] NSWCA 107; (2015) 13 ASTLR 113 per Basten JA at [17] (Leeming JA agreeing at [94]).
In relation to applicants whose eligibility arises by reason only of paragraph (d), (e) or (f) of the definition of "eligible person" in s 57, there is a further question as to whether, having regard to all the circumstances of the case (past or present) there are factors which warrant the making of the application: s 59(1)(b) Succession Act.
In determining whether to make a family provision order and the nature of any such order the Court may have regard to a number of matters enumerated in s 60(2) Succession Act which in any given case may be relevant to an assessment of whether adequate provision has been made.
In this regard I refer to my comments in Shymko v Lach [2022] NSWSC 1096 (Shymko v Lach) at [759]-[763].

[54]

Membership of a household

What is meant by a person being "a member of the household of which the deceased person was a member" has been addressed in numerous cases - in particular, cases under the FP Act.
A brief summary of the caselaw on membership of a household was referred to by Hallen J in Sadiq v NSW Trustee & Guardian [2015] NSWSC 716 at [227]-[235].
For many years in the Equity Division of this Court as a practical matter in assessing whether a person was a "member of a household which the deceased person was a member" assistance was drawn from the comments of McLelland J (as his Honour then was) in Munro v Lake (Supreme Court (NSW), McLelland J, 8 February 1991, unrep) to the effect that the concept of membership of a household connotes "a degree of continuity and permanency of mutual living arrangements": see e.g. Porthouse v Bridge [2007] NSWSC 686 at [20]-[21] per Bryson AJ (as his Honour then was).
McLelland J, in describing the requirement in that way, noted that the concept of household had been extensively discussed by Gobbo J in Kingsland v McIndoe [1989] VR 273 and by Young J (as his Honour then was) in Benny v Jones (Supreme Court (NSW), Young J, 13 February 1990, unrep).
Ultimately, as was observed by Young J (as his Honour then was) in Markulin v Drew (Supreme Court (NSW), Young J, 12 August 1993, unrep) at 47, it is a question of fact.
The plaintiff lived with the deceased in the property for two periods (totalling approximately 10-11 years). The initial period commenced from June 1964 and ended in or about December 1973 or January 1974: CB 54 [11], 55 [25].
Leaving aside the second more limited period in which plaintiff lived with the deceased, I am comfortably satisfied that during this initial time there was a household constituting the deceased and his mother, and the plaintiff and Aunty Sharon at least up until the deceased married Joan G in 1969.
There was, so far as the plaintiff was concerned, a continuity and permanency of mutual living arrangements with other members of the household including the deceased.
The constitution of the members of the household changed to some degree when Joan G came to live in the household in 1969 or thereabouts following her marriage with the deceased. Nonetheless, again so far as the plaintiff is concerned, there was a continuity and permanency of mutual living arrangements with the deceased and those other members of the household until Joan G's death and Louise's death in 1972.

[55]

Dependency

There has been in recent years some refinement in Court of Appeal decisions bearing upon the question of dependency. I discussed the law regarding dependency in Shymko v Lach at [767]-[787] including the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Chisak v Presot [2022] NSWCA 100 (Chisak v Presot) and Spata v Tumino (2018) 95 NSWLR 706; [2018] NSWCA 17 (Spata v Tumino). I am bound by Court of Appeal authority and, accordingly, adhere to what I said in Shymko v Lach at [792]-[799].
Ultimately, whether an applicant was dependent upon the deceased is a question of fact.
It is clear that one of the commonest forms of dependence may be a financial one "in the sense that the dependence flows from the fact that accommodation, food, clothing and other necessities or amenities of life are provided by the person who owns or is otherwise entitled to the accommodation and pays the other things": Petrohilos v Hunter (1991) 25 NSWLR 343 (Petrohilos v Hunter) at 346 per Hope AJA (Clarke and Sheller JJA agreeing).
The plaintiff does not give precise evidence as to who within the household was looking after her between the period from July 1964 (when she went to live in the property) up till 1968 (when her mother died). The plaintiff indicated that her mother had gone to be with the plaintiff's brothers and the plaintiff's paternal grandfather in Lane Cove.
In any event, the plaintiff states that from 1968, when she was 11 years of age at the time, she "continued to live with the deceased after [her] mother died. The deceased and [her] grandmother provided everything to continue raising [her] and they also paid for [her] education": CB 54 [15]-[16].
Had there been serious dispute regarding dependency, it might have been necessary for me to probe the question somewhat further.
In light of the above evidence, I am satisfied that the plaintiff was at least partly dependent upon the deceased at least in so far as the plaintiff nominates the deceased and her grandmother as providing what was necessary to raise her and educate her.
Apart from Mr Wood SC's concession, I am satisfied as a matter of evidence that the plaintiff is an eligible person.

[57]

The legal principles

In the case of a niece who is eligible by reason only of s 57(1)(e), the Court may only make a family provision order if it is satisfied that there are factors which warrant the making of the application: s 59(1)(b).
As with the law regarding dependency, there has been recent refinement in Court of Appeal decisions as to the question of what constitutes "factors warranting". I discussed the law regarding factors warranting in Shymko v Lach at [767]-787] including the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Chisak v Presot and Spata v Tumino. I am bound by Court of Appeal authority and, accordingly, adhere to what I said in Shymko v Lach at [792]-[799].
Essentially, one looks to determine whether there are factors which when added to the facts which render the applicant an "eligible person" give him or her the status of a person who would be generally regarded as a natural object of testamentary recognition by the deceased, as discussed by McLelland J (as his Honour then was) in Re Fulop (deceased) (1987) 8 NSWLR 679 at 681D.
In Churton v Christian (1988) 13 NSWLR 241 at 252A-E, in addressing the case of a step-child, Priestley JA (Hope JA agreeing) substantially agreed with the analysis of McLelland J in Re Fulop, although added that: although the classes affected by s 9(1) are not necessarily generally regarded as natural objects of testamentary recognition, in some cases members of those classes may, when the circumstances of their relationship with the deceased are set out, immediately be seen to be persons who would be regarded by most observers as, in their particular circumstances, natural objects of testamentary recognition.
In Petrohilos v Hunter, Hope AJA (with whom Clarke and Sheller JJA agreed) at 347C when discussing the issue of factors warranting referred, with apparent approval, to the above-mentioned comments of Priestley JA. Further, his Honour, in addressing the application of the plaintiff, another stepchild, stated at 347G-348A. In my opinion, the position of the plaintiff was virtually indistinguishable in important respects from that of a child of the deceased. The plaintiff lived with her father and step-mother from five to eighteen; her relationship with the deceased was that of child and mother; and although distance in due course diminished the amount of contact between them, the visits the plaintiff made to the deceased, and the visit of the deceased to the plaintiff at Whyalla, underline the continuance of their relationship.
Whilst the determination of the Court as to whether to make a family provision order is made having regard to the facts known to the Court at the time that the order is made (s 59(2)), the consideration of facts or circumstances that may bear upon factors warranting is not limited to circumstances as of the date of the hearing.
The wording of the statutory provision is that the Court may have regard to all the circumstances of the case (whether past or present) as to whether there are factors which warrant the making of the application: s 59(1)(b).

[58]

Parties' submissions

There is dispute between the parties as to whether there are factors warranting the making of the plaintiff's application.
Mr Davidson SC, in the opening written submissions in the section dealing with the issue factors warranting, identified the following factors as being factors which, in addition to the facts which he indicated made the plaintiff eligible, warranted the making of the application.
In substance, he indicated that the following facts demonstrated a closeness of relationship to support his equivalent adult daughter submission (POS [D1.2]-[1.7]): 1. the deceased became the plaintiff's guardian and supported and cared for the plaintiff until adulthood (I take the reference to "guardian" to be de facto guardian, there being no formal evidence of legal guardianship); 2. the deceased walking the plaintiff down the aisle in her wedding ceremonies in 1979 and 1988; 3. the regularity of time the deceased and the plaintiff spent with each other both on special occasions and throughout each week; 4. the support that the plaintiff provided to the deceased during periods of ill-health including supporting him during his recovery from kidney operations, after he contracted hepatitis and after he suffered a heart attack as well as continuing to assist the deceased with all of his medical appointments; 5. the fact that the deceased provided support to the plaintiff when she purchased a home with her then husband in 1979 assisting them with renovation and ongoing maintenance work which support was reciprocated by the plaintiff who assisted the deceased with maintenance of the property; and 6. the appointment in 1987 of the plaintiff as power of attorney for the deceased.
I pause to note that the assistance that the plaintiff provided to the deceased in respect of taking him to medical appointments and being the primary contact for him for all his treating medical practitioners and for RPA on the plaintiff's own evidence either ceased or substantially diminished in 2015: CB 58 [48].
Mr Wood SC submits that there are no factors warranting the plaintiff's application (DCS [31]-[32], [42]) because: 1. the plaintiff is an adult niece of independent means and not a natural object of the deceased's testamentary intentions nor a person in respect of which the deceased could be said to owe a moral duty: DOS [14], DCS [31]; 2. "the community would not impose upon the deceased any duty to make provision for a niece who is now a mature adult with ample capacity to support, and provide for, herself": citing Yee v Yee [2017] NSWCA 305 at [173] per McColl JA (Gleeson and Simpson JJA agreeing): CB 27 DOS [16]; 3. the first stay, the second stay and the third stay are best characterised as temporary periods of recuperation, as opposed to periods during which the deceased became a member of the plaintiff's household: DOS [43], DCS [41] - (I did not understand Mr Davidson SC to submit otherwise); 4. for the majority of the period in which the plaintiff resided at the property with the deceased as a child/teenager, she was only partly dependent on him, being also dependent upon her grandmother: DOS [45c]; 5. the total duration of the time that the plaintiff resided with the deceased at the property was about 10 years, and the majority of that time expired many decades ago when the plaintiff turned about 16 (in fact about 17-18 - the period being from June 1964 to about December 1973/January 1974): DOS [45a,b]; 6. there was no further sharing of a household or ongoing dependence for more than 37 years prior to the deceased's death: DOS [45d,e].

[59]

Determination

I have referred to Mr Davidson SC's equivalent adult daughter submission.
It is a little curious that in the plaintiff's affidavit evidence there was no express statement by the plaintiff to the effect that she regarded the deceased as a father.
However, during cross-examination on the issue of perjury nonetheless the plaintiff stated, somewhat non-responsively, as follows (T 63): … My uncle was not my uncle, my uncle was my father, he raised me from the time I was seven years old…
Whilst I separately comment upon how the deceased reacted to the plaintiff's conviction for perjury, I accept that at least during her childhood from age about 7 to 17, the position of the plaintiff was akin to that of a child of the deceased.
Mr Wood SC submitted that there is no evidence that the plaintiff was dependent upon the deceased during the first stay, the second stay and the third stay. He submits that the deceased was dependent upon her and not vice versa.
I accept that is a reasonable characterisation. The evidence of the deceased's stay with the plaintiff on those occasions does not provide any material support for the plaintiff's dependency on the deceased. However, it does provide evidence of the plaintiff's contribution to the deceased's welfare.
The plaintiff indicates that during the first stay she provided the deceased with all his meals, attended to his laundry, helped him bathe and changed his dressings on a daily basis and administered his daily medication.
In the second stay, the plaintiff likewise provided meals, administered medication and sterilised items (I infer to ensure the deceased did not contract infection). Also, in the third stay, the plaintiff apart from providing meals, doing laundry and ironing, bathing and administering medication and changing dressings, sat together with the deceased in front of her combustion heater and listened to his favourite music and conversed with him about their lives.
Apart from those circumstances, a clear indication of whether an applicant is or might be described as a natural object of testamentary recognition involves looking at the terms of the Will or Wills that the relevant deceased person has made.
Each of the 1987 Will and the 2003 Will made substantial provision for the plaintiff.
The 1987 Will left the property together with all his household chattels to the plaintiff and one third of residue.
The 2003 Will left the plaintiff 50% of residue.
The 2018 Will, although making what Mr Davidson describes as nominal provision for the plaintiff, nonetheless names the plaintiff as a beneficiary thus providing strong support for characterising her as a natural object of testamentary recognition.
The scheme of testamentary provision running through those three Wills is, in my estimation, a strong factor suggesting factors warranting.
There is other very significant material indicating a close relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased for many years and up until the time of her death, with a couple of qualifications that I have mentioned above in the events which I refer to as a form of realignment of the deceased's relationships.
First, as I have noted, from about 2014, the deceased spent more time in the company of the defendant and resultingly less time in the company of the plaintiff. Mr Davidson SC acknowledged the lessening of time spent although at least on one view he places this down to what he describes as the deceased's declining mental cognition: POS [D1.4].
Secondly, with respect to the realignment, the defendant says that because of the plaintiff's conviction for perjury the deceased became somewhat less trusting of the plaintiff. I have addressed this above.
Overall, I accept as noted below that there are aspects of this case in which the plaintiff would be regarded as a natural object of testamentary recognition.
I accept there are factors which warrant the making of the plaintiff's application.

[61]

The legal principles

The question as to whether an applicant has been left with inadequate provision for her proper maintenance, education or advancement in life involves a finding of fact, albeit one that is, in light of the substantive character of the matter to be decided, evaluative. It does not involve an exercise of discretion: see Strang v Steiner [2019] NSWCA 143 at [76] per Macfarlan JA and at [131] per White JA; Georgopoulos v Tsiokanis [2022] NSWSC 563 at [256] per Hallen J.
I addressed and adhere to what I stated in Shymko v Lach regarding a number of the principles which are relevant to considering the question of adequacy of provision as follows: Adequacy of provision 800. Logically, in approaching the question of inadequacy provision one needs to have some reference point for assessing inadequacy. 801. This issue was addressed by White JA in Sgro v Thompson. His Honour stated at [86] that: "The most important word in s 59(1)(c) is "proper". Until the court has identified what is proper maintenance, education and advancement in life for an applicant, it cannot assess whether the provision made, if any, is adequate. What is proper requires an evaluative judgment that has regard to all relevant circumstances, not merely the parties' financial circumstances. Whilst the court will know the latter, it will only have an incomplete picture of the former. Of course, the court's assessment of what is proper maintenance, education and advancement in life must be made when the court is considering the application. That does not mean that considerable weight should not be given to the assessment of a capable testator or testatrix who has given due consideration to the claims on his or her estate" 802. The evaluative judgment made under s 59(2) is fact specific and that the general words of the provision cannot be read down by applying constraints that are not to be found in the text of the legislation: Sgro v Thompson per White JA at [67] citing Bates v Cooke [2015] NSWCA 278 at [67]. 803. Whilst an applicant's financial needs and the financial needs of other persons with claims on a deceased's testamentary bounty are important, and often highly important considerations, it "is important not to elide the distinction between needs and adequate provision; the former is but one indicator of the latter": Sgro v Thompson at [71] citing Basten JA in Chan v Chan [2016] NSWCA 222; (2016) 15 ASTLR 317 at [22]. The adequacy of provision is not to be determined by a calculation of financial needs: Sgro v Thompson at [71]. 804. Nonetheless, judicial comment at the highest levels of Court hierarchy have provided sufficient guidance to enable judges in applying the legislation to the facts of the various cases that come before the courts. 805. "Provision" covers the many forms of support and assistance which one individual can give to another": Mallitt v Gow at [187] citing Diver v Neal [2009] NSWCA 54; (2009) 2 ASTLR 89 at [34] (Basten JA). 806. "Maintenance" clearly includes sufficiency of means upon which to live but is clearly not to confined to that: Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191 at 228-229; [2005] HCA 11 per Callinan and Heydon JJ. 807. "Advancement" goes beyond the need for education and maintenance: Bartlett v Coomber [2008] NSWCA 100 at [50] per Mason P (Hodgson JA agreeing). 808. The question as to whether an applicant has been left with inadequate provision for her proper maintenance, education or advancement in life involves a finding of fact, albeit one that is, in light of the substantive character of the matter to be decided, evaluative. It does not involve an exercise of discretion: see Strang v Steiner [2019] NSWCA 143 at [76] per Macfarlan JA and at [131] per White JA; Georgopoulos v Tsiokanis [2022] NSWSC 563 at [256] per Hallen J. 809. In relation to the general principles regarding grandchildren claims both counsel referred me to the decision of Hallen AsJ (as His Honour then was) in Bowditch v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWSC 275 at [113] and the apparent approval of those comments by the Court of Appeal in Chapple v Wilcox (2014) 87 NSWLR 646; [2014] NSWCA 392 per Basten JA at [17]-[21] and Barrett JA at [65]-[67]. 810. A specific consideration, as acknowledged by Hallen J and also by the Court of Appeal is that the general principles are not rules of law and each case is fact specific: e.g. Sgro v Thompson per White JA at [49].

[63]

Defendant's submissions

Mr Wood SC emphasised that the plaintiff is an eligible person at the "outskirts" of that legislative term: DCS [7].
Mr Wood SC submitted that whilst the plaintiff no longer derives an income from employment, there is no evidence to suggest that she does not have the means to meet her day-to-day expenses and also to cover additional items of discretionary spending including "luxuries" that cannot be characterised as necessities in life: DOS [53]; DCS [33].
He submits that the plaintiff is not a person with any financial need for provision and that her evidence betrays that she is unable to articulate any such need: DOS [54].
In this regard, Mr Wood SC refers to the comments of Gaudron J in Singer v Berghouse at 227 that financial need refers to an inability to satisfy financial requirements from the applicant's own resources.
However, her Honour's comments as I read them were directed more generally to the question of determining adequacy of provision which her Honour indicated is to be determined in light of all the circumstances of the case and thus noted that it followed at least as a matter of law, that the issue goes beyond the question of whether an applicant has needs and requirements that cannot be met from his or her own resources: at 227.
Mr Wood SC referred to the fact that the plaintiff had nominal liabilities (referencing the credit card debts). He argued that her only quantifiable need - the funds for renovations in the sum of $108,000 - could hardly be characterised as a need as opposed to a want or a luxury. He submitted that the plaintiff is able to meet all of her claimed needs for "healthcare expenses" or "retirement" out of her existing financial resources: DOS [55]-[57].
In substance, Mr Wood SC submitted that the defendant had a superior claim to retain the benefits given to him by the 2018 Will such that no provision should be made for the plaintiff: DOS [58].
Mr Wood SC submitted (DOS [61]-[73], DCS [19], [54]) that the claim of the defendant was urgent and undeniable in circumstances in which the defendant: 1. had a particularly close and interdependent relationship with the deceased marked by trauma and struggle; 2. had an objectively distressing childhood, and lost a child himself and did not presently maintain a relationship with two of his three surviving children; 3. had a fractured relationship with the plaintiff in which the plaintiff had not provided him with support; and 4. had struggles with alcohol and drugs but nonetheless had been able to turn his life around.
Mr Wood SC emphasised the fact that since early 2017 there had been a role reversal in terms of care and support as between the deceased and the defendant in which the defendant became the deceased's primary carer: DOS [74]-[77], DCS [55].
Mr Wood SC also pointed to the fact that the defendant and Ms Febers by dint of their financial circumstances (which I have referred to above): 1. are required to live frugally; and 2. have no security associated with a strong asset base, and that the challenge to the permanency of their accommodation (being the property) gives rise to a risk of financial instability in that their capacity to meet their needs wholly presupposes their security of accommodation in the property: DOS [85], [90]; DCS [58].
Mr Wood SC also indicated that if the property has be sold the defendant and Ms Febers will be setback indefinitely and lose any meaningful capacity to move forward in their lives: DCS [56].
Mr Wood SC, like Mr Davidson SC, also referred to the deceased's intentions and financial freedom but submitted that the 2008 Will and the deceased's comments to the plaintiff are consistent with the fact that the deceased had a history of changing his Will to look after and support family members in need: DOS [96], DCS [14]. He noted that the plaintiff had accepted, in substance, in cross examination that the deceased changed his Will to support family members: T 40.50, 41.5.
In particular, he indicated that after the defendant turned his life around the deceased made a deliberate decision to look after him by granting him the house: DCS [14].
Ultimately, Mr Wood SC submitted that the plaintiff is an objectively wealthy, independent adult niece and the deceased had no particular accruing obligation to her as distinct from his primary obligation to the defendant: DOS [105].
Mr Wood SC submitted that it had not been demonstrated that the provision made for the plaintiff by the Will is in all the circumstances inadequate and not proper: DOS [17]-[18], DCS [34]. Rather, he submits that no additional provision should be ordered in favour of the plaintiff as any such provision would "fundamentally threaten the integrity of the testamentary disposition in favour of the Defendant, which the deceased wanted" and submits that the majority of the estate should be preserved for the benefit of the defendant: DOS [24]-[26], DCS [37].
I propose to deal with some particular submissions raised by Mr Davidson SC first before addressing submissions regarding the plaintiff's resources and claim for provision and the remaining submissions on the question of adequacy of provision.

[64]

Equivalent adult daughter submission

Mr Davidson SC principally put forward the equivalent adult daughter submission to persuade the Court to find that the threshold of establishing factors warranting had been passed: T 138. However, he also referred to the fact that the plaintiff's relationship with the deceased was like a daughter in relation to the question of adequacy of provision: POS [E4].
To say that the plaintiff was the equivalent of an adult daughter begs the question of whether there is any material difference between the deceased being a de jure parent (biological or adoptive father of the child) or a de facto parent.
I accept that by force of the legislation, and to a degree as confirmed by caselaw, that the bare fact of paternity is "of very great importance" or at least "of importance" in considering the question of adequacy of provision and any order: see e.g. Gorton v Parkes (1989) 17 NSWLR 1 (Gorton v Parkes) at 10A per Bryson J.
However, it must be remembered that in this case the deceased did not formally adopt the plaintiff. The deceased thus did not, at least in an express way, take on the obligations towards the plaintiff that arise from being the legal biological or adoptive parent of a child.
The Court of Appeal has in the realm of family provision cases emphasised that the distinction between de jure and de facto legal obligations is significant. In particular, in Marshall v Carruthers; Marshall v Marshall [2002] NSWCA 47 (Marshall v Carruthers), Hodgson JA stated at [63] as follows: The Master found that Ms Carruthers had a strong claim, and I agree with that finding. However, the strength of a claim of a surviving partner does, in my opinion, vary with circumstances. Although the Family Provision Act does, in some respects, equate de facto spouses with de jure spouses, this does not, in my opinion, make the existence or otherwise of a marriage irrelevant. In my opinion, a formal and binding commitment to mutual support through good times and bad, other factors being equal, adds strength to a legitimate claim. In my opinion also, the strength of a claim can be affected by the length of a relationship and contributions to the relationship. One factor which may be particularly important in a claim by a woman is that a woman may have, to the detriment of her own financial prospects, taken a major role in raising the children of herself and the deceased.
Young CJ in Eq, who broadly agreed with the reasons of Hodgson JA, stated at [73]: It must be remembered that Powell J put his proposition as a "broad general rule". However, there is in fact no "standard former spouse" to which one can just apply that proposition as a rule of thumb.
Palmer J at [78] agreed with the reasons of Hodgson JA and concurred with the observations of Young CJ in Eq.
Ultimately, each case is facts specific.
To say that someone is the equivalent of an "adult daughter" does not in some quantifiable way benchmark what the status of being the daughter or an equivalent daughter entitles the applicant to in assessing adequacy of provision and in determining the amount of any order.
Marshall v Carruthers reinforces the notion that there are no specific benchmarks and broad guidelines regarding forms of provision, whilst providing some assistance to Judges in dealing with family provision cases over the years, cannot apply to mandate a particular outcome for the very reason that each case is fact specific: [64]-[65].
Indeed, Bryson J, who made the observation regarding paternity in Gorton v Parkes as noted above, later, as a Judge of the Court of Appeal in Bladwell v Davis [2004] NSWCA 170 (Bladwell v Davis) made a similar point.
His Honour (with whom Ipp JA and Stein AJA agreed) observed that there have been many statements in judicial decisions, including decisions in the Court of Appeal, generally to the effect that primacy of some kind is accorded to the claims of widows: Bladwell v Davis at [12].
After referring to a degree of caselaw, his Honour expressed the (respectful) view that there is an inconsistency between an approach, in the context of competing claims, to the claims of widows as paramount, and the application to the facts and circumstances of each case of this statutory provision as established by the approach in Singer v Berghouse.
His Honour noted that preconceptions and predispositions are likely to be the source of inadequate consideration of the process required by the relevant legislation (in that case the FP Act): at [18].

[65]

Adequacy transcends financial needs submission

Little needs to be said regarding the submission to the effect that adequacy of provision can transcend financial needs. In Shymko v Lach (see above) I referred to the comments of Basten JA in Chan v Chan [2016] NSWCA 222; (2016) 15 ASTLR 317.
Mr Davidson SC cited Steinmetz v Shannon (2019) 99 NSWLR 687; [2009] NSWCA 114 (Steinmetz v Shannon) at [32] per White JA and at [122]-[132] per Brereton JA: T 140.
Describing a proposed expenditure as a hoped for or preferred course of action rather than as a need does not per se deprive the proposed expenditure of being eligible to be considered in the assessment of what is proper provision for advancement in life.
Thus, expressing a preference for a proposed expenditure, if the preference is soundly based, informs what is "proper" maintenance (or advancement) for an applicant: Steinmetz v Shannon at [32] per White JA citing Sgro v Thompson at [74].
Brereton JA noted in summary in Steinmetz v Shannon at [132]: 132. It therefore bears repeating and reemphasising that: (1) the jurisdiction is not solely needs-based, but by reason of some of the factors specified in s 60(2), plainly also contributions-based; (2) the jurisdiction is not limited to maintenance, but extends to advancement in life, which encompasses improvement and enhancement of the claimant's position; (3) to the extent that "needs" are relevant, no narrow view of that notion limited to the necessities or essentials of life is to be taken; and (4) ultimately, in the words of McLelland J in Re Fulop, the cases make clear that attention must be directed to "a standard appropriate to all the circumstances of the case".
Their Honours' comments are helpful reminders of the nature of the jurisdiction. Obviously, the precise interaction between the financial resources and needs or claim for provision of an applicant as a factual matter and the ultimate assessment of whether the applicant has been left with inadequate provision will vary in any given case.

[67]

Unauthorised withdrawals submission

Considerable time was spent on the morning of the first day of the hearing and other times during the second day of the hearing exploring with Mr Davidson SC precisely what finding he was asking me to make regarding the so-called systematic deduction from the deceased's accounts.
Mr Davidson SC handed up a schedule which I marked as "MFI-1" which recorded deductions from the deceased's S70 Account over the period from 2 January 2014 to 25 December 2019.
The figures on the schedule for that almost six-year period totalled $187,740 (2014 $24,100; 2015 $33,190; 2016 $18,440; 2017 $37,100; 2018 $41,000 and 2019 $33,210).
Further, connected to the meagre Will entitlement submission was a submission to the effect that the deceased wanted to make sure that the plaintiff was "taken care of".
In particular, to attempt to make good that submission Mr Davidson SC tendered a file note from Ms Ginges, solicitor, dated 10 April 2018 which became Exhibit P-1: T 92.
The file note is in the following form: Met with Raymond at home in Young St. Springly older man; appears on the ball. Lives with his nephew - Jason - heavily tattooed. Sat at kitchen table - Jason not in the room. He explained that he wanted Jason to have the house as he had done such a good job of looking after him. Wanted to make sure that Jason's mother was also taken care of. Said he had some AMP shares(?) but had been retired for a long time. Not as fit as he used to be. Wanted an appointment of enduring guardian if he became unwell but did not require a power of attorney. Arranged to return with Debbie when documents were finalised for signing.
There was an objection to tender of the document on the basis that it did not fall within the business records exception within s 69(2) Evidence Act: T 89-92.
Ultimately, I permitted the tender on the basis that the representation within the document of Ms Ginges' was, I infer, made on the basis of information directly or indirectly supplied to her by the deceased. That was on the basis that he was the person who had personal knowledge of what he had in mind in the assertion that the plaintiff would be "taken care of": T 92.
Beyond the reference to making sure that the plaintiff was "taken care of", precisely what Mr Davidson SC sought to draw from the file note remained elusive.
He did not identify except by reference to returning to the unauthorised withdrawal submission what content should be ascribed to the notion of making sure that the plaintiff was "taken care of".
Mr Davidson SC initially sought to identify, over a six-year period, withdrawals that had been made from the deceased's S70 Account with the purpose of identifying what monies (he said) should have been in the deceased's account as the date of his death for the purposes of quantifying - as the date of death - the benefit the deceased supposedly "intended" for the plaintiff.
To the extent at that point in the hearing that Mr Davidson SC sought to have me infer that the deceased intended that the sum of $187,740 of funds should have been in his bank account as at the end of 2019 or even at that the date of his death, I reject that submission.
Ultimately, from what I note below, Mr Davidson SC sought to persuade me that the questions as to adequacy of provision and the amount (if any) of an order should be determined by reference to the fact that a more limited amount of money had been withdrawn by the defendant from the deceased's bank account which was not used for the benefit of the deceased.
Mr Davidson SC suggested that a figure of approximately $130,000 was "probably now too large" and "without having done the maths" was of that order or under it: T 97, 99.
The submission to my mind is flawed in a number of respects. I note: 1. The content of "taken care of" is very arguably identified simply by reference to the provisions of the Will that the deceased made seven days after the attendance of Ms Ginges upon the deceased, which Will gave the plaintiff a one-third share of monies (whatever amount they might happen to be) in the deceased's bank accounts as of the date of his death. 2. If a deceased makes a Will leaving the contents of bank accounts to a number of persons, it is clear that the content of the gift is inherently uncertain prior to death because the balance of a bank account may fluctuate up to that point for numerous reasons.
To even get remotely close to making good a submission that $130,000 (or thereabouts) was impermissibly withdrawn it would have been necessary to adduce evidence or otherwise providing some rational basis for establishing or inferring: 1. the defendant rather than the deceased made the withdrawals; 2. what the monies were drawn were used for; and 3. the defendant did not use the monies withdrawn for expenses on behalf of the deceased or for his benefit or in any event in some way other than in accordance with the deceased's wishes.
The utility of that exercise appeared to me to be marginally relevant.
There are a number of reasons for that. They include (without being exhaustive) the following: 1. It is not obvious to me that it is appropriate to consider any withdrawals from the account prior to the date that the deceased made his last Will on 17 April 2018. 2. Monies paid out of the deceased's account prior to the date of the Will, without anything further, can hardly be used per se as a basis for inferring the quantum of benefit which the deceased intended beneficiaries to share on his death. 3. The balance of the deceased's S1 Account as of the date of the Will was $5,118.30. Two days later, on 19 April 2018, the deceased received a pension payment of $871.55 which increased the balance of the account to $5,989.85: CB 517. Even if one uses the latter figure, at that point, had the deceased died, the balance in that bank account coupled with the then balance of his S70 Account, being $1,329.56 (CB 531), totalled $7,319.41. The benefit under clause 7(c) of the deceased's 2018 Will to the plaintiff, Aunty Sharon and Glenn would have been $2,439.80 each at best assuming the proceeds of the bank accounts did not bear any burden of any other debts, funeral or testamentary expenses of the deceased. 4. There was no specific evidence adduced in chief as to who withdrew the monies from the deceased's bank account and what the monies were used for. 5. In particular, there was no specific evidence identifying what amount could reasonably have been expected to have been the total balance of the deceased's bank accounts as of the date of his death as being an amount either not used for the deceased's expenses or otherwise for the deceased's benefit or, more particularly, used otherwise than with the knowledge and consent of the deceased.
In particular, I am mindful that in this regard there are cases where a purported interested party or beneficiary seeks to have restored to the estate of a deceased monies taken or removed from an elderly person's bank account allegedly without authority.
Some such cases fail because there is evidence that the deceased gave the allegedly offending party a general authorisation to use the money and account for their own benefit: e.g. Dulhunty v Dewhirst [2005] NSWSC 350.
Thus, to lay the foundation for the unauthorised withdrawal submission, Mr Davidson SC would need to embark upon cross-examination of the defendant, potentially putting to him an assertion of some form of improper conduct giving rise to unauthorised withdrawals.
The transcript will record that on the first day of the hearing, I was reluctant to permit Mr Davidson SC to undertake that exercise in circumstances in which there had been no attempt made to set aside the 2018 Will or to amend the plaintiff's claim in the proceedings to seek specific relief in relation to the withdrawals.
I was further concerned that it might not be fair to the defendant to allow an issue to be ventilated on the hearing alleging inappropriate conduct by the defendant in respect of the withdrawals without the defendant having fair notice of such an issue and an opportunity to adduce evidence to explain the withdrawals.
Mr Davidson SC patiently sought to demonstrate that the alleged unauthorised withdrawals were a live issue by reference to an assertion in correspondence from his instructing solicitors on 22 April 2022 to the defendant's solicitors (which letter became Exhibit P-2) that an alleged failure by the defendant to produce documents gave rise to inferences which the plaintiff would ask the Court to draw including that the defendant: 1. exercised undue financial control and influence over the deceased including by way of utilising the deceased's funds for his own expenses without authority: T 95; and 2. wasted the assets of the deceased: T 95.
Mr Davidson SC further sought to tender a document from his instructing solicitors to the defendant's solicitors dated 7 February 2023 which had been partly redacted by reason of the fact that it was a document that had been part of without prejudice correspondence.
Mr Wood SC objected to the tender on the basis that it should be excluded pursuant to s 131 Evidence Act as being a document prepared in connection with an attempt to negotiate settlement of a dispute.
There was some debate over the admissibility of the letter: T 92-101.
In the midst of that debate, Mr Davidson SC, bearing in mind comments that I had made about the relevance or utility of withdrawals from the account prior to the date of the Will, eventually proposed to seek to limit whatever claim he was making in relation to cash withdrawals in a way so as to commence from a later date, namely March 2017.
Mr Davidson SC selected that date as being relevant based on the timing from which he would submit that the defendant's alcohol and drug addictions were overcome: T 95-96.
Ultimately, following submissions and an indication from Mr Wood SC that he might be able to address the matter by means of a relevance submission (T 100), I indicated to Mr Davidson SC that I would mark the tendered letter MFI-1 (T 101), but nonetheless give him an opportunity to cross-examine the defendant with respect to withdrawals from the deceased's S1 Account and the use of such funds: T 101.
Mr Davidson SC availed himself of the opportunity to cross-examine the defendant on withdrawals from the account: T 125. Mr Wood SC made a general objection to the evidence on the ground of relevance: T 125.
The cross-examination proceeded.
The defendant gave evidence that: 1. from about March 2017, when the deceased was declining at least in relation to his physical health, and the point of time at which the defendant had been able to deal with his own drug and alcohol issues, the deceased would very rarely leave the property: T 126; 2. by August 2017, the deceased even more rarely left the house unless accompanied: T 126; 3. in respect of five withdrawals from the deceased's S1 Account between 9 and 17 August 2017 (CB 513) totalling $3,210 it was probable that he (the defendant) was the person who attended to make those withdrawals using the deceased's EFTPOS card: T 126; 4. those sums were used on house renovations including a lot of painting, a lot of things that were replaced (including a washing machine), renovation of the laundry in the bathroom, installation of handrails, tiling and electrical work to make the house more liveable and that he (the defendant) did most of the work: T 126; 5. sometimes the deceased was with the defendant when some of the withdrawals were made, but not on a daily basis: T 127; 6. there were three withdrawals made on 9 July 2018 ($1,000), 13 July 2018 ($800) and 17 July 2018 ($1,000) which the defendant speculated could be referable to renovations although he indicated that the deceased liked to keep money on him: T 127; 7. he (the defendant) although asked to produce receipts for works done does not have any such receipts: T 127-128; 8. all cash withdrawals the defendant made from the deceased's account were solely for the deceased's purposes with his consent: T 127; 9. contrary to Mr Davidson SC's assertions, with the inability of the deceased to go out, his normal living expenses actually went up (rather than being lower) than before his physical health declined in 2017: T 128; 10. an incidence of increased expenses was that the deceased had incontinence and they were buying adult nappies for him and the defendant was replacing blankets, pillows, clothing and underwear and a lot of things on a regular basis: T 128; and 11. the defendant did not know that he had to keep receipts for such expenditure: T 128.
The entries for the deductions of amounts of the three withdrawals made on 9 July 2018, 13 July 2018 and 17 July 2018 are not entirely clear as to the ATM location.
The withdrawal of the $800 amount appears to be at an ATM at Annandale. The other two withdrawals have a reference "LE". There is a further entry just immediately below those entries being another ATM withdrawal on 24 July 2018 in the sum of $1000. However, that entry appears to be distinctly referable to an ATM at Leichardt: CB 518.
There is evidence, which I referred to, that the deceased in 2018 caught a bus to Leichardt. Such evidence is consistent with the notion that the deceased was still, at that stage, able to travel and that he went to a suburb which was at least one of the suburb locations in which withdrawals were made from an ATM.
It was further evidenced in the medical records that the defendant had assisted the deceased with renovations.
Overall, I accept the defendant's evidence as to the withdrawals of monies from the deceased's S1 Account.
I am not persuaded that it has been demonstrated that the defendant systematically withdrew monies without the deceased's consent, and I reject the unauthorised withdrawal submission.

[68]

Testamentary deference submission

Mr Davidson SC sought to support his submission in relation to persuading me not to be overwhelmed by the deceased's testamentary decision to give the provision he gave to the plaintiff by reference to the comments of Parker J in Scott v Scott [2021] NSWSC 1619 at [343]-[348] as follows: 343. As I have just mentioned, counsel for Charlene relied on what I will term the "testamentary judgment principle". The principle is stated by White JA in Sgro v Thompson [2017] NSWCA 326 at [48], reasserting his Honour's earlier statements in Slack v Rogan (2013) 85 NSWLR 253 at [127]. It may be stated as being that in determining a proper level of provision the Court should place considerable weight on the judgment of a capable and responsible testator who will have known the circumstances far better than the Court can. See also the discussion in MacAlpine at [340]-[342]. 344. But this principle only applies if the testator's judgment is a responsible one. Counsel for Charlene submitted that the testamentary statement was taken by an experienced legal representative who had ensured his instructions were independent. But on my findings that was not so at all; the testamentary statement was the work, directly or indirectly, of Charlene. Mr Wehbe had no realistic way of identifying the distortions and falsehoods that it contained. 345. For these reasons the testamentary statement, and the May 2019 will, do not attract the testamentary judgment principle. But it is not merely a case of that principle being negatived in its application to the 2019 will and the testamentary statement. 346. Once the 2019 will and 2019 testamentary statement are swept away, the testamentary judgment principle focusses the Court's attention on the deceased's previous will in 2015. It is not suggested that the deceased or Clifton Snr was suffering from any relevant disability, or that any undue influence was brought to bear on the preparation of their 2015 wills. At that time, both of them had had many years of experience of living with Coralynne and Charlene. The judgment made by each of them was that the merits of their children were sufficiently close to make it proper to make an equal distribution between them. 347. I do not see, given my findings, that anything happened between 2015 and the deceased's death in July 2019 sufficient to alter that judgment as between Coralynne and Charlene. And, to the extent that Charlene's circumstances are relevant, there was no real change, or at least no change that would not have been contemplated and taken into account when the deceased made her will in 2015. 348. The testamentary statement tried to make the case that Coralynne had, as against the deceased, forfeited any testamentary recognition at all. The legacy of $40,000 (plus one-third of the remainder of the residue) was presented as being justified, not by Coralynne's own merits, but "out of respect" for Clifton Snr.
The passages referred to above from Sgro v Thompson and Slack v Rogan (2013) 85 NSWLR 253; [2013] NSWSC 522 relate to the provision a deceased makes in a Will.
Parker J's comments at [344]-[348] relate not per se to the provision in a will but rather to what is described as a testamentary statement (see s100 Succession Act).
Quite often Wills either embody reasons for why a deceased is making the provision (whether fulsome, minimal or non-existent) the deceased makes for a beneficiary, or the Will is accompanied by a statement, sometimes in the form of a statutory declaration, which expresses such reasons.
The comments of Parker J are conventional in the above respect.
However, they are somewhat different from what I understood Mr Davidson SC sought to submit in this case.
What he sought to do was to point to pieces of evidence suggesting that the deceased had dementia and cognitive impairment to provide the springboard for a submission that the deceased's assessment of provision for the plaintiff as minimal was not something that should stand as a strong barrier to the Court making its own assessment of adequacy of provision and order provision (if any) for the plaintiff.
There was at least some flavour in what Mr Davidson SC was suggesting that the Court should have regard to the evidence regarding dementia and cognitive impairment and for that reason not place considerable weight on the judgement of the deceased in altering the provision for the plaintiff from that set out in the 2003 Will and/or making the provision of only a one third share of the ultimate balance of his bank accounts in the 2018 Will for the plaintiff.
To the extent that the submission was to that effect, I reject this submission.
The Court should be wary to guard against a collateral attack on a Will that has been granted probate, where the plaintiff does not seek to set aside the Will despite having had an opportunity to do so and having made a forensic decision not to do so.
As a basic starting point, the Court should proceed on the basis that the deceased understood at least as of the date of the Will the provision given to the beneficiary under it.
Without attempting to be specific, it is self-evident that the deceased, at the time that he made the 2018 Will, in giving the defendant the property and its contents on one hand and giving to the plaintiff a one-third share of the monies in his bank accounts on the other hand, understood, at that point, that he was providing in favour of the defendant the vast majority of his then estate.
The corollary of that is that he was not providing the vast majority of his estate to the plaintiff.
Further, as I have noted above, the total of the proceeds of his bank accounts at that stage were not significantly more than about $7,000.
There is no evidence that the deceased was expecting his bank accounts to be enlarged in any significant way by monies other than through the payment of a weekly pension amount and some income from an AMP investment.
It is not in my estimation profitable to dwell too much upon the practical effect that had upon provision for the plaintiff. There are a number of reasons for that.
Those reasons include the fact that assessing the value of the deceased's gift to the plaintiff was inherently difficult to quantify until such time as the deceased had died. I have already noted the obvious that the bank account balances in the general scheme of life's affairs vary over time.
There are possibilities by which the plaintiff might ultimately have received a more significant benefit under the Will without the deceased changing the Will. For example, if the deceased had later sold his house in order to go into nursing home accommodation and directed some portion of the proceeds to be paid into his bank accounts, more significant provision might have flowed to the plaintiff.
Further, the assessment of the family provision claim is made at the time the Court makes the order, not at an earlier time.

[76]

Expenditure to date

On 30 November 2022, the defendant's solicitors corresponded with the plaintiff's solicitors complaining that documents produced by the plaintiff pursuant to a notice to produce were scant and piecemeal and identified a number of documents which they pressed for production of: CB 782.
The plaintiff produced various CBA bank statements for: 1. a Complete Access Account for the period 1 February 2021 to 31 July 2022; and 2. a Pensioner Security Account for the period from 1 January 2022 to 30 September 2022.
The Complete Access Account appears from the materials to be essentially a general account with balances, for the most part, under $10,000.
Matters of note include that: 1. up until August 2021, the plaintiff's fortnightly salary (as I have noted above) was paid into the account; 2. from time to time the plaintiff topped up the account with various transfers from what appears to be the Pensioner Security Account; 3. on some occasions, salary amounts were received in excess of the sum of $2967.57: e.g. 30 March 2021 ($3013.08) and 13 April 2021 ($5389.08); 4. the plaintiff on occasion transferred monies to Elisha in relation to kitchen expenses (four amounts of $2500 between 3-6 October 2021); 5. the plaintiff received a cheque for $6863.15 on 31 January 2022 which amount is unexplained; 6. on 2 March 2022, the plaintiff withdrew the first sum of $20,000 from Australian Super; 7. on 21 March 2022, the plaintiff withdrew a sum of $10,000 from Australian Super which was deposited into the account; 8. on 17 and 18 June 2022, the plaintiff paid legal fees to her lawyers in connection with an invoice in 2 amounts totalling $39,783.53; 9. on 28 and 29 June 2022, the plaintiff topped up the account in order to pay amounts to Gilles Motors Pty Ltd totalling $27,990.
The plaintiff was cross-examined regarding some five withdrawals she had made on 11 March 2021 from an ATM at the Canada Bay Club at Five Dock totalling $900 (four withdrawals of $200 and one withdrawal of $100): CB 789.
The plaintiff accepted that she had spent at least some of that money on poker machines, drinks and dining with friends: T 49. The plaintiff further accepted that she was in a position as at that date (21 March 2021) to enjoy a fairly "luxurious lifestyle" of being able to withdraw up to $900 on such an occasion: T 49.
Although it was not expressly the subject of submissions, the evidence reveals that, as at 1 April 2022, the plaintiff had an opening balance of $2,884,598.73 in her Pensioner Security Account.
The pages of the account statement for the period 1 April 2022 to 30 September 2022 disclose quite a few deductions in varying amounts but often in the sums of $2000 and, occasionally, greater, to top up the Complete Access Account: CB 851-855.
As at 1 January 2022, the plaintiff had a nominal balance of $17.49 in her Pensioner Security Account: CB 849.

[80]

Plaintiff

In respect of the plaintiff, the following may be noted in relation to s 60(2) factors.
I have referred above to the nature and duration of the relationship between the deceased and the plaintiff. I accept there was a closeness of relationship particularly in the plaintiff's formative childhood years and well into adult life: s 60(2)(a).
Whilst the deceased is said by the Mr Davidson SC to have been a father to the plaintiff, he did not take on the responsibilities of being a de jure parent and did not adopt the plaintiff: s 60(2)(b).
I have referred to the plaintiff's financial resources above. She is not cohabiting with another person, and no other person is liable to support her: s 60(2)(d),(e),(l).
The plaintiff is aged 66, does not have any disclosed physical intellectual or mental disability, and is retired from employment (having retired a number of months prior to her 65th birthday). There is no particular evidence suggestive that the plaintiff will live longer or shorter than the average lifespan of an adult female: s 60(2)(d),(g).
The plaintiff contributed by some degree of modest means to maintenance of the deceased's home: s 60(2)(h).
I accept that during the plaintiff's lifetime she contributed at times (in particular during the first study, second stay and third stay) to the deceased's welfare by caring for him. I further accepted that the plaintiff for much of her life had regular and convivial contact with the deceased and provided companionship akin to that of a daughter: s 60(2)(h).
The deceased provided for the plaintiff during her childhood and teenage years: s 60(2)(i)
It is clear that under the 1997 Will and 2003 Will the deceased intended significant provision for the plaintiff at those times. The deceased must have been taken to have still intended the significant provision provided under the 2003 Will at least up until April 2018. At that point of time the deceased made a conscious decision to reassess his testamentary intentions and priorities: s 60(2)(j).
Whilst the plaintiff depended upon the deceased as a child and into her teenage years, she was not being maintained by the deceased prior to his death and any such particular financial dependence ceased decades prior to his death: s 60(2)(k).
Much has been made by Mr Wood SC of the conduct of the plaintiff in respect of the convictions of perjury. As I have indicated, I accept that the deceased was somewhat cautious of statements made by the plaintiff to him after that time: s 60(2)(m).

[81]

Defendant

In respect of the defendant the following may be noted in relation to s 60(2) factors.
The defendant, other than for a period of about 15 months in 1982-1983 did not live with the deceased or have any apparent relationship of significance until about 2014, when the defendant commenced to live with the deceased. The principal means by which the defendant describes his relationship with the deceased is by reference to the description "Uncle Ray". In some of the medical records, the defendant is referred to as the deceased's nephew: s 60(2)(a).
At least formally, the deceased should not owe any de jure obligations to the defendant: s 60(2)(b).
The defendant cohabits with his wife Ms Febers and I have referred to their financial resources above. They are liable to support one another: s 60(2)(d),(e),(l).
The defendant is aged 49. He will be shortly 50 and has potentially another decade or more of opportunity to engage in remunerative employment prior to a natural retirement age: s 60(2)(d),(g).
The defendant had until March 2017 addiction issues with drugs and alcohol. He has some health issues which I have referred to. Other than that, he does not have any disclosed intellectual or mental disability: s 60(2)(f).
Prior to 2014, there is no suggestion that the defendant contributed in any particular financial sense to the conservation and improvement of the deceased's welfare or his property or estate. The defendant asserts that he contributed in a material way thereafter and I accept this: s 60(2)(h).
There is no suggestion that the deceased made any particular financial provision for the defendant prior to 2014: s 60(2)(i).
The deceased, prior to the 2018 Will, made no testamentary provision for the defendant: s 60(2)(j).
From about 2014, the defendant was maintained at least in part by the deceased in the form of provision of accommodation and care. Beyond March 2017, the accommodation and maintenance continued. However, there was a form of role reversal from about March 2017 in terms of the defendant caring for the deceased: s 60(2)(k).

[83]

Determination

Mr Davidson SC accepted that Aunty Sharon and Glenn were not competing financial claimants: T 139.
Mr Davidson SC accepted that there was no claim for education provision for the plaintiff and the claim was effectively for maintenance and advancement: T 149.
Mr Davidson SC opened the case on the basis that there ought to be provision for the plaintiff in the order of $250,000-$300,000: T 149.
At the end of submissions, Mr Davidson SC entertained the possibility that the Court in considering the plaintiff's claim for provision might entertain some "slight adjustments" to those figures, such that a smaller amount might be awarded by way of provision to the plaintiff: T 150, 151.
As I have noted above, logically, in approaching the question of inadequacy of provision one needs to have some reference point for assessing inadequacy.
The approach of the Court in having a reference point for assessing inadequacy is, as I have noted, addressed by White JA in Sgro v Thompson. His Honour stated there at [86]: … What is proper requires an evaluative judgment that has regard to all relevant circumstances, not merely the parties' financial circumstances.
To my mind, one of the most critical issues in the case was the relative strength of the plaintiff's financial position by reference to her claim for provision on the one hand and the competing claim of the defendant to retain the provision given to him. Mr Davidson SC accepted that: T 138.
Relatively speaking, it seems to me that that issue is a much larger consideration in the assessment of whether the plaintiff has been left with inadequate provision rather than the submissions as to unauthorised withdrawals, testamentary deference and testamentary involvement.
Ordinarily, applicants for provision will be able to quantify (to some degree) specific items within a claim for provision that are present and future "financial needs" within the meaning of s 60(2)(d) Succession Act.
Apart from such specific quantifiable financial needs, often applicants for provision will propound, as part of the claim for provision, a claim for advancement in life.
Whilst the Court does not necessarily expect that an applicant will be able to quantify a figure for "advancement in life" in the same way as a figure might be quantifiable for specific financial needs or for maintenance, ordinarily an applicant might be expected to identify as a matter, item or thing for which provision for advancement in life might be given.
In this case, once one puts aside the items of dental work (the availability and costing for which is uncertain) and the claims related to the swimming pool in the Berkeley Vale property (as to which it is unclear as to whether a pool can be installed in the space available and the separate costing for it is unquantified), the only matters which have in some sense been identified are the: 1. the prospect that she may incur medical expenses as she ages which may deplete her savings; and 2. the fact that as matters currently stand she has retired and is simply drawing on savings to pay her monthly expenses.
I can accept for the moment that those matters may be considered in assessing what the plaintiff's "proper" maintenance (or advancement) requires.
However, it is far from clear to me that the plaintiff is not able to address those matters from her existing resources and what, if anything, the plaintiff would be able to do differently by reason of having such additional resources ($1.85 million to $2 million) as distinct from having her existing resources of $1.6 million to $1.7 million: T 149-150.
Mr Davidson SC was not really able to point to anything that the plaintiff could purchase with increased resources as distinct from being able to be purchased out of her existing resources.
He directed my attention to the fact that the plaintiff had to sell the Five Dock property and draw on some superannuation and pay out a mortgage.
I indicated that effectively what has happened is that she has demonstrated that she is able, on one view, to make sensible financial choices and put herself in a position to be mortgage free.
Mr Davidson SC suggested that she was, however, forced to move to a cheaper area and be away from the home where she wanted to be and had lived for 37 years (or strictly speaking 32 years): T 150.
It is not the law that a plaintiff must present to the Court detailed calculations to demonstrate that they are using their existing resources in an economically optimal way to budget for their maintenance and to achieve their goals to advance their lives.
However, it is significant in this case that no attempt was made to set out in any form the way in which the plaintiff proposed to marshal her existing resources to provide her with any form of investment or other income to cover her expenses other than simply drawing down on funds principally in the Pensioner Security Account.
Ordinarily, there is wisdom in putting financial resources which one has (or has been entrusted with) to some appropriate use to generate more resources rather than not do so: 'Parable of the Talents', Matthew 25:14-30, Bible - New Revised Standard Version, Anglicised (see also Luke 19:12-27).
I attempted to engage Mr Davidson SC in respect of this. The discussion was at least in part as follows: HIS HONOUR: Sure, sure. But there's been no attempt to set out before me in any way, or how she proposes to marshal her resources other than just simply drawing on funds. And if that's what she wants to do, then she can presumably continue to do it. DAVIDSON: For some period. HIS HONOUR: For some period of time. But I'm being asked to consider making an order for provision in the order of about 250 to 300, or I think you've acknowledged perhaps on some conceptually lesser amount. DAVIDSON: Yes. HIS HONOUR: But to do what? To give some extra buffer to a plaintiff who has about 1.6 million to work with. DAVIDSON: Yes. Yes, your Honour, that is what it is.
The plaintiff expenses are $4,724 per month or $56,688 per annum.
I posed some very rough calculations in submissions to Mr Wood SC, but also for the benefit of Mr Davidson SC, to try to get at least some sense of how long the plaintiff might be able to draw on her resources if she was still being paid income of approximately $3,000 net per fortnight. That equates to $78,000 per annum: T 160.
Accepting for the moment that none of these figures are precise, the point is that even if the plaintiff's expenses went up to $60,000 per annum, on one view, the plaintiff should still be able to save $15,000 or more a year, or, more particularly, have available to her $15,000 or a bit more to cover contingencies each year.
Accordingly, I noted that if the plaintiff were to live with availability of $78,000 per annum (to cover not merely expenses but also some degree of contingencies) resources of approximately $1.6M might be extinguished within 20 years: T 160.
It is not unknown in family provision cases for an applicant to provide the Court with little detail regarding her (or his) financial requirements.
In Robinson v Tame [1994] NSWCA 266, Kirby P (with whom Handley and Sheller JJA agreed) stated at 8: But the fact remains that to the end of the case the appellant could not point to any specific objective which she had in mind and which was needed to provide adequately for her welfare and advancement. A hint of the need of a motor vehicle was made from the bar table. But if this had been the true desire of the appellant, one would have thought that such evidence would have been given at some stage during this long litigation. Alternatively, one might have expected more substantial evidence concerning her real needs. It is a constant source of surprise to me in this, as in other cases under the Act, that so much attention is spent upon personal recrimination and insufficient attention is paid to the proof of precise financial means of the parties and the precise needs of the claimant. The Act is not about the righting of moral wrongs, as such, but about the making of adequate provision In short, the focus of the Act is upon property - dollars and cents; not emotion and ethical desserts. What the appellant was asking, for unspecified needs, was that the Court should, by its order, in effect put the respondent widow out of her home. That would have a very significant, if not devastating, effect at this stage of the widow's life. It would be arguably unjust The respondent meanwhile has her own home arrangements. She can look to even better arrangements at some time in the future, according to the communication from the Housing Department. Even a comparatively small legacy (say $40,000.00) would have carried significant costs of the proceedings, and possibly necessitated substantial costs of the sale of the present home of the respondent and the purchase of a new and more modest home for the respondent.
There is a tension in the proceedings regarding whether the property would have to be sold or not.
The defendant's case is presented on the basis that the property should not be sold as it provides the defendant with accommodation and the defendant could not easily obtain alternative accommodation, and if the property were to be sold the defendant and Ms Febers would at least to some degree be set back in having any capacity to move forward in their lives: DCS [56].
Mr Davidson SC, whilst pressing for provision for the plaintiff, did not submit that the outcome of the case meant that sale of the property was inevitable.
My sense of the matter is that the defendant, in order to retain the property, may be able to bear the expenses that I have noted above. However, if an order for provision were made to the plaintiff and any costs order made for the plaintiff that would in a sense be the straw that breaks the camel's back which would compel a sale of the property.
I am mindful that the strength of the plaintiff's financial position and resources is not the only consideration in assessing adequacy.
I am, in particular, mindful of the importance not to elide the distinction between needs and adequate provision and that adequacy of provision is not to be determined by a calculation of financial needs.
In considering adequacy of provision, whilst I have accepted that the plaintiff's relationship with the deceased was akin to that of child and parent, I am nonetheless mindful that the deceased did not have the de jure obligations of a parent.
I am mindful that the plaintiff provided daughter-like companionship to the deceased on a regular basis throughout his life - at least up until 2014 - and contributed to his welfare in that respect and, in particular, cared for the deceased on three occasions (3 months plus 2 months plus 6-7 months) which I have described is days totalling a period of about a year.
However, as against those matters there are strong factors favouring a determination that the plaintiff has not been left without proper and adequate provision.
These include: 1. The plaintiff did not, other than by some degree of maintenance (painting and other unspecified renovations) and some homemaking assistance (making new curtains, help with choosing appliances and choices with replacing carpet and other furniture), contribute in any significant material way to the maintenance or improvement of the deceased's estate. 2. The plaintiff has not been able to quantify other than by reference to credit card debts of $11,300 any specific debt or expense as a current or anticipated future need. 3. The plaintiff, whilst referring to some requirement for dental work, has not sought any information in relation to the cost of dental work or obtained any quote in respect of it. If the plaintiff is unable to have implants because of bone density issues, I do not have any clear evidence of what, if any, dental treatment might be ultimately necessary for the plaintiff and if so, what that treatment might cost. 4. The plaintiff has not provided any other details regarding her current health or any medical condition such as might require an outlay for her to incur private health insurance. 5. In any event, the plaintiff has not provided any costing in relation to the expense of private health insurance. 6. The plaintiff has already undertaken landscaping work. She has not provided any sufficient evidence to identify what part of a figure of $108,000 (which was not, in any event, supported by any quote or basis for calculation) might be referable to non-landscaping work being installation of a swimming pool, pool fencing, landscaping and sliding doors. 7. In terms of advancement in life, as I have discussed above, the plaintiff is unable to point to any specific matters requiring provision to advance her position in life beyond the fact that she may in the future incur medical expenses (notwithstanding there is no evidence of any current medical condition apart from requiring some dental work) that might give rise to significant expense and she is simply drawing upon accumulated funds to pay expenses. 8. Whilst I accept that potentially funding future medical expenses would generally inform proper provision there is no evidence of any current medical condition (other than the dental work which I have separately addressed) that might give rise to significant expense. 9. Whilst I accept that drawing on accumulated funds or savings to pay expenses would generally inform proper provision, the plaintiff has not provided the Court with any even rudimentary plan regarding how she proposes to marshal her resources to generate income to pay for her expenses. 10. The deceased whilst caring for the plaintiff in her childhood did not assume de jure legal obligations to maintain the plaintiff. 11. The defendant contributed in the last years of the deceased's life to his welfare. 12. The defendant carried out works on the deceased's property, albeit that some undefined part of the works were paid from the deceased's S1 Account. 13. The defendant is in need of a residence and if the property were to be sold, he (and Ms Febers) will be setback indefinitely and lose any meaningful capacity to move forward in their lives. 14. The defendant was not challenged in cross-examination in relation to his evidence regarding his attachment to the property and his limited capacity to purchase alternative accommodation. 15. I have accepted that the defendant: 1. does not have the financial capacity or means to purchase alternative accommodation in the Annandale area nor the financial capacity or means to cover stamp duty, removalist costs and other costs and expenses associated with the purchase of a home; and 2. given the state of his savings and superannuation he does not have any buffer for unseen contingencies and, accordingly, if any major expenses did arise, he would not have the ability to meet these. 1. The deceased, in discussions with Ms Ginges prior to preparation of his 2018 Will, wished the defendant to receive the property in a context where the deceased regarded that the defendant had "done such a good job of looking after him". 2. The deceased's desire to make sure that the plaintiff was also taken care of does not appear to have been intended by him to impinge in any significant way his intention for the defendant to "have the house".
If more ready funds had been accumulated by the deceased in his bank account the plaintiff would, subject to the effect of estate expenses, have received a greater provision.
If any provision were given at all to the plaintiff, it would ordinarily carry with it an order for costs.
However, as matters presently stand the defendant does not have additional ready funds that might be able to permit him to cover any order for provision and an associated costs order for the plaintiff without jeopardising his ability to retain the property.
Overall, whilst I accept that proper provision can encompasses improvement and enhancement of the plaintiff's position, making an order for provision to give the plaintiff what she claims by way of provision ($250,000 to $300,000) or even some lesser amount, would in my assessment only marginally potentially enhance the plaintiff's position, whilst significantly impacting upon the defendant's position.
Ultimately, taking all these considerations into account, I am not persuaded that the plaintiff has been left without proper and adequate provision.

Robertson v McCann

At a glance

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Judgment (86 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (5)

Cases Cited (43)

Cited By (3)