ROBERTSON -v- LEGAL SERVICES AND COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE [2025] WASCA 92 (20 June 2025)

I have been operating on the basis that the first defendant was playing no further part in the action and that this was accepted because of notice of external administration and the DOCA. I had understood this trite legal position was known and accepted by the parties[.]

1. This response was not misleading so far as it related to the basis on which the appellant had been operating in 2017 and 2018. Rather, it generally reflects our findings as to the appellant's subjective understanding at that time. The passage does not refer to particular provisions of the Corporations Act and does not convey the pleaded representation.
2. The above passage from the appellant's email does not reflect the basis on which we have found the appellant to be operating in the period from 26 June 2019 to 16 July 2019. However, it is not clear that these passages in Mr Penglis' and the appellant's emails are directed to the appellant's understanding in that more recent period. They can be taken as relating to the conduct of the SC proceedings since the appointment of the administrators and the execution of the DOCA generally. The materiality of the appellant's more recent assumption in relation to the points being made in the passages is not clear. It must also be recalled that the appellant was making a lengthy email response to Mr Penglis' long email which had been sent only two hours earlier. Having regard to all of the above matters, in our view it was not open to the Tribunal to find that this passage was intentionally misleading in any material respect.
3. Beyond what is stated in the passage reproduced at [199] above, the Tribunal did not make any specific finding about this passage of the appellant's email.

1. The third particular of complaint ground 2, noted at [195] above, related to the appellant's response to the following paragraph of Mr Penglis' email sent on 18 July 2019:

In this regard it is not correct for you to suggest that you have not taken any step in your capacity as solicitor for the first defendant since the appointment of Administrators and subsequent to the DOCA. On many occasions (see your emails to, amongst others, [Fletcher Law] dated 30 October 2017, 3 February 2018, 25 April 2018, 7 August 2018, 16 October 2018, 15 January 2019) you have signed consent orders as solicitors for both defendants. You have recently appeared before Archer J (twice) on behalf of both defendants. Moreover, even as recently as 2, 6 and 12 July you have sent emails expressly on behalf of the First and Second Defendants.

1. The appellant's email made the following response:
   • As noted above the emails between 30.10.17 - 15.1.19 contain consent orders prepared by others and I accept a lack of attention to the detail therein.
   • I will correct the record with the court about the two July 2019 appearances by an email to the Associate at the conclusion of our conferral. I also apologise for the error of referring to the first defendant in the July 2019 emails.
2. The statement, 'as noted above', in the first dot point of the appellant's response was to the following earlier passage of the appellant's email:

Up until the emails this month, each of the emails you have referred to dated 30 October 2017, 3 February 2018, 25 April 2018, 7 August 2018, 16 October 2018 and 15 January 2018 - all relate to consent orders prepared by others. I accept that this should have made clear that we acted only for the second Defendant and that the emails and appearances this month were incorrect.

1. The passages of the appellant's email were not misleading so far as they referred to the appellant signing and returning minutes of consent orders prior to June 2019 in error due to lack of attention to detail.
2. The appellant's email does not expressly state the nature of his 'error' in referring to the first defendant in the 2019 emails. The email does not indicate whether the error was in referring to the first defendant in circumstances where he knew Williams + Hughes did not act for Ironbridge or in mistakenly assuming that Williams + Hughes did act for Ironbridge. Further, while the appellant referred to sending an email asking for the court's record of his appearances to be corrected, he does not explain how he came to announce his appearances for Ironbridge.
3. The Tribunal found that what it characterised as the 'suggestion in the email' that the announcement of appearances and signing of minutes of consent orders was a result of lack of attention to detail was untrue.[221] As we have explained, this finding was in error so far as it referred to the signing of minutes of consent orders prior to June 2019. The finding that the appellant's email conveyed that the announcement of his appearances was the result of lack of attention to detail is not supported by the text of the appellant's email, considered in light of the context in which it was sent. Further, a finding that a legal practitioner has engaged in professional misconduct by knowingly making a false statement requires more than the mere suggestion in the text of an email of a circumstance which does not exist. There was no finding, and the evidence before the Tribunal did not support a finding, that the appellant intended to convey that his announcement of appearances for Ironbridge in July 2019 was the result of lack of attention to detail.
4. In our view, the evidence did not establish the third particular of complaint ground 2.

1. For the above reasons, the evidence does not establish any of the Committee's particulars of complaint ground 2. The Tribunal's order that the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by sending the email of 18 July 2019 to Mr Penglis should be set aside and an order dismissing the complaint substituted.

Complaint ground 5: letter to Mr Penglis of 22 July 2019

1. It is convenient to deal next with complaint ground 5 in the Tribunal. Complaint ground 5 relates to a letter the appellant sent to Mr Penglis on 22 July 2019, which is set out at [100] above. Complaint ground 5 alleged that, on or about 22 July 2019, the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by preparing and sending a letter to another practitioner in circumstances where he knew that the letter contained statements that were misleading and intended the other practitioner to be misled by those statements.
2. The Committee alleged that the appellant's letter to Mr Penglis of 22 July 2019 was misleading in the following material respects:[222]
   1. The letter represented that the appellant had, since 15 September 2017, proceeded on the basis and assumed that the SC proceedings had not continued against Ironbridge by reason of the operation of s 444E of the Corporations Act. This representation was misleading because the appellant had not proceeded on that basis.
   2. The letter represented that the appellant had inadvertently and in error previously purported to sign minutes of consent orders in the SC proceedings on behalf of Ironbridge. This representation was misleading because the appellant had proceeded on the basis and assumption that it was open to him and Williams + Hughes to continue to represent Ironbridge in the SC proceedings and, consequently, the previous correspondence was not a result of inadvertent error.
   3. The letter represented that the appellant had inadvertently and in error previously purported to appear before the Supreme Court on behalf of Ironbridge in the SC proceedings. This representation was misleading because the appellant had proceeded on the basis and assumption that it was open to him and Williams + Hughes to continue to represent Ironbridge in the SC proceedings and, consequently, the appearances were not a result of inadvertent error.

1. The Committee's first particular noted at [215] above relates to the following passage of the letter sent by the appellant to Mr Penglis on 22 July 2019:

[I] have had no involvement with the DOCA administrators - since and after they were appointed DOCA administrators of Ironbridge. They were also unaware of this action and have played no part in it whatsoever.

As a matter of Law (as I understood it) my firm's ... retainer with Ironbridge ended when DOCA administrators were appointed to Ironbridge on 15 September 2017 - which was when different parties took control of Ironbridge and did not instruct me to act.

The requirement of your client to apply for leave to proceed against Ironbridge, under s 444E(3) of the Corporations Act, is not something the DOCA administrators could ever consent to, or waive, without the leave of the Court.

1. The Committee's particular appears to focus on the third paragraph of the passage just quoted. It is that paragraph which refers to s 444E(3) of the Corporations Act, which provides that a creditor cannot proceed with proceedings against a company subject to a deed of company arrangement without the leave of the court. However, in this third paragraph the appellant is explaining the actual legal position rather than his past understanding of that position. This is in contrast to the second paragraph which refers to the appellant's understanding that, at the time the DOCA administrators were appointed, Ironbridge's retainer of Williams + Hughes was at an end. The appellant's letter does not convey the representation alleged by the Committee: that the appellant had, since 15 September 2017, proceeded on the basis and assumed that the SC proceedings had not continued against Ironbridge by reason of the operation of s 444E of the Corporations Act.
2. The Tribunal found that the letter intended to convey to the reader that the appellant knew at the time he notified the parties about Ironbridge being in administration and subject to a DOCA, that the effect was that the SC proceedings were 'stayed' against Ironbridge. The Tribunal found that this was untrue.[223] For the above reasons, the Tribunal erred in finding that the appellant's letter conveyed, or was intended to convey, that representation.

1. Although this was not the subject of a particular in the Committee's application, the Tribunal found that the appellant did not understand that Williams + Hughes' retainer with Ironbridge had come to an end when the deed administrators were appointed, and that the statement in the letter that that was his understanding at the time was false and misleading.[224] In the absence of a pleaded allegation to this effect, the matter should not have been the subject of an adverse finding of this kind. However, for completeness, we will consider whether the finding is correct.
2. The second paragraph of the passage of the letter quoted at [216] above does objectively convey that the appellant understood at the time the deed administrators were appointed that Ironbridge's retainer of Williams + Hughes came to an end at that time. The compelling inference is that the appellant intended to convey this meaning, by the insertion of the words 'as I understood it' in parentheses. The appellant modified the amendment which Mr Zelestis had suggested in this part of the letter, and so paid significant attention to this critical part. The appellant must have known the statement was false, as on his own evidence (noted at [142] above) he did not turn his mind to the status of the contract of retainer until speaking to Mr Zelestis less than three days earlier. The fact that Mr Zelestis suggested the amendment, based on what the appellant had told him, did not relieve the appellant from ensuring that the statement was factually accurate. In his evidence before the Tribunal, the appellant accepted that he should not have expressed himself in those terms.
3. However, we are not satisfied that by making this statement the appellant intended to mislead Mr Penglis in any material respect. There is little difference between an understanding that Williams + Hughes had ceased to act for Ironbridge and an understanding that the contract of retainer between Williams + Hughes and Ironbridge had come to an end. There is nothing to suggest that the appellant might have thought that his position would be mitigated by an understanding that the contract of retainer was at an end, as opposed to an understanding that Williams + Hughes no longer acted for Ironbridge. The fact that the appellant appreciated that Williams + Hughes was not acting for Ironbridge when the appellant signed minutes of consent tended to aggravate rather than mitigate the unprofessional conduct. Given the advice which Mr Zelestis had given, noted at [95.4] and [99] above, the compelling inference is that the appellant was attempting to take full responsibility for his conduct in adding the words 'as I understood it' in parentheses. The Tribunal's finding, that the reason for the appellant making this statement was to avoid criticism of his conduct in purporting to act for Ironbridge after it had entered into administration and the DOCA when he was no[225]nger able to do so,225 is contrary to that compelling inference.

1. The Committee's second particular noted at [215] above relates to the following passage of the letter sent by the appellant to Mr Penglis on 22 July 2019:

I accept I have inadvertently signed programming orders prepared by your instructors on 30 October 2017, 3 February 2018, 25 April 2018, 7 August 2018, 16 October 2018 and 15 January 2019. I apologise for the lack of attention to detail in signing those consent orders without scoring through reference to [Ironbridge].

1. The Tribunal found that the statements in the letter that the appellant signed consent orders as a result of inadvertence or lack of attention to detail were false and misleading. This was because the appellant did not have appreciation that the action was 'stayed' against Ironbridge at the time he took those actions.[226]
2. For the reasons explained above, the statement that the appellant inadvertently signed the consent orders referred to in the passage quoted at [222] above was true. The Tribunal erred in finding to the contrary and in finding that this passage of the appellant's letter was misleading.

1. The Committee's third particular noted at [215] above relates to the following passage of the letter sent by the appellant to Mr Penglis on 22 July 2019:

I also acknowledge that - at the two and only court appearances I have ever made in this action (that both occurred this month) - I incorrectly announced my appearance on behalf of the First and Second Defendant. I will correct this oversight with the Court immediately and request that the Court record be updated to reflect my two appearances were only on behalf of [Ian] Wallace.

1. This passage indicates that the appellant's announcement of his appearances on behalf of Ironbridge was 'incorrect'. It does not expressly state that it was incorrect because he did not intend to announce his appearance for Ironbridge. The appellant refers to correcting 'this oversight', without expressly stating that the oversight was either in unintentionally announcing his appearance for a party he did not appear for or in intentionally announcing his appearance for a party he did not actually represent. The terms of this passage are not sufficiently clear to enable an inference to be confidently drawn that the appellant intended to convey that he had inadvertently purported to appear for Ironbridge as alleged by the Committee.
2. The Tribunal found that the statements in the letter that the appellant announced his appearance as a result of inadvertence or lack of attention to detail were false and misleading. This was because the appellant did not have an appreciation that the SC proceedings were 'stayed' against Ironbridge at the time he took those actions.[227] However, the passage in the appellant's letter to Mr Penglis of 22 July 2019 did not clearly convey that he announced his appearances as a result of inadvertence or lack of attention to detail. The terms of the letter were such that the Tribunal could not be satisfied to the requisite standard that the appellant intended to convey that meaning or to mislead Mr Penglis by doing so.

1. The evidence did not establish any of the Committee's particulars of complaint ground 5, or the additional matter relating to the termination of the retainer which was the subject of the Tribunal's finding. Therefore, the Tribunal erred in finding the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by preparing and sending the letter of 22 July 2019 which he knew contained misleading statements, intending that Mr Penglis would be misled by those statements.[228] The Tribunal's order that the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by sending the letter of 22 July 2019 to Mr Penglis should be set aside and an order dismissing the complaint substituted.

Complaint ground 3: letter to associate of 22 July 2019

1. Complaint ground 3 related to the letter the appellant sent to the associate to Archer J on 22 July 2019, which is set out at [102] above. Complaint ground 3 alleged that, on or about 22 July 2019, the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by preparing and sending a letter to the associate to Archer J in circumstances where he knew that the letter contained statements that were misleading and intended the court to be misled by those statements.

1. The Committee alleged that the appellant's letter to the associate to Archer J of 22 July 2019 was misleading in the following material respects:[229]
   1. The letter represented that the appellant had, since at least 15 September 2017, proceeded on the basis and assumed that Williams + Hughes had not been retained to act for Ironbridge since that time. This representation was misleading because the appellant had not proceeded on that basis or made that assumption. Rather, the appellant had proceeded on the basis and assumption that it was open to him and Williams + Hughes to continue to represent Ironbridge in the SC proceedings.
   2. The letter represented that the appellant had, since at least 15 September 2017, proceeded on the basis and assumed that the SC proceedings had not continued against Ironbridge by reason of the operation of s 440D, alternatively s 444E, of the Corporations Act. This representation was misleading as the appellant did not make this assumption.

However, as is noted below, the Tribunal's findings did not reflect these particulars of the complaint.

1. In his letter to the associate, the appellant said:

It has come to my attention that I incorrectly announced my appearances as counsel for the First Defendant (Ironbridge) and the Second Defendant ([Ian] Wallace). This was an error because I had been operating on the assumption that [Williams + Hughes'] retainer for Ironbridge ended, on or about 21 July 2017, when Ironbridge appointed Messrs Neil Crabb and Greg Dudley of RSM Australia Partners as Ironbridge's administrators. (original emphasis)

The appellant gave reasons for his 'assumption that [Williams + Hughes'] retainer with Ironbridge was at an end'. One of those reasons was that there was a statutory 'stay' of the action under s 444E(3) of the Corporations Act.

1. This passage of the appellant's letter to the associate seeks to explain the appellant's conduct in announcing his appearance as counsel for Ironbridge. It is therefore speaking to the appellant's subjective appreciation of the position at the hearings on 3 July 2019 and 16 July 2019. For the reasons explained above, at that time the appellant was acting on the assumption that he was acting for Ironbridge. He did not appreciate the terms of s 444E until he looked at the statutory provisions after the hearing on 16 July 2019. The appellant did not turn his mind to the status of the retainer until he spoke with Mr Zelestis on 19 July 2019. The statement that, when he announced his appearances, the appellant assumed he was not acting for Ironbridge and the reasons for that assumption (the end of the retainer and the operation of s 444E of the Corporations Act) were false. When he sent this letter on 22 July 2019 he must have been aware of the contrary assumption on which he had been acting up until 16 July 2019, which was only about six days earlier.
2. The Tribunal found that the statement that he was operating on the assumption that Williams + Hughes' retainer was at an end was false and misleading because the appellant had not made that assumption. It also found that the statement that, when announcing appearances, the appellant understood that s 444E of the Corporations Act had brought his retainer to an end was false and misleading. The Tribunal found that the appellant did not understand that a statutory 'stay', brought about by operation of s 444E of the Corporations Act, had come into effect upon it entering into administration.[230] In our view, while there is a little infelicity in the use of the term 'entering into administration' when the Tribunal ought to have referred to Ironbridge entering into a deed of company arrangement, these findings were supported by the evidence.

1. In his letter to the associate, the appellant also apologised for 'the lack of attention to detail' in signing consent orders on 30 October 2017, 3 February 2018, 25 April 2018, 7 August 2018, 16 October 2018 and 15 January 2019 without deleting reference to the first defendant. The Tribunal also found the letter to be misleading so far as it represented that the appellant had signed consent notices as a result of lack of attention to detail because at the time he signed he knew that he was not acting for Ironbridge was false and misleading.[231] For the reasons explained above, the appellant's statement in this part of his letter as to his state of mind when signing specified minutes of consent was true. The Tribunal erred in finding that this statement was misleading.

1. The Tribunal found that the appellant's intention in making those statements in the email was to mislead the court and deflect criticism of his earlier conduct.[232] We agree with this finding so far as it relates to the appellant's explanation for announcing his appearances for Ironbridge.

1. The Tribunal found the appellant to be guilty of professional misconduct by preparing and sending the letter knowing that it contained statements that were misleading and intending the court to be misled by those statements.[233] That finding was correct so far as it related to the appellant's explanation in the letter to the associate for announcing his appearances. It was in error so far as it related to the appellant's explanation in that letter for signing the minutes of consent orders.
2. In these circumstances, it is appropriate to set aside the Tribunal's order in relation to complaint ground 3 and substitute an order finding that, on 22 July 2019, the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by preparing and sending a letter to the associate to Archer J which represented that, when he announced his appearances in the SC proceedings on 3 July 2019 and 16 July 2019 he had been operating on the assumption that Williams + Hughes' retainer with the first defendant was at an end, when the appellant:

(a) knew the representation was misleading; and

(b) intended to mislead the court in making the representation.

1. Complaint ground 4 concerns the affidavit sworn by the appellant on 22 July 2019 in support of an application for Williams + Hughes to cease to act for Ironbridge. The material parts of the affidavit are set out at [101] above.

1. Complaint ground 4 alleged that, on or about 22 July 2019, the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by swearing an affidavit and causing it to be filed in the Supreme Court in circumstances where he knew that the affidavit contained statements that were misleading and intended the Court to be misled by those statements.
2. The Committee alleged that the appellant's affidavit of 22 July 2019 was misleading in the following material respects:[234]
   1. The affidavit represented that the appellant had, since at least 15 September 2017, proceeded on the basis and assumed that Williams + Hughes had not been retained to act for Ironbridge since that time. This representation was misleading because the appellant had not proceeded on that basis or made that assumption. Rather, the appellant had proceeded on the basis and assumption that it was open to him and Williams + Hughes to continue to represent Ironbridge in the SC proceedings.
   2. The affidavit represented that the appellant had, since at least 15 September 2017, proceeded on the basis and assumed that the SC proceedings had not continued against Ironbridge by reason of the operation of s 440D, alternatively s 444E, of the Corporations Act. This representation was misleading because the appellant did not make this assumption.

1. At par 6 of that affidavit, the appellant stated:

I confirm I have had no contact with and taken no instructions from Messrs Cribb and Dudley in their capacity as administrators of Ironbridge. The reasons for that include:

6.1 I regarded [Williams + Hughes'] retainer with Ironbridge to be at an end as at 21 July 2017; and

6.2 Ironbridge was under a statutory stay, under s 444E(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), by which it was impermissible that [Satterley] could continue this action against Ironbridge without the leave of the Court. No such application for leave under s 444E(3) of the Corporations Act was ever filed by [Satterley].

1. This paragraph firstly deposes that the appellant had no contact with and had taken no instruction from the deed administrators. That statement was true. The purpose of making that statement was to support the application by Williams + Hughes to cease to act as solicitors for Ironbridge. The balance of this paragraph of the affidavit explains the reasons why the appellant has had no contact and taken no instructions from the deed administrators. The appellant is not here explaining why he announced his appearance for Ironbridge or signed documents purporting to act as solicitor for Ironbridge.
2. While the paragraph of the affidavit deposes as to the appellant's state of mind, it does not expressly say when he held that state of mind. It appears to relate to the period since the appointment of the administrators. It does not clearly distinguish between the appellant's state of mind at the time of swearing the affidavit and his state of mind when the deed administrators were appointed.
3. So far as the paragraph deposes to the appellant's state of mind when the deed administrators were appointed in 2017, it is accurate so far as it conveys that the appellant at that time thought Williams + Hughes was not acting for Ironbridge and that Ironbridge would play no further part in the SC proceedings. It is not accurate so far as it conveys that the appellant considered the status of the retainer in 2017, as that only occurred during the appellant's discussion with Mr Zelestis on 19 July 2019. However, as we have noted above, there is little difference between an understanding that Williams + Hughes had ceased to act for Ironbridge and an understanding that the contract of retainer between Williams + Hughes and Ironbridge had come to an end. This paragraph of the appellant's affidavit is also not accurate so far as it conveys that in 2017 the appellant was of the view that Ironbridge was under a statutory 'stay' pursuant to s 444E(3) of the Corporations Act. The appellant only appreciated the terms of that provision when he looked at it after the hearing on 16 July 2019.
4. The appellant came to understand that the retainer had been terminated and s 444E(3) operated as a statutory 'stay' in the days prior to his swearing the affidavit on 22 July 2019. Gaining that understanding ought to have been fresh in his mind. However, the distinctions between what the appellant understood in 2017 and what is stated in par 6.1 and par 6.2 of his affidavit are relatively fine. Those distinctions were not material to the purpose for which the appellant swore the affidavit. Further, the understanding conveyed by par 6.1 and par 6.2 of the affidavit did accurately reflect the appellant's understanding at the time the affidavit was sworn. The inaccuracy in the paragraph lies in conflating the appellant's understanding at the time of swearing the affidavit with his state of mind at the time the deed administrators were appointed in 2017. As the appellant accepted in the exchange with Archer J noted at [124] - [125] above, the understanding deposed to at par 6.1 and par 6.2 of the affidavit ought to have been expressed in the present tense.
5. Given the fineness of the distinction between the appellant's actual past state of mind and that represented by the affidavit, and the immateriality of that distinction to the purpose for which the affidavit was sworn, the terms of the affidavit do not support the inference that the appellant deliberately set out to mislead the court. The appellant's conduct in misstating his past state of mind is to be assessed in a context where the affidavit did not clearly indicate when the appellant held the state of mind and that fact was immaterial to the court's decision to grant the relief sought. The critical facts were that the appellant had not been in communication with the deed administrators, currently regarded the retainer to be at an end and considered that the SC proceedings could not continue against Ironbridge without the court's leave. Williams + Hughes had plainly ceased to act for Ironbridge in these circumstances so that a declaration pursuant to O 8 r 7 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) was inevitable. Evidence as to the appellant's past state of mind, or the reasons for his lack of contact with the deed administrators could not affect that conclusion. The appellant's inappropriate use of tense in this context does not support an inference that he sought to mislead the court in any material respect.

1. The Tribunal found that the appellant did not appreciate that his retainer had come to an end or that the action was under a statutory 'stay' under s 444E(3) of the Corporations Act. It found that the affidavit was misleading in stating that those understandings were reasons why he did not obtain instructions from the administrators. That finding was open on the evidence. However, the Tribunal erred in finding that the appellant made those statements intending to mislead the court.[235]

1. For the above reasons, the Tribunal erred in finding that the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by swearing the affidavit and causing it to be filed in court when he knew that it contained statements that were misleading and intended the court to be misled by those statements.[236] The Tribunal's finding that the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by swearing that affidavit and causing it to be filed should be set aside and an order dismissing the complaint substituted.

1. Complaint ground 6 relates to the affidavit sworn by the appellant on 5 August 2019 in opposition to Satterley's application that Williams + Hughes pay the costs of an application for leave to proceed against Ironbridge under s 444E of the Corporations Act. The relevant part of the affidavit is set out at [119] above.

1. Complaint ground 6 alleged that, on or about 5 August 2019, the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by swearing an affidavit and causing it to be filed in the Supreme Court in circumstances where he knew that the affidavit contained statements that were misleading and intended the Court to be misled by those statements.
2. The Committee alleged that the appellant's affidavit of 5 August 2019 was misleading in the following material respects:[237]
   1. The affidavit represented that the appellant had, since at least 15 September 2017, proceeded on the basis and assumed that the SC proceedings had not continued against Ironbridge by reason of the operation of s 440D, alternatively s 444E, of the Corporations Act. This representation was misleading because the appellant had not proceeded on that basis.
   2. The affidavit represented that the appellant had, since at least 15 September 2017, assumed that Mr Penglis, Fletcher Law and Satterley understood and proceeded on the basis that the SC proceedings had not continued against Ironbridge by reason of the operation of s 440D, alternatively s 444E, of the Corporations Act. This representation was misleading because the appellant did not hold that assumption.
   3. The affidavit represented that the contents of the appellant's email of 18 July 2019 to Mr Penglis were true and correct, when the email was misleading for the reasons given in relation to complaint ground 2.
   4. The affidavit represented that the contents of the appellant's letter of 22 July 2019 to Mr Penglis were true and correct, when the letter was misleading for the reasons given in relation to complaint ground 5.
   5. The affidavit represented that the contents of the appellant's letter to the associate to Archer J of 22 July 2019 were true and correct, when the email was misleading for the reasons given in relation to complaint ground 3.
   6. The affidavit represented that the appellant's previous email correspondence and appearances by him in the SC proceedings in which he had represented that he continued to act for Ironbridge were a result of inadvertent error. This representation was misleading because this was not the case.

Assumptions about the SC proceedings against Ironbridge

1. The first and second particulars of complaint ground 6, referred to at [251] above, concern the following paragraph of the appellant's affidavit:

The reason why [Williams + Hughes] did not apply to get off the record for Ironbridge before it filed the application dated 22 July 2019 is that I had assumed that it was common cause between the parties to this action that:

5.1 Ironbridge was in insolvent administration;

5.2 Ironbridge was subject to a DOCA (as I had notified [Satterley's] solicitors on 11 October 2017) and [Satterley] required leave of the Court to proceed with its action against Ironbridge; and

5.3 Ironbridge was taking no further part in the proceedings.

1. On the findings about the appellant's state of mind made above, this paragraph of the appellant's affidavit was true. Contrary to the allegation in the Committee's particulars, the passage does not refer to the appellant's earlier understanding of the operation of s 440D or s 444E of the Corporations Act. It reflects the appellant's general understanding of the position from the time when the deed administrators were appointed, as we have found it at [167] above. It is not directed to the appellant's appearances for Ironbridge in July 2019. Therefore, the first and second particulars of complaint ground 6 are not established.
2. In any event, the Tribunal did not make any misconduct finding in relation to this aspect of the appellant's affidavit of 5 August 2019 or the first and second particulars to complaint ground 6.[238]

1. The third and fourth particulars of complaint ground 6, referred to at [251] above, concern the following paragraph of the appellant's affidavit:

On 18 July 2019, I emailed Mr Penglis SC. This email forms part of attachment BT-1 to the affidavit of [Fletcher Law's solicitor] affirmed and filed on 22 July 2019. The contents of my email dated 22 July 2019 to Mr Penglis SC (attachment BT-1), insofar as the email contains my explanation for [Williams + Hughes] remaining on the record for Ironbridge, is true and correct.

1. The reference in this passage to the appellant's 'email dated 22 July 2019 to Mr Penglis SC' is plainly a typographical error, and is intended to refer to the appellant's email of 18 July 2019. That email, rather than the appellant's letter to Mr Penglis of 22 July 2019, was attachment BT‑1 to the affidavit of Fletcher Law's solicitor.[239] It follows that the appellant's affidavit did not adopt the contents of his letter to Mr Penglis of 22 July 2019 and the fourth particular to complaint ground 6 was not established.
2. We have found that the appellant's email to Mr Penglis of 18 July 2019 was not knowingly misleading in any of the respects alleged by the Committee in respect of complaint ground 2. It follows that the third particular to complaint ground 6, referred to at [251] above, is also not established.
3. Based on its finding that the contents of the email from the appellant to Mr Penglis dated 18 July 2019 was misleading, the Tribunal concluded that the statement in the affidavit that the explanation given in that email was 'true and correct' was itself false and misleading.[240] This finding was in error for the reasons explained above.

1. The fifth particular of complaint ground 6, referred to at [251] above, concern the following paragraph of the appellant's affidavit:

On 22 July 2019, I wrote to the Associate to the Honourable Justice Archer, and caused a copy of this letter to be sent to the solicitors for the other parties. Attached hereto and marked 'JAR1' is a true copy of that letter.

The contents of my letter being 'JAR1' are true and correct.

1. For the reasons explained in dealing with complaint ground 3, the appellant's letter to the associate to Archer J of 22 July 2019 was misleading so far as it represented that, when he announced his appearances in the SC proceedings on 3 July 2019 and 16 July 2019, the appellant had been operating on the assumption that Williams + Hughes' retainer with Ironbridge was at an end. We have found that, when he sent the letter, the appellant knew the representation was misleading and intended to mislead the court when making the representation.
2. The appellant's affidavit of 5 August 2019 was sworn only two weeks after the letter was sent and less than three weeks after the appellant's appearance before Archer J on 16 July 2019. The events must have been fresh in his mind. Further, the only conceivable purpose of attaching and adopting the appellant's letter to the associate could be to explain why he had announced his appearance for Ironbridge at the hearings in July 2019. That issue was material to the possible exercise of the court's costs discretion. The compelling inference is that the appellant knew that the representation in the letter was false when he swore an affidavit deposing that the contents of that letter were true and correct. He did so intending to mislead the court and deflect criticism for his conduct.
3. The Tribunal noted its finding that that the state of the appellant's knowledge was not as he had set out in the letter to the associate of 22 July 2019 which was attached to his affidavit of 5 August 2019 as attachment JAR1. The Tribunal found that the statement in the affidavit that the contents of that letter were true and correct was also false and misleading.[241] The Tribunal found that the only purpose for making the misleading statements in the affidavit was to deflect criticism of his earlier conduct.[242] These findings were correctly made.

1. The sixth particular of complaint ground 6, noted at [251] above, alleges that the appellant's affidavit represented that the appellant's previous email correspondence and appearances by him in the SC proceedings in which he had represented that he continued to act for Ironbridge were a result of inadvertent error. The text of that affidavit is set out at [119] above. It does not contain a representation in those terms. To the extent that this particular relates to the express adoption of statements made in earlier correspondence, it does not add anything to the other particulars of complaint ground 6 discussed above.

1. The appropriate order in relation to complaint ground 6 is that, on 5 August 2019, the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by swearing an affidavit in the SC proceedings which deposed that the contents of his letter to the associate to Archer J of 22 July 2019 were true and correct, when the appellant:

(a) knew that the letter represented that, when he announced his appearances in Supreme Court proceedings on 3 July 2019 and 16 July 2019, the appellant had been operating on the assumption that Williams + Hughes' retainer with Ironbridge was at an end;

(b) knew that this representation was misleading; and

(c) intended to mislead the court and deflect criticism for his conduct.

1. We turn to identify the extent to which the grounds of appeal succeed in light of the above conclusions.

1. Appeal ground 1 contends that the Tribunal erred in making the following findings of fact:[243]

(a) the appellant held a general understanding of insolvency law that actions do not proceed against companies which are in administration but failed to apply that knowledge to the SC proceedings;
>
> (b) the appellant did not understand that the SC proceedings were 'stayed' against Ironbridge or that there was an impediment to it proceeding; and
>
> (c) the appellant regarded himself as continuing to act for Ironbridge in the SC proceedings prior to 17 July 2019.

1. The 'ethical consultation finding' that the appellant was not being honest in his communications with Mr Zelestis about his knowledge at the relevant time. 2. The 'intention findings' that the appellant intended Mr Penglis and the court to be misled by the various statements in complaint grounds 2 - 6.

1. We have concluded that the Tribunal erred so far as its state of mind findings identified at [266.1] above related to the period prior to 26 June 2019. However, those findings represent a fair characterisation of the appellant's state on mind in the period from 26 June 2019 to 16 July 2019 and are consistent with the inferences we have drawn in relation to that period.

1. The appellant disclosed to the Tribunal his communications with Mr Zelestis in which he sought advice on how to respond to the correspondence received from Mr Penglis. The Committee alleged that the appellant did not frankly explain the circumstances to Mr Zelestis. The Committee therefore contended that the guidance offered by Mr Zelestis could not mitigate the appellant's subsequent conduct (which was intentionally misleading) in corresponding with the court and Mr Penglis and in filing the affidavits.[244]
2. The Tribunal found that the appellant:[245]

(a) did not inform Mr Zelestis that he had, on 8 July 2019, prepared and circulated the minute of amended defence referred to at [70] above on behalf of the first and second defendants;

(b) did not explain to Mr Zelestis 'the details of his appearances' before Archer J on 3 July 2019 and 16 July 2019; and

(c) informed Mr Zelestis that, in some cases, his staff had signed the minutes of consent order for the first and second defendants when in fact the appellant did so himself.

1. The Tribunal found that the appellant therefore did not give Mr Zelestis a full account of the actions which he had taken in the SC proceedings which might have been seen to convey to others an impression that he was acting for Ironbridge after the administrators had been appointed.[246]
2. After questioning the view Mr Zelestis might have taken if he had been given a full account, the Tribunal concluded:[247]

The fact that the [appellant] did not give a full account, in our view, tells against a finding that he was being honest in his communications with Mr Zelestis KC about his knowledge at the relevant time. We find to the contrary.

1. In our view, it was not reasonably open to the Tribunal to infer from omissions in the account given by the appellant to Mr Zelestis that he acted dishonestly in providing that account. The appellant approached Mr Zelestis for guidance after receiving aggressive and implicitly threatening correspondence from senior counsel. The appellant had no motive to lie to Mr Zelestis, as the value of Mr Zelestis' guidance would depend upon the accuracy and completeness of the facts the appellant provided to him. The appellant was under no obligation to give a 'full account' of the matter to Mr Zelestis. The appellant did convey the essence of the matters about which Mr Penglis was complaining, including his actions in announcing his appearance for, and signing minutes of consent orders on behalf of, Ironbridge. The omission of details such as:

(a) the circulation of a draft defence that was never filed;

(b) the appellant's absence of objection to the court making orders for the filing of an application for Ian Wallace to act for Ironbridge;[248] and

(c) whether the appellant personally signed the relevant minutes of consent orders,

provide an inadequate foundation for a finding that the appellant acted dishonestly in these circumstances.

1. The Tribunal's finding that the appellant acted dishonestly in his communications with Mr Zelestis was not the subject of an order making a finding of professional misconduct. That reflects the fact that such dishonesty was not the subject of the Committee's application to the Tribunal. However, in our view the Tribunal did err in making the dishonesty finding which formed part of the Tribunal's report to the Supreme Court (full bench) under s 438(2)(a) of the LP Act.

1. We have concluded that the Tribunal was correct to find that the appellant intended to mislead the court in:

(a) representing in his letter to the associate to Archer J on 22 July 2019 that, when he announced his appearances in the SC proceedings on 3 July 2019 and 16 July 2019, he had been operating on the assumption that Williams + Hughes' retainer with Ironbridge was at an end; and

(b) deposing in his affidavit sworn 5 August 2019 that the contents of this letter to the associate of 22 July 2019 were true and correct.

1. Appeal ground 1 is not established to the extent that it seeks to impugn these findings as to the appellant's intention in relation to complaint grounds 3 and 6.
2. We have found that the other representations alleged by complaint grounds 2 - 6 were either not made, were not established by the evidence to be false or were not intended to mislead. Appeal ground 1 is established to the extent that it seeks to impugn the dishonesty findings in relation to the other representations in those complaint grounds.

1. Appeal ground 2 contends that the Tribunal erred in failing to give adequate reasons for the intention findings. There is no merit in this ground. As the appellant's written submissions accept, the essential requirement of reasons is to explain the Tribunal's actual path of reasoning in sufficient detail to enable a court to see whether the decision is vitiated by error.[249] That has been achieved in the present case, in which we have identified error in a number of those findings.

1. Appeal ground 3 contends that the Tribunal failed to accord procedural fairness to the appellant by failing to give him notice of, or an opportunity to respond to:[250]

[I]ts finding at [conduct decision] [232] and [306] that the Appellant had knowledge or understanding that actions do not proceed against companies which are in administration but did not 'apply' that knowledge or 'consider the application of the law' to the SC Proceeding before 17 July 2019.

1. We agree with the Committee's submissions that this ground is not established. The Tribunal's finding that the appellant had knowledge or understanding that actions do not proceed against companies which are in administration reflected the appellant's evidence as to his 'General Understanding'. The central issue in the Tribunal proceedings was whether that was the basis on which the appellant proceeded when he purported to act for Ironbridge. The Tribunal's finding resolved that issue against the appellant. While we have found the Tribunal to have erred in making that finding, it was not a finding which the appellant had no reasonable opportunity to address, or which involved any practical unfairness to the appellant. The Tribunal did not fail to accord procedural fairness to the appellant by failing to alert the appellant to the possibility that the finding, which resolved the central issue of the appellant's state of mind, might be made before the Tribunal made the finding.

Ground 4: characterisation of the appellant's conduct

1. Appeal ground 4 contends that the Tribunal erred in law in characterising the appellant's conduct the subject of complaint ground 1 as professional misconduct. For the reasons explained at [189] - [191] above, ground 4 is established.

Ground 5: finding as to whether appellant's conduct was isolated

1. Appeal ground 5 contends that the Tribunal erred in fact in the penalty decision in concluding that the appellant's conduct was not isolated. The Tribunal's finding was made in the following terms:[251]

Contrary to the [appellant's] submission, we do not accept that the [appellant's] conduct as found in [the misconduct findings made in relation to complaint grounds 1 - 6] can be characterised as an isolated error of judgment. While it all arose in the context of one piece of litigation, and, for the most part, involved the [appellant] telling the same untrue version of events in multiple contexts, the false explanation for his conduct was repeated in affidavits filed in the court, in his communications with the court and in his communications with [Satterley] on different occasions. In that sense, the conduct cannot be regarded as isolated or a 'one-off', even though it occurred in the course of just over a two-week period.

1. As can be seen from the above passage, the Tribunal's conclusion was based on its earlier findings that the appellant had engaged in professional misconduct in the manner alleged by complaint grounds 1 - 6. We have found many of those findings of professional misconduct to have been made in error. Those errors in the conduct decision plainly infect the above finding of the Tribunal. Appeal ground 5 is established to that extent.

1. Appeal ground 6 contends that the Tribunal erred in law in imposing a penalty that was manifestly excessive. The appellant contends that error should be inferred from a penalty decision which was unreasonable or plainly unjust, on the basis that in all the circumstances suspension rather than striking off would be the appropriate response.
2. This ground of appeal is misconceived, as the Tribunal did not relevantly impose any penalty on the appellant. Having found the appellant to be guilty of professional misconduct, the options for the Tribunal were to make and transmit a report on the finding to the Supreme Court (full bench) or itself to impose one or more of the penalty orders referred to in s 439, s 440 and s 441 of the LP Act. In this case, the Tribunal adopted the former course. On reception of that report, the imposition of a penalty, either by way of order made under s 439, s 440 and s 441 of the LP Act or an order for removal of the appellant's name from the local roll of persons admitted to the legal profession under the LP Act,[252] will be a matter for the full bench. The recommendation of the Tribunal under s 438(4)(b) of the LP Act is not binding on the full bench and is not a precondition to the full bench making an order for removal of the appellant's name from the roll.
3. Although, in this respect, ground 6 is misconceived, had it been necessary to do so we would have approached the ground on the basis that it alleged discretionary error on the ground that the order to make and transmit a report to the full bench with a recommendation that the appellant's name be removed from the roll of practitioners was unreasonable or plainly unjust. However, the challenged order was made as a consequence of the Tribunal's findings of professional misconduct, many of which we would set aside. In those circumstances, ground 6 falls away. Instead we turn to consider the consequential orders which should be made on the appeal.

1. We have found that many of the Tribunal's orders finding that the appellant engaged in professional misconduct should be set aside. The following orders made by the Tribunal on 8 October 2024 should also be set aside as a consequence of the setting aside of the misconduct findings:

1. Pursuant to s 438(2)(a) and s 438(2)(b) of the [LP Act], the Tribunal is to make and transmit a report to the Supreme Court (full bench) with:

(a) a record of the evidence taken at the hearing; and
>
> (b) a recommendation that the name of the [appellant] be removed from the roll of practitioners.

1. Pursuant to s 438(3)(a) of the LP Act, the [appellant's] practising certificate is suspended with immediate effect pending the determination of the Supreme Court (full bench). 2. Pursuant to s 87(2) of the [SAT Act], the [appellant] pay the [Committee's] costs fixed in the sum of $66,017.78, such costs to be paid to the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia within 30 days of this order or as otherwise agreed between the parties.
2. The question is then whether this court should send the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration of the question of penalty under s 105(9)(c) of the SAT Act, or should make any decision that the Tribunal could have made in the Tribunal proceedings under s 105(9)(b) of the SAT Act. The orders which the Tribunal could make after finding the appellant was guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, under s 438(2) of the LP Act, are to:

(a) make and transmit a report on the finding to the Supreme Court (full bench); or

(b) make any one or more of the orders specified in, relevantly, s 439 and s 441 of the LP Act.

1. The limits on the power conferred by s 105(9) of the SAT Act where the appeal is on a question of law were identified by this court in Medical Board of Australia v Woollard.[253] Those limitations are not applicable in an appeal on questions of fact and law pursuant to s 105(13) of the SAT Act. It is appropriate for this court to consider for itself whether making orders specified in s 439 and s 441 of the LP Act is the appropriate exercise of the discretion.[254]
2. Different considerations might arise in relation to the transmission of a report to the full bench, given the provision in s 444 of the LP Act for the report of the Tribunal (rather than the reasons of this court) to be conclusive as to all facts and findings mentioned or contained in the report. It is unnecessary for us to consider that issue as we consider an order suspending the appellant's local practising certificate, under s 439(a) of the LP Act, to be the appropriate penalty for the findings of unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct which we would substitute.
3. The Tribunal accepted the Committee's submission that the conduct the subject of complaint ground 1, even when categorised as professional misconduct, did not require the appellant to be suspended or referred to the full bench.[255] The far more serious conduct is the intentional making of a misleading representation in the appellant's letter to the associate to Archer J of 22 July 2019 and, further, in deposing that the contents of that letter were true and correct in his affidavit sworn 5 August 2019.
4. The seriousness of knowingly misleading a court is explained by the decision of this court in Vogt v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee:[256]

For a practitioner, in the course of his or her practice, intentionally to mislead anyone is a serious breach of the practitioner's professional duty. But the finding in the present case that the appellant intentionally misled the court is of particular significance. It goes to the very heart of a practitioner's duty as an officer of the court and therefore to the proper administration of justice. We would respectfully adopt what was said in that respect by the Queensland Court of Appeal in The Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Wright [ 2001] QCA 58, a case involving a solicitor who (among other things) intentionally misled a court in relation to an affidavit relied upon to resist a summary judgment application and as to the availability of a witness. The court said:

'A practitioner's duty to the court arises out of the practitioner's special relationship with the court; it overrides the duties owed by a practitioner to clients or others ... The lawyer's duty to the court includes candour, honesty and fairness. ... The effective administration of the justice system and public confidence in it substantially depends on the honesty and reliability of practitioners' submissions to the court. This duty of candour and fairness is quintessential to the lawyer's role as officer of the court; the court and the public expect and rely upon it, no matter how new or inexperienced the practitioner. Breaches such as this are hard to detect and once established to the requisite standard are deserving of condign punishment, not only as a deterrent but also to reassure the public that such conduct on the part of lawyers will not be tolerated.' (footnotes omitted)

1. Misleading the court with a knowingly false statement in an affidavit is particularly serious. Knowingly making a statement under oath that is false in a material particular is an offence against s 169 of the Criminal Code (WA) for which a term of imprisonment may be the appropriate sentence.[257] As Mason P observed in Coe v New South Wales Bar Association,[258] in a passage cited by the Tribunal in the penalty decision,[259] it would be a truly exceptional case where a practitioner who knowingly swears a false affidavit that is filed in court could be regarded as fit to practise.
2. However, as Murphy and Beech JJA recognised in Khosa v Legal Profession Complaints Committee,[260] the court's, and the Tribunal's, jurisdiction with respect to the regulation of the profession is not to be exercised for the purpose of punishing the practitioner concerned, but for the protection of the public and the maintenance of the reputation and standards of the legal profession. Further, a finding of unfitness to practise does not necessarily mean that a practitioner is permanently unfit to practise. Where the conclusion is reached that a practitioner is presently unfit to practise, a choice may be made between suspension and striking off.[261] Further, as is illustrated by the decision in Vogt (where a period of suspension was imposed on a practitioner who knowingly made a false statement in an affidavit), striking off is not an inevitable consequence of knowingly making a false statement in an affidavit.
3. The appellant's conduct in knowingly making the false representation in the letter to the associate to Archer J on 22 July 2019, and in deposing that the contents of that letter were true and correct in the affidavit sworn on 5 August 2019, is very serious professional misconduct. It justifies a finding that the appellant is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practise. However, it does not lead us to conclude that the appellant is permanently unfit to practice so as to justify striking his name from the roll of local practitioners. The conduct occurred almost six years ago, in circumstances where the appellant was placed under considerable pressure by Mr Penglis' allegations. It did not occasion any loss to, or confer any significant advantage upon, any person. There is nothing to suggest that the appellant has engaged in similar conduct before or since. While the appellant has not accepted responsibility for his conduct, and his lack of insight and remorse emphasises the need for personal deterrence, a significant period of suspension will demonstrate the seriousness of the appellant's conduct and operate as a personal and general deterrent.
4. In our view, the appropriate penalty is suspension of the appellant's local practising certificate for a period of 15 months. As the appellant has been under suspension since the Tribunal's penalty orders were made on 8 October 2024, it is appropriate for the 15-month suspension period to begin from that date.

1. For the above reasons, leave to appeal should be granted, the appeal should be allowed, the orders of the Tribunal made on 12 February 2024 and 8 October 2024 should be set aside and the following orders should be substituted:

1. Between 11 October 2017 and 16 July 2019, the appellant engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct by:

(a) causing Williams + Hughes to purport to act as the solicitor of record for a defendant to Supreme Court proceedings when Williams + Hughes was not authorised to do so and had no instructions to do so; and
>
> (b) purporting to act as solicitor and counsel for a defendant to Supreme Court proceedings when he was not authorised and had no instructions to do so.

1. On 22 July 2019, the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by preparing and sending a letter to the associate to Archer J which represented that, when he announced his appearances in Supreme Court proceedings on 3 July 2019 and 16 July 2019, he had been operating on the assumption that Williams + Hughes' retainer with the first defendant was at an end, when the appellant:

(a) knew the representation was misleading; and
>
> (b) intended to mislead the court in making the representation.

1. On 5 August 2019, the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by swearing an affidavit in Supreme Court proceedings which deposed that the contents of his letter to the associate to Archer J of 22 July 2019 were true and correct, when the appellant:

(a) knew that the letter represented that, when he announced his appearances in Supreme Court proceedings on 3 July 2019 and 16 July 2019, the appellant had been operating on the assumption that Williams + Hughes' retainer with the first defendant was at an end;
>
> (b) knew that this representation was misleading; and
>
> (c) intended to mislead the court and deflect criticism for his conduct by swearing this affidavit.

1. The grounds contained in annexure A to the Committee's application dated 18 June 2021 are otherwise not established. 2. The appellant's practising certificate is suspended with effect from 8 October 2024 for a period of 15 months.
2. We would hear from the parties as to the precise form of these orders, and on question of the costs of the proceedings before the Tribunal and this court.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Legal Services and Complaints Committee and Robertson [2023] WASAT 127 (conduct decision).

[2] Legal Services and Complaints Committee and Robertson [2023] WASAT 127(S) (penalty decision).

[4] Goldsmith v Legal Services and Complaints Committee [2023] WASCA 136 [53] - [56].

[5] Kyle v Legal Practitioners' Complaints Committee [1999] WASCA 115; (1999) 21 WAR 56, 72.

[6] Conduct decision [23] quoting Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Chang [2019] WASAT 67 [8].

[9] See the writ of summons in CIV 2599 of 2016 beginning at Green AB 504. The statement of claim (SoC) is indorsed on the writ. The Tribunal misidentified Nicholas Wallace as the third defendant, and Leveque as the fourth defendant, at conduct decision [49], although nothing appears to turn on this.

[10] There was also a claim for breach of confidence by Ironbridge or Leveque disclosing confidential information, namely the amount of the Department's offer, to Piara: see SoC pars 33 - 35 (Green AB 515 - 516).

[12] SoC pars 9 - 11 (Green AB 506 - 507).

[16] SoC pars 19 - 22 (Green AB 509 - 510).

[21] SoC pars 30 - 32 (Green AB 511 - 515).

[22] SoC prayer for relief (Green AB 516).

[26] Conduct decision [84]; Green AB 326.

[33] Primary ts 60 - 61 (Green AB 60 - 61).

[34] Clause 5.2(b)(i), (iii) and (x) of the DOCA read with the definitions of 'Arrangement Period' and 'Commencement Date' in cl 1.2 of the DOCA (Green AB 592 - 593).

[35] Clause 5.2(c) of the DOCA (Green AB 593).

[36] Clause 9.1(c) of the DOCA (Green AB 596).

[37] Clause 9.2(c) of the DOCA read with the definition of 'Appointment Date' in cl 1.2 of the DOCA (Green AB 588, 596).

[38] Clause 8.1 of the DOCA (Green AB 595).

[39] Clause 8.3 of the DOCA read with the definition of 'Completion' in cl 1.2 of the DOCA (Green AB 589 - 596).

[40] Clause 11.1 of the DOCA (Green AB 597 - 598).

[41] Conduct decision [69]; Green AB 552.

[42] Corporations Act s 435C.

[43] Corporations Act s 437A(1)(a) and s 437A(1)(b).

[53] Conduct Decision [102]; Green AB 582.

[55] Conduct decision [103]; Green AB 371.

[57] Green AB 679; Conduct decision [104].

[59] Conduct decision [106] - [110].

[80] Conduct decision [134] - [135]; Green AB 786 - 787.

[82] Conduct decision [137]; Green AB 802.

[83] Conduct decision [138]; Green AB 379.

[87] Conduct decision [141] - [142]; Green AB 825 - 827.

[89] Conduct decision [143] - [145]; Green AB 863 - 867.

[90] Conduct decision [147] - [149]; Green AB 868.

[91] Conduct decision [150]; Green AB 870.

[94] Conduct decision [151]; Green AB 897.

[95] Conduct decision [152]; Green AB 900 - 915.

[97] Conduct decision [153]; Green AB 383.

[100] Conduct decision [160]; Green AB 939.

[103] Conduct decision [161] - [168]; Green AB 956.

[114] Conduct decision [173]; Green AB 966.

[120] Conduct decision [174]; Green AB 972.

[122] Conduct decision [175]; Green AB 975.

[123] Conduct decision [176]; Green AB 976 - 977.

[126] Conduct decision [72]; Green AB 979 - 982.

[130] Conduct decision [198] - [201].

[131] Conduct decision [202], Green AB 1847.

[138] Conduct decision [179]; Green AB 984 - 987.

[139] Conduct decision [181]; Green AB 1028.

[140] Conduct decision [180]; Green AB 1032.

[151] Conduct decision [187]; Green AB 1074 - 1084.

[171] Conduct decision [190]; Green AB 1117.

[172] Green AB 1113 - 1115, 1772. The Tribunal incorrectly stated that the leave application was refused at Conduct decision [190]. Nothing appears to turn on this error.

[192] Conduct decision [42] - [43].

[193] Conduct decision [44] - [45].

[194] Conduct decision [240] - [241].

[195] Conduct decision [242] - [249].

[196] Conduct decision [254] - [255].

[197] Conduct decision [258] - [261].

[203] Conduct decision [46] - [47].

[204] See, for example, Hanssen Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 58161 [2024] WASCA 87 [71] and cases cited therein.

[205] Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; (2019) 266 CLR 129 [55].

[206] Panegyres v Medical Board of Australia [2020] WASCA 58.

[207] Primary ts 21 - 22 (Green AB 21 - 22).

[208] Primary ts 21 - 22 (Green AB 21 - 22).

[210] Conduct decision [231]; The Tribunal misidentified the date that Ironbridge was placed into administration as 17 July 2017, however nothing appears to turn on this error.

[215] Conduct decision [291], [340].

[218] The Committee's application on this and other grounds also referred to the appellant being reckless as to the truth, but this allegation was ultimately not pursued before the Tribunal: see Green AB 213 - 216.

[219] See Annexure A to the Committee's application, pars 12, 27 - 28 (Blue AB 136, 139 - 140).

[222] See Annexure A to the Committee's application, pars 12, 39 - 40 (Blue AB 136, 143).

[229] See Annexure A to the Committee's application, pars 12, 35 - 36 (Blue AB 136, 141 - 142).

[230] Conduct decision [311] - [312].

[234] See Annexure A to the Committee's application, pars 12, 31 - 32 (Blue AB 136, 140 - 141).

[235] Conduct decision [316] - [318].

[237] See Annexure A to the Committee's application, pars 44 - 45 (Blue AB 144 - 145).

[238] See conduct decision [324] - [327].

[248] It would appear from the Tribunal's reference to evidence at conduct decision [212] that this may have been one of the 'details' of the appellant's appearances before Archer J noted at [269(b)] above.

[249] Centex Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Consumer Protection [2017] WASCA 79 [103].

[250] Appellant's grounds of appeal, White AB 12.

[252] See LP Act s 444(2) read with s 28(1).

[253] Medical Board of Australia v Woollard [2017] WASCA 64; (2017) 51 WAR 32 [214], [273] - [274].

[256] Vogt v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2009] WASCA 202 [61].

[257] See the recent decision of this court in Frigger v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2025] WASCA 7.

[258] Coe v New South Wales Bar Association [2000] NSWCA 13 [10].

[260] Khosa v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2017] WASCA 192 [188].