75 While it can be accepted that an effect of the operation of s 31C is that there would not be publication of a practitioner's name or unsubstantiated allegations in the ordinary course of proceedings before the Tribunal which failed, in the absence that is of an order pursuant to s 31C(2), it is not apparent that the legislative scheme of s 31C is designed to protect any "right" of the practitioner by ensuring that outcome. While the section and the Act as a whole does not contain any explicit statement of legislative intention it was noted in argument that s 31C(1) is not usual in the statutory schemes of this State dealing with disciplinary proceedings for other professions. There is no apparent basis for thinking that the legislature would be minded to regard the concerns of legal practitioners, to keep confidential the details of disciplinary proceedings against them, in a more favourable light than similar concerns of other professional persons. Hence, it appears more likely that the policy of the section is directed to guarding some other interest or concern, rather than to protect the "rights" of legal practitioners. It is to be noted that in s 31C(3), cf para (c), the legislative intention is directed particularly to preventing the identification of persons who appear before the tribunal in certain circumstances, and that in s 31C(5)(d) any publication by the Tribunal of an adverse finding against a practitioner may not include any details which the Tribunal considers, in the interests of the complainant, should be withheld, or which would prejudice the interests of any person other than the practitioner. As much as these provisions provide some indication of the policy underlying the provision, what is indicated is a concern to protect those, whether clients, witnesses or others, who might be obliged to give evidence before the Tribunal when it is hearing a disciplinary proceeding against a practitioner or whose affairs or interests might be aired in the course of such a proceeding or adversely affected by publication of the proceeding. These provisions provide an indication that the legislature was conscious of the potential for disciplinary proceedings against legal practitioners to have adverse consequences for clients and others. Indeed s 29(3) reveals that the legislature was well aware that matters involving legal professional privilege might well arise before the Tribunal. That provision enables the receipt by the Tribunal of evidence that would otherwise be subject to legal professional privilege without that privilege being lost for other purposes or the evidence reported. For these reasons I am not persuaded that s 31C provides any adequate foundation for a conclusion that it is part of the legislative scheme that practitioners, who are the subject of disciplinary proceedings, should be protected from the publication of their name or of unsubstantiated allegations. It is true that those things may occur, but only as an incidental consequence of the operation of the provisions which appear to me to be directed primarily to protecting the rights of clients and other persons who may be required to give evidence before the Tribunal or whose affairs may be the subject of disclosure before the Tribunal. (These comments are not intended to diminish the clear provision of s 31C(5) with respect to cases where an adverse finding is in respect of circumstances of a minor nature).