Rixon v Horseshoe Pastoral Co Pty Ltd

Rixon v Horseshoe Pastoral Co Pty Ltd - [2017] NSWSC 1293 - NSWSC 2016 case summary — Zoe

[11]

Pre-purchase inspection

According to Mrs Rixon, before the arranged inspection of the property, but excited by the prospect, she and Tom went out to have a quick unaccompanied and unannounced look at the property. They went to the cocky's gate on the Tomakin Road, because they did not at that stage have permission to enter the property and did not want to be seen. When asked, in cross-examination, how she knew to go to the cocky's gate, Mrs Rixon at first answered, "Because it was described to me when I spoke to Ray", but it was then put to her: Q. Now, you have not said in your affidavit that Mr Brown told you there was any other entrance other than the more apparent entrance opposite the Buckenbowra Road. Do you accept that? A. He didn't. I went and found a fence and climbed through it. Q. Well, perhaps I misunderstood you? Did you not say only a few minutes ago that Mr Brown told you where to find the cocky's gate? A. No, he told me where to find the property.
According to Mrs Rixon, a few days after their initial conversation she met Mr Brown Jnr at the entrance gate to Lot 130, on the Princes Highway. Mr Brown unlocked the gate (which had been chained and locked), and they drove in their respective vehicles - Mrs Rixon following Mr Brown - across Lot 130 on what Mrs Rixon describes as "an old track that initially went down a small incline then uphill … that commenced at the gate" to a high vantage point on Lot 5 - where her house is now located. She was immediately taken by the property, and told Mr Brown that she would buy it and make arrangements with her bank and solicitor.
Mr Brown denies that he played any part in the sale of Lot 5, or met or had any conversation with Mrs Rixon at any time prior to the sale; he says that it was his late father who negotiated the sale to Mrs Rixon. Mr Rogers submitted that Mrs Rixon's version was unreliable, and that Mr Brown's version should be preferred, but I do not agree. First, my impression was that Mr Brown had little recollection of the events, and denied participating in them as a matter of reconstruction rather than recollection; this is illustrated by his evidence concerning the placement of house on Lot 5, referred to below. Secondly, Mr Brown's assertion that his father took all the important decisions does not sit well with his demonstrated involvement in cancelling a development application for a manager's residence on Lot 5, shortly before completion of the sale to the plaintiff in 1982. Thirdly, when the whole of Mrs Rixon's evidence is reviewed in context, I think the better explanation for the apparent inconsistency about how she first came to enter the property from the cocky's gate at Tomakin Road is that she misapprehended the question when it was first asked; her answer was directed to how she knew where the property was, rather than where the cocky's gate was. Finally, Mrs Rixon's evidence generally was characterised by understatement (of which her restrained response to the suggestion that the location in which the home was placed on the property involved some detriment is an example) and moderation (illustrated by her willing acceptance of the Queen Street option if RMS would permit it); she was a thoroughly credible witness.
It is possible, though unlikely, that Mrs Rixon has confused Mr Brown Jnr with Mr Brown Snr, 25 years ago. But even if that were so, that would lead to the conclusion that Mrs Rixon was dealing with Mr Brown Snr, and had the same conversations with him. It is highly improbable that she would have purchased the property without an inspection; someone on behalf of the vendor must have showed her the property and, as Mr Rogers accepted, it must have been one or other of the two Mr Browns. Mrs Rixon was shown the property, on behalf of the vendor, by one or other of the Mr Browns, from the high vantage point, which they accessed via the Princes Highway gate and the track.

[12]

The house

After paying the deposit, but before settlement, Mrs Rixon sourced a removable home to be placed on Lot 5. She deposed that she approached Mr Brown and they had a conversation to the following effect: Rixon: Ray I have been offered a house for removal but I have to move it within the next three weeks. Can I put it on the property? The house will come in two sections. Brown: Yes. Rixon: Well how do I get in? Brown: You can access the land through the front gate along the track. I will unlock the gate.
Mrs Rixon says that the lock and chain were then removed, and never replaced. The house was moved onto the property and installed near the high point from which she had first viewed the property with Mr Brown. The purchase was completed soon afterwards.
Mr Brown denies having had any such conversation with Mrs Rixon. But he was clearly aware that she was going to use the track for the purpose of moving the home onto Lot 5: when asked when he first became aware that a house was to be or had been placed on Lot 5, he said at first that he did not recall, but it would have been in the mid-80s; that it was after it had been put there, because Mr Hurst who used to work for him was residing there for a while; that he was not sure what access they were using, though he knew that Mr Hurst was "going across the back of the cemetery" to get to work; that he knew there was supposed to be a locked gate, but could not say what had happened about it, though he thought "the main reason that they used that access was to bring the house in, because it was quite a wide thing … but I didn't see the house going in there and … I wasn't sure where it … had been situated on their block". But an at earlier point he gave this evidence: Q. But you came to know where the location of the house was to be on the top of the - at the high point of the property, there, didn't you? A. Yes but I've always doubted whether I was there when it was put there because you may not be aware but it's about a metre off our boundary.
Moreover, as the house was moved onto Lot 5 before completion of the purchase, there is a high degree of likelihood that the purchaser would have sought the vendor's permission to do so; a purchaser would not likely move a house onto a property before completion without first seeking the vendor's consent. If Mrs Rixon did not speak to Mr Brown Jnr about installing the house on Lot 5, then she had such a conversation with Mr Brown Snr. The circumstance that, as Mr Brown accepted, the gate thereafter remained unlocked, tends to confirm this.

[13]

Subsequent use of the track

After installing the relocated home on Lot 5, Mrs Rixon moved horses and other stock onto Lot 5, using a horse float, along the track. She has since transported cattle to and from the property, using the track. She has received visitors, family and friends at her home, who use the track to gain access. She has had had power installed to Lot 5, for which purpose the track provided the access; and the authority's employees use the track for access to read the meter. Replacement gas bottles have been and are delivered via the track. Local council officers have used and continue to use the track to access the property for septic tank inspections. Deliveries of all kinds have been and are made to Lot 5 via the track. She has fenced Lot 5, using the track to bring in materials and the personnel who assisted in its construction.
From the time of her purchase of Lot 5 to date, Mrs Rixon has slashed, graded and otherwise maintained the track. This, coupled with sustained use of the track, has resulted in its becoming considerably more defined than it was in 1982. However, Mrs Rixon does not suggest that any construction works have been carried, save that: 1. according to Mrs Rixon, in the early 1980s, she obtained Mr Brown's permission to install a rudimentary cattle grid at the gate from Lot 130 onto the Princes Highway. Mr Brown denies that he was asked or agreed to this, but acknowledges that he has been aware of the grid; based on this acknowledgement and my general acceptance of Mrs Rixon's evidence, I find that there was such a conversation as Mrs Rixon says; and 2. in the course of roadworks on the Princes Highway, RTA workmen constructed a spoon drain at the entrance gate to Lot 130, and 'tarred' the area between the highway and the gate to facilitate the entry of vehicles.
Mr Brown does not dispute that Mrs Rixon, her family and invitees such as guests and tradespeople have accessed Lot 5 through Lot 130 along the track, and that at least to some extent he knew that to be so, and did not prevent it. He says he did not give "express permission and none was sought." Nor does he deny that the gate from the Princes Highway onto Lot 130 was unlocked and remained unlocked. Mr Brown does not dispute that, from the time of her purchase of Lot 5 to date, Mrs Rixon has slashed, graded and otherwise maintained the track.

[15]

Relations deteriorate

Following her remarriage in 2002 to Malcolm Rixon, in about 2005 Mrs Rixon and her new husband established a bus business. From about 2005 until 2008-9 (when the first bus business was sold), buses when not in use were parked on Lot 5 (though they were maintained and serviced elsewhere), and moved into and out of Lot 5 over the track.
Relations between the Rixons and Mr Brown appear to have deteriorated from about 2005. One precipitant appears to have involved a Mr Pakis, who initially stored logs and other items on Lot 5, and paid a fee to Mrs Rixon for doing so. Then he erected a business sign on the gate to Lot 130, which Mrs Rixon says was not authorised by her. Mr Brown raised the issue - including reference to a potential liability risk - with Mrs Rixon.
Subsequently, a confrontation between Mr Brown and Mr Malcolm Rixon resulted in police attending the property. Mrs Rixon then embarked on exploring a range of alternative means of access to her property - including via Tomakin Road, School Road, Queen Street, and the Jock Hendry Access - none of which provided a resolution. Meanwhile there was an uneasy détente between the parties.
In April 2010, the Rixons recommenced a bus business, and up to ten buses have been and are parked on Lot 5 from time to time, and enter and exit Lot 5 using the track daily, although once again they are maintained and serviced elsewhere.
By letter dated 7 August 2014, solicitors for Mr Brown demanded that Mrs Rixon cease exercising access over Lot 130, and threatened an injunction and damages if the alleged "trespass" continued. Mrs Rixon instituted these proceedings on 30 March 2015. By letter dated Friday 10 July 2015, solicitors for the defendant advised that the gate from the Princes Highway to the track would be locked. On the evening of Friday 10 July 2015, Mrs Rixon sought and was granted an ex parte injunction restraining the defendant from denying the plaintiff and her invitees access along the track. The ex parte injunction was on 13 July 2015 continued, and remains in force.
The Court had the benefit of a view of the properties on the first day of the hearing. The transcript records the observations I made during the view, which are evidence. [3]

[18]

Implied easements and the Torrens system

However, although there are cases in which implied easements have been recognised in connection with Torrens title land, [5] it is doubtful that such easements can arise in respect of land under the (NSW) Real Property Act 1900, in which s 42 relevantly provides: (1) Notwithstanding the existence in any other person of any estate or interest which but for this Act might be held to be paramount or to have priority, the registered proprietor for the time being of any estate or interest in land recorded in a folio of the Register shall, except in case of fraud, hold the same, subject to such other estates and interests and such entries, if any, as are recorded in that folio, but absolutely free from all other estates and interests that are not so recorded except: … (a1) in the case of the omission or misdescription of an easement subsisting immediately before the land was brought under the provisions of this Act or validly created at or after that time under this or any other Act or a Commonwealth Act,
The prevailing view is that easements can be created over Torrens land only in the manner provided by Real Property Act, s 46, [6] and that this does not admit of implied grants of the Wheeldon v Burrows variety. [7] The same considerations apply to easements of necessity. [8] Exceptions in relation to easements created by implied grant before the land is brought under Torrens title [9] are irrelevant for present purposes. However, at least until the decision of the Court of Appeal in McGrath v Campbell, [10] it has generally been accepted that a Wheeldon v Burrows easement, although not noted on the certificate of title of the servient tenement, may be enforced against the registered proprietor of that tenement who created the easement, though not against successors in title. [11]
In McGrath v Campbell, [12] the common registered proprietor of the dominant and servient tenements who was said to have created the alleged Wheeldon v Burrows easement contemporaneously transferred both tenements to different purchasers. At first instance Barrett J, as he then was, relying on Aldridge v Wright, [13] held that in those circumstances, the transferee of the dominant tenement was entitled to enforce the easement against the transferee of the servient tenement, by requiring the servient owner to execute an instrument in registrable form for the purpose of the Real Property Act granting the easement. This was overturned in the Court of Appeal. Although the principal judgment was that of Tobias JA, the position was concisely summarised by Hodgson JA in the following terms: [3] The decision of the primary judge proceeded by the following steps: (1) The circumstances of the acquisition of Lot 6 by the respondents and Lot 12 by the appellants were such as would, at general law, give rise to an implied easement of the Wheeldon v Burrows type (Wheeldon v Burrows (1879) 12 Ch D 31). (2) However, since no such easement was created in accordance with the requirements of the Real Property Act 1900, it could be no more than an equitable easement. (3) Such an equitable easement is binding as between the parties to its creation, though not as against successors in title to the servient tenement. (4) Such an equitable easement can therefore be enforced as a personal equity against the appellants. [4] I agree with step (1). However, steps (2), (3) and (4) require close analysis of the kind undertaken by Tobias JA. The question whether an equitable easement arose, and whether that easement was enforceable against the appellants, depend on whether the circumstances were such that there was a personal equity against them. I agree with Tobias JA, for the reasons he gives, that the appellants' involvement in the relevant transactions was not such as to give rise to a personal equity against them, even though it would have been sufficient at general law to give rise to a Wheeldon v Burrows easement enforceable against them. [5] Accordingly, s 42 and s 43 of the Real Property Act preclude the recognition of any such easement; and thereby make it misleading to assert that there was an equitable easement of the Wheeldon v Burrows type
Tobias JA referred [14] to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Williams v State Transit Authority (NSW) [15] - a case involving a prescriptive easement - in which Mason P, with whom Sheller JA and Tobias JA agreed, noted that text writers had expressed the view that prescriptive easements based upon the doctrine of lost modern grant did not trump the registered proprietor's indefeasible title by means of the statutory exception in s 42(1)(a1) of the Real Property Act, [16] and that it was "to pile fiction upon fiction to extend the doctrine of lost modern grant into the Torrens system, because (assuming no relevant exception to s 42 or its equivalents) that system contemplates title at law as arising only upon registration". [17] His Honour thought that there was much force in the observations of Professor Butt [18] that Williams required reconsideration of the in personam enforcement of unregistered implied easements, in the light of that that "given the relevant similarities between prescriptive and implied easements", but did not express a concluded view. [19]
In Cuzeno Pty Ltd v Owners and Strata Plan 65870, [20] Darke J observed that there were unresolved questions, which had been left open in McGrath v Campbell, concerning the extent to which implied easements were capable of enforcement as in personam exceptions to the indefeasibility provisions of the Real Property Act, but proceeded on the assumption that implied easements were capable of enforcement on that basis.
As it seems to me, while casting doubt on the availability of a Wheeldon v Burrows easement in the context of Torrens land simpliciter, McGrath v Campbell does not overrule the earlier cases in which it had been found available as a personal right enforceable against the transferor though not against successors in title. Moreover, it recognises that if there are circumstances which so implicate the grantor as to make it unconscionable to insist on its strict legal right, a personal equity against the grantor (though not against successor in title) will stand outside the cloak of indefeasibility.
In the present case, the defendant was the registered proprietor of Lot 130 at the time of the sale of Lot 5 to Mrs Rixon and her husband, and its shareholders were the vendors of Lot 5. No point was taken that the corporate identity of the defendant, as distinct from that of its shareholders, made any difference. Accordingly, like Darke J in Cuzeno, I proceed on the basis that, notwithstanding that the subject land is under the Real Property Act, an easement arising by implication upon the sale of Lot 5 to Mrs Rixon could be enforced against the defendant while it remains the registered proprietor of Lot 130.

[19]

Easement of necessity

An easement may be implied of necessity where, on the sale by a common owner of part of its land, either the grantor or the grantee is left without any access to its property. An easement of necessity is implied where the right claimed is essential for the use of the dominant tenement; it must be more than a matter of convenience. The prevailing view is that this is based on the presumed common intention of the parties. [21]
The conventional view is that the existence of an alternative means of access exercisable as of right, even if inconvenient, is fatal to a claim of a right of way of necessity. Relevantly, the fact that construction of an access route to a public highway is difficult and/or expensive is insufficient to give rise to an easement of necessity. [22] In New South Wales there are obiter dicta that favour a more liberal view: in Parish v Kelly, [23] Rath J said that the existence of a legal access did not necessarily exclude the implication of a way of necessity, and that matters to be considered included the locality, the use of the land and the nature of the legal access (in particular whether it is constructed and, if not, the problems and expense in constructing it), but rejected the claim for an easement of necessity. This dictum was approved by Cohen J in Lamos Pty Ltd v Hutchison. [24] However, the correctness of these decisions has been doubted, in the light of more recent [25] as well as the earlier authorities.
The critical time for the implication of an easement by necessity is the time of the sale by the common owner - in this case, the sale of Lot 5 to the plaintiff. Although I accept that there was at that time no alternative constructed access to Lot 5, the property was not legally landlocked: it abutted Tomakin Road; and there were unconstructed crown roads at the school and at Queen Street. Pedestrian access was available, and the land was not incapable of being accessed from a public road: although construction of one or more of these means of access for vehicular use may have involved some planning and engineering challenges and difficulties, as well as expense, that is insufficient.
In my view, there were alternative means of access available as of right, albeit that they may have been inconvenient and expensive to construct. The conditions for implication of an easement of necessity are not established - even if one can arise in the context of Torrens title land.

[20]

Wheeldon v Burrows

The rule in Wheeldon v Burrows was stated, in the case from which it derives its name, in the following terms: [26] On the grant by the owner of a tenement of part of that tenement as it is then used and enjoyed, there will pass to the grantee all those continuous and apparent easements (by which, of course, I mean quasi-easements), or, in other words, all those easements which are necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted, and which have been and are at the time of the grant used by the owners of the entirety for the benefit of the part granted.
While the rule has often been explained as a manifestation of the maxim that a grantor may not derogate from the grant, [27] its juridical basis is the presumed common intention of the parties. [28] The essential elements are that the "quasi-easement" be (1) continuous and apparent, (2) necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted, and (3) at the time of the grant used by the owners of the entirety for the benefit of the part granted.
A reasonably close analogy to the present case is provided by Tarrant v Zandstra, [29] in which the plaintiff acquired a block of land which, though it had a frontage to a main road, did not have direct access to it, but gained access via a private road which ran through the adjoining block, which the plaintiff continued to use after the purchase, to the knowledge of the defendants who later bought the adjoining block from the common vendor; the conditions necessary for the implication of a Wheeldon v Burrows easement were satisfied.
The requirement that the quasi-easement be "continuous and apparent" is satisfied if there is, on the quasi-servient land, a feature visible on inspection which is neither transitory nor intermittent - for example, drains or paths. [30] This is to be judged in the light of each particular case, and the nature of the enjoyment in question. [31] In Ward v Kirkland, the absence of a feature which would be seen on inspection and is neither transitory nor intermittent defeated the claim. [32] However, the notion of a visible mark on the land is crucial; absence of visible physical evidence pointing to the existence of an "easement" precludes its implication. [33]
As to the second element, the test is less demanding than the absolute necessity required for an easement of necessity; in this context, it means needed or required for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the dominant land, as was explained in Wilcox v Richardson by Handley JA: [34] It is clear from the judgment of Thesiger LJ that the test of what is necessary for the purpose of the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows is not the strict test relevant for the implication of an easement of necessity: see also Wheeler v J J Saunders Ltd [1996] Ch 19 at 31, per Peter Gibson LJ. What is necessary for this rule is what "conduces to the reasonable enjoyment of property" (ibid). Moreover in Schwann v Cotton [1916] 2 Ch 459 at 469, Lord Cozens-Hardy MR said: "The word necessary must not be taken in a rigid sense. The better phrase is that which is used by Lord Campbell … 'convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property' …." Thus the expression means needed or required for the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted
To similar effect, Meagher JA said: [35] It is at this point that his Honour's judgment seems, with respect, deficient.His Honour seems to have held that because: (a) there was no exclusive use of lot 276 outside the area found by him; and (b) it was not absolutely essential to the operations of the southern shop that any other area be used, the rights of the sub-lessees did not extend beyond that 4,060 square feet area. This, in my view, cannot be sustained; the appellants have proved that they had rights of a Wheeldon v Burrows (1879) 12 Ch D 31 kind over additional areas, that is, a quasi-easement of a "continuous and apparent" nature which was "reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the property granted" by the sub-lease. These "additional areas" are the areas which it was proved were used in common with the proprietors of the northern shop. Mr Biscoe QC learned senior counsel for the respondents, resisted this proposition because of his Honour's finding that these areas were not essential for the conduct of the southern shop. In my view this is to apply too stringent a test. The additional areas were "reasonably necessary" within the rule. To take an example: if you are going to fillet fish, it is "reasonably necessary" to have a filleting bay; and this "reasonable necessity" does not disappear because it would be possible to fillet the fish in one's kitchen at home.
Mr Brown says that in 1982, the track ended about half-way across Lot 130, at the power lines (in the middle of Lot 130). The track is visible, though faintly, on a 1979 aerial photograph; as Mrs Rixon accepted, on the photograph it appears to have then ended "a long way short" of where it does now (near her house, on Lot 5). Mrs Rixon said that on the initial inspection of the property they drove more or less to the location where her house now is. She said that the track was then "just indentations in the ground and lots of grass on it", but "there was definitely a track there", although not nearly so well defined as now, and "whether it went much further (than it appears to in the 1979 photo) or whether I just followed the wheel tracks of the car in front of me, I couldn't say".
While it is not possible from the poor-quality photo reproductions in evidence to be certain of where the track then ended, it makes sense that it would then have ended at the powerlines: access to the powerlines would have been required by the authority responsible for their maintenance, but there being no house on Lot 5 there is no reason why the track would have extended beyond the powerlines to the house location. The evidence does not establish that the track extended beyond the powerlines, let alone to the boundary. Although Mrs Rixon was taken via the track (and then, probably across country) to inspect the property, it is not established that prior to the transfer to her, the defendant was in the habit of using the track to access Lot 5; Mr Brown denied that he did so, and there is no evidence to the contrary. In those circumstances, I cannot be satisfied that at the time of the transfer to Mrs Rixon and her then husband in 1982, the track constituted a continuous and apparent quasi-easement, or that it was used by the Browns to access Lot 5.
Accordingly, on the assumption that there is room within the Torrens system for an easement to arise by implication, at least as against the grantor, the facts here are insufficient to support an easement of necessity, or under the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows. But although insufficient of themselves to warrant implication of an easement under Wheeldon v Burrows, those facts are not irrelevant to the plaintiff's estoppel case, to which I now turn.

[21]

The estoppel case

The plaintiff's case is put primarily on the basis of an equitable proprietary estoppel, the elements of which were articulated by Brennan J in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher [36] as follows: … it is necessary for a plaintiff to prove that (1) the plaintiff assumed that a particular legal relationship then existed between the plaintiff and the defendant or expected that a particular legal relationship would exist between them and, in the latter case, that the defendant would not be free to withdraw from the expected legal relationship; (2) the defendant has induced the plaintiff to adopt that assumption or expectation; (3) the plaintiff acts or abstains from acting in reliance on the assumption or expectation; (4) the defendant knew or intended him to do so; (5) the plaintiff's action or inaction will occasion detriment if the assumption or expectation is not fulfilled; and (6) the defendant has failed to act to avoid that detriment whether by fulfilling the assumption or expectation or otherwise. For the purposes of the second element, a defendant who has not actively induced the plaintiff to adopt an assumption or expectation will nevertheless be held to have done so if the assumption or expectation can be fulfilled only by a transfer of the defendant's property, a diminution of his rights or an increase in his obligations and he, knowing that the plaintiff's reliance on the assumption or expectation may cause detriment to the plaintiff if it is not fulfilled, fails to deny to the plaintiff the correctness of the assumption or expectation on which the plaintiff is conducting his affairs.
Equity comes to the relief of a plaintiff who has acted to his or her detriment on the basis of a fundamental assumption, in the adoption of which the defendant has played such a part that it would be unfair or unjust if he or she were left free to ignore it, on the footing that it would be unconscionable for the defendant to deny the assumption. [37] While it is essential to an equitable estoppel that the defendant knows or intends that the party who adopts the assumption will act or abstain from acting in reliance on it, [38] and such knowledge or intention may easily be inferred where the adoption, assumption or expectation is induced by the making of a promise or representation, it may also be found where a defendant encourages a plaintiff to adhere to an assumption or expectation already formed, or acquiesces in an assumption or expectation when, in conscience, objection ought to be stated. [39] The unconscionability which attracts the intervention of equity is the defendant's failure, having induced or acquiesced in the adoption of the assumption or expectation, to fulfil it, or otherwise to avoid the detriment which that failure would occasion. [40]
While numerous judicial and academic attempts have been made over the years to catalogue the elements of an estoppel of this type, [41] it suffices for present purposes to observe that, at least generally speaking, the matters that a plaintiff must establish to found such an equitable estoppel may be characterised as comprising certain conduct of the plaintiff, certain conduct of the defendant, and certain qualities of the subject matter, which for present purposes, may be sufficiently summarised as follows. First, as to the conduct of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff acted, or abstained from acting, in reliance upon an assumption or expectation that a particular legal relationship existed or would exist between the plaintiff and the defendant or that the plaintiff had or would acquire some interest in the defendant's property. Secondly, as to the conduct of the defendant, that the defendant induced the plaintiff to adopt the assumption or expectation and encouraged the reliant activity of the plaintiff, or at least failed to deny the assumption or expectation with knowledge that the plaintiff was relying on it to the plaintiff's potential detriment, and that the expectation could be fulfilled only by transfer of the defendant's property, a diminution of the defendant's rights or an increase in the defendant's obligations. Thirdly, as to the subject matter, that the assumption or expectation in respect of it was one that the defendant could lawfully satisfy. Ordinarily the relevant conduct of the plaintiff (assumption or expectation) and that of the defendant (encouragement or acquiescence) will be factually interrelated and interwoven. [42]

[22]

The plaintiff

The plaintiff's case is that in reliance on an assumption that she was and would continue to be entitled to exercise access to Lot 5 over the track, she: 1. located her home on the property by reference to the path of the track and point where it entered her property, at a place which was in a practical sense inaccessible if the track were not available; 2. expended labour and/or money on the maintenance and improvement of the track, including slashing and grading, and extending the track to her home, and installing a cattle grid on Lot 130 at the gate where the track leaves the Princes Highway; and 3. refrained from taking steps to enforce her rights and/or explore alternative means of access.
Although she did not say so directly in her affidavit evidence, in oral evidence Mrs Rixon gave evidence to the effect that, when she made the decision to purchase the property and until 2005, she believed that the track was the lawful access to the property. She was asked: Q. When you decided to purchase the property, what did you believe were the access arrangements so as the property was concerned? A. Well I thought we'd just go through the gate that was unlocked to show us the property. Q. You also tell us in your affidavit and also in your oral evidence that, after you'd contracted to the property but before it was settled, you had a conversation with Mr Brown in which you say you sought permission to take a house onto the property? A. Yes, that's right. Q. Why did you think you needed permission to take the house on? A. Because we didn't own it yet.
Although I have rejected her claim for a Wheeldon v Burrows easement, it is not without significance, when considering the estoppel case, that the track existed (albeit in primitive form), was visible (at least as far as the powerlines), and crucially, was used as the access when the plaintiff was shown the land by or on behalf of the vendor. If an intending vendor takes the purchaser onto the property to inspect it by a particular access route, and does not then say "Of course, you're not legally entitled to use this access", that is calculated to create, or at least contribute to, an assumption on the part of the purchaser that the route used was an available access to the property. Such an assumption is an obvious one to form from being taken onto the property to inspect it via that route, and fortified if the gate, which had been locked, is thereafter left unlocked. It is improbable that Mrs Rixon and her then husband would have purchased a property which, apart from the track, had no obvious means of vehicular access, and to which they were shown no other such means, unless under the impression that the track was lawful access.
In connection with placement of the house, Mrs Rixon could not be accused of overstatement; when asked whether she would have put the house in the same place if she had thought that she would not be entitled to use the track, she said "Probably not", and that she would probably have located it closer to wherever the access entered the property. However, the objective facts, visible on the view, are eloquent. The house was placed just inside Lot 5, adjacent to its boundary with Lot 130, on the high point of the property, closely proximate to where the track reached the boundary. It was plainly placed there on the basis that access to and from it would be via the track. If access was to be via the Tomakin Road, then it would have been necessary to construct a road and bridge to reach the place where the house was located. Similarly, if access was to be via Queen Street or School Road, where there was no constructed access, significant construction works - including in the latter case a crossing of Tomakin Creek - would have been required. While the location is less disadvantageous in relation to an access via the Mogo Cemetery and the crown road through Lot 204, through which the suggested access runs, a much lengthier and steeper transit of Lot 5 would have been involved from the access point to the present house location than with access via the track. If access were not via the track, the house would self-evidently have been located closer to the available access. Mrs Rixon's understated evidence reinforces rather than detracts from her credibility; that the house was located by reference to accessibility via the track is, in the vernacular, as "plain as a pikestaff" on inspection of the property, and bespeaks an assumption that she was entitled to access over the track.
It does not tell against such an assumption that, as I have found, Mrs Rixon sought the vendor's permission to place the house on Lot 5. The house was placed on the land before settlement of the purchase, although after exchange, and a purchaser under contract who has not taken possession would not normally assume a right to enter onto the property; in those circumstances a request for permission to take the house onto the property before settlement does not tell against the assumption that she would entitled to use the track as of right upon completion; to the contrary, such a request would be expected if the access were to be used before completion.
Mrs Rixon's assumption that she was entitled, as of right, to use the track is manifested by her continual use of the track thereafter, without seeking permission to do so, for 23 years from the time of purchase in 1982 at least until 2005, when Mr Brown began to raise objections. She did not after completion of the purchase seek permission to use, or for her invitees to use, the track, although she did seek permission if works on Lot 130, such as installation of the cattle grid, were proposed. Mr Brown's evidence, that permission was neither sought nor expressly given for use of the track, fortifies the position that the plaintiff's assumption was that she was entitled to use the track as of right, rather than by permission of the defendant.
Mrs Rixon was asked: Q. Could I suggest to you that you didn't actually believe that you had a right but merely that it was the most convenient mechanism to get to the roadway? A. Do you mean before or after 2005? Q. I'm sorry, that's unfair, yes. After 2005 at the very least. A. After 2005, not before, because I did think that was my access, particularly after the other road was put in and I was told I could still have - my access was safe.
The circumstance that after 2005, Mrs Rixon was prepared to explore alternative access options does not tell against her previously - and critically at the time of purchasing the property and placing her home on it - having assumed that she was entitled as of right to use the track to access the property; her explanation to the effect that from 2005 she began to explore alternative access options because she realised that the use of the track was greatly annoying Mr Brown, and she was seeking to avoid a conflict if she could, is eminently reasonable.
I am therefore satisfied that when Mrs Rixon purchased Lot 5, and when she caused the house to be located just inside the point where the track leads to the Lot 5 boundary, she did so upon the assumption that she was entitled as of right to use the track to access Lot 5, and she continued to hold that assumption until about 2005.
Mr Rogers, for the defendant, submitted that detrimental reliance was not established, and in particular that there could have been no detrimental reliance in making the purchase, because before any conversation about using the track to move the house onto the property, Mrs Rixon had already exchanged contracts for the purchase; and in respect of the location of the house, while Mrs Rixon said that she would probably have put the house closer to wherever she may otherwise have had access to or egress from the land, she was not dissatisfied with the location of the house.
However, while it is true that Mrs Rixon exchanged contracts for the purchase without any express guarantee of access - whether along the track or otherwise - across Lot 130, I do not accept that there could be no detrimental reliant activity in purchasing the property. Given the absence of any other apparent vehicular access, it cannot be supposed that Mrs Rixon (and her then husband) would have purchased Lot 5 at all, had they not assumed that the track over which they were taken by the vendor to inspect the property was not lawful access. And as to the location of the house, that Mrs Rixon is happy with the present location of the house, given the current access arrangements, is beside the point; what is important is that its location is utterly impractical if access were not available from the track. If she were now denied use of the track, Mrs Rixon would be left with a house on Lot 5 to which she could gain vehicular access only by undertaking substantial and expensive works. Access from any of the suggested available alternatives would require substantial construction works: if access were to be via the Tomakin Road, then it would be necessary to construct a 400 metre road, and a bridge over Tomakin Creek, to reach the place where the house is located, and even so it would be subject to occasional inundation; if access were to be via Queen Street, the Council would have to be persuaded to construct the road to the boundary, or to close the road so that Mrs Rixon could construct it (200 metres), and there would then be a further 150 metres of construction within Lot 5 on a steep incline to the house; similarly if access were to be via the school corridor; access via the Mogo Cemetery would not be possible without an easement over Lot 130; and access via Lot 204 would not be possible without arrangements with the owners of Lot 204. In my judgment, there was detrimental reliance in purchasing a property which had no other constructed access, and in placing the house and orienting the layout of the property to and on the basis that access was available via the track, when it would have been placed elsewhere if that access were not available and access had to be exercised from elsewhere.
The other matters of detriment relied upon on behalf of Mrs Rixon are admittedly less compelling. Although it was submitted that Mrs Rixon had extended the track, it is not suggested that she undertook any construction works in that respect. The track has been "extended" only by use; the repeated passage of vehicles to and fro over it has resulted in its becoming more worn and defined. This has been accentuated by the occasional repair of potholes, the grading of the track and the slashing of its immediate surrounds. However, the slashing and grading of the track, and the installation of the rudimentary cattle grid, involved effort and expenditure of a relatively minor order, and is explicable as no more than would have been undertaken in connection with maintaining the track in a useable condition so long as permission to utilise it continued. Installation of the cattle grid cost nothing. Such acts are consistent with those which anyone who as a matter of fact used the track might undertake to maintain its convenience, and are not necessarily referable to an assumption that Mrs Rixon was entitled as of right to use the track; they are equally consistent with a revocable permit to do so. Any detrimental reliance in this respect was, if not de minimis, then very slight; I accept that those matters would not of themselves constitute such detriment as to render it unconscionable to revoke permission to use the track.
I also accept that no detriment was incurred in abstaining from taking steps to enforce the plaintiff's right of access, or to explore alternative means of access, at any earlier time. There is no basis for supposing that the plaintiff would have been any better off had she taken such steps earlier, than she is now. It follows that there was no relevant detrimental reliance in this respect.
However, it follows that I accept that in deciding to purchase the property (to which there was otherwise no practically available vehicular access), and in locating her house on it (at a place which in a practical sense was inaccessible if the track were not available), Mrs Rixon relied on an assumption that she was entitled as of right to access her property using the track, and that denial of such entitlement now would occasion her substantial detriment, in that she would be left with a property which is in a practical sense land-locked, and a house which she could access only by constructing a new access, at considerable inconvenience and cost.

[23]

The defendant's role

The matters which potentially implicate the defendant in Mrs Rixon's assumption and detrimental reliance, so as to preclude it from now denying its truth, are, first, the manner in which Mr Brown showed her the property prior to purchase; secondly, Mr Brown's grant of permission to use the track prior to the settlement of the purchase to install the house; thirdly, ongoing acquiescence in her use and maintenance of the track; and fourthly, the reassurance given, in connection with the development plans under contemplation by Mr Brown in or about 2000, that she would continue to have access to her property over the track.
Mr Brown was reluctant to concede that he was aware that Mrs Rixon and her invitees were using the track to access Lot 130. In his affidavit evidence, Mr Brown said that he took little notice of what access Mrs Rixon and her family were using at any given time; that he did not prevent them travelling from their property to the main road via the track, but gave no express permission and none was sought. However, although Mr Brown may have been an infrequent visitor to Lot 130, his quarry business was located nearby. In his oral evidence, it became apparent that although he may not have taken an extensive interest in the manner of use of the track, and how Mrs Rixon was accessing the property, he was aware that she (and her children) were using the track. He had no satisfactory explanation for why the gate at the highway remained unlocked; but the obvious explanation is that the defendant knew that it was being used by Mrs Rixon.
However, mere knowledge that the plaintiff was using the track does not import knowledge of detrimental reliance. Nor does giving an assurance that access would be unaffected by a development proposal, and even if such an assurance was given, there was no subsequent detrimental reliance on it. It was not established that Mr Brown - or anyone else on behalf of the defendant - was actually aware of the slashing and grading, although a reasonable landowner would have been. In any event, my above conclusion that there is little if any detriment in activity of the plaintiff after the installation of the house means that it is in connection with the purchase of the property, and the location on it of the house, that any relevant involvement must be found; I agree with the defendant's submission that later events do not avail the plaintiff.
Although Mr Brown denies that he showed Mrs Rixon and her then husband the property, or took them over the track to it, it is inherently credible and probable that someone on behalf of the vendor did so; as already indicated, it is highly improbable that Mrs Rixon and her then husband would have purchased the property without an inspection, and as Mr Rogers accepted, it must have been one or other of the two Mr Browns who showed them. It would, or at least ought to have been, apparent to the vendor that the purchaser would, in deciding to purchase, in the absence of any other apparent vehicular access, assume that the access they then used was legal access to the property.
And although Mr Brown also now denies that his permission was sought, let alone granted, to place the house on Lot 5, it is - for reasons already stated - highly probable that Mrs Rixon would have sought permission to move the house onto the property before settlement, and that one or other of the Mr Browns gave her that permission. The defendant must have known that the house was being moved onto the property via the track, that there was no other practical way of getting it there, and that once there, the only practical means of access and egress to and from it would be via the track. Inherent in this is that the defendant must, or at the very least ought to have, also known that the plaintiff was acting on the assumption that, upon completion of the purchase, she would be entitled to use the track. Allowing her to do so before completion was calculated to create the impression that upon completion she would be entitled to access via the track.
Moreover, the defendant must have known, or at least ought to have known, that the plaintiff would not likely have purchased the property, or placed a house on it via the track, if she were not entitled to access over the track. In those circumstances, the defendant could not, knowing that she was proposing first to purchase the property, and then to locate the house on it, stand by, allowing the plaintiff to act on the basis of her assumption, and later deny its truth. At the least, the defendant acquiesced in the plaintiff's assumption when, in conscience, any objection ought to have been stated. [43]
By using the track to show the plaintiff the property for the pre-purchase inspection, and indicating to her that she should use the track to install her house, without stipulating that the track was not legal access or that there was any restriction or limitation on its use, the defendant is so implicated in the plaintiff's purchase of the property and installation of the house on it reliant on her assumption that she was entitled as of right to use the track, as to render it unconscionable now for it to deny the truth of that assumption, given the detrimental consequences of such a denial.

[24]

The remedy

Although it has sometimes said that the relief granted in a case of equitable estoppel is the minimum necessary to avoid the detriment to the party who has relied on the assumption induced by the party estopped, this is unduly narrow; underlying the doctrine of estoppel in equity is that, when the conditions for its operation are established, it is unconscionable for the defendant to deny the plaintiff's assumption or expectation, and thus the equity will not infrequently be satisfied only by holding the defendant to the plaintiff's assumption, though there are cases in which the equity might be satisfied by a charge for expenditure and so on. [44]
In cases in which rights of access over land owned by others have been upheld on the basis of an equitable estoppel, the equity has sometimes been satisfied by a licence, [45] but in others by an easement. [46] In Thomas v Symons, Windeyer AJ said: I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not established entitlement to a permanent easement benefiting her land. In other words, the representations she relied upon have not required such a result. In addition I consider such relief would be out of proportion to the detriment. However, I conclude the evidence is clear enough and strong enough to lead to a finding that there was a representation that the plaintiff would have a right of access as has been used for 66 years and it would be unjust and unconscionable to bring that right to an end while Mrs Thomas remains in occupation of lot 9. I find the defendant is estopped from denying that the plaintiff has a right of continued access as used since 1947 over lot 25 so long as she remains in occupation of lot 9 as her home.
In Hill v AWJ Moore & Co Pty Ltd, [47] Needham J said: In my opinion, these facts raise an equity in the plaintiff's favour. The question is - what is the extent of the equity? The licence was for an indefinite period, and, for that reason, in my opinion, the remedy should be indefinite. Such a remedy is the only way in which the defendant could be estopped from exercising its legal right. That the right, in appropriate circumstances, should be transferrable is established by Plimmer's case, by Ward v Kirkland, and by the majority in Hamilton v Geraghty (1901) 1 SR (NSW) (Eq) 81. It follows that my opinion is that the plaintiffs are entitled to have transferred to them a right of way over the road.
These cases indicate that the appropriate remedy is informed by the scope of the plaintiff's assumption (to the extent that it was or ought to have been known to the defendant), and the proportionality of the remedy to the detriment. Prima facie the relevant assumption defines the remedy, which need not be the minimum, [48] but if it is disproportionate some lesser remedy (such as a charge for expenditure) may be granted.
In this respect, this is a stronger case than Hill v Moore, in which the plaintiff "did not have a clear view of the basis of his right" and "was undoubtedly of the view that, in some way, whatever rights of user he had were based, at least in part, in the fact that the Council had built the road". In the present case, although the plaintiff may not have turned her mind to it at the time in legal terms, her assumption was that she was entitled in perpetuity to use the track as of right, not as a matter of permission of the defendant - in legal terms, that she had an easement. On the faith of that assumption, as the defendant must have known, she (and her then husband) purchased Lot 5 and located the house where they did. A personal licence would leave Mrs Rixon with a property which she could not sell with a viable access, when she had purchased it on the assumption that it was entitled to such access. Mrs Rixon's assumption was to the effect that she had an easement - not a mere licence - over the track, and in those circumstances, the defendant is estopped from denying that she has such an easement; her equity would not be satisfied by a mere licence.

[26]

Express grant

In the case of an easement created by express grant or reservation, the scope of the right of way is prima facie a matter of construction of the words of the grant, although this may be influenced by the circumstances surrounding the grant. [49] A grantee is not confined to the user prevailing at the time of the grant, but may use the right of way for any lawful purpose within the terms of the grant; [50] thus if the grant is in general terms, it can be used for all purposes for which the dominant tenement can lawfully be used, [51] so far as they are compatible with the physical nature of the servient tenement. [52] As Campbell J (as he then was) put it in Maher v Bayview Golf Club: [53] 40 … Because the use of the servient tenement which is permitted by an express grant of easement depends upon the construction of the grant, it is possible for the nature and extent of use actually made of such an easement to alter quite significantly with time: eg Dand v Kingscote (1840) 6 M&W 174; 151 ER 370 (right of way to a colliery able to be exercised by railway, even though railways not invented at time of grant); Attorney-General v Hodgson [1922] 2 Ch 429 (grants of "a right of carriage horse and footway" made between 1853 and 1861 not restricted to carriages drawn by horses, but can apply to motor vehicles); Jelbert v Davis and Another [1968] 1 WLR 589 (express grant of right of way "at all times and for all purposes", but "in common with all other persons having the like right" to land used for agricultural purposes at time of grant allows user of the right of way with caravans, so long as it is "not in such manner as to cause substantial interference with the use of the right of way by [others entitled to use it] or to cause a nuisance to [owners of the servient tenement]").
Notwithstanding observations to the contrary in the dissenting judgment of McHugh J in Gallagher v Rainbow, [54] the Court of Appeal said in Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Westfield Management Ltd [55] that in the case of an express grant, as distinct from a case of prescription, an easement may, on the true construction of the grant, permit user for new or additional purposes of the dominant tenement. Hodgson JA, with whom Beazley JA (as her Honour then was) and Tobias JA agreed, said: [56] [37] Later on the same page, McHugh J says: Speaking generally, where there is an alteration in the use of the dominant tenement, the grantee has no right to use the easement for any new or additional purpose of the dominant tenement. This proposition applies to grants by prescription as well as to express grants. [38] The proposition is in my opinion correct in relation to grants by prescription; but in my opinion it is against the weight of authority in relation to express grants, as to which the question depends on the construction of the grant in question. [39] In United Land Company v. Great Eastern Railway Company (1875) LR 10 Ch Apps 586 at 590 Mellish LJ said this: Where a right of way is claimed by user, then, no doubt, according to the authorities, the purpose for which the way may be used is limited by the user; for we must judge from the way in which it has been used what the purposes were for which the party claiming has gained the right. But when a right of way is created by grant, or by Act of Parliament, then it must depend on the proper construction of the grant, or Act of Parliament, whether the right of way is to be used for all purposes, or for only limited purposes. [40] Other cases in which it has been held that a grant of a general right of way for all purposes may authorise use beyond that which prevailed at the time of the grant include South Eastern Railway Company v Cooper [1924] 1 Ch 211 and British Railways Board v Glass [1955] 1 Ch 538. [41] At 640-1, McHugh says that "no alteration can be made in the use or purpose of the easement that goes beyond that contemplated by the parties at the time of the grant", and he goes on to refer to Harris v Flower, to which I will return. McHugh J then continued (at 641-2): In Bracewell v Appleby [1975] Ch 408 at 418, Graham J applied this dictum of Romer LJ and held that the owner of a dominant tenement was not entitled to use a right of way for the purpose of gaining access to a house that he subsequently built on adjoining land. In Jelbert v Davis [1968] 1 WLR 589; [1968] 1 All ER 1182, the defendant who owned agricultural land had a right of way to that land over land owned by the plaintiff. Subsequently the defendant converted his land to a caravan park which had more than 200 camping sites. The plaintiff objected to the use of the right of way by caravans and cars that were using the park. The English Court of Appeal held that use of the right of way for such a large number of camping sites was impermissible, as it could not have been within the contemplation of the parties upon the original grant of the easements. The underlying principle was stated by Lord Denning MR as follows: "… [T]he true proposition is that no one of those entitled to the right of way must use it to an extent which is beyond anything which was contemplated at the time of the grant." These cases may be contrasted with White v Grand Hotel Eastbourne Ltd [1913] 1 Ch 113 and Robinson v Bailey [1948] 2 All ER 791. In White, the conversion of a private residence on the dominant tenement to a lodging house for the drivers of cars whose owners stayed at a nearby hotel owned by the defendants was held not to subject the easement to a use not contemplated at the time of the grant in 1883. At that time, the dominant tenement had one resident with two vehicles. After the conversion it had "many residents of a shifting character with vehicles that do not belong to them". Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that the different use was within the terms of the grant. Hamilton LJ said: "The house in the present case was used as a private dwelling-house in 1883, but with the consent of a third person it might be, as in fact it was, turned into a house which could be used to trade." White v Grand Hotel, Eastbourne, Ltd was applied in Robinson where access to a partly completed dwelling house used for storing building materials was held to be within the terms of the grant of the easement to land even though when the grant was made it was contemplated that a dwelling house would be built for occupation on the land. Lord Greene MR applied the dictum of Hamilton LJ and held that, with the consent of a third party, the land could be used for the new purpose. However, it is not easy to reconcile these two cases with the principle that an easement cannot be used for a purpose that was not contemplated by the parties to the grant. Perhaps the two cases are to be explained on the basis that the parties contemplated that the land might be used for the purposes for which it was ultimately used. But there was no finding to this effect. [42] The cases of White v Grand Hotel Eastbourne Ltd and Robinson v Bailey, of which McHugh J seems to disapprove, seem to me to be consistent with the cases of United Land, Cooper and Glass to which I have referred; and in my opinion the other cases referred to by McHugh J support a proposition somewhat narrower than the proposition asserted by him, limiting the use of an easement to that contemplated by the parties at the time of the grant. [43] In Bracewell v Appleby, the primary ground of the decision was that, construed in the circumstances, the words of the grant did not have the effect of authorising any use beyond the gaining of access to the dominant tenement. And in Jelbert, although Lord Denning MR did use the words quoted by McHugh J, his subsequent discussion was directed to the interpretation of the grant in the light of the objective circumstances. There was also a suggestion in the judgment that Lord Denning was applying the principles of nuisance law to which I referred earlier. Similarly, in Todrick, the finding that the easement granted in that case did not extend to the user of the subject roadway for motor omnibuses was based not on a change of user as such, but on a construction of the words of the grant having regard to the physical circumstances of the properties.
This appears to have been accepted in the High Court: [57] [42] To some degree the attraction of "the common law approach to the construction of grants of easement" [Grinskis v Lahood [1971] NZLR 502 at 508] has been to counter arguments that a right of way may be used only for the purposes for which the way was used at the time of the grant. But to accept the proposition that the user under a registered easement may change with the nature of the dominant tenement, so long as the terms of the grant are sufficiently broad [Megarry and Wade, 2000, pp 1153-4 [18-197]], does no violence to the principles of the Torrens system.
Thus, in the case of an express grant, any user within the terms of the grant and not inconsistent with the physical characteristics of the servient tenement is permissible.

[27]

Prescription

As is apparent from the above discussion, the authorities indicate that a different approach applies in the case of an easement acquired by prescription. Although the mode of user of such an easement can evolve in the same way as in an express grant - so that a prescriptive right obtained by animal-drawn vehicles can be used by motor vehicles [58] - the purpose of the user is confined to that which gained the prescription. [59] This is because, in the absence of an actual grant, there is no grant to be construed, and the permissible user must be ascertained from the actual user through which the right has been gained. [60] The distinction was explained by Mellish LJ in United Land Company v Great Eastern Railway Company: [61] Where a right of way is claimed by user, then, no doubt, according to the authorities, the purpose for which the way may be used is limited by the user; for we must judge from the way in which it has been used what the purposes were for which the party claiming has gained the right. But when a right of way is created by grant, or by Act of Parliament, then it must depend on the proper construction of the grant, or Act of Parliament, whether the right of way is to be used for all purposes, or only for limited purposes.
In Maher v Bayview Golf Club, [62] Campbell J (as he then was), after an extensive and illuminating review of many authorities, [63] concluded that while there can be a change in the extent to which an easement is used from that which existed while the easement was accruing, and while there can also be changes in the detail of how the easement is used, so long as the use is still of the same nature, a change in the nature of use of the easement (such as if the dominant tenement comes to be used not only for agricultural purposes but also for a carrying business) is beyond the scope of the prescriptive easement. [64] In my view there are sound grounds in policy and in principle for doubting that a prescriptive easement cannot accommodate a change in user of the dominant land. After all, the concern is the user of and burden on the servient land, and an easement should not control the use to which the dominant land, for which the easement may well be the only access, can be put. If dominant land which was agricultural had the benefit of a right of way, over which on average three cattle trucks transited daily, was converted to commercial use, with three delivery trucks using the right of way daily, it is not apparent how there would be the slightest adverse impact on the servient land. Yet it is accepted that the agricultural use could be intensified (so that the number of cattle trucks increased), without exceeding the permissible use of the easement. However, the principle is too well-established, including in the cases considered by Campbell J, to be discarded by a judge sitting at first instance.

[29]

Conclusion

If the plaintiff's easement were or analogous to a prescriptive one, or if the plaintiff's equity depended on a permission granted by the defendant for a limited purpose, then it would not extend to authorise use to access the property for the purpose of parking buses there. However, here the easement is founded on an assumption that the track was the legal access, to which she was entitled as of right, and while at first sight there are some similarities between an equitable easement such as arises in this case and an easement arising by prescription or implication, the closer and preferable analogy is with an express grant. The equitable easement neither depends on nor arises from evidence of actual user, but because the defendant is precluded from denying that an easement has been granted; thus, as in so many instances of equitable estoppel, where the dealings between the parties fall short of creating a legally enforceable contract, nonetheless the matters that found an equitable estoppel produce a comparable result.
The touchstone is, once again, the scope of the plaintiff's assumption (to the extent that it was or ought to have been known to the defendant). And again, while neither party may have turned their minds to it at the time in legal terms, Mrs Rixon's assumption concerning her access was that she had a general right of way for all purposes over Lot 130 via the track. If Mrs Rixon were wrong in supposing that she had unfettered legal access over the track, then in conscience the defendant ought to have stipulated any limitation when showing her the land, and/or when agreeing to her installing her home. Accordingly, the easement to which she is entitled is the equitable equivalent of an express grant in general terms for all purposes - a right of carriage way as defined in (NSW) Conveyancing Act 1919, Schedule 8, Part 1, namely: Full and free right for every person who is at any time entitled to an estate or interest in possession in the land herein indicated as the dominant tenement or any part thereof with which the right shall be capable of enjoyment, and every person authorised by that person, to go, pass and repass at all times and for all purposes with or without animals or vehicles or both to and from the said dominant tenement or any such part thereof.
It follows that any user not inconsistent with the physical characteristics of the servient tenement is permissible, notwithstanding changes in use of the dominant land since 1982.
There is no physical feature of the servient land that would constrain use by the Rixons' buses. Lot 130 was (and remains) vacant and unimproved; user of the track would not foreseeably (at the time of the purchase) and does not now occasion inconvenience to any occupant or user of Lot 130. While it can be accepted that at the time of Mrs Rixon's purchase there was no contemplation, on either side, of the establishment of a bus business, nonetheless given the size and rural nature and history of the property, it would have been anticipated that the access to the property would be used from time to time by heavy vehicles - including for example cattle trucks, and/or milk tankers to and from a dairy. While much was made of using the track for buses to pass and repass, there is little practical difference between buses on the one hand, and cattle trucks or milk tankers on the other.
I do not accept any relief should be conditional upon the plaintiff obtaining such lawful approvals as are necessary to use her property as a bus depot. So far as the evidence reveals, use of the property as a "bus depot" has been permissible under the applicable planning instrument at all material times, subject to the council's consent; in other words, it is not a forbidden purpose for which the land cannot be used. Council's consent has not been obtained, but it is not clear that merely parking buses on land constitutes use of the land as a "bus depot", given that the buses are fuelled, maintained and serviced elsewhere. And even if the use is not permissible under the relevant planning instrument, that is a matter for the relevant planning authorities to address under their laws, not for the defendant to seek to enforce through restricting access. The defendant has a legitimate interest in the use of the easement, to confine it to reasonable user, but it has no legitimate interest in whether or not there has been any requisite planning consent for the parking of buses on the neighbouring property.
Nor is there any significance in the circumstance that the proprietors of the business (Mr and Mrs Rixon) are not identical with the proprietor of the dominant land (Mrs Rixon alone); for example, an easement is available to tenants of the dominant owner.
A question remains as to the width of the easement. Although survey evidence was presented of a 10-metre easement, Mrs Rixon indicated that she sought only a 4-metre easement, covering the width of the track; the notion of a 10-metre easement had, she said, emerged from discussions between her and Mr Brown in the course of negotiations between them. It was submitted for the defendant that if there were to be an easement, a 10-metre easement would be preferable, but there was no compelling reason for this contention, which I suspect was derived from the evidence that the compensation for a 10-metre easement, at least if imposed under s 88K, would be greater than for a 4-metre easement. No basis for an easement wider than approximately 4 metres is established.
Thus, the plaintiff's assumption that she had legal access via the track in general terms founds the equitable equivalent of an express grant of a right of carriageway over the track, 4 metres in width, in general terms for all purposes, so that any user not inconsistent with the physical characteristics of the servient tenement is permissible, notwithstanding changes in use of the dominant land. Absent any physical feature of the servient land that would constrain such use, the easement accommodates use by the Rixon's buses. The plaintiff is entitled to a transfer of a right of carriageway to that effect. [69]

[31]

Reasonable necessity: s 88K(1)

An order under s 88K(1) imposing an easement may be made only if the easement is "reasonably necessary for the effective use or development" of the dominant land. While the words of s 88K(1), rather than some substituted phrase, must be applied, the word "reasonably" points to something less than absolute necessity, but "reasonably necessary" involves more than mere desirability, preferability over the alternative available means, or convenience; the requirement is far closer to necessity than it is to convenience. [70]
The factors that inform whether an easement is "reasonably necessary" cannot be considered in isolation; ultimately the question is determined by the evaluation of all the factors in conjunction with each other. [71] The relevant factors include the impact of the easement on the servient tenement, the fact that ordering an easement detracts from the property rights of the owner of the servient tenement, and the reasonableness of the use for which the easement is proposed. [72] However, one essential consideration is the alternative methods by which effective use or development of the dominant land could be achieved. [73]
Even on the assumption that access is not available over the track, I am unsatisfied that an easement under s 88K, whether over the track or one of the alternative proposals, is "reasonably necessary for the effective use or development" of Lot 5. No doubt an easement of the track, or one of the alternative options, would be highly convenient, and much more so than the legally available alternatives; but the Queen Street option, though it would require construction and expense, is not impracticable, and on Mrs Rixon's own evidence would be acceptable to her; she said: Q. You said in the course of your evidence this afternoon that, if some access other than over the existing rack could be made available, you'd be happy with that, or something along those lines. As I understand the evidence given by Mr Millett yesterday, he essentially says that, if you couldn't have legal access over the track, option 4, then he would recommend that access be permitted at Queen Street? A. I think that's what he said, yes. Q. So if you could have legal access to the highway over Queen Street, is that an acceptable option to you? A. Yes, it is.
Lot 5 can be effectively used and developed by constructing an access using Queen Street, without acquiring an easement over Lot 103. For the purposes of s 88K, an imposed easement is not reasonably necessary.

[33]

Valuation and compensation

Evidence of value was adduced, by the plaintiff from Mr Wayne Riches, and by the defendant from Ms Symons. The evidence covered the compensation for an easement over the existing track (Option 4), and alternatively a fee for a license to use the existing track; an easement for "access option 1" (Option 7); and an easement for "access option 2" (Option 8).
Although they used somewhat different methodologies, for the most part there was remarkable consistency in the outcomes, given the difficulties and scope for difference of opinion in the valuation of an easement. Thus, based on a 10-metre easement: 1. Mr Riches valued Option 8 at $20,428 (as a 4-metre easement) and $29,338 (as a 10-metre easement), and Ms Symons at $20,413. 2. Ms Symons valued Option 7 at $20,780, and while Mr Riches did not value that option, it is broadly consistent with both valuations of the comparable Option 8 - allowing that the impact on Lot 130 of Option 7 would be less than option 8. 3. Ms Symons valued Option 4 (easement) at $33,971. Mr Riches did not directly value a 10-metre easement for this option, but valued a 4-metre easement at $20,000 (on the incorrect assumption that there was no dwelling entitlement). His valuation requires at least the following adjustments: 1. substituting his market valuation in 2016 "with dwelling entitlement" of $285,000, for the "without dwelling entitlement" valuation that he used. This results in the analysis producing $3.73sqm. Applied to a 10-metre easement (which, according to the survey plan tendered, would affect 3,259sqm), at an affectation of 50% (reduced from his 85%, on account of the wider easement), the land value component would be $6,078; 2. the severance component, which he allowed at $2,000 on the basis of only agricultural use, would be increased where the highest and best use is rural residence and the easement runs through the centre of the property, to at least $10,000; and 3. the decrease in value of the remainder of the land due to the impact of the easement, which he allowed at $15,000 on the basis of agricultural use only, would also increase; he allowed $15,000 for the considerably less intrusive Option 8, which should be increased to at least $25,000. 1. Accordingly, on Mr Riches' approach, a 10-metre easement over the existing track would apparently warrant compensation in excess of $40,000; I can safely accept Ms Symons' valuation as not excessive.
As discussed with counsel during the hearing, on that basis, it was accepted that there could be no serious dispute with allowing compensation of $20,000 for Option 7, $22,500 for Option 8, and $30,000 for the track (Option 4).

[34]

Conclusion

My conclusions may be summarised as follows:
As there were alternative means of access available as of right, albeit that they may have been inconvenient and expensive to construct, the conditions for implication of an easement of necessity are not established - even assuming that one can arise in the context of Torrens title land.
Although Mrs Rixon was taken via the track (and then, probably across country) to inspect the property, the evidence does not establish that the track then extended beyond the powerlines, let alone to the boundary; moreover, it is not established that the defendant had been in the habit of using the track to access Lot 5. In those circumstances, I cannot be satisfied that at the time of the transfer to Mrs Rixon and her then husband in 1982, the track constituted a continuous and apparent quasi-easement of the Wheeldon v Burrows variety - again, assuming that one can arise in the context of Torrens title land.
In deciding to purchase Lot 5 (to which there was otherwise no practically available vehicular access), and in locating her house on it (at a place which in a practical sense was inaccessible if the track were not available), Mrs Rixon relied on an assumption that she was entitled as of right to access her property using the track. Falsification of that assumption now would occasion her substantial detriment, in that she would be left with a property which is in a practical sense land-locked, and a house which she could access only by constructing a new access, at considerable inconvenience and cost.
By using the track to show the plaintiff the property for the pre-purchase inspection, and indicating to her that she should use the track to install he house, without stipulating that the track was not legal access or that there was any restriction or limitation on its use, the defendant is so implicated in the plaintiff's purchase of the property and installation of the house on it, reliant on her assumption that she was entitled as of right to use the track, as to render it unconscionable now for it to deny the truth of that assumption, given the detrimental consequences that such a denial would have.
Although the parties may not have turned their mind to it at the time in legal terms, the plaintiff's assumption, of which the defendant knew or ought to have known, was that she was entitled in perpetuity to use the track as of right, not as a matter of permission of the defendant - that is, in legal terms, that she had an easement. In those circumstances, the appropriate remedy is an easement, and her equity would not be satisfied by a mere licence.
The plaintiff's assumption that she had legal access via the track in general terms founds the equitable equivalent of an express grant of a right of carriageway over the track, 4 metres wide, in general terms and for all purposes, so that any user not inconsistent with the physical characteristics of the servient tenement is permissible, notwithstanding changes in use of the dominant land. Absent any physical feature of the servient land that would constrain such use, the easement accommodates use by the Rixon's buses. The plaintiff is entitled to have transferred to her such a right of carriageway.
As Lot 5 can be effectively used and developed by constructing an access using Queen Street, without acquiring an easement over Lot 130, for the purposes of s 88K, an imposed easement is not reasonably necessary. Thus I would not have granted relief under s 88K. Were I wrong in that conclusion, I would have preferred Option 7, being the least intrusive on Lot 130, for which appropriate compensation would have been $20,000.
The plaintiff has substantially succeeded on her primary case. Although she failed on the "implied easement" case, it had no significant impact on the overall costs of the proceedings, and is not severable from the estoppel case. The plaintiff would also have failed on the s 88K case, but it was an alternative case, brought as a reasonable response to the circumstances which confronted the plaintiff, which overlapped in several respects with the estoppel case, and added little to the overall costs, not least because the options addressed under it were advanced as alternatives to the requirement for access over the track. Essentially, the litigation was caused by what I have found to be the defendant's wrongful refusal to acknowledge and accept the plaintiff's rights of access over the track, and for that reason the defendant should be regarded as responsible for the litigation. The defendant should bear the plaintiff's costs.
However, this does not extend to the costs of creating the legal easement to which the plaintiff is entitled. The plaintiff as transferee should bear the costs of any further survey (in the event that one is necessary), and of preparation and registration of the s 88B instrument and transfer creating easement.
The Court: 1. declares that the plaintiff is entitled to an equitable right of carriageway (as defined in (NSW) Conveyancing Act 1919, Sch 8), burdening Lot 130 in DP755902 and appurtenant to Lot 5 in DP835976, over the gravel access track as depicted in the plan prepared by Conway Burrows + Hancock dated 24 August 2015, being exhibit PX11 in the proceedings, save that the easement is 4 metres and not 10 metres in width; 2. orders that the defendant do all things and execute all documents, in registrable form, necessary to transfer to the plaintiff, at the plaintiff's cost, an easement in accordance with the declaration in par 1; 3. orders that there be liberty to apply in the event of any difficulty arising in the implementation of order 2; and 4. orders that the defendant be permanently restrained from interfering with or obstructing the use by the plaintiff and those authorised by her of the said easement. 5. orders that the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs.

[35]

Endnotes

Lot 27 in DP755902 became Lot 5 in DP835976 in 1989 in connection with a widening of Tomakin Road undertaken by Eurobodalla Council. For convenience, it is generally referred to as Lot 5, but when dealing with the early history as Lot 27.
In 1989, Mr Brown Jnr and his wife Anne acquired his parents' interests in the defendant and so became its sole shareholders.
(NSW) Evidence Act 1995, s 54.
(1879) 12 Ch D 31 (CA).
Nelson v Hughes [1947] VLR 227.
Jobson v Nankervis (1943) 44 SR(NSW) 277; Kostis v Devitt (1979) 1 BPR 9231; Torrisi v Magame Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 14.
Kostis v Devitt (1979) 1 BPR 9231 (Powell J); Tarrant v Zandstra (1973) 1 BPR 9381; Kebewar Pty Ltd v Harkin (1987) 9 NSWLR 738 (CA); Australian Hi-Fi Publications Pty Ltd v Gehl [1997] 2 NSWLR 618 (CA).
Parish v Kelly (1980) 1 BPR 97,040; Lamos Pty Ltd v Hutchison (1984) 3 BPR 9350 at 9354-5.
Cf Beck v Auerbach (1986) 6 NSWLR 454.
(2006) 68 NSWLR 229; (2006) ANZ ConvR 412; (2006) NSW ConvR 56-159; [2006] NSWCA 180.
McGrath v Campbell at [7]-[8], [102]-[105] (Tobias JA).
(2006) 68 NSWLR 229; (2006) ANZ ConvR 412; (2006) NSW ConvR 56-159; [2006] NSWCA 180
[1929] 2 KB 117.
(2006) 68 NSWLR 229 at 252 [115].
(2004) 60 NSWLR 286. Special leave to appeal was refused on 29 April 2005.
(2004) 60 NSWLR 286 at 297 [111].
(2004) 60 NSWLR 286 at 300 [129].
In Land Law, 5th ed, at 779.
(2006) 68 NSWLR 229 at 252-3 [116]-[119].
[2013] NSWSC 1385 at [93].
North Sydney Printing Pty Ltd v Sabemo Investment Corporation Pty Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 150; Nickerson v Barraclough [1981] 1 Ch 426 (CA).
Tarrant v Zandstra (1973) 1 BPR 9381; Titchmarsh v Royston Water Co Ltd (1900) 81 LT 673.
(1980) 1 BPR 97,040.
(1984) 3 BPR 9350 at 9354-5.
Bradbrook, A and Neave, M, Easements and Restrictive Covenants in Australia, 2nd ed (2000), [4.11]; cf MRA Engineering Ltd v Trimster Co Ltd (1988) 56 P&CR 1 (CA); Manjang v Drammeh (1991) 61 P&CR 194 (PC).
(1879) 12 Ch D 31 at 49 (Thesiger LJ); see also Wilcox v Richardson (1997) 43 NSWLR 4 at 13ff (Handley JA); Young PW, "Lessees' Ancillary Rights" (2000) 74 ALJ 384.
Nelson v Walker (1910) 10 CLR 560 at 583 (Isaacs J); Wilcox v Richardson (1997) 43 NSWLR 4 at 14 (Handley JA); Australian Hi-Fi Publications Pty Ltd v Gehl [1979] 2 NSWLR 618 at 623 (Mahoney JA).
McGrath v Campbell (2006) 68 NSWLR 229; (2006) ANZ ConvR 412; (2006) NSW ConvR 56-159; [2006] NSWCA 180 at [75] (Tobias JA).
(1973) 1 BPR 9381; see also Lancaster v Lloyd (1927) 27 SR(NSW) 379; Taylor v Browning (1885) 11 VLR 158.
Ward v Kirkland [1967] 1 Ch 194 at 225 (Ungoed-Thomas J).
Pallister v Clark (1975) 30 P&CR 84 at 89 (CA).
Ward v Kirkland [1967] 1 Ch 194 at 225 (Ungoed-Thomas J).
Cf Polden v Bastard (1865) LR 1 QB 156 (unformed and unmade path - no easement); Suffield v Brown (1864) 4 De GJ & Sm 185; 46 ER 888 (Ch) (overhanging bowsprits of ships - no sign of existence unless ship in dock - no easement); Bartlett v Tottenham [1932] 1 Ch 114 (overflow from tank - only temporary and left no mark on the land - no easement).
Wilcox v Richardson (1997) 43 NSWLR 4 at 15 (Handley JA).
Wilcox v Richardson (1997) 43 NSWLR 4 at 8 (Meagher JA).
(1988) 164 CLR 387 at 428-9. See also Duic v Duic [2013] NSWCA 42; Waddell v Waddell [2012] NSWCA 214; Walsh v Walsh [2012] NSWCA 57; Tadrous v Tadrous [2012] NSWCA 16; DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd [2011] NSWCA 348; Evans v Evans [2011] NSWCA 92 and Delaforce v Simpson-Cook [2010] NSWCA 84; (2010) 78 NSWLR 483.
Grundt v Great Boulder Gold Mines Limited (1937) 59 CLR 641, 675; Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507, 547; Waltons Stores (Interstate) Limited v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 404 (Mason CJ and Wilson J).
Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179, 188; Waltons v Maher, 423 (Brennan J).
Waltons v Maher, 423 (Brennan J).
Waltons v Maher, 423 (Brennan J).
See, for example, Fry J's five probanda in Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 ChD 96; Brennan J's six proofs in Waltons v Maher, above; Priestley JA's seven propositions in Silovi Pty Limited v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466, as modified in Austotel Pty Limited v Franklins Selfserve Pty Limited (1989) 16 NSWLR 582; and Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's six common factors in Equity Doctrines and Remedies, 4th Edition (2002), [17-105]
See generally Waltons v Maher, 428-429 (Brennan J); Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, [17-105]; O'Neill v Williams [2006] NSWSC 707 at [40]; Vukic v Grbin [2006] NSWSC 41 at [28].
Cf Waltons v Maher at 423 (Brennan J).
See the discussion by Handley JA in Delaforce v Simpson-Cook [2010] NSWCA 84, (2010) 78 NSWLR 483 at [53]-[78].
For example, Thomas v Symons [2013] NSWSC 490.
For example, Hill v AWJ Moore & Co Pty Ltd (1990) 5 BPR 97,358; BC9002063; Fenwick v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] NSWSC 788.
(1990) 5 BPR 97,358.
See for example Thomas v Symons [2013] NSWSC 490 at [37].
Cannon v Villars (1878) 8 Ch D 415 at 420 (Jessel MR); White v Grand Hotel, Eastbourne Ltd [1913] 1 Ch 113 at 116 (Cozens-Hardy MR); Robinson v Bailey [1948] 2 All ER 791 at 795-6 (Lord Greene MR); Rodwell v G R Evans & Co Pty Ltd (1977) 3 BPR 9114 at 9117; Gallagher v Rainbow (1994) 179 CLR 624 at 639-641 (McHugh J); Maher v Bayview Golf Club [2004] NSWSC 275; (2004) 12 BPR [98112] at [40] (Campbell J).
White v Grand Hotel, Eastbourne Ltd [1913] 1 Ch 113; Jelbert v Davis [1968] 1 WLR 589 at 594 (Lord Denning MR: where dominant tenement changed from agricultural use to camping and caravan site, meaning that different types of vehicles would use the easement, that of itself was quite permissible); South Eastern Railway Co v Cooper [1924] 1 Ch 211 (CA) at 226f (Warrington LJ: where a right of way originally used for only agricultural purposes was, after opening of sand pit, used for conveying minerals, there would be no question (if it were a grant, as distinct from a prescription) that the grantee would be entitled to use it for any purpose, without reference to the purposes for which the dominant tenement was used at the date of the grant).
United Land Company v Great Eastern Railway Company (1873) LR 17 Eq 158 (affirmed (1875) 10 Ch App 586) (where at time of grant use was agricultural only, but much later land was developed and mode of user changed, a right of way in general terms entitled user for all purposes for which the dominant land could lawfully be used); Newcomen v Coulson (1877) 5 Ch D 133 (where right of way to allotments granted in 1760, in general terms, and holder later develops dominant land and constructs road in place of cart-track, the grant was not limited to agricultural purposes and could be used for any purpose and by any vehicles for which it might be required).
Elliott v Renner [1923] St R Qd 172 at 176.
Maher v Bayview Golf Club [2004] NSWSC 275 at [40].
(1994) 179 CLR 624 at 640; 121 ALR 129 at 140.
(2007) 12 BPR 23,793; (2007) ANZ ConvR 103; (2007) NSW ConvR 56-170; [2006] NSWCA 337 at [38] (Hodgson JA; Beazley and Tobias JJA concurring). See also Hurt v Bowmer [1937] 1 All ER 797; South Eastern Railway Co v Cooper [1924] 1 Ch 211 (CA); White v Grand Hotel, Eastbourne Ltd [1913] 1 Ch 113.
12 BPR 23,793 at 23,802-804.
Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 528; (2007) 239 ALR 75; (2007) 81 ALJR 1887; (2007) NSW ConvR 56-196; [2007] HCA 45 at [42].
Lock v Abercester Ltd [1939] Ch 861.
Wimbledon and Putney Commons Conservators v Dixon (1875) 1 Ch D 362 at 368 (CA); R P C Holdings Ltd v Rogers [1953] 1 All ER 1029 (prescriptive right acquired for agricultural use, held limited to agricultural use and any extension of use as caravan park would be unjustifiable increase in burden (Harman J)); British Railways Board v Glass [1965] Ch 538 (CA) (although no different purpose could be imposed, intensification of existing enjoyment (and thus burden on servient land) permissible).
Maher v Bayview Golf Club [2004] NSWSC 275 at [41]-[42] (Campbell J).
[1875] 10 Ch App Cas 586 at 590.
Maher v Bayview Golf Club [2004] NSWSC 275 at [42] (Campbell J).
Williams v James (1867) LR 2 CP 577: The use must be the reasonable use for the purposes of the dominant land in the condition in which it was while the user took place. Where the dominant land was a rural field apparently used only for rustic purposes, legitimate user of the right of way was confined to the purpose of the enjoyment of the field, and only for the field in its ordinary use as a field; the right could not be used for a factory built upon the field (Willes J at 581-582; cf Bovill CJ at 580); Wimbledon and Putney Commons Conservators v Dixon (1875) 1 Ch D 362: one cannot infer, from evidence of user of a privilege connected with the enjoyment of property in its original state, a right to use it, into whatsoever form or whatever purpose it may be changed; "if a right of way to a field be proved by evidence of user, however general, for whatever purpose, qua field, the person who is the owner of that field cannot from that say, I have a right to turn that field into a manufactory, or into a town, and then use the way for the purposes of the manufactory or town so built" (James LJ at 367-8; cf Mellish LJ at 369, 371); Milner's Safe Company, Limited v Great Northern and City Railway Company [1907] 1 Ch 208; Lock v Abercester, Limited [1939] 1 Ch 861: where prescriptive right of way was acquired by user by horse-drawn vehicles to access a property which was used as a residence, the right of way could be used by mechanically propelled vehicles, notwithstanding that they weighed more than the horse drawn vehicles which had previously been used (Bennett J at 864); RPC Holdings, Ltd v Rogers [1953] 1 All ER 1029: original use for agricultural purposes does not accommodate use for caravan park (Harman J at 1032, 1035-6); British Railways Board v Glass [1965] Ch 538: a mere increase in the use of the right of way, for the original purpose, is permissible (Davies LJ at 567-8; cf Harman LJ at 562); Woodhouse & Co Ltd v Kirkland (Derby) Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 1185: a mere increase in user is permissible, but a user of a different kind or for a different purpose is not (Plowman J at 1190-1); Cargill v Gotts [1981] 1 WLR 441: a mere increase in the use of easement to draw water, for original (agricultural) purpose, is permissible (Templeman LJ at 447-8; cf Lawton LJ at 451); Nelson v Hughes [1947] VLR 227: where prescriptive right initially established by ingress and egress, by vehicle, animal or on foot, for the purpose of carrying on farming operations on the dominant tenement and for ingress and egress of the occupants of and visitors to the residence thereon, but for last thirteen years also for the passage of a vehicle by which dominant owner carried on carrying business not necessarily connected with dominant land, held, the plaintiffs had no right to continue it over the way in question (Lowe J at 231-2).
Maher v Bayview Golf Club [2004] NSWSC 275 at [57] (Campbell J).
Stevens & Evans v Allan & Armanasco (1955) 58 WALR 1 at 19f (Wolff J); see also Milner's Safe Co Ltd v Great Northern and City Railway Co [1907] 1 Ch 208
Stevens & Evans v Allan & Armanasco (1955) 58 WALR 1 at 20 (Wolff J).
Stevens & Evans v Allan & Armanasco (1955) 58 WALR 1 at 19f (Wolff J).
As to easements of necessity, see North Sydney Printing Pty Ltd v Sabemo Investment Corporation Pty Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 150; Nickerson v Barraclough [1981] 1 Ch 426 (CA); as to Wheeldon v Burrows easements, see McGrath v Campbell (2006) 68 NSWLR 229; (2006) ANZ ConvR 412; (2006) NSW ConvR 56-159; [2006] NSWCA 180 at [75] (Tobias JA).
Cf Hill v AWJ Moore & Co Pty Ltd (1990) 5 BPR [97,358] at 7.
117 York Street Pty Ltd v Proprietors of Strata Plan 16123 (1998) 43 NSWLR 504 at 508-509; D&D Corak Investments Pty Ltd v Yiasemides [2006] NSWSC 1419; Moorebank Recyclers Pty Limited v Tanlane Pty Limited [2012] NSWCA 445 at [154]; ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v O'Shea (2010) 14 BPR 27 at [52]-[53].
Moorebank Recyclers Pty Limited v Tanlane Pty Limited [2012] NSWCA 445 at [159].
ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v O'Shea [2010] NSWCA 71; (2010) 14 BPR 27 at [48]-[49]; Moorebank Recyclers Pty Limited v Tanlane Pty Limited [2012] NSWCA 445 at [156]-[157].
Moorebank Recyclers Pty Limited v Tanlane Pty Limited [2012] NSWCA 445 at [158]. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 26 September 2017

Parties

Applicant/Plaintiff:

Rixon

Respondent/Defendant:

Horseshoe Pastoral Co Pty Ltd

Cases Cited (36)

Duic v Duic [2013] NSWCA 42 Elliott v Renner [1923] St R Qd 172 Evans v Evans [2011] NSWCA 92 Fenwick v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] NSWSC 788 Gallagher v Rainbow (1994) 179 CLR 624; 121 ALR 129 Grundt v Great Boulder Gold Mines Limited (1937) 59 CLR 641 Hill v AWJ Moore & Co Pty Ltd (1990) 5 BPR 97,358 Hurt v Bowmer [1937] 1 All ER 797 ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v O'Shea [2010] NSWCA 71; (2010) 14 BPR 27 Jelbert v Davis [1968] 1 WLR 589 Jobson v Nankervis (1943) 44 SR(NSW) 277 Kostis v Devitt (1979) 1 BPR 9231 Lamos Pty Ltd v Hutchison (1984) 3 BPR 9350 Lancaster v Lloyd (1927) 27 SR(NSW) 379 Lock v Abercester, Limited [1939] 1 Ch 861 Maher v Bayview Golf Club [2004] NSWSC 275; (2004) 12 BPR [98112] Manjang v Drammeh (1991) 61 P&CR 194 McGrath v Campbell (2006) 68 NSWLR 229; (2006) ANZ ConvR 412; (2006) NSW ConvR 56-159; [2006] NSWCA 180 Milner's Safe Company, Limited v Great Northern and City Railway Company [1907] 1 Ch 208 Moorebank Recyclers Pty Limited v Tanlane Pty Limited [2012] NSWCA 445 MRA Engineering Ltd v Trimster Co Ltd (1988) 56 P&CR 1 Nelson v Hughes [1947] VLR 227 Nelson v Walker (1910) 10 CLR 560 Newcomen v Coulson (1877) 5 Ch D 133 Nickerson v Barraclough [1981] 1 Ch 426 North Sydney Printing Pty Ltd v Sabemo Investment Corporation Pty Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 150 O'Neill v Williams [2006] NSWSC 707 Pallister v Clark (1975) 30 P&CR 84 Parish v Kelly (1980) 1 BPR 97,040 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Westfield Management Ltd (2007) 12 BPR 23,793; (2007) ANZ ConvR 103; (2007) NSW ConvR 56-170; [2006] NSWCA 337 Polden v Bastard (1865) LR 1 QB 156 Robinson v Bailey [1948] 2 All ER 791 Rodwell v G R Evans & Co Pty Ltd (1977) 3 BPR 9114 RPC Holdings, Ltd v Rogers [1953] 1 All ER 1029 Silovi Pty Limited v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466 South Eastern Railway Co v Cooper [1924] 1 Ch 211 Stevens & Evans v Allan & Armanasco (1955) 58 WALR 1 Suffield v Brown (1864) 4 De GJ & Sm 185; 46 ER 888 Tadrous v Tadrous [2012] NSWCA 16 Tarrant v Zandstra (1973) 1 BPR 9381 Taylor v Browning (1885) 11 VLR 158 Thomas v Symons [2013] NSWSC 490 Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507 Torrisi v Magame Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 14 Titchmarsh v Royston Water Co Ltd (1900) 81 LT 673 United Land Company v Great Eastern Railway Company (1873) LR 17 Eq 158 United Land Company v Great Eastern Railway Company (1875) 10 Ch App Cas 586 Waddell v Waddell [2012] NSWCA 214 Walsh v Walsh [2012] NSWCA 57 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 Ward v Kirkland [1967] 1 Ch 194 Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 528; (2007) 239 ALR 75; (2007) 81 ALJR 1887; (2007) NSW ConvR 56-196; [2007] HCA 45 Wheeldon v Burrows (1879) 12 Ch D 31 White v Grand Hotel, Eastbourne Ltd [1913] 1 Ch 113 Wilcox v Richardson (1997) 43 NSWLR 4 Williams v James (1867) LR 2 CP 577 Williams v State Transit Authority (NSW) (2004) 60 NSWLR 286 Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 ChD 96 Wimbledon and Putney Commons Conservators v Dixon (1875) 1 Ch D 362 Woodhouse & Co Ltd v Kirkland (Derby) Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 1185 Vukic v Grbin [2006] NSWSC 41 Texts Cited: Bradbrook, A & Neave, M, Easements and Restrictive Covenants in Australia, 2nd ed (2000) Butt, P, Land Law, 5th ed Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies, 4th Edition (2002) Young PW, "Lessees' Ancillary Rights" (2000) 74 ALJ 384 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Susan Margaret Rixon (plaintiff) Horseshoe Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (defendant) Representation: Counsel: M. J. Heath (plaintiff) A. Rogers (defendants

(1998) 43 NSWLR 504

(1989) 16 NSWLR 582

(1986) 6 NSWLR 454

(2010) 78 NSWLR 483

(1994) 179 CLR 624

(1937) 59 CLR 641

(2006) 68 NSWLR 229

(1910) 10 CLR 560

(1988) 13 NSWLR 466

(1933) 49 CLR 507

(1988) 164 CLR 387

(2007) 233 CLR 528