67 The second respondent's construction leads to the position that the carrying out of the Project would be prohibited under s 75R(2)(b) but the Minister would be authorised to grant approval unconstrained by the prohibition. All that would mean is that the Court could grant injunctive relief against the second respondent carrying out the Project but could not declare the approval void. The notion of a valid but inoperative approval is absurd, to my mind, suggesting that it is unlikely to have been what the legislature intended. Indeed, the whole statutory approval process in such a situation seems absurd on the second respondent's construction. Surely the legislature did not intend a process whereby a proponent applies for the Minister's approval and submits an environmental assessment "to carry out" a project (ss 75E, 75H), the Director-General gives a report to the Minister for the purposes of the Minister's consideration of the application for approval "to carry out" the Project (s 75I), and the Minister approves the "carrying out" of the Project (s 75J) when, at every step of the process, the Project cannot lawfully be carried out because it is prohibited. Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary and grammatical construction, leads to absurdity that can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words or even the structure of a sentence: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV [2009] HCA 40 at [9]."
89 The applicant submitted that I should follow this decision, not only because it was correct but in any event for reasons of judicial comity. The Minister and the proponent submit to the contrary, saying I should not follow the decision as it is wrong.
90 Judicial comity usually dictates that a judge of first instance should follow the decision of another judge of first instance unless convinced that it is wrong: see, for example, Michael Realty Pty Ltd v Carr [1975] 2 NSWLR 812 at 820; Pancho Properties Pty Ltd v Wingecarribee Shire Council [1999] NSWLEC 245; (1999) 110 LGERA 352 at [128]-[129]; Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Sydney Water Corporation [2004] NSWLEC 699; (2004) 138 LGERA 383 at [29]; and Cracknell and Lonergan Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Sydney [2007] NSWLEC 392; (2007) 155 LGERA 291 at [57]. However, this does not apply where the decision is obiter dictum. Obiter dictum need not be followed by another judge at first instance even for reasons of judicial comity.
91 The decision in Hill Top that the SEPP in that case applied to, but precluded, the exercise of the power under s 75J(1) to approve the project in question cannot be characterised as obiter dictum. The applicant in that case contended that the approval granted by the Minister was void because the Minister had no power to approve the project that was prohibited by the SEPP, as well as that the carrying out of the approved project was prohibited. The second respondent (the proponent of the project) joined issue with the applicant's contention that the approval was void by reason of the SEPP precluding the exercise of the power to approve the project. The second respondent contended that the SEPP did not apply to the approval of a project but rather only applied to the stages of declaration of a project as a project to which Part 3A applies and, later, the carrying out of the project. Accordingly, the decision in Hill Top resolving this contested issue, of the applicability of the SEPP to the exercise of the Minister's power to approve the carrying out of the project in question that was prohibited by the SEPP, was part of the ratio decidendi.
92 I, therefore, need to consider whether judicial comity requires me to follow the decision. With regret, I am convinced that the decision on this point is wrong and that I should depart from it. My reasons are as follows.
93 First, as I have explained above, the text of s 75R is clear in expressly and exhaustively specifying the circumstances in which, and the times at which, SEPPs will apply. SEPPs do not apply to any circumstance or at any time not expressly specified in s 75R of the Act. Hence, SEPPs do not apply to the exercise of the power under s 75J to approve or disapprove a project.
94 Secondly, with respect to the reason given in paragraph 65 of the Hill Top decision, I do not consider that there is implicit in the scheme of the Act a limitation on any person with power under the Act to approve a development, project or activity not to exercise that power to approve a development, project or activity that is prohibited. If any such limitation on the exercise of such a power exists, it derives from the statutory provisions governing the exercise of the power and is not implicit in the statutory scheme.
95 Under Part 4 of the Act, a consent authority is precluded from granting development consent to development that is prohibited. That preclusion is because the statute expressly provides that a development application seeking development consent to carry out development may only be made for development that an environmental planning instrument provides may not be carried out except with development consent. The provisions regulating the making, assessing and determining of a development application are contained in Division 2 of Part 4 of the Act. Section 77, in Division 2, pronounces that this Division "applies to development that may not be carried out except with development consent". Hence, if an environmental planning instrument provides that specified development is prohibited on land to which the provision applies or development cannot be carried out on land with or without development consent, Division 2 has no application to such development. Hence, a person cannot apply under Division 2, by means of making a development application, to a consent authority for consent to carry out such development. A public authority can only be a "consent authority" as defined in s 4(1) of the Act in relation to a development application (or application for a complying development certificate) that is made under Division 2. The power of a consent authority under s 80(1) of the Act is to determine a development application made under Division 2.
96 Hence, the lack of power to grant development consent to development that is prohibited is a result of the express statutory provisions in Division 2 of Part 4 of the Act, not by implication from the statutory scheme.
97 Under Part 3A of the Act, the express provisions of the Part regulate the making, assessing and determining of applications for approval of a project under Part 3A. None of these provisions expressly refer to or operate on the basis of a threefold classification of projects as not needing approval, needing approval or being prohibited, in contrast to the provisions of Part 4 which do refer to and operate on the basis of such a threefold classification of development. Indeed, the provisions of s 75R(1), (2) and (3) operate to exclude other provisions of the Act in Parts 3, 4 and 5 and environmental planning instruments under Part 3, except to the extent that s 75R specifies that they are to apply.
98 Hence, any prohibition in an environmental planning instrument will only apply for the purposes of Part 3A if, and to the extent that, s 75R specifies that the environmental planning instrument is to apply. If the environmental planning instrument does not apply to the power under s 75J(1) to approve or disapprove a project, the Minister may still take the provisions of the environmental planning instrument into account under s 75J(3) of the Act, but would not be required to do so.
99 In the face of the express provisions of Part 3A, there is no room for implication of a limitation on the exercise of the Minister's power under s 75J(1) to approve or disapprove the carrying out of a project under Part 3A.
100 Thirdly, in relation to the reason given in paragraph 66 of the Hill Top decision, I do not agree that s 75R(3) has the effect of making SEPPs apply to the exercise of power under s 75J(1) to approve or disapprove the carrying out of a project. In terms, s 75R(3) states that it is the "approved project" to which environmental planning instruments (other than State environmental planning policies) do not apply. The inverse is that SEPPs do apply to an "approved project". "Approved project" is a defined term in Part 3A and means the project to the extent that it is approved by the Minister: see s 75A. In terms, therefore, s 75R(3) does not make SEPPs apply to a project before it is approved by the Minister, only afterwards.
101 Furthermore, s 75R(3) applies SEPPs to the project that is approved, not to the process of approving the project, including the exercise of power of s 75J(1) to approve the carrying out of the project.
102 I do not agree that the term "approved project" in s 75R(3) bears the extended meaning it is given in s 75R(1). Subsection 75R(1) provides:
"(1) Part 4 and Part 5 do not, except as provided by this Part, apply to or in respect of an approved project (including the declaration of the project as a project to which this Part applies and any approval or other requirement under this Part for the project)."
103 The legislative draftsperson did not include in sub-s (3) the words in brackets inserted after "approved project" in sub-s (1). The words in brackets cause the term "approved project" to include not only the project as approved, but also things that are not the project itself but relate to the process of approval of the project, such as the declaration that the project is a project to which Part 3A applies and the approval of the project by the Minister. The extension of the meaning of "approved project" in sub-s (1) beyond the definition of "approved project" in s 75A must be taken to be deliberate and intended to extend the exclusory operation of sub-s (1) in respect of Part 4 and Part 5 of the Act. Similarly, the non-inclusion of the words in brackets found in sub-s (1) in sub-s (3) should also be seen to be deliberate and intended to allow the term "approved project" to operate only as defined in s 75A and not have the extended meaning found in sub-s (1). Accordingly, on this construction, s 75R(3) does not cause SEPPs to apply to any of the things referred to in the words in brackets in sub-s (1), including to the approval of the project by the Minister.
104 I also do not agree that the presence of the words "in respect of" in sub-s (3) alters this conclusion. True it is that the words "in respect of" are of wide import but, as noted by a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Butler v Johnston (1984) 4 FCR 83 at 87, "their exact width will depend upon the context in which they appear". Furthermore, whatever be the width conveyed by the words "in respect of" in their context, the two subject matters the subject of the relationship established by the words must remain. In this case, the relationship established by the words "in respect of" is between two specified subject matters: "environmental planning instruments (other than State environmental planning policies)" on the one hand and "approved project" on the other hand. It is not permissible in interpreting the words "in respect of" to change one of the subject matters of the relationship established by the words. Hence, it is not permissible to substitute for the "approved project", being one of the subject matters of the relationship, "the exercise of the power to approve a project" under s 75J(1). To say that a SEPP applies to or in respect of the exercise of power to approve a project under s 75J(1) is quite different to saying, as s 75R(3) does say, that SEPPs apply to or in respect of an approved project, that is a project that is approved by the Minister under s 75J(1).
105 Fourthly, with respect to the reason in paragraph 67 of the Hill Top decision, having regard to the provisions of Part 3A of the Act and their purpose, I do not agree that the notion of a valid but inoperative approval under Part 3A is absurd. If the provisions of Part 3A, and in particular s 75R, have the operation and effect I have said, there is no limitation on the Minister exercising the power under s 75J(1) to approve a project, regardless of whether the carrying out of the approved project would be prohibited by a SEPP which applies to the approved project and the carrying out of the project. It cannot be absurd to do that which the statute allows. As Cole JA observed in Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (1996) 91 LGERA 31 at 75-76:
"It is not unreasonable to do that which the statute permits in performance of a statutory power or obligation and for purposes contemplated or permitted by the statute."
106 Furthermore, any prohibition in a SEPP on the carrying out of the approved project is capable of being overcome. The Minister can exercise the special power under s 75R(3A) of the Act to amend the SEPP containing the prohibition to remove the prohibition or otherwise authorise the carrying out of the approved project. Exercise of this special power overcomes the problem (or the putative absurdity) of a valid but inoperative approval; upon exercise of the power the approval becomes operative in the sense that the approved project may be carried out lawfully under the approval. The Minister could also recommend to the Governor the making of another environmental planning instrument under Part 3 of the Act, such as a new SEPP, removing the prohibition in the existing SEPP or authorising the carrying out of the approved project regardless of the prohibition. This too would enable the approval to become operative.
107 These steps to overcome the prohibition in a SEPP need not take a long time. If the proponent, the Director-General and the Minister are aware that there is a prohibition in the SEPP which would apply to the approved project, steps could be taken to overcome the prohibition simultaneously with, or shortly after, the exercise of the power under s 75J(1) to approve the carrying out of the project. Such steps were not taken in the Hill Top case, no doubt because the project was not considered to be prohibited before the Court determined that it was. However, if they had known, such steps could have been taken.
108 For these reasons, I am not convinced that I should follow the decision in Hill Top. Instead, I am of the view that SEPPs did not apply to or in respect of the exercise of power under s 75J(1) to approve or disapprove the carrying out of the Project. On this basis, the Mining SEPP, and hence cl 12 of the Mining SEPP, did not apply to the Minister's exercise of power under s 75J(1) to approve the carrying out of the Project.
109 If I am wrong in this conclusion, I consider that in any event cl 12 of the Mining SEPP did not apply to the Minister's determination of the application for approval of the Project under Part 3A of the Act. Clause 12 uses the language found in Part 4 of the Act of "an application for consent for development", "consent authority" and "development". None of these words, phrases or terms are used in Part 3A where, instead, application is made for "approval" (not "consent") to carry out a "project" (not "development") and there is no "consent authority" but simply "the Minister" who may "approve" or "disapprove" of carrying out of the Project. It is to be noted that cl 12, containing this language of Part 4 of the Act, is contained within Part 3 of the Mining SEPP which is entitled "Development application - matters for consideration".
110 The use of the language and concepts of Part 4 of the Act in cl 12 of the Mining SEPP, but not the language and concepts of Part 3A of the Act, would appear deliberate and intended. The Mining SEPP was made after the insertion into the Act of Part 3A. The Mining SEPP does expressly refer to Part 3A in certain provisions. In the interpretation provision of cl 3(2) of the Mining SEPP, the word "approved" is defined to include any development or any use of land, not only for which any required development consent under Part 4 of the Act has been granted but also for which approval under Part 3A of the Act has been granted. Clause 19 of the Mining SEPP, containing savings and transitional provisions, again expressly distinguishes between an application for approval under Part 3A of the Act and an application for development consent under Part 4 of the Act.
111 In circumstances where the legislative draftsperson of the Mining SEPP has expressly referred in some of the provisions of Mining SEPP to the language and concepts of Part 3A of the Act, but not in cl 12 of the Mining SEPP, and has expressly referred in cl 12 to "determining an application for consent for development" by "a consent authority" but not "approving an application for approval of a project", cl 12 should be interpreted as referring only to determining an application for consent for development under Part 4 of the Act and not approving an application for approval under Part 3A of the Act.
112 Accordingly, cl 12 of the Mining SEPP did not apply to the Minister's exercise of power under s 75J(1) to approve the carrying out of the Project.
113 For these two sets of reasons, the applicant's challenge on ground 3 should be rejected. It is not necessary to determine the third question of whether cl 12 was breached if it applied.
Ground 4: Condition 6 of Schedule 6
114 Condition 6 of Schedule 6 of the approval provides:
"If the Proponent exceeds the performance measures in Table 1 of this approval, and either