Riley v State of New South Wales

Proceedings before the Anti-Discrimination Board and the Tribunal

1. On 20 February 2017, Nathan Riley made a complaint to the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board ("President") against the Department of Education, alleging discrimination on the ground of race. The period of the complaint was 22 June 2016 to 20 February 2017.
2. Nathan Riley complained that: 1. On Wednesday 22 June 2016 at staff muster, whilst he was talking about taking Aboriginal students on an excursion to the police station, Kathryn Bermingham, the Deputy Principal of Delroy, laughed at him in front of the entire Delroy Staff; 2. On Thursday 23 June 2016, after the excursion, he was told that the Principal, Debbie Head, had said in the morning muster meeting, after Glen Braithwaite announced to the meeting that he was going on the excursion, "Make sure they all come back"; 3. After Robert Riley spoke at the muster meeting on 24 June 2016, Ms Head's attitude started to change. She cancelled a meeting with Nathan Riley, she criticised Nathan Riley for bringing a new staff member to the school, she criticised him for organising a barbecue, then she ended the ICaN program in Term 3 of 2016.
3. On 1 June 2017, Robert Riley emailed the Anti-Discrimination Board saying he would like to change Nathan Riley's complaint from him as an employee to "myself being Indigenous Concepts and Networking." The President treated his complaint as a separate complaint of race discrimination, victimisation and aiding and abetting. The period of the race discrimination and aiding and abetting complaints was 22 June 2016 to 1 June 2017 and the period of the victimisation complaint was 27 June 2016 to 1 June 2017.
4. On 21 December 2017, the President referred Nathan Riley's complaint of racial discrimination (AD Act, ss 7, 8, 10 and 53) and ICaN's complaints of racial discrimination (AD Act, ss 7, 8, 10 and 53), victimisation (AD Act, s 50) and aiding and abetting (AD Act, s 52) to the Tribunal under s 93C of the AD Act, having formed the opinion that the complaints could not be resolved by conciliation.
5. The first case conference was adjourned to allow Nathan and Robert Riley to obtain legal representation. At the second case conference, on 14 March 2018, the applicants were ordered to file points of claim and the respondents were ordered to file points of defence. By this time, the applicants and the respondents were represented by both solicitors and counsel.
6. On 25 September 2018, the applicants were directed to file any application to amend the complaint and any amended Points of Claim by 26 October 2018. The respondents were ordered to indicate whether or not they objected to the application to amend the complaint and any amended Points of Claim, and to file and serve any amended Points of Defence, by 16 November 2018.
7. The matter was first set down for hearing for four days in March 2019. Many statements and affidavits were filed by the applicants and by the respondents. Oral evidence was given at the hearing by each of the applicants and by staff and former staff of Delroy, including Ms Head, Ms Exner and Ms MacLeod and almost all witnesses were cross examined.
8. On the first day of hearing, 18 March 2019, we made an order, by consent, joining James Riley as an applicant.
9. On 20 March 2019, we granted the applicants leave to file the Amended Points of Claim handed up at the hearing on 19 March 2019.
10. On 22 March 2019, we ordered the applicants to file and serve, by 12 April 2019, an application to amend the complaint, setting out the conduct and/or legal characterisation of that conduct which the applicants say should be included in their complaint but which was not part of the complaint which was referred to the Tribunal. We also ordered the respondents to file and serve, by 3 May 2019, a reply indicating whether there is any objection to any part of the proposed amendments to the complaint and, if so, to which part and on what basis; and Amended Points of Defence.
11. We set the matter down for another two day hearing on 15 and 16 May 2019.
12. On 15 April 2019, the applicants sent a letter to the Tribunal, applying to amend their complaints. The key amendments were: 1. adding James Riley, in his capacity as a partner of ICaN, as an applicant (an amendment which had been foreshadowed at the beginning of the hearing); 2. amending Nathan Riley's complaint to comprise alleged breaches of ss 7, 10, 20C (vilification), 50 (victimisation), 52 (aiding and abetting) and 53 of the AD Act; 3. amending the complaint so that Robert Riley and James Riley complain, in their own capacity and as partners of ICaN, about alleged breaches of ss 7, 8, 20C, 50, 52 and 53 of the AD Act; 4. incorporating into the complaints the further facts pleaded in the Further Amended Points of Claim filed on 15 April 2019.
13. On 16 May 2019, the Tribunal amended the complaint as requested (with a minor exception). It also amended the period of the complaint to commence on 21 June 2016 (because it was accepted that the muster meeting at which Nathan Riley spoke occurred on that date, and not on 22 June 2016, as originally alleged). On the same day, the Tribunal granted the applicants leave to file the Further Amended Points of Claim dated 16 May 2019.
14. We ordered the respondents to file and serve a Defence to the Further Amended Points of Claim by 23 May 2019. We made further orders requiring the parties to file and serve written submissions.

Applicants' claims

1. The applicants make the following claims in their Further Amended Points of Claim filed in the hearing on 16 May 2019: 1. The State discriminated against Robert and James Riley in contravention of s 8(1)(b) of the AD Act (but this claim is no longer pressed); 2. The State discriminated against Nathan Riley in contravention of s 10(d) of the AD Act; 3. The State racially vilified the applicants in contravention of s 20C of the AD Act; 4. The State victimised all of the applicants in contravention of s 50 of the AD Act as a consequence of Robert Riley making informal and formal complaints; 5. The second respondent, Ms Head, the former Principal of Delroy College, aided and abetted, by virtue of her conduct, the State in contravening the AD Act and, in doing so, contravened s 52 of the AD Act.
2. The applicants each claim damages of $100,000 for each complaint of racial discrimination (in the case of Nathan Riley) and for each complaint of racial discrimination and victimisation (in the case of all applicants). The applicants also seek some non-monetary orders, including an order for an apology.

Racial vilification

1. The applicants claim that the State racially vilified each of them in contravention of s 20C of the AD Act. The alleged racial vilification relates to Ms Bermingham's laughter at the muster meeting on 21 June 2016 during Nathan Riley's presentation and comments made on 23 June 2016 by Ms Head about students coming back from the excursion.
2. Section 20C(1) of the AD Act provides as follows: 20C Racial vilification unlawful (1) It is unlawful for a person, by a public act, to incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of the race of the person or members of the group.
3. In order to establish that they have been racially vilified, the applicants need to establish: 1. The act or acts of vilification were public acts; 2. The acts were capable of inciting hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons; 3. Such incitement was on the ground of the race of the person or members of the group.

What are the alleged acts?

1. The applicants allege, in the Further Amended Points of Claim, that, during Nathan Riley's presentation at the muster meeting on 21 June 2016, a "staff member made a comment which caused Deputy Principal Miss Bingham" (presumably they mean Ms Bermingham) "to laugh continuously throughout Nathan Riley's presentation."
2. On 23 June 2016, Glen Braithwaite spoke at the muster meeting about going on the excursion to the police station that day. The applicants allege, in the Further Amended Points of Claim, that, after Mr Braithwaite had spoken, Ms Head said words to the effect: "Do you think that's a good idea? Make sure all the students come back."
3. The applicants plead that when Glen Braithwaite, Nathan Riley and Robert Riley returned from the excursion that afternoon, Ms Head said words to the effect: "Oh Glen, I'm glad you made it back."
4. They claim, in their Further Amended Points of Claim, that the "exchange" referred to above was a public act by Ms Bermingham and Ms Head which incited severe ridicule and severe contempt of Aboriginal persons on the ground of their race.

Did the act on 21 June 2016 occur as alleged?

1. Nathan Riley provided his recollection of what occurred in his affidavit of 17 December 2018, as follows: "As I was speaking about taking the students to the police station, I was laughed at in front of the entire Delroy staff by Kathryn Bermingham, the Deputy Principal. I had to stop talk to wait for her to finish laughing."
2. Under cross examination, Mr Baroni, for the respondents, asked Nathan Riley about whether he heard any comment being made before he heard laughter. Mr Riley replied: "I didn't need to know what the comment said, it was obvious that it was right in my face. Even if there was no comment and the laughter, the laughter says enough. The laughter hurt me more than the comment because it was obvious what she was laughing at, and staff members even came up to me afterwards and were disappointed and they made reference to what had happened to me."
3. The applicants did not provide the names of the staff members who spoke to Nathan Riley or any details of what they said. There was no evidence from any staff members of having spoken to Nathan Riley.
4. Later, Mr Baroni reminded Nathan Riley that he had been asked some questions about the lack of reference in his statement to Ms Bermingham's alleged comment at the muster meeting. Following some objections to Mr Baroni's questions, counsel for the applicants asked Nathan Riley why he made no reference to the making of a comment in his statement. His reply was: "Because I wasn't exactly sure of what they said. I didn't, I wasn't sure if you could quote people if you don't know what they said. But the comment is obviously what led to me being laughed at."
5. In his statement of 18 December 2018, Robert Riley stated that Nathan Riley told him after the muster meeting that, when he gave the presentation, "Deputy Principal Miss Bermingham laughed loudly and continuously. I had to stand in front of my peers and colleagues and wait for her to finish laughing before I could continue."
6. This part of Robert Riley's statement was admitted into evidence, but not as evidence of the truth of what occurred.
7. Ms Kathryn Bermingham's evidence in her statement filed on 18 February 2019 is that she did not laugh at Nathan Riley during his presentation. She also denies laughing "in front of the entire Delroy staff" as Nathan Riley claims.
8. Mr Glen Braithwaite, the Deputy Principal of Delroy at all relevant times, does not recall anyone laughing during or after Nathan Riley's announcement at the muster meeting.
9. Ms Debbie Head, the relieving principal of Delroy, typed a document entitled "The muster incident" some time after the muster meeting of 23 June 2016, at which Robert Riley spoke. Her evidence was that she wrote it to send to the executive principal of Dubbo College, Stacey Exner. Her oral evidence was that she thinks she wrote it on 24 June 2016. The document contains the following account of the muster meeting (presumably that of 21 June 2016): "At muster prior to the excursion Nathan spoke and said he was going to the courthouse to have a look around etc. Kath B made a flippant comment saying 'make sure you bring everyone back then' Staff laughed at this comment Debbie could see that Nathan felt upset by this comment by the look on his face. Interestingly Doug Gordon had recently taken some students to the Court house and he had said that same comment receiving the same response by staff (laughing)."
10. Under cross examination, Ms Head first said that she did not accept that Ms Bermingham said, "Make sure you bring everyone back then" on 21 June 2016. She said that she had written the notes hurriedly and just "flicked it off" to Ms Exner to get it to her quickly. Ms Head said that "some of the stuff that's at the top should have been put down the bottom" (of the page) and said that she thought "Nathan felt upset on the Friday" (not the Tuesday). However, Ms Head then agreed that she heard Ms Bermingham make the comment, "Make sure you bring everyone back then."
11. When asked about the day on which Ms Bermingham made the comment, Ms Head said that she felt it was made on the Thursday, to the best of her recollection, because otherwise everything did not make sense in her head, but she could not be sure.
12. We consider that the evidence establishes, on balance, that Ms Bermingham laughed at the muster meeting on 21 June 2016 during Nathan Riley's presentation. It is not surprising that she does not remember this years later. Nor is it surprising that Mr Braithwaite has forgotten this (or perhaps did not hear the laughter). Nathan Riley had a reason to remember the laughter, because he said (and we accept) that he felt humiliated and belittled by it.
13. Ms Head's note, written several days later, does not state that Ms Bermingham laughed, but rather that Ms Bermingham made a comment at which other staff members laughed. Ms Head refers to herself in the third person in the note and records that she could see that Nathan Riley was upset by the comment.
14. Ms Head's oral evidence on this point was confused. We do not consider that the note or Ms Head's oral evidence is of assistance in determining whether the allegations in the Further Amended Points of Claim are established.
15. We note that it is not necessary to determine whether Ms Bermingham made the comment, "Make sure you bring everyone back then" on 21 June 2016, causing others to laugh. That is because the applicants allege in the Further Amended Points of Claim that a staff member made a comment which caused Ms Bermingham to laugh continuously throughout Nathan Riley's presentation. It is a reasonable inference that the "staff member" referred to in the pleadings is a staff member other than Ms Bermingham. However, even if the words "staff member" could refer to Ms Bermingham (which we doubt), there is no allegation in the Further Amended Points of Claim about what was said.
16. The applicants were represented throughout these proceedings and both parties had both solicitors and counsel from an early stage. The applicants were given several opportunities to amend their pleadings. They filed the Further Amended Points of Claim on 16 May 2019. This was on the last day of the hearing, having had four hearing days in March 2019 and two in May 2019. The applicants had abundant opportunity to amend the part of the pleading concerning vilification.
17. The applicants are bound by their pleading. They did not submit otherwise or make any application for leave to depart from it. However, in their submissions on vilification, they contend that Ms Bermingham said "Make sure you bring everyone back then" at the muster meeting of 21 June 2016, that this was a public act, and that it was capable of inciting severe ridicule. This is despite the pleading that "a staff member" made an unspecified comment at that meeting at which Ms Bermingham laughed.
18. We (and a third Tribunal member) discussed an applicant's failure to plead a case, as made in the applicant's submissions, in Lipman v Commissioner of Police [2015] NSWCATAD 250 at [206] and following. That discussion is pertinent to these proceedings. We referred at [207] to Whiteoak v State of New South Wales [2014] NSWCATAD 45 at [37], where the Tribunal held, in circumstances where an applicant was legally represented, that the respondent was entitled to meet the case as pleaded. We also commented, at [209], that one of the advantages of pleadings is that they require a party to identify his or her case with precision. Without pleadings, it is difficult to know exactly what an applicant's case is.
19. We made the following observations (at [211]), which are also applicable here: "As a general proposition, where the Tribunal chooses to direct the parties to file pleadings, the Tribunal is required to determine the case according to the pleadings, unless it indicates to the parties that it proposes to decide the case on another basis and gives the parties an opportunity to make submissions about this course. Mason CJ and Gaudron J have commented in the context of civil litigation that pleadings ensure the basic requirement of procedural fairness that a party should have the opportunity of meeting the case against him or her and a case should only be decided on another basis if the parties choose some different basis for the determination of their respective rights and liabilities (Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279, Mason CJ and Gaudron J at 286-287)."
20. We do not consider that the parties have chosen a different basis for the determination of their rights and liabilities. Whilst the respondents have responded in their submissions to the allegation that Ms Bermingham said "Make sure you bring everyone back then," they have also said that, properly understood, the evidence is: "a. someone made a comment; b. the Applicants' do not know: i. what that comment was; ii. who the comment was directed at; iii. what it was about; and c. Ms Bermingham laughed."
21. The other relevance of the apparent departure from the allegation made in the Further Amended Points of Claim is that it may require an amendment to the complaint. The applicants were permitted to amend their complaint after the first four days of hearing. They applied to amend their complaint by letter dated 15 April 2019. One of the proposed amendments was to allow the applicants to plead a breach of s 20C (vilification) of the AD Act, a matter which was not included in their complaint to the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board. In their solicitors' letter of 15 April 2019, it is stated: "The factual circumstances giving rise to the complaint of vilification under s 20C of the ADA were included in the complaint referred to the Tribunal, however it was not characterised as a contravention of s 20C of the ADA at that time." The amendment was allowed, on the basis set out in the letter.
22. The Tribunal discussed with the parties the need to amend not only the Points of Claim, but also the complaint, at the hearing on 22 March 2019. The Tribunal's presiding member said to the parties' legal representatives that the Tribunal needs to define very clearly and to make an order as to the scope of the amended complaint before it. The Tribunal only has jurisdiction in respect of a complaint referred to it or a complaint as amended by it.
23. In the complaint to the President, it is alleged that Ms Bermingham laughed during the muster meeting and subsequently made a comment to Mr Glen Braithwaite that he needed to take care to ensure "all kids come back." The applicants have not applied to amend their complaint to allege that Ms Bermingham made the comment in the muster meeting. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to make orders in relation to a complaint, as referred to it, and in relation to any complaint, as amended (AD Act, s 108). In the absence of an amendment, the Tribunal may not consider a new complaint (AD Act, ss 91C, 94A and 103; Brooks v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2017] NSWCATAD 300 at [4]; see also Fields v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2017] NSWCATAD 311 at [7]).
24. We note that, in Chand v RailCorp [2011] NSWCA 79 at [81], Hodgson JA (Campbell JA and Sackville AJA agreeing) held that a decision of the Appeal Panel of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal not to permit an amendment to a complaint (pursuant to s 103 of the AD Act) was "an appropriate discretionary decision." His Honour continued: "The matter had been contested before the Tribunal on the basis of the Points of Claim and on further and better particulars supplied pursuant thereto; and no document seeking to amend the Points of Claim or particulars was submitted to the Appeal Panel. In the absence of such a document, it would have been a clear denial of procedural fairness to permit the appellant to rely on triggers or detriments outside the Points of Claim and the particulars."
25. We consider that, in circumstances where both the Points of Claim and the complaint itself were amended on the last day of a six-day hearing, it would be a breach of procedural fairness to permit the applicants to rely on matters which are not pleaded in the Further Amended Points of Claim, particularly where they do not form part of the amended complaint. In any event, there has been no application to depart from the pleadings or for any further amendment of the complaint.
26. The applicants are bound by the pleadings and the complaint, as amended, and cannot change their case by alleging (in written submissions) that they were vilified by a comment of Ms Bermingham at the muster meeting of 21 June 2019.
27. We find that Ms Bermingham laughed during Nathan Riley's presentation. The evidence does not establish that Ms Bermingham laughed continuously throughout Nathan Riley's presentation. Nathan Riley's own evidence indicates that he started speaking, Ms Bermingham laughed, he stopped to allow her to finish, then he finished his presentation.
28. Nathan Riley's evidence was equivocal as to whether a comment was made, prompting the laughter. His remark in oral evidence, "Even if there was no comment," indicated an implicit acceptance that a comment may not have been made (or that he did not hear a comment). It may be that he assumed that Ms Bermingham's laughter was in response to a comment. Ms Byrnes, the applicants' counsel, said after Nathan Riley's oral evidence had concluded, that Mr Riley "understood Miss Bermingham to be laughing because a comment had been made by one of the teachers." That may be a correct assessment of Mr Riley's understanding. However, that does not establish that a comment was made.
29. The applicants have not established, on the balance of probabilities, that a staff member made a comment which prompted Ms Bermingham's laughter.

Did the acts at the muster meeting of 23 June 2016 occur as alleged?

1. The applicants allege that Ms Head made a comment to Glen Braithwaite at the muster meeting of 23 June 2016, being "Make sure you bring them all back" (from the excursion). This is consistent with the complaint made to the President.
2. Ms Bermingham gave evidence, in a statement filed on 18 February 2019, that Glen Braithwaite stated at the muster meeting of 23 June 2016 that the ICaN excursion to the Dubbo Police Station was taking place that day. After Mr Braithwaite's presentation, Ms Bermingham said words to the effect, "Make sure you bring them all back." She stated that the comment was directed at and in reference to Mr Braithwaite only.
3. Ms Head's evidence was that she heard Ms Bermingham say words to the effect, "Make sure you bring them all back" after Mr Braithwaite's presentation on 23 June 2016.
4. Robert Riley's evidence was that, on 23 June 2016, the Aboriginal Education Officer at the Dubbo College, Chantelle Lane, told him that, after Mr Braithwaite's presentation, Ms Head said words to the effect of, "Do you think that's a good idea? Make sure all the students come back." Contrary to the respondent's submission, this evidence was not "struck out". However, it is second-hand evidence which contradicts the primary evidence of Ms Bermingham and Ms Head, and we do not accept it.
5. We find, on the basis of the evidence of Ms Bermingham and Ms Head, that Ms Bermingham said the words the applicants attribute to her. We also find that Ms Head did not say those words at the muster meeting of 23 June 2016.
6. The applicants did not contend in their submissions that Ms Head spoke the words at the muster meeting on 23 June 2016; they contended that they were spoken by Ms Bermingham. However, they did not amend their Further Amended Points of Claim to plead this. Nor did they amend their complaint to include an allegation that Ms Bermingham said those words.

Did the acts on the afternoon of 23 June 2016 occur as alleged?

1. Ms Head's evidence is that she said to Glen Braithwaite, on 24 June 2016, shortly before the muster meeting or shortly after its commencement, "Glen, I'm glad you made it back."
2. Robert Riley's evidence in his written statement is that Ms Head said to Glen Braithwaite in his presence and that of Nathan Riley on the afternoon of 23 June 2016, "Oh Glen, I'm glad you made it back." In their written submissions, the applicants submit that Robert Riley said that this comment was made on the morning of 24 June 2016, but this is a misreading of his statement.
3. The applicants submit that Ms Head's note (written on or about 24 June 2016) supports the conclusion that she made the comment at the muster meeting on 24 June 2016. We agree. However, this is not what was pleaded.
4. It appears, from the applicants' written submissions, that they no longer contend that Ms Head made a comment to Glen Braithwaite to the effect, "I'm glad you made it back" in Nathan and Robert Riley's presence on the afternoon of 23 June 2016. Nathan Riley makes no mention of this occurring in his affidavit of 17 December 2018. Robert Riley was present at the meeting on 24 June 2016 when Ms Head states that she made the comment and may have wrongly remembered when the comment was made.
5. We find that Ms Head did not make the comment on 23 June 2016, as alleged in the Further Amended Points of Claim. Rather, she made it at the muster meeting on 24 June 2016.
6. The date and place on which a particular statement was made may appear to be trivial details which make no difference to the substance of the applicants' claim. That is not so. Those contextual details make a substantive difference because vilification only occurs if there is a "public act". The time and place at which a comment is made are therefore critical. Further, it is very challenging for a respondent effectively to respond to an allegation that a statement was made at a particular time and in a particular context, if it becomes apparent only when written submissions are filed after a hearing that the applicants are in fact alleging that it was made at a different time in a different context from that alleged in pleadings. In the context of a serious allegation such as racial vilification, it is important that an applicant does not depart from the allegation, as pleaded, without seeking leave to do so, so that a respondent has adequate notice of the allegation which is being pressed and an adequate opportunity to respond.

Were the acts public acts?

1. We do not consider that any of the acts the subject of the vilification complaint were "public acts".
2. The laughter occurred at a muster meeting on 21 June 2019. Another comment was made at a muster meeting on 23 June 2016 (albeit by a different person from the alleged maker of the statement). It is alleged that Ms Head made a statement in conversation with Glen Braithwaite, Nathan Riley and Robert Riley, but it seems that it is now being alleged that that also occurred at a muster meeting.
3. For reasons which follow, we do not consider that a statement at a muster meeting is a public act. This means that, even if we were to give the applicants leave to pursue the allegations about vilification made in their submissions, which are not made in the Further Amended Points of Claim, they would not be able to establish this element of racial vilification.
4. Section 20B provides a definition of "public act" for the purposes of Division 3A of Part 2 (the division containing s 20C, which makes racial vilification unlawful). That definition is as follows: 20B Definition of "public act" In this Division, public act includes: (a) any form of communication to the public, including speaking, writing, printing, displaying notices, broadcasting, telecasting, screening and playing of tapes or other recorded material, and (b) any conduct (not being a form of communication referred to in paragraph (a)) observable by the public, including actions and gestures and the wearing or display of clothing, signs, flags, emblems and insignia, and (c) the distribution or dissemination of any matter to the public with knowledge that the matter promotes or expresses hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of the race of the person or members of the group.
5. The definition is inclusive. As can be seen, each of the examples refers to "the public". A public act may be "any form of communication to the public", "any conduct… observable by the public" and "the distribution or dissemination of any matter to the public".
6. The words "the public" and "public act" have their ordinary meaning. The first six definitions of "public" in the Macquarie Dictionary are as follows: 1. of, relating to, or affecting the people as a whole or the community, state, or nation: public affairs. 2. done, made, acting, etc., for the people or community as a whole: a public prosecutor. 3. open to all the people: a public meeting. 4. relating to or engaged in the affairs or service of the community or nation: a public official. 5. maintained at the public expense, under public control, and open to the public generally: a public library. 6. open to the view or knowledge of all; existing, done, etc., in public: the fact became public.
7. The general sense of the word "public" is something which is open to all or affecting the community as a whole.
8. We accept Ms Head's evidence that the muster meetings were compulsory for teaching staff, and were open to contractors. They were not open to the general public.
9. As Ward JA has commented, "that the task of construing the racial vilification provisions is one to be approached with conservatism, recognising the high value placed by the common law, and by the legislature, on freedom of expression" (Jones v Trad [2013] NSWCA 389; (2013) 86 NSWLR 241 at 249 [27]; see also Sunol v Collier (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 260 FLR 414, Allsop P at [59]).
10. The ordinary meaning of "public act" is an act in public. The requirement that it be public (for example, a statement in a place open to all, or a communication to the public generally) is to be understood in light of Ward JA's recognition that the legislature places a high value on freedom of expression. The word "public" in s 20B of the AD Act should not, therefore, be given an unduly confined meaning.
11. In our opinion, an act at a school muster meeting is not a "public act". A member of the public was not entitled to be present at the meeting or to hear what was said at the meeting. We do not accept the applicants' submission that the "'public' can consist of employees and contractors at Delroy College."
12. As the respondents submit, under s 4 of the Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901, it is unlawful, without lawful excuse, to enter into inclosed lands without the consent of the owner, occupier or person apparently in charge. "Inclosed lands" includes "prescribed premises" which include a government school (Inclosed Lands Protection Act 1901, s 3). This provides a further reason why speech at a staff meeting, in the school library, is not a public act.
13. The evidence establishes that, as a practical matter, people other than staff and contractors did not attend the meetings. People wanting access to the school were required to sign in. Attendance at muster meetings was not open to the general public.
14. The cases upon which the applicants rely do not require a different result (Anderson v Thompson [2001] NSWADT 11; Z v University of A (No 7) [2004] NSWADT 81; Rae v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 36; Barry v Futter [2011] NSWADT 205). As the applicants submit, in Barry v Futter [2011] NSWADT 205 at [74]-[76], the Tribunal identified factors which might indicate that an act is a "public act" for the purposes of s 38S of the AD Act, which renders transgender vilification unlawful: "74 Whilst it is not possible to identify in advance all the types of circumstances that may be relevant in determining whether a communication by speaking is public or private, there are a number of factors that may indicate that the communication is to the public rather than a private communication and that might be relevant in the present case. First, where a speaker addresses an audience irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the members of the audience and the speaker, the communication is more likely to be to the public. In that case, it is often appropriate to conclude that the speaker is addressing them in their capacities as members of the public and not because of their relationship. By way of contrast, speaking only to a family member, friend or acquaintance, fellow employee or co-participant in a joint activity, in that capacity, may be more likely to involve a private communication rather than a 'public act'. 75 Secondly, the size of the audience may also indicate whether the communication is public or private. A speaker addressing a group of people is more likely to be communicating to the public than a speaker who is having a one on one conversation with another person. Nonetheless, a person who speaks to a series of people individually and seeks to communicate essentially the same message may be seen as speaking to a wider audience and not just engaging in private conversations. 76 Thirdly, the nature of the communication, the intentions of the parties to the communication and the circumstances giving rise to it may also give some indication of whether the communication is properly characterised as a public communication or a private conversation."
15. Those considerations are equally applicable when considering ss 20B and 20C of the AD Act.
16. Here, the communications at muster meetings were made to an audience with whom Ms Head and Ms Bermingham had a pre-existing relationship (generally, a relationship with colleagues, subordinates or workers at Delroy). Further, the communications were in an employment context and a context in which school matters were discussed. This context indicates that the meeting was not public because matters confidential to staff could be discussed, including sensitive matters concerning named children. These factors point to a communication in a muster meeting being a private communication; or, at least, to such a communication not being a "public act".
17. The applicants also rely upon Anderson v Thompson [2001] NSWADT 11, where the former Administrative Decisions Tribunal found that the shouting of words in a stairwell of an apartment building was a "public act". The Tribunal members found that the words were "overheard, because they were shouted with such force" by persons in other units (at [25]). The Tribunal concluded that those words were communicated to the public (at [25]). It may be that, because the words were shouted loudly, the Tribunal had in mind that a member of the public, passing by the block of units, could have heard them. In any event, we do not consider that it inevitably flows from this decision that words spoken in a school library, at a staff meeting, constitute a public act.
18. We find that none of the pleaded acts was a "public act".
19. We also find that, if, contrary to our view, it is open to us to consider the acts which were not pleaded but were the subject of submissions (as discussed above), those acts were not public acts.

Were the acts capable of inciting serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a group of persons?

1. It is not strictly necessary for us to decide whether the acts were capable of inciting serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, Aboriginal persons, in light of our findings that the acts were not public acts. However, as this matter was argued, we express our brief reasons.
2. The only act which was pleaded as an act of vilification and which we have found to have occurred is Ms Bermingham laughing during Nathan Riley's presentation on 21 June 2016.
3. The word "incite", when used in vilification provisions, has its ordinary natural meaning (being "to rouse, to stimulate, to urge, to spur on, to stir up, to animate" and it covers "words which command, request, propose, advise or encourage"): Sunol v Collier (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 260 FLR 414, Bathurst CJ at [26]-[28].
4. The words "hatred", "serious contempt" and "severe ridicule" are to be given their ordinary meaning: Kazak v John Fairfax Publications Limited [2000] NSWADT 77 at [40]; Ekermawi v Jones (No 3) [2014] NSWCATAD 58 at [33]. The applicants allege in their Further Amended Points of Claim that the public acts of Ms Head and Ms Bermingham incited severe ridicule and severe (presumably they mean serious) contempt. In Kazak v John Fairfax Publications Limited [2000] NSWADT 77 at [40], the Tribunal set out the ordinary meaning of "serious", "contempt", "severe" and "ridicule", as defined in the Macquarie Dictionary and Oxford Dictionary: • ""serious" means "important, grave" (Oxford); "weighty, important" (Macquarie); • "contempt" means "the action of scorning or despising, the mental attitude in which something or someone is considered as worthless or of little account" (Oxford); the feeling with which one regards anything considered mean, vile, or worthless (Macquarie); • "severe" means "rigorous, strict or harsh" (Oxford); "harsh, extreme" (Macquarie); • "ridicule" means "subject to ridicule or mockery; make fun of, deride, laugh at" (Oxford); "words or actions intended to excite contemptuous laughter at a person or thing; derision" (Macquarie)."
5. It is not necessary for a person to in fact be incited by the act, and it is not necessary to show an intention to incite: Sunol v Collier (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 260 FLR 414, Bathurst CJ at [29]-[31] (Allsop P agreeing). The public act must incite serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, persons in an ordinary member of the class of persons to whom it is directed: Sunol v Collier (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 260 FLR 414, Bathurst CJ at [33]-[34].
6. In Sunol v Collier (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 44; (2012) 260 FLR 414 at [60], Allsop P commented that s 49ZT(1) of the AD Act, which makes homosexual vilification unlawful, "reflects an attempt by Parliament to weigh the policies of preventing vilification and permitting appropriate avenues of free speech." His Honour then made the following comments (at [62]) about s 49ZT(1), which is in similar terms to s 20C(1): "…satisfaction of s 49ZT(1) is not necessarily to be assumed or concluded by rude, indecorous, base or insulting language that reflects some dislike of, or opposition to, homosexuality. The section provides for an act to incite hatred, serious contempt, or severe ridicule. Fine linguistic distinctions should of course not be drawn which may deflect attention from the language of the statute. The words of the statute are to be applied with a recognition of the degree or quality of the act contemplated by the language. The act is to be assessed by reference to the context in which it takes place, including the audience or likely audience."
7. Basten JA commented in the same case (at [79]) that "[m]ere insults, invective or abuse will not engage the prohibition."
8. We do not consider that Ms Bermingham's laughter at the muster meeting is an act capable of inciting serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, Aboriginal persons in ordinary persons (such as staff members) attending the muster meeting. Whilst we accept that laughter may, in some circumstances, convey extreme derision and incite serious contempt, the applicants have not established that it did so in these circumstances.

Conclusion

1. For these reasons, the applicants have not established that either of the respondents contravened s 20C(1) of the AD Act.

Discrimination against Nathan Riley on the ground of race

1. The applicants contend that the State discriminated against Nathan Riley on the ground of race, in contravention of s 10(b), (c) and (d) of the AD Act.
2. Section 10 of the AD Act provides: 10 Discrimination against contract workers It is unlawful for a principal to discriminate against a contract worker on the ground of race: (a) in the terms on which the principal allows him or her to work, (b) by not allowing him or her to work or continue to work, (c) by denying him or her access, or limiting his or her access, to any benefit associated with the work in respect of which the contract with his or her employer is made, or (d) by subjecting him or her to any other detriment.
3. A "contract worker" is defined to mean "an employee who, under a contract of employment performs work for an employer who has undertaken to perform that work for another person" (AD Act, s 4).
4. Section 7 of the AD Act provides for what constitutes discrimination on the ground of race. The applicants' submissions make clear that they are relying only upon s 7(1)(a) (direct discrimination). They do not rely upon s 7(2) (the characteristics extension). Section 7(1)(a) provides: 7 What constitutes discrimination on the ground of race (1) A person (the perpetrator) discriminates against another person (the aggrieved person) on the ground of race if the perpetrator: (a) on the ground of the aggrieved person's race or the race of a relative or associate of the aggrieved person, treats the aggrieved person less favourably than in the same circumstances, or in circumstances which are not materially different, the perpetrator treats or would treat a person of a different race or who has such a relative or associate of a different race, or …
5. There is no dispute that Nathan Riley is of the Aboriginal race.
6. In order to prove that the State discriminated against Nathan Riley on the ground of race, contrary to s 10, the applicants must prove: 1. Nathan Riley was a contract worker and the State was the principal; 2. The State treated Nathan Riley less favourably than in the same circumstances, or in circumstances which are not materially different, it treats or would treat a person of a different race; 3. At least one of the reasons for the differential treatment was his race; and 4. The discriminatory treatment consisted in not allowing him to continue to work, denying him access to a benefit and/or subjecting him to a detriment.

Alleged discriminatory conduct

1. The applicants plead, in their Further Amended Points of Claim, that the State subjected Nathan Riley to a number of detriments (within s 10(d)) on the ground of his race. This is said to have occurred by: 1. Ms Head making unfavourable reports about Nathan Riley to the executive principal, Stacey Exner; 2. Ms Head cancelling various ICaN projects; and 3. Ms Head excessively reprimanding Nathan Riley.
2. The applicants also plead that, in contravention of s 10(c) of the AD Act, Delroy denied Nathan Riley access to the benefits associated with ICaN's work, when it cancelled the projects referred to above, which otherwise would have provided Nathan Riley with professional development opportunities.
3. The applicants plead that, in contravention of s 10(b) of the AD Act, Delroy did not allow Nathan Riley to continue to work on the ground of his race when it terminated ICaN's contract at the end of term 3, 2016.
4. We note that the applicants have not claimed that the alleged discriminatory treatment of Nathan Riley was on the ground of the race of a relative or associate (see AD Act, s 7(1)(a)).

Is Nathan Riley a contract worker?

1. Nathan submits that he was a "contract worker" for the purposes of s 10 of the AD Act because he provided services to the State as an employee of ICaN.
2. The term "contract worker" is defined in s 4(1) of the AD Act as "an employee who, under a contract of employment performs work for an employer who has undertaken to perform that work for another person."
3. Both parties accept that Nathan was an employee of ICaN. The respondents deny that he was a "contract worker".
4. We find that Nathan was a "contract worker" because he performed work for his employer (ICaN) under a contract and ICaN had undertaken to perform that work for the State (that is, for Delroy).
5. The State (acting through Delroy) was "the principal" for the purposes of s 10 of the AD Act, being "a person for whom a contract worker performs work otherwise than under a contract of employment" (AD Act, s 4).

Did the State treat Nathan Riley less favourably than a non-Aboriginal person?

1. Nathan Riley must establish that the treatment he was afforded was less favourable than the treatment that was or would have been afforded to an actual or hypothetical person of a different race in the same or similar circumstances.
2. The applicants do not identify an actual comparator in their Further Amended Points of Claim. In their written submissions, the applicants submit that Ms Head would not have made unfavourable reports to Ms Exner, cancelled ICaN projects or given Nathan Riley "excessive reprimands" if he were a person of non-Aboriginal race. That is, they have used a hypothetical comparator in relation to the allegations of contraventions of s 10(c) and (d) of the AD Act. This is clarified further in their submissions in reply, where they say that the appropriate comparator is a non-indigenous contractor in the same circumstances as Nathan Riley. They also say that Clontarf is an actual comparator. There is, however, no evidence before us that the staff of Clontarf are non-indigenous.
3. The applicants have made very few submissions supporting the proposition that Ms Head would have treated non-Aboriginal persons less favourably than she treated Nathan Riley.
4. When making the comparison, the circumstances must be "the same or not materially different". Those circumstances include "all of the objective features which surround the actual or intended treatment of the … person": Purvis v State of New South Wales [2003] HCA 62; (2003) 217 CLR 92 at [224].

Unfavourable reports to Ms Exner

1. The first "unfavourable report" to Ms Exner is the typed document entitled "The muster incident" referred to above, which Ms Head wrote on about 24 June 2016. The only negative comment about Nathan Riley in this report is the following: "Nathan organised an excursion to the court house for ICaN students. I considered this outside the role of Nathan who is employed as a Norta Norta tutor but it had already been organised."
2. There is no evidence which indicates that Ms Head would have made a different (less critical) comment, if the person organising the excursion had not been Aboriginal.
3. The evidence establishes that Nathan Riley was not employed as a Norta Norta tutor, as Ms Head stated. Rather, ICaN was engaged to provide services, including the services of Nathan Riley as a mentor. However, we accept Ms Head's evidence that she believed that Nathan Riley was a tutor, and that ICaN was to be paid for his tutoring services out of the Norta Norta budget. When cross examined about this, Ms Head said that Nathan Riley did in-class work with the teachers, as the Norta Norta tutors did. She remained firm in her view that Nathan Riley was a Norta Norta tutor, even though the documentary evidence indicates that this view was mistaken.
4. Ms Head's expression of an opinion that it was not Nathan Riley's role to organise an excursion to the court house for ICaN students is consistent with her view that he was a Norta Norta tutor. We are not satisfied that she would have treated a non-Aboriginal person in Nathan Riley's position differently.
5. The second "unfavourable report" Ms Head made to Ms Exner was entitled "Report Subject: Nathan Riley" and completed in the holidays following term 2, 2016 on about 17 July. Remarks which might be considered critical in that report include that Nathan Riley "has no qualifications and to my knowledge has not undergone any training as a tutor"; that he takes students off-site, "not supervised"; and that he picks students up from home and takes them home. Under the heading, "Indicators of Concern," Ms Head states in the document: • "The terms of employment are not clear. My prime target area is the support of indigenous students in improving literacy and numeracy as identified in the terms of Norta Norta (NN) funding. • Cultural activities being organized by Nathan/ICaN. These should be organised separate to Nathan as NN tutor, be developed in consultation with the HT Equity, and school executive and be part of a clearly defined plan and meet the campus strategic goals. • Nathan is pushing the boundaries of the role he should play in the school. Trying to expand into other areas which is causing tension with other equity program eg Clontarf, and teaching staff due to the amount of times students are missing from their class."
6. Ms Head raises further concerns in the document, including "Nathan/ ICaN taking students on excursions/incursions without teachers" and that "[t]here are foreseeable risks with Nathan having unsupervised access to male and female students."
7. There is no evidence from which we could conclude that Ms Head would not express these concerns about a person in Nathan Riley's position, behaving in the way Nathan Riley behaved, if that person were non-Aboriginal. The concerns are partly explicable by her misapprehension that Nathan Riley was a Norta Norta tutor. If this were the case, he would have been acting outside his role by organising excursions and taking students outside the school without any other supervision.
8. The applicants have not established differential treatment in relation to this document.

Cancellation of ICaN projects

1. The applicants rely upon: 1. Ms Head cancelling a garden makeover project, shortly after 22 July 2016, that Ms Head and Robert Riley had been negotiating, or had agreed would take place; 2. Ms Head cancelling a meeting with Robert Riley, shortly after 22 July 2016, which had been convened to discuss some projects Robert Riley was working on; 3. the cancellation of the breakfast barbecues run by ICaN in term 3, 2016; 4. a decision, in term 3 of 2016, not to go ahead with a mentoring program for primary school students to be run by ICaN; 5. a decision, some time after 22 July 2016, not to proceed with setting up a dedicated room for ICaN so that Aboriginal students could drop by at recess and lunch time; and 6. a failure to accept ICaN's proposal for cultural awareness training for staff, as constituting discriminatory treatment of Nathan Riley by subjecting him to a detriment under s 10(d) or denying him access to a benefit under s 10(c).
2. It is doubtful, in our view, that any of these actions or decisions are properly characterised as subjecting Nathan Riley to a detriment within s 10(d). It may be (although we express no opinion about this) that those actions or decisions subjected ICaN to a detriment. If Nathan Riley was subjected to a detriment by any of these actions or decisions, the applicants have not explained how that is so.
3. We do not consider that the decisions to cancel, or not to go ahead with, the projects set out above, denied Nathan Riley access, or limited his access, "to any benefit associated with the work in respect of which the contract with his or her employer [was] made" within s 10(c). The applicants say that those decisions did so in that those projects "otherwise provided professional development opportunities for Nathan Riley."
4. The decisions not to go ahead with, or to cancel, proposed projects defined the scope of the work in respect of which the contract between the State and ICaN was made. Once the proposed projects were cancelled, they were not part of that "work" (and, as the projects were all proposed, they never had been). Nathan Riley was therefore not denied "access" to the "benefit associated with the work"; rather, that "benefit" (and the "work" itself) did not exist.
5. In our view, s 10(c) is concerned with situations where there are benefits associated with work under a contract and a particular contract worker is denied access to such benefits. It is not concerned with a situation, such as the present, where the person for whom the work is performed (here, the State) makes decisions (rightly or wrongly) about the work the contractor's employer may perform under the contract.
6. Even if we are wrong about this, the applicants have not established that Nathan Riley's Aboriginal race was a factor in Ms Head's decisions to cancel projects or not to go ahead with them. The decisions concerned the scope of the engagement of ICaN by Dubbo College or Delroy and were not, on their face, decisions directly concerning Nathan Riley.
7. It is pleaded in the Further Amended Points of Claim (in relation to the victimisation claim) that the reason for cancelling or not pursuing proposed projects was Robert Riley's complaints of racial discrimination. The applicants also make this submission in their written submissions. They have not explained how the evidence supports the claim that a reason for cancelling (or not pursuing) the projects was Nathan Riley's race, for the purposes of the discrimination claim.
8. The applicants have not discharged their onus of persuading us that the race of Nathan Riley (an employee of ICaN) had any bearing on Ms Head's decisions about cancelling or not pursuing ICaN projects.
9. We find that Ms Head did not treat Nathan Riley less favourably than she would have treated a person of a different race by cancelling or deciding not to go ahead with the ICaN projects referred to above.
10. The applicants' claims that the decisions to cancel or not to go ahead with ICaN projects constituted discrimination against Nathan Riley on the ground of race, by denying him access to a benefit associated with the work (which they say would have provided professional development opportunities for him), and/or by subjecting him to a detriment, must therefore fail.

"Excessive reprimands"

1. The applicants allege that Ms Head treated Nathan Riley less favourably than she would have treated a non-Aboriginal person by "excessively" reprimanding him on a number of occasions, as follows: 1. On or about 19 July 2016, Ms Head unfairly stated to Nathan Riley in relation to an ICaN employee, Latoya Duras, "How dare you bring someone on to the School without my approval"? The applicants claim that this was a demeaning and extreme response to Ms Duras's presence; 2. On 8 September 2016, Ms Head spoke harshly to Nathan Riley after muster in front of other staff, about a barbecue he had organised; 3. Ms Head spoke harshly to Nathan Riley and an Aboriginal student he was mentoring, and criticised the student's uniform; 4. The following day, Ms Head spoke harshly to Nathan Riley after muster in front of Glen Braithwaite and Michael Lee, asking him who he thought he was taking students to the Aboriginal Education Consultative Group ("AECG") and that he did not know how to dress appropriately himself.
2. The allegations about excessive reprimands are first made in the Further Amended Points of Claim in the context of the applicants' victimisation claim. It is pleaded that "there was no other reason" for Ms Head's "chastisement" of Nathan Riley on 8 September 2016 other than to humiliate him and to victimise him for ICaN's complaint of racial vilification. It is also pleaded that Ms Head's manner of speaking to Nathan Riley changed after Robert Riley's complaint about racial discrimination and that "Ms Head subjected Nathan Riley" to the "excessive reprimands" (as referred to above) "on the ground of Robert Riley's informal complaints."
3. If an act is done for two or more reasons, and one of the reasons consists of unlawful discrimination under the AD Act against a person (whether or not it is the dominant or a substantial reason for doing the act), then the act is taken to be done for that reason (AD Act, s 4A). This means that an act done both to victimise a person for making a complaint, and on the ground of a person's race, is taken to have been done for the discriminatory reason.
4. The difficulty here, however, is that the applicants have pleaded that the "excessive reprimands" were a response to Robert Riley's complaint of racial vilification, but have not explained why they say they were also done on the ground of Nathan Riley's race. Their case appears to be that Ms Head did not excessively reprimand Nathan Riley until after the racial vilification complaint (even though she was always aware of Nathan Riley's race).
5. In their written submissions, the applicants make the broad submission that Ms Head would not have given those "excessive reprimands" to a person of non-Aboriginal race. However, they do not refer to any evidence in support of that proposition or explain why they say that it so.
6. The applicants submit, with respect to causation, that it may be inferred from "the comments made by Miss Bermingham at the muster on 21 June 2016 and 23 June 2016 and by Miss Head on 24 June 2016 … that Ms Head subjected him to the less favourable treatment for a reason that included his Aboriginal race." The applicants have not established that Ms Bermingham made any comments at the muster on 21 June 2016 or 23 June 2016. Even if she had made comments as alleged, it is unclear how that could give rise to an inference about Ms Head's conduct. The applicants have only established that Ms Head said, "Glen, I'm glad you made it back" at the muster meeting on 24 June 2016.
7. To ground an inference where direct proof is not available, "it is enough if the circumstances appearing in evidence give rise to a reasonable and definite inference: they must do more than give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so that the choice between them is mere matter of conjecture" (Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1 at 5; see also TB v New South Wales [2015] NSWSC 575 at [85] and [86]; Marshall v Prescott [2015] NSWCA 110 at [83]). No "reasonable and definite inference" arises from Ms Head's comment at the muster meeting on 24 June 2016 that later "reprimands" of Nathan Riley were on the ground of his Aboriginal race.
8. It follows that, even if the applicants could establish that the "excessive reprimands" occurred in the way they allege, their claim of unlawful racial discrimination against Nathan Riley, by way of such reprimands, would fail.
9. We are generally not satisfied that the applicants have established that Ms Head excessively reprimanded Nathan Riley as alleged.
10. The first allegation is that Ms Head excessively reprimanded Nathan Riley by saying "How dare you bring another employee into my school."
11. Ms Head denies, in her statement, that she "firmly" reprimanded Nathan Riley about bringing Latoya Duras into the school, after he introduced her at a muster meeting. Ms Head reports having had a conversation with Robert Riley on about 22 July 2016, in which he asked her about bringing a female worker into the ICaN program, and Ms Head responded by saying she would need to discuss this with the finance and senior leadership team. Robert Riley agrees that this conversation occurred, but says it occurred at the end of term 2. We accept Robert Riley's account, as the muster meeting at which Nathan Riley introduced a new employee occurred afterwards and that was on 22 July 2016.
12. Ms Head had those discussions then said to Robert Riley that the school could not afford to pay for another ICaN worker.
13. Ms Head stated that she was surprised when Nathan Riley made an announcement at the muster meeting, on 22 July 2016, introducing Latoya Duras as a new employee of ICaN. Ms Head's evidence is that, following the muster meeting, she spoke to Nathan Riley about the school's policy and procedure about bringing ICaN employees on to the school premises without completing the requisite checks. Under cross examination, Ms Head said: "Any programme that works on the school does so in negotiation with the principal. And I certainly wouldn't expect a contractor to announce at muster that a new member of staff was working and that's the first I've ever heard of it, as principal, that someone telling me that there is a new staff member starting that I've never even heard of or approved of."
14. This is an explanation of her reaction to Nathan Riley's introduction of Latoya Duras at the muster meeting, rather than an account of how she reacted.
15. Ms Head denied, when being cross examined, that she said to Nathan Riley, "How dare you bring another employee to my school." She gave the following evidence: "This would be an example of where I would speak to Nathan and say, Nathan, like you can't just bring people into my school and tell me that this person is now working in my school with students. Like, you, that's just can't be done."
16. We find that Ms Head spoke to Nathan Riley about bringing people into the school without her permission, and that she expressed displeasure that he had not sought her permission before introducing the new employee to the school. We are satisfied that she was angry about Nathan Riley's announcement and that she spoke to him sharply. We find that she said words to the effect of those alleged, even if she did not use those exact words.
17. The question as to whether the reprimand was "excessive" is not part of the statutory test. We do not consider that the words Ms Head spoke to Nathan Riley were "a demeaning and extreme response to Ms Duras's presence" (as the applicants allege), such as to subject him to a detriment.
18. McKechnie J considered the term "detriment" in the context of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) in Hautlieu Pty Ltd (t/as Russell Pathology) v McIntosh [2000] WASCA 146. His Honour said: "165. "Detriment" is defined by the "Macquarie Dictionary" as "loss damage or injury". 166. "Injury" is harm of any kind done or sustained or a wrong or injustice suffered. 167. Clearly "injury" can take many forms and is not limited to physical harm. Psychological damage may amount to an injury. 168. An injustice or wrong may amount to an injury especially if deliberately inflicted in order to victimise the person. In O'Callaghan v Loder (1983) 3 NSWLR 89, Mathews DCJ, after discussing the English decision in Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah [1980] QB 87 said at 105: … I consider that we should adopt the meaning ascribed to the word "detriment" by Brandon LJ, and treat it as requiring that a complainant has been placed under a disadvantage in comparison with employees of the opposite sex. The disadvantage must be a matter of substance; the legislation is not directed to trivial distinctions in the treatment afforded to men and women. 169. Her Honour noted that essentially, it is a matter of fact to be determined in each individual case. 170. With respect, I agree that the disadvantage must be a matter of substance. Even if there was evidence of disadvantage to Mrs McIntosh from restricted access to computer programs, I would not regard such disadvantage as a detriment."
19. A similar approach was adopted in Mitchell v Clayton Utz [2009] NSWADT 266 at [21].
20. We do not consider that the sharp words Ms Head spoke to Nathan Riley about introducing a new employee were, without more, a matter of substance, such as to constitute a detriment.
21. Further, the applicants have not established that one reason for Ms Head's reprimand of Nathan Riley was his race.
22. The applicants also say that Ms Head excessively reprimanded Nathan Riley in relation to a proposed ICaN barbecue.
23. Robert Riley arranged for a barbecue to be held at Delroy, with the Deputy Premier, Troy Grant, attending to talk to the students in the ICaN program. His evidence is that he told Ms Head and Mr Braithwaite about the arrangements for the barbecue on about 22 July 2016, but that dates later changed due to a request from the Minister's office. According to Robert Riley, Mr Braithwaite then said the school had too little notice of this, and Robert Riley decided to host the event at ICaN's nursery.
24. Ms Head's evidence is that when Robert Riley told her that the Deputy Premier was coming to the school in a few days' time for a barbecue, she objected that there was too little time to get permission notes and to prepare. She says that Robert Riley responded by saying he would hold the event at the ICaN nursery.
25. On 4 August 2016, Robert Riley sent Ms Head a text message stating that the barbecue would be at the nursery and inviting her to the event. He also informed her in the text messages that only parents would attend.
26. Nathan Riley's evidence is that Ms Head said to him on the morning of the barbecue, "Make sure no Delroy kids attend Robert's barbecue" and "Whose parents have you invited to the barbecue because they aren't your parents, they are my parents."
27. Ms Head's evidence is that she spoke to Nathan Riley about the barbecue as she identified that no permission notes had been issued. Under cross examination, Ms Head said: "I just said to Nathan, look, remember, those kids don't have, there's to be nothing organised for the children to go to that barbeque, there's no notes for them, so you, you know, you can't take them…. So, again, just a reminder again once about those policies and procedure things. So, just in case, you know, you got an idea in your head that we'll just take them anyway, I'm just preventing him from stepping out of that line. I'm trying to protect him in terms of school policies and procedures."
28. When Ms Head was asked by counsel for the applicants, Ms Byrnes, whether she spoke to Nathan about not taking the children to the barbecue because Robert Riley had spoken out at the muster meeting and made a complaint about discrimination, she replied "No, absolutely not, the reason is about the duty of care of students leaving the school grounds. That's a separate issue."
29. We find that Ms Head did not "excessively reprimand" Nathan Riley in relation to the barbecue. We find, on the balance of probabilities, that she said the words attributed to her by the applicants: "Make sure no Delroy kids attend Robert's barbecue" and "Whose parents have you invited to the barbecue because they aren't your parents, they are my parents," or words to that effect. However, we are not satisfied that this was an "excessive reprimand" such as to constitute a detriment or that a reason for saying this was Nathan Riley's race.
30. Another matter said to constitute an excessive reprimand is Ms Head's words to Nathan Riley about a student's uniform.
31. Nathan Riley gave evidence that Ms Head "spoke down to him" and the student before an AECG meeting, because she did not approve of the student's uniform. Ms Head's evidence is that when she spoke to Nathan Riley about the student's uniform, the student was out of earshot. She recalls saying words to the effect of: "Nathan, why did you bring a student who is not in school uniform? It is an expectation of any student representing Delroy at an external event to be in school uniform."
32. It was put to Ms Head in cross examination that she said to Nathan Riley (about the student), "What do you think you're doing bringing him here, and what do you think you're doing going to the AECG?" Ms Head's response was that she did not say those words in front of the student.
33. We accept that Ms Head said to Nathan Riley critical words about bringing a student to the AECG meeting whilst not in school uniform. On either account of what she said, however, we are not satisfied that the statement was made on the ground of Nathan Riley's race, or that she would have spoken to Nathan Riley in a different way, had he not been Aboriginal. We find that Ms Head did not treat Nathan Riley less favourably, on this occasion, than she would have treated a non-Aboriginal person.
34. Nathan Riley's evidence is that, on the following day, 22 July 2016, Ms Head said to him in front of others, "Who are you, to take students to the AECG?" and "You do not know how to dress appropriately." Ms Head's evidence is that she said to him, "Nathan, you have a responsibility to follow school procedures when dealing with students. You owe a duty of care to all students at Delroy."
35. Neither witness was cross examined about what he or she said on that day. The applicants have not established, on the balance of probabilities, that Ms Head said the words attributed to her. Even if she did, we are not satisfied that this subjected Nathan Riley to a detriment. Further, there is no evidence that Ms Head would have spoken differently to a non-Aboriginal person.

Termination of the contract with ICaN

1. The applicants plead that, in contravention of s 10(b) of the AD Act, Delroy "did not allow Nathan Riley to continue to work on the ground of his race when it terminated its contract with ICaN in the end of Term 3 2016."
2. Section 10(b) provides that It is unlawful for a principal to discriminate against a contract worker on the ground of race by not allowing him or her to work or continue to work.
3. This provision does not appear to have been the subject of any detailed consideration by a court or tribunal. In our view, s 10(b) is directed at a situation where a principal withdraws permission for a particular contract worker to work, or precludes that person from working, and not to a situation where a principal ends a contract with the contract worker's employer.
4. However, even if s 10(b) is capable of applying in a situation such as the present, where a principal terminates an arrangement with a worker's employer, the applicants' claim cannot succeed.
5. The applicants submit, in their written submissions, that the "appropriate comparator with respect to his claim of not being allowed to work" (under s 10(b) of the AD Act) "is whether Ms Head would have terminated the contract of an organization providing services to the Delroy Campus with non-Aboriginal employees in the same or similar circumstances." They also submit in those submissions that "Ms Head would not have terminated the contract of an organization with non-Aboriginal employees in the same or similar circumstances."
6. The applicants' characterisation of the appropriate comparator is problematic, in that the person with whom Nathan Riley must be compared under s 7(1)(a) of the AD Act is "a person of a different race". The term "comparator" does not appear in the AD Act and is a term of convenience which may, at times, be apt to distract from the statutory test. The comparison is not between two different organisations, but between the individual in question (Nathan Riley) and another individual.
7. An appropriate comparator is a non-Aboriginal employee of an organisation such as ICaN, contracted to the State.
8. There is very little evidence to support the applicants' contention that the State would have treated a non-Aboriginal person differently from the way it (indirectly) treated Nathan Riley when it terminated ICaN's contract. The applicants make some comparisons with the school's treatment of Clontarf, but this does not assist as there is no evidence of the race of its employees. The applicants have not established that, if Nathan Riley had not been Aboriginal, it would have made any difference to the decision to terminate the contract.
9. The applicants submit that "the comments made by Miss Bermingham at the muster on 21 June 2016 and 23 June 2016 and by Miss Head on 24 June 2016 … [give] rise to the inference that Ms Head subjected him to the less favourable treatment for a reason that included his Aboriginal race."
10. We do not consider that any comments made by Miss Bermingham are capable of giving rise to an inference that Ms Head subjected Nathan Riley to less favourable treatment on the ground of his Aboriginal race. Nor do we consider that Ms Head's comment at the muster meeting of 24 June 2016, "Oh Glen, I'm glad you made it back," is capable of giving rise to an inference that she later treated Nathan Riley unfavourably on the ground of his race. The comment is capable of being understood as having racist overtones, but it is also capable of being understood as having a racially-neutral meaning. It does not "give rise to a reasonable and definite inference" that Ms Head's later conduct towards Nathan Riley was on the ground of his race (in part or in whole).
11. We are not satisfied that the State (through Ms Head) would not have terminated ICaN's contract if its only employee was a non-Aboriginal person, or that a reason for terminating ICaN's contract was that it had an Aboriginal employee. The applicants have not established that Nathan Riley was treated less favourably than a non-Aboriginal person would have been treated, or that a reason for the treatment (the cancellation of the contract) was Nathan Riley's race.

Conclusion

1. It follows that the applicants have not established that the respondents unlawfully discriminated against Nathan Riley on the ground of his race within s 10 of the AD Act.

Victimisation

1. In the Further Amended Points of Claim, the applicants plead that they were victimised after a series of informal complaints made by Robert Riley.
2. Section 50(1) of the AD Act provides: 50 Victimisation (1) It is unlawful for a person (the discriminator) to subject another person (the person victimised) to any detriment in any circumstances on the ground that the person victimised has: (a) brought proceedings against the discriminator or any other person under this Act, (b) given evidence or information in connection with proceedings brought by any person against the discriminator or any other person under this Act, (c) alleged that the discriminator or any other person has committed an act which, whether or not the allegation so states, would amount to a contravention of this Act, or (d) otherwise done anything under or by reference to this Act in relation to the discriminator or any other person, or by reason that the discriminator knows that the person victimised intends to do any of those things, or suspects that the person victimised has done, or intends to do, any of them.
3. The applicants rely upon s 50(1)(c) and (d).
4. The applicants plead that: 1. Robert Riley made an informal complaint about racial vilification at the muster meeting of 24 June 2016; 2. The applicants were then subjected to a detriment on the basis of the informal complaint when Ms Head wrote the reports to Ms Exner, which are referred to above; 3. Robert Riley made another informal complaint of racial vilification or racial discrimination at a meeting with Ms Head and Mr Braithwaite on about 22 July 2016, saying to Ms Head that he believed her comments about the police station at the staff muster were racially offensive; 4. Soon after Robert Riley made this informal complaint, Ms Head cancelled or decided not to proceed with various proposed ICaN projects referred to above, which subjected all of the applicants to a detriment; 5. Nathan Riley was subjected to the detriment of excessive reprimands, due to Robert Riley's complaint of racial vilification or racial discrimination; 6. On 22 August 2016, on the ground of Robert Riley's informal complaints, the State "effectively terminated ICaN's employment" by telling Robert Riley that there was only sufficient funding for the ICaN program to take place until the end of term 3, 2016. This was a detriment to Robert Riley as a partner of ICaN and to Nathan Riley (as his "assignment" to Delroy was thereby terminated).

Victimisation complaints made by James Riley and Nathan Riley

1. One of the difficulties with the applicants' victimisation claim is that it is pleaded that only Robert Riley made complaints about racial vilification and racial discrimination, but the applicants claim that all three applicants were victimised. It is not pleaded that the informal complaints made by Robert Riley were made on behalf of anyone else. In their submissions, the applicants state that Robert Riley made various complaints of racial discrimination "on behalf of himself, his son Mr Nathan Riley and ICAN".
2. Section 50(1) only applies where the person allegedly victimised has done one of the acts described in paragraphs (a) to (d). It does not apply when an alleged discriminator (here, the State) subjects the person allegedly victimised (here, Nathan Riley or James Riley) to a detriment on the ground that a third party (here, Robert Riley) has done one of the acts described in s 50(1)(a) to (d).
3. The applicants have pleaded that Robert Riley made an allegation, and that, on the ground of his informal complaints, the respondents subjected Robert, James and Nathan Riley to various detriments.
4. The pleading that the respondents have subjected James and Nathan Riley to a detriment on the basis of Robert Riley's complaints does not identify a contravention of s 50(1) of the AD Act.
5. For this reason, James Riley's and Nathan Riley's complaints of victimisation must fail.

Victimisation complaint of Robert Riley

1. The first question to be considered in relation to Robert Riley's victimisation complaint is whether Robert Riley did an act meeting the description in s 50(1)(c) or (d).
2. If so, the next question is whether the State (through its employees) or Ms Head subjected him to a detriment.
3. If the State or Ms Head subjected Robert Riley to a detriment, the next question is whether the fact that Robert Riley did one of the things in s 50(1)(c) or (d) "was at least one of the 'real', 'genuine' or 'true' reasons for being subjected to a detriment" (Nicholls and Nicholls v Director General, Department of Education and Training (No 2) [2009] NSWADTAP 20 at [37]).
4. The words "on the ground that" require a direct causal link between the relevant act of victimisation - namely subjecting a person to a detriment - and the reason for that act (Tropoulos v Journey Lawyers Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 436; (2019) 287 IR 363 at 475 [323], in the context of the equivalent provision in the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)).

Did Robert Riley make an allegation of racial discrimination or do something by reference to the AD Act on 24 June 2016?

1. The applicants allege (and the respondents deny) that Robert Riley made an "informal complaint" when he spoke at the muster meeting of 24 June 2016. The applicants plead, in their Further Amended Points of Claim, that Robert Riley said on that occasion: "People used to laugh at me when I was a young man and I told them my dreams. They thought as a young Aboriginal man, my dreams were not achievable, but I fulfilled my dreams - I have my own business now and I've travelled the world. And I'm here trying to help other young Aboriginal kids achieve their dreams. We can help kids whether they are in our program or not, I am available 24/7. We can all be part of the solution not the problem. The School should not suspend Aboriginal students without understanding their culture and history."
2. We find, on the basis of Robert Riley's evidence, that he did say those words, or words to that effect.
3. In their written submissions, the applicants submit that Robert Riley's comments at the muster meeting on 24 June 2016 were a complaint about the "unfair treatment of Aboriginals at the school and of Nathan when he was giving his presentation at the muster on 21 June 2016; and make an allegation of racial discrimination or were made with reference to the ADA". The applicants rely upon Ms Head's oral evidence that she assumed that Robert Riley's comment that he was laughed at when he was a boy was a reference to the laughter during Nathan's speech at the muster meeting a few days earlier. Ms Head also said that she understood Robert Riley's comment, "You can be part of the problem or part of the solution", to be a reference to the problem of closing the gap with Aboriginal people.
4. We accept that Ms Head has correctly identified the references which Robert Riley was making. However, we are not satisfied that either comment (or that anything he said) amounted to an allegation that a person had committed an act which would amount to a contravention of the AD Act (within s 50(1)(c)) or that the making of the comments was doing anything under or by reference to the AD Act in relation to a person (within s 50(1)(d)). The applicants have not explained how either comment could amount to a contravention of s 50(1)(c) or (d).
5. When considering the application of s 50(1)(c) the relevant question is whether Robert Riley made an allegation that another person had committed an act that, objectively characterised, would amount to a contravention of the AD Act (Chi v Technical and Further Education Commission [2012] NSWCA 421 at [20]). A similar objective approach is to be taken when considering the application of s 50(1)(d).
6. In the spoken words which the applicants rely upon, Robert Riley did not make an allegation at all with any specificity. Robert Riley made no direct reference to the AD Act or doing anything under it, and we do not consider that there was any implicit reference in his words to it, or to doing anything under it. Robert Riley did not, through his words, make any direct allegation of racial discrimination. He did not allege that a staff member of Delroy "committed an act which, whether or not the allegation so states, would amount to a contravention of" the AD Act (AD Act, s 50(1)(c)). The applicants have not identified any staff member or other person who is alleged to have committed an act which would amount to a contravention of the AD Act, and they have not identified what the alleged contravention was. The only words capable of constituting such an allegation are the words concerning the suspension of Aboriginal students. The applicants have not adduced any further evidence to explain these words, nor have they made any submissions about them.
7. We find that Robert Riley's comments at the muster meeting of 24 June 2016 did not meet the description of an act in s 50(1)(c) or (d). The claim of victimisation, insofar as it depends upon these comments, is not established.

Did Robert Riley make an allegation of racial discrimination or do something by reference to the AD Act on 22 July 2016?

1. The applicants allege that Robert Riley made an allegation of racial discrimination or did something under or by reference to the AD Act in relation to a person at the meeting held on 22 July 2016 with Ms Head and Mr Braithwaite. They claim that, at that meeting, Mr Robert Riley said words to the effect of "Ms Head's comments about the Police Station at the Staff Muster were racially offensive."
2. Mr Braithwaite does not remember the meeting or Robert Riley's comment. Ms Head denies attending the meeting. Robert Riley has produced a text message from Ms Head on 22 July 2016, in which he states, "it was really good to clear everything up" and Ms Head replies "I agree it was really good."
3. We find, on the basis of Robert Riley's evidence and the text messages, that a meeting between Ms Head, Mr Braithwaite and Robert Riley occurred on 22 July 2016. Ms Head and Mr Braithwaite do not remember it. We also accept Mr Riley's evidence that he said words to the effect, "Ms Head's comments about the Police Station at the Staff Muster were racially offensive." This is consistent with his comment about clearing everything up and he maintained that he had spoken these words, and that the meeting occurred, in cross examination.
4. The applicants have not explained why they say that Robert Riley's words constituted an allegation of racial discrimination, nor have they explained why they say that speaking those words was doing something under or by reference to the AD Act.
5. We do not consider that Robert Riley's complaint that Ms Head's comments were racially offensive amounted to an allegation that Ms Head had committed an act which would amount to a contravention of the AD Act within s 50(1)(c) of the AD Act. The applicants have not pleaded that the allegation was that Ms Head had committed an act of racial vilification. We note, however, that making a racially offensive comment is not, without more, racial vilification, because it does not necessarily incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of race. Robert Riley's words did not allege that Ms Head's comments had this character. Nor is making a racially offensive comment, without more, racial discrimination.
6. The applicants have not established that Robert Riley's complaint that Ms Head's comments were racially offensive was doing anything under or by reference to the AD Act in relation to Ms Head or anyone else (within s 50(1)(d) of the AD Act).
7. For these reasons, Robert Riley's remark on 22 July 2016 did not provide a "trigger" for the victimisation complaint.

Did Robert Riley make an allegation of racial discrimination or do something by reference to the AD Act on or around 29 July 2016?

1. The applicants allege in the Further Amended Points of Claim that, after the equity meeting in term 3 of 2016 on or around 29 July 2016, Robert Riley spoke with Glen Braithwaite and said words to the following effect: "Mate, it feels like our program is being treated differently in the school than others run by non-indigenous facilitators."
2. In their written submissions, the applicants submit that these words were spoken at a meeting with Mr Braithwaite in early August 2016. This is consistent with Robert Riley's statement. Mr Braithwaite's evidence is that he recalls the meeting taking place, but he does not indicate whether he remembers those words being spoken.
3. We find, on the basis of Robert Riley's evidence, that he said words to the effect of those alleged in early August 2016.
4. The applicants submit that this is a complaint of racial discrimination, made on behalf of Robert Riley, Nathan Riley and ICaN, falling within s 50(1)(c) and/or (d) of the AD Act, but do not say anything further about it. They do not explain how it constitutes a complaint of racial discrimination.
5. The complaint made by Robert Riley was of differential treatment of the program. It was not, on its face, a complaint about differential treatment of individuals. The applicants have not identified the individual whom they say Robert Riley alleged was discriminated against, unless it may be inferred that they are claiming that the complaint was that Robert, Nathan and James Riley were all discriminated against.
6. We do not consider, on balance, that those words constitute an allegation of racial discrimination. That is, first, because they do not identify an individual or "person" who is said to have been treated less favourably on the ground of race than a non-indigenous person (see AD Act, s 7(1)(a)).
7. If the complaint is, in substance, that Robert and James Riley were discriminated against on the ground of race, that would not be "an act which … would amount to a contravention of" the AD Act (within s 50(1)(c)). That is because Robert and James Riley do not fall within any of the categories of person within Division 2 or 3 of Part 2 of the AD Act against whom it is unlawful to discriminate. The applicants made no submissions as to the provision of the AD Act which they claimed would be contravened if the complaint is to be understood as a complaint that Robert and James Riley were discriminated against.
8. It should be noted that the applicants made, but did not press, a complaint of racial discrimination made by Robert and James Riley under s 8 of the AD Act on the basis that the State was their "employer". In the context of the victimisation complaint, this was not repeated. However, insofar as Robert's complaint in early August 2016 about the program being treated differently is one of discrimination against him and his brother, we find that the State was not their "employer" within s 8.
9. We are not satisfied that Robert Riley's words constitute a complaint that the State (through Delroy) discriminated against Nathan Riley on the ground of race.
10. Making the complaint was not doing anything under or by reference to the AD Act (within s 50(1)(d) of the AD Act). Robert Riley did not refer to that Act, explicitly or implicitly.
11. For these reasons, the words spoken by Robert Riley to Glen Braithwaite in early August 2016 did not provide a basis, under s 50(1)(c) or (d), for the victimisation complaint.

Did Robert Riley make an allegation of racial discrimination or do something by reference to the AD Act on 22 August 2016?

1. The applicants plead that Robert Riley informed Ms Exner in a telephone call, on 22 August 2016, that he intended to lodge a formal complaint with the Department of Education.
2. The respondents admit that Mr Robert Riley made a complaint, on 22 August 2019, to Ms Exner.
3. Robert Riley's evidence is that the telephone call was made after a meeting in which Ms Head said to him that ICaN's contract would not be continuing in term 4 of 2016, due to lack of funding. In his statement, Robert Riley states: "I informed Ms Exner during that telephone call that I intended to lodge a formal complaint with the Department of Education."
4. Ms Exner's evidence is that Robert Riley said to her in the telephone call words to the effect, "I am not happy about being unable to work at Delroy. It is bad for my business. I am going to make a formal complaint."
5. The sequence of events indicates that Robert Riley's statement that he was going to make a complaint was not causative of the decision not to proceed with ICaN in term 4 of 2016. It followed that decision.
6. There is no evidence that the statement made by Robert Riley to Stacey Exner on 22 August 2016 was a complaint of racial discrimination or that it was doing something by reference to the AD Act (within s 50(1)(c) or (d) of the AD Act). Robert Riley's statement that he was going to lodge a formal complaint does not, of itself, amount to a complaint of racial discrimination. It could have been, simply, a proposed complaint about the termination of ICaN's services. There is insufficient evidence for us to conclude that it was anything else.
7. The applicants have not established that the words attributed to Robert Riley by Ms Exner constitute a complaint of racial discrimination.
8. Accordingly, we are not satisfied that the words spoken by Robert Riley to Ms Exner on the telephone on 22 August 2016 were capable of supporting a complaint of victimisation.

Formal complaint made to the Department of Education

1. The applicants plead that, on 15 September 2016, ICaN made a formal complaint of racial discrimination to the Department of Education on behalf of all three applicants. In the Further Amended Points of Claim, it is alleged that, on the ground of this formal complaint, the principals of the other campuses subjected Robert Riley to detriments. The applicants no longer press the claims of victimisation relating to the other campuses.
2. An available reading of the Further Amended Points of Claim is that the applicants also plead that, on the ground of the formal complaint, Dubbo College subjected Robert Riley to the detriment of withdrawing the offer to ICaN to conduct cultural awareness training.
3. The applicants allege in their submissions that Delroy did not proceed with a proposal, made by ICaN, to provide cultural awareness training to staff. The applicants submit that "[t]he inference is available that a reason for not proceeding to engage ICAN to conduct the cultural awareness training for staff was that Mr Robert Riley had made a formal complaint of race discrimination."
4. There is no evidence as to when the decision not to proceed with the staff training was made. We find, on the basis of Ms Exner's evidence, that Ms Head made a comment on 22 August 2016, indicating that she was still considering engaging ICaN to provide cultural awareness training to staff. However, the evidence does not establish whether she decided against this before or after 15 September 2016.
5. The applicants have therefore not established that a reason for the decision not to engage ICaN to provide that training was Robert Riley's formal complaint.
6. Further, we are not persuaded that the decision not to proceed with staff cultural awareness training (which had only ever been a proposal) subjected Robert Riley to a "detriment". Nothing was taken away from him by this decision; rather, Ms Head, on behalf of the State, decided not to confer a benefit upon ICaN (and, through ICaN, on Robert Riley).

Conclusion as to victimisation

1. For these reasons, the applicants' victimisation claims are not established.

Liability of Ms Head

1. The applicants plead that Ms Head is liable under s 52 of the AD Act, for causing the State to contravene the AD Act. Section 52 provides: It is unlawful for a person to cause, instruct, induce, aid or permit another person to do an act that is unlawful by reason of a provision of this Act.
2. The applicants submit that the Department of Education is a "person" (relying upon s 21(1) of the Interpretation Act 1987). They allege that Ms Head has "permitted" or "caused" the Department of Education to victimise Robert Riley, James Riley and Nathan Riley by her conduct, including her decision not to continue ICaN's services in term 4 of 2016.
3. The first respondent, the State of New South Wales, acting through the Department of Education, is a "person".
4. However, as we have not found that the State has done an act which is unlawful by reason of a provision of the AD Act, the claim against Ms Head must fail.

Costs

1. All parties indicated that they wished to be heard on costs.
2. We have made orders allowing for each party to make an application for costs and for material to be provided in response to any such application.
3. Our preliminary view is that the issues for determination on any costs application could adequately be determined in the absence of the parties by considering any written submissions or any other documents or material lodged with or provided to the Tribunal (see Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, s 50). However, we will consider any submissions to the contrary, which are to be made when applying for, or responding to, an application for costs.

Orders

1. We make the following orders: 1. The applicants' application is dismissed. 2. Any party may make an application for costs by providing any evidence and submissions in support of such application to the Tribunal and the other parties by 19 November 2019. 3. Any party against whom, or against which, a costs application is made, is to provide any submissions and evidence on which the party intends to rely in response to the costs application, to the Tribunal and the other parties by 3 December 2019. 4. The applicant for a costs order is to provide any reply to the Tribunal and the other parties by 10 December 2019. 5. Any party applying for costs, or responding to an application for costs, is to address in the party's submissions whether the costs application should be dealt with on the papers.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 29 October 2019