REYNOLDS -v- BYRAM [No 2] [2025] WASCA 72 (12 May 2025)

1. Lemonis J set out his conclusions in respect of the single judge appeal as follows [119]:

(1) I grant leave to appeal in respect of charge AL 2097/2021.

(2) The appeal is allowed in respect of charges AL 2097/2021, AL 2150/2021 and AL 682/2022.

(3) The appellant's conviction on charge AL 2150/2021 is set aside and substituted with a judgment of acquittal.

(4) The appellant's conviction on charge AL 2097/2021 is set aside and I order that charge be referred to the Magistrates Court for trial.

(5) The appellant's conviction on charge AL 682/2022 is set aside and I order there be a retrial of that charge in the Magistrates Court.

1. The appeal notice in CACR 23 of 2025 contains eleven proposed grounds of appeal. The appellant has not yet filed the appellant's case. He is required to file and serve the appellant's case by 4.00 pm on 14 May 2025.

Appeal notice CACR 55 of 2025 in respect of the single judge appeal decided by Gething J

1. On 30 April 2025, the appellant filed an appeal notice in CACR 55 of 2025. He appeals against the decision of Gething J in a single judge appeal from the Magistrates Court. Gething J heard the single judge appeal on 20 March 2025 and published his reasons for decision on 9 April 2025. See Reynolds v WA Police.[2] The single judge appeal before Gething J related to charges in the Magistrates Court. Those charges were tried before Magistrate O'Donnell.
2. Gething J set out the procedural history of the charges in the Magistrates Court, relevant, as follows [6] ‑ [12], [15] ‑ [18]:

In prosecution notice AL 2414 of 2022, the Appellant was charged that on 18 November 2022 at town in rural Western Australia he, being a person bound by restraining order (which was identified), breached that order. On 10 February 2023 the court entered a plea of not guilty to this charge on behalf of the Appellant pursuant to Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) (CPA) s 126(5).

The person protected by the restraining order is the Appellant's former partner, whom I will refer to as 'MET'. The restraining order, among other things, prevented the Appellant from entering or remaining on MET's home address or any other place where she lived or worked, or being within 100 m of the nearest external boundary of such premises. MET worked as a teacher at a school in the rural Western Australian town identified in the prosecution notice. Her son, of whom the Appellant is the father, was a student at the same school (Son). The prosecution alleged that the Appellant visited the Son at the school and in doing so breached the terms of the restraining order protecting MET.

In prosecution notice PE 2382 of 2023, the Appellant was charged that on 12 January 2023 he, without reasonable cause, failed to appear in the Magistrates Court at Albany, and failed to appear, as soon as practical thereafter, such appearance being a requirement of a bail undertaking entered into by him on 2 December 2022. On 10 February 2023 the court entered a plea of not guilty to this charge on behalf of the Appellant pursuant to CPA s 126(5).

In prosecution notice JO 1792 of 2023, the Appellant was charged that on 16 February 2023 he, without reasonable excuse, failed to appear in the Magistrates Court at Albany and failed to appear as soon as practicable thereafter, such appearance being a requirement of an undertaking entered into by him on 10 February 2023. On 31 March 2023, the court entered a plea of not guilty to this charge on his behalf of the Appellant pursuant to CPA s 126(5).

All three charges were the subject of a prior appeal to this court, along with a number of other charges. Her Honour Justice Forrester refused leave to appeal, and dismissed the appeal, in relation to the three charges the subject of the present appeal on the basis that the Appellant had not yet stood trial in the Magistrates Court and had not been convicted or sentenced. Consequently no 'decision' had been made as that term is defined in Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (CA Act) s 6, and thus the Appellant had no right of appeal pursuant to CA s 7 in respect of those charges.

At the commencement of the hearing before the Magistrate, an exchange took place between her Honour and the Appellant in which the Appellant refused to acknowledge his identity as 'Kellan John Reynolds'. It is readily apparent that the Appellant firmly believes that he should not be referred to by this name. For example, in an affidavit filed in these proceedings he describes himself as 'functioning as trustee/ executor for the ©Kellan John Reynolds, estates'. This issue has been the subject of three prior appeals to this court by the Appellant. Courts throughout Australia have repeatedly rejected the notion of a distinction between a person's legal identity and their status as a 'living person', sometimes referred to as the 'strawman duality theory'.

There was then a second issue raised. The Appellant said that he had tried to issue a witness summons to the Son whom he wanted to give evidence in his defence. The Magistrate informed the Appellant that she had set aside this summons on the basis that, as the Son was a child, the Appellant was required to obtain leave to issue the summons, which he had not done. The Appellant sought an adjournment because he wanted the Son to give evidence. There then followed a further exchange between the Appellant and the Magistrate in which the Appellant sought to raise what her Honour referred to as 'pseudo law'. After a number of threats to do so, the Magistrate ejected the Appellant from the courtroom.

...

Accordingly, the Magistrate proceeded with the trial in relation to AL 2414 of 2022. The prosecution called three witnesses who gave evidence, including MET. The Magistrate gave oral reasons, the transcript of which is in the materials before this court, and convicted the Appellant of the charge.

The Magistrate then referred to PE 2382 of 2023. Her Honour noted that there was an indication on the court record to the effect that the Appellant in fact attended court on 12 January 2023. The prosecution discontinued the charge which her Honour accepted and dismissed the charge. The court then adjourned for lunch.

On returning after lunch, the Magistrate proceeded with the trial of JO 1792 of 2023. Again, witnesses were called and gave evidence. The Magistrate gave oral reasons, the transcript of which is in the materials before this court, and convicted the Appellant of the charge. When giving reasons, her Honour set out reasons for the decision to exclude the Appellant:

HER HONOUR: No, that's okay. Okay. No, that's all right. Now, sorry, I've just accidentally - I've clicked the wrong button. I just want to make sure I'm noting that he has been convicted after trial. Now, of course, this has been, as was the other trial, a trial conducted in the absence of the accused, which is not a decision that should be made lightly by a court, but I am not prepared to have Mr Reynolds in here making his nonsensical submissions to me in an argumentative way, in which he talks over me continually.

He actually ended up laughing at me. Now, it's not me personally that the concept of contempt is aimed at.

Contempt is contempt in the face of the court. So the processes of the court, what it stands for, the fact that this is a serious proceeding, it's a serious and solemn occasion, and when people come in here and want to make stupid nonsensical pseudo‑law arguments, that in and of itself, in my view, is contentious. But in addition to that, Mr Reynolds, as I said, was talking over me, was not listening, and simply wanted to be belligerent and to advance an argument that I, in fact, was the one who was interfering with him. I was not.

I was asking him a question which I would ask anyone, particularly someone who's appearing unrepresented, namely, I was asking him, 'Are you maintaining your pleas of not guilty?' That's all I needed an answer to at that point. It was nothing to do with trying to controvert any defence he had. As it is, I don't consider that he had any reasonable defence for either of these charges, and as to his submission that he's not a person, I can't make sense of it. I defy anyone to make sense of that. But in any event, those are my reasons, just to enlarge upon the reasons why I was not prepared to have him in the courtroom.

He also, as do a lot of constitutionalists, had someone in the back supporting. Now, I've had people of the same viewpoint have people in the back in support of them in other matters, and I don't necessarily mind, but once I have made a decision that the accused himself is not going to stay in court, then those other people have no reason to remain in court either, which is why I ejected that other person as well. So those are my reasons for getting rid of the accused. All right. Now, we can proceed to sentence.

The Magistrate then proceeded to sentence the Appellant. In relation to AL 2414 of 2022 her Honour imposed a fine of $2,500 and ordered the Appellant to pay costs in the amount of $137. In relation to JO 1792 of 2023, the Magistrate imposed a fine of $1,000 and ordered the Appellant to pay costs in the amount of $137. (footnotes omitted)

1. The appellant relied upon 26 grounds in his single judge appeal before Gething J. His Honour concluded that leave to appeal should be granted on five of those grounds, the appeal should be allowed and the matters should be remitted to the Magistrates Court in Perth for retrial before a different Magistrate.
2. The appeal notice in CACR 55 of 2025 contains five draft grounds of appeal. The appellant has not yet filed the appellant's case. He is required to file and serve the appellant's case by 4.00 pm on 25 June 2025.
3. On 16 April 2025, Hall and Archer JJA dismissed an application by the appellant in CACR 23 of 2025 for a suspension order under s 12 and s 18 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) to suspend the operation of the orders made by Lemonis J until the resolution of his appeal to this court. See Reynolds v Byram.[3] Their Honours observed that the appellant had not established that the appeal had reasonable prospects of success [16].

The application in an appeal dated 2 May 2025 filed in CACR 23 of 2025

1. On 2 May 2025, the appellant filed an application dated 2 May 2025 in CACR 23 of 2025 for an order, relevantly, that the appeal in CACR 23 of 2025 'be joined and heard together' with the appeal in CACR 55 of 2025.
2. The application was supported by the appellant's affidavit affirmed 2 May 2025.
3. The grounds for the application were as follows:
   1. The appeals arise out of the same course of conduct, namely beyond limits intended by the executive therefore exceeding powers e.g., a series of arrests, restraining orders, bail and court decisions arising from related incidents.
   2. The matters raise common questions of law and fact.
   3. The parties to the proceedings are the same or substantially the same.
   4. Joinder will promote the efficient administration of justice, avoid duplication, reduce costs, and minimise the risk of inconsistent findings.
4. On 7 May 2025, we ordered that the appellant's application be refused.
5. On 7 May 2025, the appellant requested reasons for decision in relation to the refusal of the application.
6. We dismissed the application for these reasons.
7. First, the application is premature because the appellant has not yet filed his appellant's case in either CACR 23 of 2025 or CACR 55 of 2025.
8. Secondly, it is not apparent that 'joinder' of the appeals, in the sense of consolidation, is appropriate having regard to the differences between:

(a) the facts and circumstances of the charges dealt with in the Magistrates Court which are the subject of CACR 23 of 2025 compared with the facts and circumstances of the charges dealt with in the Magistrates Court which are the subject of CACR 55 of 2025;

(b) the reasons and orders of the Magistrates the subject of CACR 23 of 2025 compared with the reasons and orders of the Magistrate the subject of CACR 55 of 2025;

(c) the reasons and orders of Lemonis J compared with the reasons and orders of Gething J; and

(d) the proposed grounds of appeal in CACR 23 of 2025 compared with the draft grounds of appeal in CACR 55 of 2025.

1. Thirdly, it will be necessary for the court to determine, after the appellant's case is filed in each of the appeals, whether an order should be made, pursuant to s 9(4) read with s 18 of the Criminal Appeals Act, that whether or not leave to appeal should be given on any of the grounds of appeal in the appellant's case is to be decided on the basis of the written submissions in the appellant's case and without oral submissions at a hearing.
2. Fourthly, if the court determines that there should be oral submissions at a hearing in respect of both of the appeals, then the court may decide that both of the appeals should be heard sequentially on the same day.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Reynolds v WA Police [No 2] [2025] WASC 10.

[2] Reynolds v WA Police [2025] WASC 104.

[3] Reynolds v Byram [2025] WASCA 59.