Regina v Maisey

The judge found that earlier on the day of the offence the applicant and his co-offender met in a hotel. Both of them consumed some drugs and some alcohol. The judge was not satisfied that they were under the influence of alcohol to any marked degree.

About 10.15pm on 2 January 2003 the applicant and Stecko went to the unit in which the victim lived intent on recovery of the shoes but with no well formulated plan. The victim and Ms Box, his then girl friend were there. On the victim opening the door and without a word being spoken the applicant punched him so hard with a closed fist that the skin on his face was torn and the victim hit the floor. The facial injury required stitching.

The judge found that what happened after the victim hit the floor was the subject of considerable dispute between the applicant and the victim. The evidence of the victim and Ms. Box was not entirely consistent. This did not surprise the judge as events happened very quickly and unexpectedly.

The judge described the confrontation at the front door of the unit as an extremely violent one and found that it was suggestive of the applicant seeking to punish the victim for his treatment of the applicant's sister. The applicant said that he was angry with the victim's treatment of his sister.

The judge thought that the assault experienced by the victim at the front door would put any person in considerable fear of his own safety.

According to the victim both the applicant and Stecko kicked and punched him all over his body. He held his hands over his face to protect himself and could not see who was administering particular blows but through his fingers he caught sight of a number of arms and legs. Both accused denied kicking and punching the victim near the door. Stecko admitted slapping the victim around the face, perhaps punching him lightly around the body and forcing him to sit on a couch. Stecko denied kicking the victim or doing any considerable harm to him.

The judge found: "Miss Box, who was obviously quite startled by all this gave evidence that was not entirely supportive of [the victim] in his claim about being a kicked and punched, so I cannot conclude beyond reasonable doubt exactly what kicking or punching or slapping did occur but I can conclude that there was further physical contact beyond the initial blow thrown by Mr Maisey and that those physical blows whether they be heavy or light were aimed at subduing [the victim] and causing him to be compliant."

There was a major dispute whether the applicant persistently demanded that the victim hand over his money. The applicant took the victim's wallet but left thousands of dollars, which were on the floor. The judge thought that stealing money was not part of the motive of either of the co-offenders. The judge was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was any demand for money. Stecko took some electronic equipment. Ms Box attempted to escape but she was prevented from doing so, mainly by Stecko.

The judge held that the flat was ransacked by the two offenders. The judge was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that after the initial blow at the front door both the offenders hit the victim at least with their hands, and did cause him to continue to fear what they had in mind. The judge found that the victim's fear came not only from the violent blow and the robbery but also from the applicant possibly wanting to deal with the victim for something that had happened between him and his sister.

The victim decided to escape as he was in fear of his life. He went to the balcony and attempted to drop to the next balcony down. He got himself over his unit's balcony after he saw Ms Box being stopped as she tried to get out the front door. While he was hanging from his unit's balcony he heard the two offenders saying to one another "Where's he gone." He then dropped, hoping to land in the lower balcony and escape because he feared what might happen if they found him. He did not land in the lower balcony and he fell two storeys to the ground. (The judge mistakenly stated five storeys). Despite serious injuries he somehow got to his feet started screaming and ran for a short distance. The judge commented that this could have only caused his injuries to get worse and that his action confirmed that he was in a state of very considerable fear.

The medical certificate of Dr Peters, who signed as a medical officer of the Prince Henry and Prince of Wales Hospital and not as someone who had personal knowledge of the treatment given, records a fall by the victim from a six metre height on to his feet resulting in bi-lateral ankle deformity and swelling, a crush fracture of the L1 vertebral body in the spine with comminution and compression of the superior aspect of the vertebral body. There was a large retro-pulsed bony fragment which caused about 75 per cent of narrowing of the spinal canal with marked compression of the underlying thecal sack. He also suffered (a) Left ankle - impacted fracture of the anterior aspect of the distal tibia; and

(b) Left wrist - mildly displaced fracture through the waist of left scaphoid; and

(c) Right foot and ankle - (i) small undisplaced fracture of the anterior process of the calcaneus; (ii) non-displaced fracture of the postero-lateral aspect of the talar dome; (iii) minimally displaced fracture of the anterior mid aspect of the tibia; (iv) comminuted fracture through the base of the 4th metatarsal; (v) comminuted fracture of the antero-inferior aspect of the cuboid bone. 18. On 4 January 2003 the victim underwent an L1 laminectomy and a pedicle screw fusion from the 12th thoracic to the 2nd lumbar vertebra and postero-lateral fusion with an iliac bone graft. Postoperatively he received analgesics, intravenous antibiotics, neuro observations and nursing care. This was major surgery.

On 10 January 2003 the victim underwent further surgery with an open reduction and internal fixation of the distal fractured left tibia being carried out. Postoperatively, analgesia and antibiotics were continued. A plaster cast was applied to the right foot. His postoperative recovery was satisfactory.

During his hospitalisation, the pain team was involved for analgesia and his spine was immobilised in a turtle brace to be worn for the next 3 months. There was to be no weight bearing on both legs for 6 weeks following surgery.

On 24 January 2003 he appeared stable and he was discharged to his sister's unit. The Crown did not place an up to date medical report on the victim before the judge at the sentencing hearing. Further material as to the effect of the injuries received and his disabilities is contained in the Victim Impact Statement of 26 February 2004, which was admitted without objection. Although the victim was doing well as an apprentice carpenter and had completed the TAFE component of the apprenticeship with distinction he has had to abandon his carpentry apprenticeship because of chronic back pain and change his career. He was considered too much of a liability to his employer. He did not want to take responsibility for any further injury to the victim's spine and insurance was not possible. That is a very familiar feature of back cases in the Supreme and District Courts.

The victim complains that he has become anxious, less tolerant, has trouble controlling his anger and does not feel safe in the community and is fearful that his attackers may seek revenge. He has to abstain from alcohol as that is a contributing factor to his back pain. He was formerly physically active but is now unable to jog, skateboard, mountain-bike ride and partake in any sport that puts his back at risk or stresses his ankles.

The muscles in his back go into spasm which results in severe pain and constant vomiting for periods of 3-5 days on a fortnightly basis. On two occasions he had to go to the Prince of Wales Accident and Emergency Department for intravenous pain control.

As his posture has been altered he now finds that his entire spine (and not just the injured area) is vulnerable to injury. He has to exercise caution in any physical movement. His ankles have lost flexibility and cause him pain if he is on his feet for too long.

One of the questions agitated before the judge was that of causation. The judge recorded that the victim said that he sought to escape because of a fear that he might be killed. It was put by the applicant to the judge that what the victim did was just a foolish act unconnected with anything that happened in the flat. In resolving the issue of causation the judge applied the principles propounded in Royall v The Queen (1990) 172 CLR 378 especially per Mason CJ at p.389.

The judge found that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that "the very significant physical injuries suffered [by the victim] were caused by the conduct of both of the accused, and for that conduct both of them must bear responsibility and sentences must be imposed to reflect the seriousness of what occurred."

The judge held that it was unnecessary to resolve every factual conflict or discrepancy. He thought it was sufficient to say: "I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of a causal link to find as I do that the accused, both of them, assaulted the victim, the most violent assault being perpetrated by Mr Maisey, lesser but significant assaults being perpetuated by Mr Stecko, and that those assaults cumulatively placed [the victim] in such a state of fear that he decided to escape to save his life."

The applicant challenged neither the correctness of the principles stated by the judge nor his application of them to the facts of the present case. There was ample material to support the judge's findings.

In his letter to the judge the applicant wrote: "I must stress that I wasn't there to steal from [the victim]. I was there to collect gifts when the altercation started. It got out of hand and I allowed my anger to take over. I participated in robbing the victim as a punishment for mistreating my sister."

In his evidence at the sentence hearing he said: (T69 of 26.02.04, ln 35) "Q. Having assaulted and robbed [the victim] you were arrested correct? A. Yes." And at ln 52: "Q.. … in so far as (you) admit that you assaulted him and robbed him, what do you have to say about that now" A. I wish that it could have been done a different way, no doubt about that. But I was angry at the time that happened, it was the fact what happened in the past but I wish now that it could have been solved a different way instead of physical, by talking to him."

The applicant was born on 21 November 1976. He has an extensive criminal history which began on 15 July 1994 when he was dealt with by the Gosford Children's Court for a multitude of offences including take and drive conveyance, larceny (4 counts), drug offences, driving offences, break enter and steal, illegal use of conveyance (9 counts), stealing (2 counts), unlicensed driver (5 counts). In all there were some 36 offences. He was dealt with extremely leniently, being only sentenced to the rising of the Court. He continued to offend frequently during 1995, 1996 and 1997. He received his first prison sentence, namely 4 months on 22 September 1997 for driving whilst disqualified, goods in custody, possess prohibited drug and conceal serious offence. On that occasion he was dealt with for 11 offences. In April 1998 he was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for assault. For major dishonesty offences (steal from dwelling, break enter and steal) he received a minimum term of 12 months and an additional term of 2 years. He committed a breach of parole and was required to spend the balance of his parole of 1 year 7 months 9 days in prison. In June 1999 he was sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum term of 15 months for 8 counts of attempting to obtain benefit by deception, break enter and steal and take and drive conveyance.

In April 2001 the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years with a non-parole period of 18 months for breaking, entering and stealing. In August 2003 his parole order was revoked and he was required to serve 1 year 5 days in prison. Between 15 July 1974 and 8 August 2003 the courts or the Parole Board had to deal with him on some 19 occasions by way of sentencing him or revoking his parole.

The Pre-Sentence Report records that the applicant had extensive prior contact with the Probation and Parole Service dating back to 1995. It noted that previous parole orders had been revoked mainly because of his conviction for further matters and sometimes for his failure to maintain contact with his supervising officer.

His parents separated in 1987 reportedly due to the father's alcohol abuse and domestic violence. He left school before completing year 10. He completed a14 week course at TAFE in horticulture. He has a very patchy work history and has mostly been unemployed. He has spent much of his adult life in prison.

The applicant has a long history of drug abuse and has had a problem with alcohol. He has had some outpatient treatment and while in gaol he has had drug counselling.

The Probation and Parole officer wrote "…Mr Maisey's intentions may [be] to be drug free but his choice of associations is poor and his life is unstructured making it difficult for him to break the offending cycle"

The officer referred to the applicant's past failures as a parolee.

The judge accepted that the applicant had few life skills and commented: "Having seen him, I am somewhat concerned about what appeared to be slow thinking, whether he had some mental problem, something that affected his ability to think clearly. A psychiatric report upon him, apart from dealing with his dependency on drugs and reporting that he is hepatitis C positive … does not consider that he suffers from any developmental disability or any mental illness."

The psychiatric report was prepared by Professor David Mace Greenberg, an experienced and highly qualified psychiatrist. He wrote:

"Mr Maisey is a young man with significant personality difficulties associated with a chronic and persistent pattern of illicit substance abuse since his teenage years…He has poor insight into his need for addiction counselling. Treatment Recommendations

1. It is imperative that Mr Maisey abstains from all alcohol and other illicit substances. 2. He may benefit from anger management counselling and counselling for his personality difficulties."
2. Professor Greenberg referred to the "chronicity of the [applicant's] personality problems" and expressed the opinion that the applicant "would benefit from drug and alcohol treatment and rehabilitation."

41. The judge tended to prefer the report of Mr J Machlin, Duffy Barrier & Robilliard, psychologists, who interviewed and tested the applicant over 1 hour 45 minutes in gaol on 20 November 2003. Mr Machlin wrote that the applicant expressed himself slowly and it appeared his verbal skills were limited.

42. Mr Machlin wrote that the applicant's verbal functioning was in the 'Well Below Average Category' while his non-verbal functioning was 'Average'. His composite IQ of 87 indicates his intellect is below average but well above the level of developmental disability. He was considered potentially capable of working in a wide variety of skilled or semi-skilled occupations in which the verbal demands were low. Mr Machlin wrote: "A number of favourable features can be identified for his outlook:

First, he indicates that there have been improvements in his drug use and offending behaviours in recent times, having remained abstinent from heroin for the past two years and having complied with rehabilitative counselling and Narcotics Anonymous in the community.

Second, he has sufficient insight to reflect on his behaviours and entertain alternative paths. His intellectual profile and work history indicates he has a reasonable capacity for employment. He indicated that he prefers to be occupied, and wishes to re-enter the workforce at his next opportunity.

Third, family support is evident in his close relationship with his mother and siblings.

Fourth, having spent most of his time in custody since reaching adulthood, he has increasingly come to regret the time wasted. Troy is regretful about the consequences of his recent offence. He appears motivated to avoid returning to custody." 43. The judge after noting that the applicant had been in gaol for over a year, found that he had, to some extent, engaged whilst in gaol in doing courses aimed at rehabilitating him. The judge found that the applicant had reasonable prospects of rehabilitation.

The judge held that the applicant had genuinely expressed remorse for what he did. The judge thought it was unlikely that the applicant would get involved in similar events in the future.

The judge was unable to derive much assistance from Judicial Commission statistics or previous decisions of the court. There was a scarcity of relevant material. The judge concluded that while this was a bad case it did not fall into the category of the worst type. He held that there was no evidence from which he could conclude beyond reasonable doubt that either of the offenders had an intention to cause the victim to be very seriously injured.

The judge concluded that because the applicant committed the offence whilst he was on parole he should receive a slightly greater sentence than Stecko

The judge reduced the normal non-parole period from six years nine months to five years nine months because of special circumstances. He specified that the applicant had demonstrated that he will rehabilitate himself, was unlikely to commit this sort of offence again, and he had expressed genuine remorse and had done something about changing his life. He required ongoing drug and alcohol counselling and assistance which the judge recommended be given to him by the gaol authorities.

The judge imposed a condition that when admitted to parole, the applicant submit to the supervision of the Probation and Parole Service for soever long as that service considers it necessary to supervise him and that he take their advice on drug, alcohol and lifestyle matters.

Appeal Ground 1 reads: His Honour erred in his consideration of the future effects of [the victim's] injuries.

In his remarks on sentence the judge outlined the injuries which the victim had suffered, the surgery he underwent, some of the effects of the injuries and the surgery and the disabilities from which the victim was suffering.

The judge continued: "Whilst there is no evidence in specific terms that his back problems will persist for the rest of his life my own knowledge through being involved in hundreds, if not thousands, of personal injuries cases over thirty years and having heard evidence from many orthopaedic and neurosurgeons enables me to be certain beyond any doubt that he will suffer the problems of which he talks for the rest of his life, and in my opinion his choices in life will be very limited in a physical sense for the rest of his life."

Particular objection was taken to the judge's assertion that the victim would suffer the problems he talked about for the rest of his life and that his choices will be very limited in a physical sense for the rest of his life.

Reference was also made to the earlier remark of the judge that a person would normally be expected to recover from the ankle and wrist injuries without necessarily experiencing any further serious consequences but it was another matter when regard was had to a crush fracture of the spine at the L1 level.

Upon the tender of the Victim Impact Statement (T 38 of 11/6/04) the judge remarked that he imagined that the injuries which the victim received would have very considerable effects upon his life, adding that "the injuries speak for themselves". The judge felt he did not need a Victim Impact Statement to spell out the consequences of injuries of the kind here in question. The judge made it clear to counsel that he was relying on his many years of experience in personal injury cases and the usual consequences of such injuries and the virtually standard heads of damages, including, the effect on his employability, his pain levels, future medical and hospital expenses for future treatment and making provision for periods when he could not work. It was not suggested by the legal representatives for either of the accused or the Crown in the District Court that what the judge said was incorrect or that he should not use his experience. It is a pity that those appearing before the judge did not object and that any objection was left to this Court. It is true that the judge referred to effects on the victim's life and did not use the words "for the rest of the victim's life". The experience of the judges of this State and counsel in back cases occurs mostly, if not always, in a context of claims for compensatory damages. Back injuries occur in other contexts. The applicant read the affidavit of Professor P N Sambrook of 31 August 2005. He is a Professor of Rheumatology and conducts his practice at the Department of Rheumatology at Royal North Shore Hospital, a teaching hospital of the University of Sydney where he holds the Florence and Cope Chairs. Professor Sambrook states: "3. I have perused Dr Peters' certificate. There appear to be one ongoing area of concern in relation to the back injuries sustained by [the victim]. This relates to the crush fracture of L1 and the subsequent laminectomy and pedicle screw infusion from T12 to L2. The long term prognosis for this condition is unclear. It could range from no pain at all to chronic low back pain.

4. I have also perused the Victim Impact Statement. According to [the victim] he gets episodes of acute back pain lasting 3 - 5 days on a fortnightly basis. These may diminish in time but it is difficult to be certain. He may benefit from attendance at a Pain clinic for pain management.

5. A more comprehensive report with a better idea of his long term prognosis could only be obtained by examining [the victim] and obtaining up to date x-rays."

The applicant contended that the judge should not have relied on his own experience and the experience of the Courts in the context of assessing compensatory damages to conclude that the victim was likely to suffer continuing pain for the rest of his life, substantial loss of enjoyment of life and encounter difficulties with his employment during his working life, as well as needing treatment throughout his life. The applicant contended that this amounted to procedural unfairness. Some of the strength of this complaint has been lost because the judge told the parties of his views based on his experience and no objection was taken at the District Court hearing to his relying on that experience. The applicant complained that he had no way of testing what the judge said or meeting it. The judge's remarks on the admission of the Victim Impact Statement were made at the end of the sentencing hearing, that Statement not having been tendered until then.

The applicant also submitted that the judge's failure to give him notice of the intended finding of permanent injury to the victim breached the requirements of procedural fairness and particularly that in s 144(4) of the Evidence Act 1995.

It would have been better if the Crown had placed an up to date medical report with the assistance of up to date x-rays. They, of course, may have been far from conclusive. With complaints of pain a court and the doctors largely depend on the veracity and resilience of the person suffering the injuries.

In R v Slack [2004] NSWCCA 128 at [58] Sperling J said: "Harm to the victim of an offence is a relevant consideration: Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 at [95], Hall (NSWCCA 28 Sep 95, unrep). It is a factor in aggravation. As such the court must be satisfied as to the facts beyond reasonable doubt. The common law is now codified by s 21A(2)(g) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999."

And at [61]: "While a sentencing hearing is not subject to the rules of evidence unless an order to that effect is made and whilst s 28 [of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999] also, by implication allows the court to take a victim impact statement into account in determining the appropriate punishment by sentence, the weight to be given to such a statement is for the court to determine. In RKB (NSWCCA, 30 June 1992, unreported) it was acknowledged that a sentencing court is required to take into account the impact of criminal behaviour but, it was said, what is required is an objective assessment of the crime's effect."

Grove J, in agreement with Sperling J said of the Victim Impact Statement: "… such a statement may be given weight in determining the appropriate punishment but such unsworn and untested material is unlikely to be able to contribute significantly to the finding of facts adverse to an accused which are required to be sustained by proof to the criminal standard."

The Crown correctly submitted that the injuries suffered by the victim were extensive and serious and that his Victim Impact Statement, unchallenged before the judge, when read with the Certificate of Dr Peters provided ample material upon which the judge could come to the view that at least as at the date of that statement (26 February 2004) the victim was continuing to suffer significant pain and discomfort and disruption to his employment and life style. The difficulties mentioned could not be expected to vanish overnight. There was no medical evidence that they would continue for the rest of the victim's life at their existing level. The Court did not have medical evidence as to how long the difficulties would, or might, continue or at what level. The losses and disabilities experienced up to 26 February 2004 were serious and did not augur well for the future. That was established beyond reasonable doubt. It was also clear and established beyond reasonable doubt that the victim faced an uncertain future due to his many injuries and their effects. He was not able to face the future as a whole person as a result of the actions of the offenders. On any view he has a vulnerable back which will make insurers unwilling to insure and employers reluctant to employ him. The victim has already experienced a telling example of this.

The error of the judge in relying on his own extensive experience in respect of the lifelong effects of back injuries of the kind here in question and his failure to alert the applicant that he proposed to make a finding of permanent back injury to the victim means that this Court has to consider what would occur on re-sentencing.

Appeal Ground 2 reads: The sentence is manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances and a different less severe sentence is warranted and ought to have been imposed.

The applicant submitted that the sentence imposed does not properly reflect the objective seriousness of the offence weighed against the applicant's subjective circumstances. The applicant submitted that the judge placed too much weight upon the injuries and effects suffered by the victim when he went over the balcony and too little on the subjective and mitigating features of the case. The applicant contended that the judge's failure to deal with all the facts of the offence and the difficulties in the evidence of the victim measured against his extensive consideration of the victim's fear and injuries supports a submission that the judge placed too much emphasis on this aspect of the case and that without the injuries it could be said that this offence was not particularly high on the spectrum of aggravated robberies.

The judge dealt sufficiently with the facts of the offence. It was not essential for him to make findings on all of the facts of the case to carry out the sentencing exercise. The fear engendered in the victim as a result of the actions of the offenders was an important aspect of the sentencing. It was that fear which led to the victim escaping and using the means which led to his injuries and him running, although severely injured, away from where he had fallen. The victim thought that his life was in danger. In this context the severe injuries cannot be put to one side. The fear entertained by the victim was an element in the application of the principles of Royall v The Queen. The injuries sustained were of consequence in assessing the criminality in the present case.

The applicant pointed out that but for the applicant's plea of guilty his head sentence would have been 12 years imprisonment. He submitted that by reference to the statistics kept by the Judicial Commission this appears to be the highest sentence imposed for offences against s 96 of the Crimes Act. He also submitted that the non-parole period of 5 years 9 months was towards the top of the range disclosed by those statistics. The statistics do not provide other than an imperfect guide to the sentence in the present case. The facts of the present case are unusual The facts in the various cases the subject of the statistics are not known.

The applicant submitted that the severity of the sentence ought to have been tempered to a significant degree in view of these findings of the judge: (a) this was not an offence of the worst type as the applicant did not intend the severe injuries

(b) the applicant is minded to rehabilitate himself and is participating in courses in gaol aimed at his rehabilitation. He has reasonable prospects of rehabilitation and is unlikely to re-offend

(c) the applicant's expressions of remorse are genuine

(d) the applicant is a somewhat dull man but does have some insight into his situation

(e) the offence was motivated by a sense of family loyalty

(g) there are special circumstances on account of the applicant's remorse and efforts at rehabilitation. 66. There is a degree of repetition in these points. It is important not to over-emphasise the applicant's contrition and prospects of rehabilitation. The nature and extent of the assaults and threats offered in the home unit leading up to the escape were tested by extensive cross-examination for the most part to try and demonstrate that the victim's escape was not because of any fear he might have held, but to make contact with the authorities thereby to leave in doubt the causal relationship between the injuries suffered in the fall and the conduct of the co-offenders. The injury for which the applicant was prepared to accept responsibility was the cut to the victim's cheek which required suturing. That was insignificant when compared with the other injuries.

The past breaches of parole point to a measure of caution being necessary when holding that there are good prospects of rehabilitation.

I accept the Crown submission that the motivation borne of family loyalty to redress the perceived wrong suffered by the applicant's sister does not diminish the seriousness of the offence beyond the most marginal of degrees, if at all.

This was an extremely serious offence. The applicant and Stecko went to the victim's home unit and upon his opening the door the applicant punched him so hard that he fell to the floor. The victim was further assaulted and robbed. He feared for his life and escaped, suffering grave injuries in the process, the effects of which had seriously affected the victim as at the date of the sentencing hearing. The victim faced the prospect of a difficult and painful future, both physically and emotionally. The applicant was on parole. His lengthy criminal history underlines the need for deterrence. The community cannot tolerate citizens being attacked in their homes by offenders forcing their way into them.

The finding of special circumstances by the judge was generous to the applicant.

The sentence imposed by the judge was a stern one, but this was necessitated by the objective criminality of the offence. The sentence was not manifestly excessive. Appeal Ground 2 should be rejected.

On re-sentencing, taking into account the plea of guilty, the limited admissions as to the facts, the applicant's subjective features and the matters referred to in s 21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 so far as relevant and the grave criminality of the offence I would impose a sentence not less than that imposed by the judge. I would not have been prepared to make a finding of special circumstances as I take the view that a period in excess of two years on parole was ample, but it was open to the judge to make the finding which he did.

74. Leave to appeal should be granted because of the error identified, but the appeal should be dismissed.

75. I propose the following orders: 1. Leave to appeal against sentence granted. 2. Appeal against sentence dismissed.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.