C. THE LEGISLATION AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES
10 Section 18(1) of the ACL provides:
Misleading or deceptive conduct
A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.
11 Section 29(1) of the ACL relevantly provides:
False or misleading representations about goods or services
A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services or in connection with the promotion by any means of the supply or use of good or services:
(a) make a false or misleading representation that goods are of a particular standard, quality, value, grade, composition, style or model or have had a particular history or particular previous use; or
(b) make a false or misleading representation that services are of a particular standard, quality, value or grade;
…
12 There is no real contest between the parties as to the principles to be applied, and their differences boil down to the application of the principles to the facts of the present case. I set out the relevant principles below.
13 There is no meaningful difference between the terms "false or misleading", "mislead", "misleading or deceptive" and "mislead or deceive" as they appear in ss 18 and 29: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (2014) 317 ALR 73; [2014] FCA 634 (Coles) at [40] (Allsop CJ); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dukemaster Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 682 at [14] (Gordon J). I will treat the terms interchangeably.
14 The Court must determine two main issues:
(a) Whether the pleaded representations were conveyed by the relevant conduct; and
(b) If yes, whether the representations were misleading or deceptive or were likely to mislead or deceive, or were false or misleading. This is a question of fact.
Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45; [2000] HCA 12 (Campomar) at [100]-[101] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ); Google Inc v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2013) 249 CLR 435; [2013] HCA 1 at [89] (Hayne J).
15 Because the Advertisements were published to the public at large rather than being directed at specific individuals the Court must assess the conduct by reference to the class or classes of persons to whom the conduct was directed. The following steps are appropriate: see .au Domain Administration Ltd v Domain Names Australia Pty Ltd (2004) 207 ALR 521; [2004] FCA 424 (.au Domain) at [12]-[26] (Finkelstein J); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Telstra Corporation Limited (2007) 244 ALR 470; [2007] FCA 1904 at [14]-[17] and [19] (Gordon J); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v SMS Global Pty Ltd [2011] ATPR 42-364; [2011] FCA 855 (Murphy J).
16 First, it is necessary to identify the relevant section or sections of the public at which the Advertisements were directed: Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191 at 199; [1982] HCA 44 (Puxu) (Gibbs CJ); Finucane v New South Wales Egg Corporation (1988) 80 ALR 486 at 516 (Lockhart J).
17 Second, consider who comes within that target audience. Advertisements published to the public at large will include a broad range of people including the astute and the gullible, the intelligent and the not so intelligent, the well-educated and the poorly educated: Puxu at 199 (Gibbs CJ).
18 Third, in cases where representations are made to the public, it is necessary to enquire by reference to a hypothetical ordinary or reasonable member of the target audience whether that hypothetical person is likely to be misled or deceived, excluding reactions to the representation that are extreme or fanciful: Campomar at [103]-[105].
19 There is some debate about whether it is necessary for the applicant to show that a significant proportion of the relevant class of persons were misled or were likely to be misled by the relevant conduct. In Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd (2014) 316 ALR 590; [2014] FCA 568 at [397]-[399] I said:
In .au Domain at [21]-[26] Finkelstein J criticised the authorities which set out a requirement that for a contravention of s 52 to be established it must also be shown that a significant number of the members of the target class were misled or deceived or were likely to have been so. In his Honour's view that requirement was wrongly imported from the law of passing off, is not relevant in relation to s 52, and is inconsistent with Campomar.
I am attracted by Finkelstein J's approach in .au Domain but, since that case several Full Courts have maintained the approach that it is necessary to establish that a "not insignificant" proportion of the class are likely to have been misled or deceived: see National Exchange Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 61 IPR 420 per Jacobson and Bennett JJ at [70]-[71], per Dowsett J at [23]; Hansen Beverage Co v Bickfords (Aust) Pty Ltd (2008) 171 FCR 579 at [46] per Tamberlin J and at [66] per Siopis J; Bodum at [206]-[210] per Greenwood J with Tracey J approving.
In most cases whichever of the tests is applied the result is likely to be the same. An assessment that the hypothetical ordinary and reasonable member of the target class is likely to have been misled or deceived will usually exclude the insignificant number of class members whose reaction is extreme or fanciful. I agree with Dowsett J in National Exchange at [23] in which he described the "significant proportion" test as simply an alternative way of expressing the test in Campomar. But, out of an abundance of caution, having assessed the likely effect of the conduct on the hypothetical ordinary or reasonable member of the target class, excluding reactions to it that are "extreme" or "fanciful, I will also assess whether a not "insignificant number" of that class are likely to have been misled or deceived.
I take the same approach in the present case.
20 Fourth, whether the hypothetical member of the target audience is likely to be misled or deceived may involve questions as to the knowledge properly to be attributed to the members of the target audience: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640; [2013] HCA 54 (TPG) at [45], [53] (French CJ, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ).
21 Fifth, it is unnecessary to prove that a misconception has arisen because of the alleged misleading or deceptive conduct. Evidence that someone was actually misled or deceived by an advertisement is not required: Taco Co of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 177; [1982] FCA 170 at 199 (Deane and Fitzgerald JJ). In circumstances where the advertisements were directed to the public at large the absence of such evidence is not of great significance: Coles at [45]. On the other hand, evidence that a person has been misled by an advertisement is not conclusive that its publication constitutes misleading or deceptive conduct.
22 The representations must be considered as a whole and in the context of all the surrounding circumstances. It is wrong to select some words only and ignore others which provide the context which gave meaning to the particular words, and the same is true of acts: Puxu at 199; Coles at [41].
23 If one or more of the reasonably available different meanings conveyed to the target audience was misleading, the conduct may have been misleading, deceptive or false and misleading: Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc (1992) 38 FCR 1 at 50; [1992] FCA 962 (Tobacco Institute) (Hill J). In Tobacco Institute Hill J said:
Where, as in the present case, the advertisement is capable of more than one meaning, the question of whether the conduct of placing the advertisement in a newspaper is misleading or deceptive conduct must be tested against each meaning which is reasonably open. This is perhaps but another way of saying that the advertisement will be misleading or likely to mislead or deceive if any reasonable interpretation of it would lead a member of the class, who can be expected to read it, into error: Keehn v Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Ltd (1977) 14 ALR 77 at 81 per Northrop J and cf the approach taken by Mason J in Parkdale.
24 In Coles at [46]-[47] Allsop CJ approved Hill J's remarks and said:
Where advertising material uses simple phrases and words evoking attractive notions, but without necessarily precise meanings, ambiguity or reasonably available different meanings may well arise. Context and the "dominant message" will be important. If one or more of the reasonably available different meanings is misleading, the conduct may well be misleading or deceptive, or false and misleading.
25 It is appropriate to examine comparative advertising more critically than other advertising because the ordinary or reasonable reader is "less likely than otherwise to regard what is said or written as mere exaggeration, stated with an excess of enthusiasm": Hospitals Contribution Fund of Australia Ltd v Switzerland Australia Health Fund Pty Ltd (1987) 78 ALR 483 at 484; [1987] FCA 395 (HCF) (Fox, Davies and Morling JJ). Where the advertising is comparative, the comparison may be misleading if material that would otherwise make the comparison fair is omitted. Although the public are accustomed to the puffing of products in advertising, comparative advertising requires that the advertiser take particular care not to mislead. An unfair comparison may be misleading: Duracell Australia Pty Ltd v Union Carbide Australia Ltd (1988) ATPR 40-918 at 49,861 (Burchett J); Hoover (Australia) Pty Ltd v Email Ltd (1991) 104 ALR 369 at 375; [1991] FCA 646 (Gummow J).
26 Where the representations are conveyed by an advertisement the dominant message of the advertisement may be crucial to assessing whether it was misleading or deceptive. The Court must be mindful that many readers will read the advertisement fleetingly, will not closely study its constituent parts, and will only absorb its general thrust. The impression or thrust conveyed to a viewer, particularly the first impression, its critical in determining the representation conveyed rather than an analysis of the (sometimes) cleverly crafted constituent parts: Tobacco Institute at 4 (Sheppard J); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1254 at [38], [43] (ACCC v TPG) (Murphy J); TPG at [45].
27 As I said in ACCC v TPG at [58]-[59], where an advertisement has a dominant message:
Any purported corrective or qualifying information must be sufficiently clear and sufficiently prominent if it is to prevent an inaccurate primary message from being misleading or likely to mislead: Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Ltd v Cassidy (2003) 135 FCR 1 at [37]; National Exchange Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] FCAFC 90 at [51]; Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Telstra [2004] FCA 859 at [41]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Global One Mobile Entertainment Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 393 at [50].
The degree of prominence required to dispel a false dominant message increases with its potential to mislead: ACCC v Signature Security Group [2003] FCA 3 at [27]; National Exchange at [55]; ACCC v Boost Tel Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 701 at [77] to [81]. Where the disparity between the primary message and the true position is great, attention must be drawn to the true position in the clearest possible way: National Exchange at [55]. In Boost Tel at [77] to [81] the Court made a distinction between information which operates to fairly qualify a primary message, and information which undermines the substance and integrity of the primary message. The latter requires greater prominence if it is to be corrective. The question is one of degree and impression. First impressions are important: Medical Benefits Fund at [41].
28 The Court can undertake an assessment of an advertisement based on its ordinary words in context without recourse to witness testimony. It is ultimately a question of fact to be decided by the Court in the particular circumstances of the case and it should not be complicated or over intellectualised: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2004) 208 ALR 459; [2004] FCA 987 (ACCC v Telstra) at [49] (Gyles J).
29 The law is not intended to protect people who fail to take reasonable care to protect their own interests. The ordinary or reasonable member of the public is expected to possess a degree of robustness in relation to claims made in advertising and is accustomed to some puffing of the products and services advertised: Campomar at [102]; Stuart Alexander & Co (Interstate) Pty Ltd v Blenders Pty Ltd (1981) 37 ALR 161 at 164-165; [1981] FCA 169 (Stuart Alexander) (Lockhart J); Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [2004] FCA 859 at [66] (Jacobson J); ACCC v TPG at [39]. Nevertheless, an advertisement that fails to deceive a more wary reader may still be misleading or deceptive.
30 Conduct is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive if it has the tendency to lead another person into error. There must be a sufficient causal link between the conduct and the error by the persons to whom the conduct is directed: TPG at [39]. Causing consumers to be confused or to ask questions is insufficient.