Legal framework
13 The relevant legal framework was not in dispute.
14 By s 18(1) of the ACL, a person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.
15 Section 29(1) provides, relevantly:
(1) A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services or in connection with the promotion by any means of the supply or use of goods or services:
...
(b) make a false or misleading representation that services are of a particular standard, quality value or grade; or
…
(g) make a false or misleading representation that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits;
...
16 While s 29(1)(b) and (g) each use the expression "false or misleading" rather than "misleading or deceptive" (as in s 18(1)), there is no meaningful difference between these expressions: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 634; (2014) 317 ALR 73 at [40] per Allsop CJ.
17 Section 34 provides:
A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose or the quantity of any services.
18 The following principles, which I set out in Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Limited v Procter & Gamble Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 753 at [34]-[38] are relevant to an assessment of Telstra's conduct in this case:
[34] The applicable legal principles in respect of misleading or deceptive conduct in advertising are well-established. They are summarised in the recent decisions of Allsop CJ in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 634; (2014) 317 ALR 73 ("ACCC v Coles") at [35]-[47] and Nicholas J in Samsung Electronics Australia Pty Ltd v LG Electronics Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 227 ("Samsung v LG") at [60]-[76].
[35] A two-step analysis is required, addressing the following issues:
(1) whether each or any of the pleaded representations is conveyed by the advertisement; and
(2) whether each of the representations conveyed is false, misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive: Novartis Pharmaceuticals Australia Pty Ltd v Bayer Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 35 at [200].
[36] The causing of confusion or questioning is insufficient; it is necessary to establish that the ordinary or reasonable consumer is likely to be led into error: ACCC v Coles at [39].
[37] It is necessary to view the conduct as a whole and in its proper context (ACCC v Coles at [41]). The question whether conduct is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive is a question of fact that must be determined in light of the relevant surrounding circumstances: Samsung v LG per Nicholas J at [61], applying Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 60; (2004) 218 CLR 592 at [109] per McHugh J. The dominant message will be of crucial importance: ACCC v Coles at [42], citing Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 54; (2013) 250 CLR 640 ("TPG") at [45].
[38] In Samsung v LG at [73], Nicholas J referred to the following observations of Hill J in Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc [1992] FCA 630; (1992) 38 FCR 1 at 50, albeit in the context of a newspaper advertisement:
Where, as in the present case, the advertisement is capable of more than one meaning, the question of whether the conduct of placing the advertisement in a newspaper is misleading or deceptive conduct must be tested against each meaning which is reasonably open. This is perhaps but another way of saying that the advertisement will be misleading or likely to mislead or deceive if any reasonable interpretation of it would lead a member of the class, who can be expected to read it, into error.
19 In the case of representations to the public, "[t]he initial question which must be determined is whether the misconceptions, or deceptions, alleged to arise or to be likely to arise are properly to be attributed to the ordinary or reasonable members of the classes of prospective purchasers": Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Limited [2000] HCA 12; (2000) 202 CLR 45 ("Campomar") at [105]. Reactions that are extreme or fanciful are excluded: Campomar at [105]; REA Group Limited v Fairfax Media Limited [2017] FCA 91 at [18] ("REA Group").
20 Conduct is misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead and deceive, if it has a tendency to lead into error: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 54; (2013) 250 CLR 640 ("TPG") at [39].
21 Telstra submitted that an advertisement that merely causes "wonderment" is not misleading or deceptive. In Taco Co of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd [1982] FCA 170; (1982) 42 ALR 177 ("Taco Bell") at 201, Deane and Fitzgerald JJ decided that the "question whether particular conduct causes confusion or wonderment cannot be substituted for the question whether the conduct answers the statutory description contained in s 52 [of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the predecessor to s 18 of the ACL]". That statement was affirmed by the High Court of Australia in Campomar at [106]. Taco Bell and Campomar were each cases concerned with whether an association between unrelated traders had been misrepresented. Similarly, in Parkdale Custom Built Furniture v Puxu Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 44; (1982) 149 CLR 191 at 198, Gibbs CJ affirmed the conclusion of Smithers and Fisher JJ in McWilliam's Wines Pty Ltd v McDonalds System of Australia Pty Ltd [1980] FCA 159; (1980) 49 FLR 455 that to prove misleading or deceptive conduct it is not enough to establish that the conduct complained of was confusing or caused people to wonder whether two products may have come from the same source.
22 The fact that some persons among the relevant class of consumers might eventually learn the true nature of Telstra's mobile service offerings upon visiting a Telstra store, or reading the fine print online, is irrelevant to the question of whether the Telstra Unlimited advertisements are misleading or deceptive. The misleading or deceptive conduct occurs at the time the advertisement is published: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1177 ("Optus Think Bigger Plans case" at [16], citing Singtel Optus v Telstra [2004] FCA 859 at [42]; St Lukes Health Insurance v Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Ltd (1995) 17 ATPR 41-428 at page 40,823; and Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Ltd v Cassidy (2003) 205 ALR 402 at 417 [43]. The provisions of the ACL relied upon by Optus do not contain any limitation about what it is that consumers must be misled into doing to contravene them: cf Optus Think Bigger Plans case at [26].
23 In TPG, the High Court of Australia considered advertisements which used the words "Unlimited ADSL2+ $29.99 per month" in the context of a bundling condition by which a consumer was required to rent a home telephone line at an additional charge in order to acquired unlimited ADSL2+ home internet for $29.99 per month. At [48]-[50], the plurality said:
[48] [T]he Full Court did not recognise that the tendency of the advertisements to mislead was to be determined, not by asking whether they were apt to induce consumers to enter into contracts with TPG, but by asking whether they were apt to bring them into negotiation with TPG rather than with one of its competitors on the basis of an erroneous belief engendered by the general thrust of TPG's message.
[49] It might be said, as TPG did, that consumers, acting reasonably in their own interest, could be expected to obtain a clear understanding of their rights and obligations before signing up with TPG; but to say that is to confuse the question whether the consumer has suffered loss with the anterior question as to whether the advertisement, viewed as a whole, has a tendency to lead a consumer into error. Thus, in Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd French CJ noted that the question of characterisation as to whether conduct is misleading is "logically anterior to the question whether a person has suffered loss or damage thereby". French CJ observed that characterisation of conduct "generally requires consideration of whether the impugned conduct viewed as a whole has a tendency to lead a person into error". As observed earlier in these reasons, questions of carelessness by consumers in viewing advertisements may be relevant to that question of characterisation.
[50] It has long been recognised that a contravention of s 52 of the TPA may occur, not only when a contract has been concluded under the influence of a misleading advertisement, but also at the point where members of the target audience have been enticed into "the marketing web" by an erroneous belief engendered by an advertiser, even if the consumer may come to appreciate the true position before a transaction is concluded. That those consumers who signed up for TPG's package of services could be expected to understand fully the nature of their obligations to TPG by the time they actually became its customers is no answer to the question whether the advertisements were misleading.
(Footnotes omitted.)
24 Concerning the knowledge of the target audience, the plurality said (at [53] and [54]):
[53] It may be accepted that if the hypothetical reasonable consumer is taken to know that ADSL2+ services may be sold as part of a bundle with telephony services, then, if he or she brings that knowledge to bear in a conscious scrutiny of the terms of TPG's offer, he or she might be less likely to form the impression that the offer was of an ADSL2+ service available without a requirement to take and pay for an additional service from TPG. But the circumstance that many consumers might know that ADSL2+ services are commonly offered as a "bundle" was not apt to defuse the tendency of the advertisements to mislead, especially where the target audience is left only with the general thrust or dominant message after the evanescence of the advertisement.
[54] As the primary judge said, the vice of TPG's advertisements was that they required "consumers to find their way through to the truth past advertising stratagems which have the effect of misleading or being likely to mislead them." Given TPG's strategy, the primary judge was entitled to draw the inference that consumers might be enticed to enter into negotiation with TPG without appreciating that TPG's services were, in fact, being offered only as a "bundle". It is pertinent to note again that "many persons will only absorb the general thrust" and that the question is not whether consumers suffered loss by signing up to a contract to accept and pay for TPG's service: Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 25; (2009) 238 CLR 304 at 351-352 [142]- [143].
25 In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 87 ("Optus Unlimited Broadband case"), North J held (at [57] to [59]) that Optus had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct by representing that a broadband internet service included "unlimited broadband" when the plan was in fact limited by speed throttling implemented by Optus once consumers reached a specified data allowance as there had been no sufficiently prominent statement:
(a) that such a reduction would be applied; and
(b) that some multimedia uses would be either unworkable or significantly impaired at the reduced speed.