RE QSD INV PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION); EX PARTE DERMOTT JOSEPH MCVEIGH [2025] WASC 229 (11 June 2025)

1. These affidavits, by reason of s 596C(2) of the Act, are confidential unless otherwise ordered by the court. No order has been made by the court.
2. The originating process was initially listed before Forrester J on 1 May 2025 in general chambers. The purpose of a general chambers or corporations list (whether before the Master, a judge, or a corporations list judge) is to make programming orders in relation to contested matters and to hear matters of short duration (of a maximum of 15 ‑ 20 minutes) which do not require or warrant a special appointment. If a party wishes an originating process to be dealt with on its first return as a short matter in a general list, the court expects that written submissions will be filed at least 48 hours prior to the hearing to enable the court to consider the issues raised on the application. No submissions were filed prior to the hearing on 1 May 2025.[1] For this reason, Forrester J adjourned the originating process for two weeks to enable written submissions to be filed.
3. The originating process was re‑listed before me in a corporations list on 16 May 2025. At that time, I raised a number of concerns with counsel for the plaintiffs as to the adequacy of the materials that had been filed. Given the complexity of the issues raised on the application, it was my view that the originating process could not be dealt with in a general list and required a special appointment. As a result, the originating process was further adjourned to a special appointment on 27 May 2025 to enable the plaintiffs to file additional material in support of the application and for the matter to be properly argued and considered by the court. Since that date, the plaintiffs have filed two further affidavits as well as a further outline of written submissions.
4. Prior to the hearing on 27 May 2025, the court drew to the plaintiffs' attention that it was not open to the court under s 596B of the Act to issue examination summonses to a corporation.[2] The plaintiffs, quite properly, conceded this was the case on the basis of current authorities, and gave notice that they intended to amend the application in respect of the five companies by filing a further application under s 597(9) of the Act for the production of documents and, in respect of one company (Outback Network Pty Ltd (Outback Network)), an examination summons directed to the sole director. Consequently, the plaintiffs' application at the second court hearing on 27 May 2025 was for the issue of three examination summonses and five notices for the production of documents.
5. On 29 May 2025, the plaintiffs filed an interlocutory application seeking directions for notices to produce to be issued to each of the five companies to regularise what had been proposed at the hearing.

1. As the affidavits in support of the originating process are confidential, I am somewhat constrained in what can be said about the factual background to the application. However, given that there are proceedings currently on foot in the Supreme Court of Western Australia (CIV 1489 of 2024) (Existing Proceedings) which are not confidential, it is possible to detail some of the matters that have given rise to the present application.
2. On 30 July 2020, Scott Robert Paterson, Yah Boi Pty Ltd (Yah Boi) and Mr Kassim entered into a deed (Deed). Under the express terms of the Deed, Mr Kassim agreed to transfer or procure the transfer of certain shares in Auzcorp Pty Ltd and its subsidiaries (Auzcorp Group) to Yah Boi. Subject to Mr Kassim performing this obligation, Yah Boi agreed to pay Mr Kassim (or his nominee) $750,000 and to issue or transfer 20% of the issued capital in Yah Boi to Mr Kassim or his nominee (Shares).[3] Yah Boi was required to make these transfers within 10 business days of:

(a) the total outstanding group debt outstanding being reduced to less than $3 million; and

(b) the Mia Mia House in the Desert Hotel in Newman, Western Australia (Mia Mia House) achieving an occupancy rate of 60% or more for a period of three consecutive calendar months following settlement and the Auzcorp Group being cashflow positive

1. Prior to the Consideration Conditions being satisfied, the parties agreed that, as soon as practicable after settlement, the Shares would be issued to Mr Paterson, who would hold the Shares as trustee for Mr Kassim or his nominee pending satisfaction of the Consideration Conditions.[4]
2. Under the Deed, Yah Boi gave certain undertakings, namely that it would:[5]

(a) operate Yah Boi and the Auzcorp Group professionally and diligently so as to achieve the Consideration Conditions as soon as practicable;

(b) not engage in any act or omission that would prevent Mr Kassim obtaining the full benefit of the Deed Rights; and

(c) not make any distribution to shareholder in Yah Boi or unit holders in the Mia Mia Unit Trust until the Consideration Conditions were achieved.

1. On 11 August 2020, settlement occurred and the shares in Auzcorp Group were transferred to Yah Boi.[6]
2. Mr Kassim says that in or around June 2022, he signed a letter addressed to Mr Paterson and Yah Boi appointing the Company as his nominee to receive the cash and Shares under the Deed.[7] This letter was not sent to Mr Paterson or Yah Boi. On or about 29 June 2022, a copy of this letter was sent by his accountant to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), a creditor of the Company.[8]
3. On 2 May 2024, Mr Kassim commenced the Existing Proceedings.[9] The writ has subsequently been amended to clarify that the claim is brought by Mr Kassim in his capacity as trustee for the Company.[10]
4. In the Existing Proceedings, Mr Kassim says that Mr Paterson owed him an obligation under the Deed, alternatively a fiduciary obligation, to cause Yah Boi to issue the Shares to Mr Paterson to be held on trust. Mr Kassim pleads that as a consequence, he has suffered loss and damage.
5. In addition to the claims that arise in connection with the Deed, Mr Kassim pleads that:

(a) Mr Paterson has breached the fiduciary duties he owed to Mr Kassim; and

(b) Yah Boi, through the knowledge of its director Mr Paterson, has breached the Deed, and has assisted Mr Paterson in carrying out a 'fraudulent and dishonest ongoing design' for its benefit and the benefit of those with a direct or indirect interest in the shares of Yah Boi.

1. By way of relief in the Existing Proceedings, Mr Kassim is seeking an injunction requiring Yah Boi and Mr Paterson to take all steps necessary to issue the Shares to Mr Paterson to be held on trust for Mr Kassim and damages. Further and alternatively, Mr Kassim is seeking an account of profits or equitable compensation.[11]
2. On 29 October 2024, the plaintiffs were appointed as liquidators of Company by the Federal Court, on the application of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation.[12]
3. Mr Kassim believes, on the basis of advice from his accountant who has inspected the financial records of Yah Boi and the Auzcorp Group, that certain transactions undertaken by Yah Boi may have prevented the Deed Conditions from being satisfied.[13]
4. As a consequence, Mr Kassim and the plaintiffs have discussed the Existing Proceedings and are considering:[14]

(a) the joinder of parties that may be accessorily liable in respect of Mr Paterson's alleged breach of fiduciary duties; and

(b) amending the statement of claim to include additional claims against Mr Paterson and Yah Boi.

1. At this stage, the plaintiffs do not have sufficient information and have bought this application for the purpose of obtaining further evidence and information to enable them to undertake these steps.[15]

1. Part 5.9, div 1 of the Act sets out the provisions which enable the court to make orders for a person to be examined about a corporation and to require the production of documents in aid of the examination.
2. Section 596A of the Act governs mandatory examinations and s 596B sets out the power of the court to order a discretionary examination. Relevantly, s 596B provides that:

(1) The Court may summon a person for examination about a corporation's examinable affairs if:

(a) an eligible applicant applies for the summons; and

(b) the Court is satisfied that the person:

1. has taken part or been concerned in examinable affairs of the corporation and has been, or may have been, guilty of misconduct in relation to the corporation; or
2. may be able to give information about examinable affairs of the corporation.

1. Both 'eligible applicant' and 'examinable affairs' are defined in s 9 of the Act. 'Eligible applicant', in relation to a corporation, includes a liquidator of the corporation. 'Examinable affairs', in relation to a corporation, includes:

(a) the promotion, formation, management, administration or winding up of the corporation; or

(b) any other affairs of the corporation (including anything that is included in the corporation's affairs because of s 53); or

(c) the business affairs of a connected entity of the corporation, insofar as they are, or appear to be relevant to the corporation or to anything that is included in the corporation's examinable affairs because of subparagraph (a) or (b).

1. By referring to s 53 of the Act, the scope of what are the 'examinable affairs' of the company is significantly broadened and includes 'transactions and dealings' undertaken by the company as well as its property (s 53(a)).
2. In Re Australasian Liquid Storage Pty Ltd (ACN 110 086 509) (in liq), Derrington J confirmed there were three elements to an application under s 596B of the Act:[16]

(a) an 'eligible applicant' makes an application for the summons to be issued (s 596B(1)(a));

(b) the court is satisfied that the person to whom the summons is sought to be directed meets the criteria in one of the subparagraphs of s 596B(1)(a) (that is, either (i) or (ii)); and

(c) the discretion of the court is enlivened and the court may summons a person for examination about the corporation's 'examinable affairs'.

1. The first and second of these elements are statutory preconditions to the exercise of the discretion. As noted by his Honour:[17]

Although that requirement in s 596B(1)[a](ii) sets a relatively low bar for an applicant to satisfy, its satisfaction becomes more problematic the more removed the proposed examinee was from the operation of the relevant company. An employee (who is not an 'officer' for the purposes of s 596A) is very likely to be a person who may be able to give information about the examinable affairs of the employer company for the purposes of s 596B, as is the company's accountant. Similarly, it is likely that persons who have transacted business with the company may be able to give information about the examinable affairs to the extent to which they relate to the particular transaction. However, the further removed from the operation of the company a person has been, the less likely it is that they might be able to provide information about the examinable affairs. Where, as in this case, the proposed examinee had no direct contact or dealings with the company, the scope of the requirement that the proposed examinee 'may' be able to give information requires careful consideration.

1. There must be a factual basis on which the court can form a view that the purpose for which the eligible applicant has applied for a summons relates to the examinable affairs of the company, and not for some extraneous purpose. A legitimate use of the examination power under s 596B is to obtain information which might assist in the conduct of litigation. This is the case even if proceedings have been commenced.[18]
2. In addition to requiring the attendance of a party for examination, orders can be made under s 597(9) of the Act for documents to be produced (either by the examinee or any other person) at the examination.

Should orders be made for the issue of examination summonses?

1. There can be no dispute that the plaintiffs as liquidators of the Company have standing to bring this application. I am satisfied that the application has been served on ASIC as required by r 11.3(6) of the Supreme Court (Corporations) (WA) Rules 2004.[19]
2. The issues that arise in this case are whether:

(a) the information sought relates to the 'examinable affairs' of the Company;

(b) each of the proposed examinees are persons who may be able to give information about the examinable affairs of the Company (s 596B(1)(b)(ii) of the Act); and

(c) the court should exercise its discretion to issue the proposed summonses, including the summonses under s 579(9) of the Act.

Is information sought about 'examinable affairs' of the Company?

1. It is clear from the affidavits filed in support of the application that the transactions which are the genesis for each of the summonses relate to the Deed, and what has occurred in connection to the obligations under the Deed.
2. The Company is not a party to the Deed and was not involved in its negotiation. The plaintiffs say that the Company's interest arises from 'an equitable assignment of an equitable chose in action'. In their submission, the rights under the Deed are the Company's property and accordingly, an examinable affair of the Company. Specifically, the plaintiffs submit that:

(a) in or about June 2022, Mr Kassim assigned in equity his rights to the benefits of the Deed to the Company. These rights are equitable property of the Company;

(b) these rights have been equitably assigned by the Company to the ATO by way of charge; and

(c) neither equitable assignment required the consent of Mr Paterson and Yah Boi.

1. Counsel for the plaintiffs accepted that neither of these assignments were a legal assignment under s 20(1) of the Property Law Act 1969 (WA), as they were not absolute and notice of the assignment was not given to Yah Boi. The plaintiffs instead submitted that both assignments were effective in equity. For the purpose of this application, it is only necessary to consider the first of these assignments as the second was not contended to be an assignment of the totality of the Company's interests.
2. In equity, an effective assignment will occur where: the assignor intends to make an immediate disposition of their interest; the assignor does everything that is required on their part to give effect to that intention; and the assignor arms the assignee with the means to complete the assignment according to the requirements at law.[20]
3. In Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Windeyer J discussed the requirements for an equitable assignment of an equitable interest, an equitable assignment of a legal chose in action, and when consideration is required. His Honour stated that:[21]

If the interest to be assigned is a creature of equity, such as the beneficial interest of a cestui que trust, then, apart from any statutory provisions, an assignment of it can, of course, only be effected in equity; for the common law does not know it. Any present assignment of such an interest, that is to say of a chose in equity, is therefore necessarily an equitable assignment. Such an assignment can be by way of gift; and, except that writing is required by s 9 of the Statute of Frauds, no formality is necessary beyond a clear expression of an intention to make an immediate disposition. In short, there is no reason at all why a person should not give away any beneficial interest that is his ... It is, of course, necessary that the transaction should take the form of, and be intended as, an immediate transfer of the beneficial interest of the assignor, as distinct from an agreement to assign it. The distinction is critical, for consideration is always necessary to attract the support of equity to a transaction that is a contract rather than a conveyance ...

Turning, from assignments that are equitable because the property assigned is a chose in equity, to assignments that are equitable because the property assigned is a legal chose in action not assignable except by the aid of equity: It has been said that historically there could be no equitable assignment of a debt except for value. Whether this be correct or not as a general proposition, it never meant that there must be consideration as now understood in the law of contract ...

It seems to me that, in principle, so far as a deed has any efficacy in connexion with equitable assignments, it is not that a deed takes the place of valuable consideration where that is needed to attract the aid of equity. Rather it is that, in cases where value is not so required but a clear expression of intention is, the delivery of a deed couched in terms of present gift manifests, in the best possible way, the intention of the assignor to make an immediate and irrevocable transfer.

1. On the basis of the evidence before me, I accept that Mr Kassim's interest in the Shares which, under the terms of the Deed, were required to be issued to Mr Paterson as soon as practicable after settlement and held on trust for Mr Kassim, is an equitable interest. As a beneficiary of the trust which was created by the Deed, Mr Kassim is entitled to an injunction to compel the trustee (Mr Paterson) to perform his obligation to get trust property (that is, the Yah Boi shares) into the trust.[22]
2. I also accept that by nominating the Company in the letter of June 2022 and providing this letter to the ATO on 29 June 2022, Mr Kassim objectively intended to immediately and irrevocably transfer his equitable interest in the Shares to the Company. Having signed the letter and provided it to the ATO (by way of charge), Mr Kassim did everything in his power to assign his equitable interest in the Shares to the Company and had armed the Company and the ATO with the means to complete the assignment (by providing the letter to Mr Paterson and Yah Boi). As the assignment was of an equitable interest, the assignment could only be effected in equity.
3. Under the express definition of 'property' in the Act, the property of the Company, and accordingly its 'examinable affairs', includes both legal and equitable interests.[23] On this basis, I accept that information about the Shares, whether they have been issued to Mr Paterson, and whether the Completion Conditions have been satisfied (and if not, why not) are 'examinable affairs' of the Company.

Are each of the proposed examinees a person who 'may be able to give information about the examinable affairs' of the Company?

1. Where a relationship between the proposed examinee and the examinable affairs of the corporation is shown on the known facts, this relationship is sufficient to enliven the court's power under s 596B.
2. The court need only be satisfied that the proposed examinee is a person who 'may' be able to give information about matters bearing on the examinable affairs of a company.[24] This requires the plaintiffs to establish two matters. First, a reasonable hypothesis or scenario which raises the likelihood or possibility that the examinee has information. Second, a factual basis for the hypothesis.[25]
3. At the second court hearing, the plaintiffs sought orders for examination summonses to be issued to Scott Paterson, Christopher Holman and Craig Mitchell. I deal with each of these in turn.

1. Mr Paterson is the sole director of Yah Boi, the second defendant in the Existing Proceedings and a party to the Deed. In these capacities, I accept that Mr Paterson may be able to give information about the Deed, whether shares in Yah Boi have been issued to him to hold on trust for Mr Kassim (and if not, why not), and whether the Consideration Conditions have been satisfied (and if not, why not).
2. On this basis, I accept that Mr Paterson is a person who may be able to give information about the examinable affairs of the Company.

1. Mr Holman is a former director of Yah Boi (until shortly prior to the transactions in question) and is the sole director of Getting Busy Pty Ltd (Getting Busy).
2. The plaintiffs' evidence is that Mr Holman (on behalf of Azure Capital Pty Ltd (Azure Capital)) was centrally involved in the negotiation of the Deed,[26] and that Getting Busy has received substantial payments from Yah Boi between 2022 and the end of 2024.[27]
3. I accept that there is a reasonable hypothesis that Mr Holman may be able to give information about the Deed and the reasons for the payments that have been made to enable the plaintiffs to consider whether these payments have been made in breach of the Deed and any fiduciary obligations owed by Mr Paterson. There is a factual basis for this hypothesis set out in the affidavits.
4. On this basis, I accept that Mr Holman is a person who may be able to give information about the examinable affairs of the Company.

1. Mr Mitchell is the sole director of Outback Network. The plaintiffs' evidence is that Yah Boi entered into an agreement to lease Mia Mia House to Outback Network (or an associated entity). This agreement was terminated in December 2021 and a substantial payment made to Outback Network.
2. I accept that there is a reasonable hypothesis that Mr Mitchell may be able to give information about the arrangements concerning Mia Mia House and whether it was able to achieve 60% occupancy for three consecutive calendar months (and if not, why not), as well as information about significant payments it has received from Yah Boi since entry into the Deed. There is a factual basis for this hypothesis set out in the affidavits.
3. On this basis, I accept that Mr Mitchell is a person who may be able to give information about the examinable affairs of the Company.

Should the court exercise its discretion to issue the summonses?

1. The court has a broad discretion under s 596B to issue a summons, although it must be exercised judicially. In exercising the discretion, the court will take into account a range of factors including:[28]

[T]he expressed purpose of the examination; the importance of the information to the eligible applicant; the seriousness of the matters to be inquired into; the use to which the information obtained on the examination might be put; the possibility of an advantage to the eligible applicant which he or she would not otherwise enjoy and the concomitant disadvantage to the prospective examinee; the availability of the information from other sources; the cost to the prospective examinee in attending for examination; whether the information sought is so peripheral to make the attendance of the prospective examinees oppressive; and the wider public interest in investigating the affairs of the corporation.

1. Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that this application has been brought for a legitimate purpose, namely to obtain information for the purpose of considering whether to amend the Existing Proceedings by adding additional claims and/or defendants. At present, the plaintiffs do not have sufficient information in their possession to enable them to determine whether they should take these steps. In their submission, the information sought by them is central to these decisions.
2. The summonses attached to the originating process were in identical terms. Each sought the production of documents relating to the specific matters and transactions of concern identified by Mr Kassim, including the Deed Rights and the satisfaction of the Completion Conditions. The plaintiffs submitted that these proposed summonses were not too wide and should be issued by the court. If this primary position were not accepted by the court, the plaintiff sought orders for the issue of the amended draft summonses annexed to their submissions filed 21 May 2025 (May submissions).
3. The proposed amendments to the summonses directed to the companies are reflected in the interlocutory process filed 29 May 2025. These amended summonses removed the requirement for each of the proposed examinees and companies to produce a copy of the Deed. However, the amended summonses directed to Mr Paterson, Mr Holman, and four of the companies still required the production of any drafts of the Deed in their possession, as well as all communications and notes relating to the negotiations of the Deed.
4. In my view, the evidence before the court does not support the breadth of a number of the proposed summonses, even in their amended form. Specifically, in relation to a number of the companies from whom documents are sought, there is no evidence on which an inference could be drawn that these companies have in their possession, custody, or control, documents concerning Auzcorp Group or the financial status of Yah Boi. I regard the view that the companies may have these documents as mere speculation.
5. I set out below my reasons in relation to each of the proposed summonses. As a general observation, as raised at the hearing, the current description of 'Material Time' in each of the summonses is unclear. This should be clearly defined and included in the Interpretation section of each summons.

1. Given the central role that Mr Paterson had in the Deed, its implementation, and the transactions subsequently undertaken by the Auzcorp Group, I accept that there are a range of examinable affairs on which Mr Paterson may be able to give information. On this basis, I consider it is appropriate for the draft summons to be issued in terms of the May submissions.

1. The evidence is that Mr Holman was a former director of Yah Boi involved in the negotiation of the Deed and has since that time (either directly or through his related entity, Getting Busy) received substantial payments from Yah Boi. On this basis, I accept that there is a factual basis for the plaintiffs' hypothesis that Mr Holman may have had a continued role in Yah Boi and documents in his possession, custody, and control in relation to both the drafting of the Deed as well as what has occurred since that time. On this basis, I consider it is appropriate for the draft summons to be issued the terms of the May submissions.

1. Yah Boi, as a party to the Deed, had a central role in its negotiation and implementation, as well as the transactions that were subsequently undertaken. I accept that the categories of documents sought from Yah Boi are appropriate and that the draft summons should be issued in the terms attached to the May submissions.

1. On the evidence before the court, Azure Capital had a limited role - namely to assist in the relation to the drafting and documentation of the transaction contained in the Deed. There is no evidence before the court from which an inference can be drawn that Azure Capital has had an ongoing role. On this basis, I consider that the direction to produce documents should be restricted to [2.1] ‑ [2.2] of the May submissions.

1. I accept on the evidence before the court that since the date of the Deed, both Holvu Pty Ltd and Getting Busy have received substantial payments from Yah Boi. However, there is no evidence from which an inference could be drawn that either was involved in the negotiation of the Deed or has any documents in its possession, custody or control, in relation to this. On this basis, I consider that the directions to each company for the production of documents should be restricted to [2.3] ‑ [2.6] of the May submissions.

Proposed summons to Mr Mitchell and directions to Outback Network

1. As set out above, I accept that Mr Mitchell is a person who may be able to give information about the examinable affairs of the Company. However, the evidence before me does not support a hypothesis or inference that Outback Network will have documents in its possession in relation to the financial records of the Auzcorp Group or its debt.
2. For this reason, I consider that the categories of documents sought from Mr Mitchell and Outback Network are too broad. In my view, the documents required from them should be restricted to [2.3] and [2.5] ‑ [2.6] of the May submissions.

1. There is no basis on the evidence to support a hypothesis or inference that Compass Group Pty Ltd (Compass Group) will have documents in its possession concerning the Auzcorp Group. The only evidence concerns a particular transaction or transactions entered into between the Auzcorp Group and Compass Group.
2. In my view, the proposed direction should be restricted to this transaction, namely [2.4] of the May submissions.

1. For the reasons set out above, orders should be made for the summonses and directions to be issued consistent with these reasons for decision. I will hear from counsel as to the precise orders that should be made to reflect these reasons.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] While a document entitled 'outline of submissions' was filed on 28 April 2025, this document contained one paragraph and was not, in fact, submissions.

[2] Interchase Corp Ltd (in liq) (No 2), Re; Application of Kelly and Barber (1993) 120 ALR 143, 150; cited with approval by Young J in Rambaldi, In the matter of Quick Plumbing Australia Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1850 [20]. See also Markey (Liquidator) in the matter of Bestjet Travel Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] FCA 467; (2020) 145 ACSR 228 [24].

[3] Affidavit of Kelly Dale Meyn filed 10 April 2025, 'KDM-1'.

[4] Affidavit of Kelly Dale Meyn filed 10 April 2025, 'KDM-1'.

[5] Affidavit of Kelly Dale Meyn filed 10 April 2025, 'KDM-1'.

[6] Affidavit of Haniff Kassim filed 10 April 2025 [9], 'HK-5'.

[7] Affidavit of Haniff Kassim filed 10 April 2025, 'HK-2'.

[8] Affidavit of Haniff Kassim filed 10 April 2025 [7], 'HK-2' - 'HK-3'; Affidavit of Haniff Kassim filed 20 May 2025, 'HK-8'.

[9] Affidavit of Haniff Kassim filed 10 April 2025 [9], 'HK-5'.

[10] Affidavit of Haniff Kassim filed 20 May 2025, 'HK-9'.

[11] Affidavit of Haniff Kassim filed 10 April 2025, 'HK-5'.

[12] Affidavit of Kelly Dale Meyn filed 10 April 2025 [4].

[13] Affidavit of Haniff Kassim filed 10 April 2025 [10] - [11], 'HK-6'.

[14] Affidavit of Haniff Kassim filed 10 April 2025 [13].

[15] Affidavit of Kelly Dale Meyn filed 10 April 2025 [6] - [8]; Affidavit of Haniff Kassim filed 10 April 2025 [13].

[16] Re Australasian Liquid Storage Pty Ltd (in liq) [2017] FCA 559 [10].

[17] Re Australasian Liquid Storage Pty Ltd (in liq) [18].

[18] Lombe in the matter of Babcock and Brown Ltd (in liq) [2022] FCA 957 [44].

[19] Affidavit of Adam Forrest Roberts filed 9 May 2025, 'AFR-1'.

[20] Norman v Federal Commission of Taxation [1963] HCA 21; (1963) 109 CLR 9, 30 ‑ 31 (Windeyer J).

[21] Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (30).

[22] CGU Insurance Ltd v One.Tel Ltd (in liq) [2010] HCA 26; (2010) 242 CLR 174 [38].

[23] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9 (definition of 'property').

[24] Jane v Secatore (in his capacity as Liquidator of Last Lap Pty Ltd (In Liq)) [2021] FCAFC 108.

[25] Re Australasian Liquid Storage Pty Ltd (in liq) [28].

[26] Affidavit of Haniff Kassim filed 10 April 2025 [14], 'HK-7'.

[27] Affidavit of Haniff Kassim filed 10 April 2025 [15].

[28] Southern Cross Petroleum Sales (SA) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Hirsch [1998] SASC 7115; (1998) 70 SASR 527, 536 ‑ 537.